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Abstract
Domestic development of the tuna industry has been a high priority for the small Island
States of the Pacific over the past three decades. The extended maritime zones of
jurisdiction allowed under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention heightened the
aspirations of the Pacific Island States to derive greater benefits from their tuna
resources. A number of strategies aimed at providing increased linkages to local
economies through direct participation in shore-based development and harvesting of
resources have been implemented. Using a regional and two national case studies, the
study demonstrates that, despite previous failures and criticisms, many Pacific Island
States continue to aspire to develop their domestic tuna industries. Therefore, the central
questions of the study are: how can these aspirations be fulfilled and under what
conditions?
The study adopts a broader understanding of the tuna industry to conceptualise
the conditions under which it operates, its key influences and the interactions that drive
the policy process. This approach provides new insights into domestication strategies
and the policy context of tuna fisheries development. Sustainability of tuna resources
and the changing context of international trade in tuna are identified as the principal
external factors affecting tuna industry development. The implications of these factors
on domestication of the tuna industry are considered by analysing the key provisions of
the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention and World Trade Organisation
Agreements. Several challenges to domestication strategies and some possible
opportunities are identified.
The study shows the changing character of domestication strategies and attitudes
ranging from resource nationalism to possible strategic partnership arrangements.
Through a review and analysis of past and present domestication initiatives, the thesis
indicates a possible policy pathway for the future development of the tuna industry in
the Pacific Islands. The study argues that the regional co-operative approach needs to be
further strengthened in order to derive greater long-term sustainable benefits from their
tuna resource. At the industry level, co-operative approaches and partnerships between
domestic operators and foreign investors would provide the necessary capital,
technology and skills for domestication.
This study explains the complementary roles between trade, fisheries
management and industry, and argues that a more co-ordinated policy approach to tuna
industry development needs to be followed. The study maps out the important critical
emerging issues that will influence the future of tuna industry development policy in the
Pacific Island States.
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Introduction
Background
The dependence of Pacific Island States 1 upon marine resources has been a vital part of
their social and economic development. As the population increases, this dependence
has become even more critical. The ocean is seen as a "lifeline" that "provides the
greatest opportunities for economic development". 2 Tuna has been the major ocean
resource of economic importance for Pacific Island States. 3 For many of the smaller
island States, tuna fisheries are the only means of their economic development.
The Western and Central Pacific Ocean contains the world's largest tuna
resources, supplying about one third of the global tuna market4 worth around US$2
billion annually. 5 The Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of Pacific Island States cover
around 50% of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean and produce some 65% - 75% of
the total regional tuna catch. 6 The tuna resources of the Pacific Islands are therefore not
only of regional importance but also of global significance.
The potential economic opportunities of ocean resources were realised under the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), which provided extended
maritime zones of jurisdiction. This coincided with the political independence of the
Pacific Island States and their desire to become self-reliant.
Most Pacific Island States, however, had high aspirations to derive greater
benefits by promoting increased domestic participation as opposed to providing access
to foreign fishing vessels to derive resource rent. Licensing of foreign fishing vessels to

1

Pacific Island States in this study refers to small island developing country members of the Forum
Fisheries Agency. These include: Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall
Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and
Tokelau (a self administered territory of New Zealand and a FFA member since 2002).
2
South Pacific Regional Environment Programme, Pacific Islands Regional Ocean Policy, 13SM/
Official W.G. 4, 13th SPREP Meeting, 21-24 July 2002.
3
If tuna resources collapse, there are no substitute offshore resources capable of providing the same level
of revenue for the Pacific Island States. [World Bank, Pacific Island Economies: building a resilient
economic base for the twenty first century, World Bank, Washington, D. C., 1996, p.50].
4
R. Gillett, M. McCoy, L. Rodwell and J. Tamate, Tuna: a key economic resource in the Pacific Islands,
Asian Development Bank, Manila, 2001, p. ix.
5 p. Muller, Implementation of the Provisions of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement: conditions for success the case of the Pacific Island Nations, Policy Research: Options for Strengthening National, Sub-regional
and Regional Institutions and Policies to better Address Developing Countries' Needs, Paper fot the
Forum Fisheries Agency, IDDRA Ltd.,12 March, 2003.
6 G. Van Santen and P. Muller, Working Apart or Together: the case for a Common Approach to
Management of the Tuna Resources in the Exclusive Economic Zones ofPacific Island Countries, Pacific
Islands Discussion Paper Series, Number 10, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2000, p.11.
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exploit tuna resources was seen as an interim measure pending the development of
domestic :fishing industries.

7

The development of domestic tuna harvesting and processing industries has
become a major goal of the Pacific Island States. In every National Economic
8

Development Plan in the region, these aspirations figure highly. In fact, as Waugh
notes, "several of the island States have sought to participate in developing the tuna
fishery to the fullest possible extent". 9
Three main methods employed m the 'domestication' of the tuna industry
include the establishment of a national fishing fleet; construction of shore based
infrastructure and investments in the processing sector. All these methods involve
specific policy prescriptions to acquire the necessary skills, capital and technology that
has largely been the domain of distant water fishing nations (DWFNs). Domestication
as an industry development process is distinguished from the gradual progression
through an enterprise's own capital development by profit accumulation and
investment. Domestication was, and is, envisaged as a means of capacity building that
would in tum generate local employment opportunities, provide foreign exchange and
government revenue; thereby promoting the flow of benefits to the rest of the economy
through the increased multiplier effect.
Since the late 1970s, Pacific Island States have adopted a number of national and
regional strategies to domesticate the tuna industries. Waugh comments that strong
national feelings on the part of the coastal states have led to pressures for increased
domestic participation in the fishery, even when economic circumstances are
unfavourable. 10 The governments of the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati,
Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tonga have invested
millions of dollars of either aid funds or public revenue in the tuna industry. 11
Domestication strategies in the 1980s were also pursued because of the
dissatisfaction with foreign fishing under access agreements. There were concerns over

7

G. Geen, Tuna Industry Development: a co-ordinated approach, Forum Fisheries Agency report, 94/19,
1994, p.3.
8
L.G. Clark, South Pacific Oceanic Fisheries, South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, Solomon
Islands, FFA ReportNo.85/2, 1985, p.14.
9
G. Waugh, "The Politics and Economic of Fisheries in the South Pacific", in Henningham, S. (et al)
(eds), Resources, Development and Politics in the Pacific Islands, Crawford House Press, Bathurst, 1992,
p.176.
10 Ibid.
11
S. Pollard, Tuna Industry Development Study: Regional Report, FFA Report 95/66, Forum Fisheries
Agency, Honiara, 1995.
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under-reporting and non-reporting of catches by DWFNs resulting in foregone revenue
from access fees.

12

Concerns were also expressed over what was perceived as strategies

by the DWFNs to undermine the capacity of Pacific Island States to conserve and
manage the fisheries resources due to the unreliable data from these foreign vessels. 13
Further dissatisfaction has also been evident with the low levels of access fee received
by the Pacific Island States, which on average accounts for about 4 % of the value of the
catch. 14
National fleet operations established in Fiji, Solomon Islands and Kiribati
encountered several problems such as limited managerial and technical skills, high
operating costs, variable catch rates, fluctuating markets prices and poor management. 15
The cannery operations in Fiji and the Solomon Islands have relied heavily on
government support. Investments in shore-based infrastructure in the FSM, Kiribati and
the Marshall Islands have also resulted in major losses. This has led some studies to
suggest that the comparative advantage to the Pacific Island States lies in providing
foreign fishing vessels with access to the fisheries through access agreements rather
than by developing a domestic industrial base. 16
While the realisation of benefits to the individual countries comes at a
considerable cost, the region still continues to rely on tuna fisheries as an important
avenue for national economic development. This is reflected in the current National
Strategic Plans and Tuna Management and Development Plans of most of the Pacific
Island States. 17 Several Pacific Island States are implementing economic reforms and
making structural changes required for private sector development that can provide the
necessary capital for industry development. 18 Within this reform process, domestication

12

J. G. H. Maxwell and A. D. Owen, South Pacific Tuna Fisheries Study, Australian Agency for
International Development, International Development Issues No.38, November, 1994, p.x.; Standing
Committee on Tuna and Billfish, Non-Reporting and Under-Reporting of Catches by the Western Pacific
Purse Seiners in Data Collected by Coastal States, Working Paper 6, South Pacific Commission,
Noumea, June 19.92.
13
Food and Agriculture Organisation, Fisheries and Aquaculture in the South Pacific: situation and
outlook in 1996, FAO Fisheries Circular No 907, F AO, Rome, 1997, p.2.
14
World Bank (1996), op. cit., n.3, p.55.
15
See for example - Pollard (1995), op. cit., n.11.
16 R. Duncun, S. Cuthbertson and M. Bosworth, Pursuing Economic Reforms in the Pacific, Pacific
Studies Series, No.18, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 1999, p.129; E. H. Petersen, "Economic Policy,
Institutions and Fisheries Development in the Pacific", Marine Policy (26), 2002, p.318.
17 For example see National Tuna Management and Development Plans for Fiji, Papua New Guinea,
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Palau and Federated States of Micronesia. Plans for other Pacific Island States
are currently under preparation or planned.
18 See for example, details of the reform process in: World Bank (1996), op. cit., n.3; Duncun et.al (1999),
op. cit., n.16.
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of the tuna industry continues to be a strong element. Strategies such as providing
incentives for foreign investors to base their operations in the Pacific Island ports and
policies that increase participation of Pacific Island nationals continue.
A regional study on tuna by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) notes the
regional aspiration from a Pacific Island perspective as building on existing strength and
advantages quoting: "[t]he Pacific's successful indigenous small businesses, as well as
the region's proximity to highly productive tuna fishing grounds and its favourable
access to some export markets constitute an important advantage in favour of domestic
industrialisation." 19 The concluding remarks at the First Workshop on Rights-based
Fisheries Management convened by the Forum Fisheries Agency in 2002 reiterated that:
"[t]he empowerment of nationals, the establishment of a strong domestic industry and the
replacement of DWFN fishing capacity has been the general regional and national policy
objective for the last 25 years.',io

In 1994, the Maui Pacific Centre Conference on Pacific Island Culture and Population
resolved that ''within the next decade, 25% of the fish caught in the region's waters be
caught and processed in the Pacific Islands". 21 In 1997, the conference entitled
"Building a Sustainable Tuna Industry in the Pacific Islands" held at the Maui Pacific
Centre revised the 1994 target to take into account the different fisheries development
status and circumstance of the islands. 22 The 1997 target was refined by the addition
that: ''where appropriate, a goal be established that a minimum of 25% of the landed
value of the resources be earned and retained by the people of the Pacific Islands, by or
before the year 2004". 23
Such expectations must be analysed within the context of the international
policy framework for tuna management and development. Concern about global overexploitation of major commercial fish stocks has led to international efforts to seek
sustainable strategies for fisheries development through establishing responsible fishing

19

S. J. Pollard and R. R. Qalo,"Development Sustained by Enterprise: Toward Policies for Economic
Stimulation", Report for the Fourth Pacific Islands Conference ofLeaders, Tahiti, 24-26 June, 1993, East
West Center, Hawaii. [Cited in: Asian Development Bank, The Pacific's Tuna: the challenge of investing
in growth, Office of Pacific Operations, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 1997, p. 73].
2
Forum Fisheries Agency, Report of the Rights-based Management Workshop, 22 -24 July 2002, Nadi
Fiji, Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, 2002, p. 12.
21
D. Zachary, C. Sterling and L. Karolat (eds), Towards a prosperous Pacific: building a sustainable
Tuna industry in the Pacific Islands, Maui Pacific Center, Hawaii, November 5-8, 1997, p.7.
22
lbid.
23
lbid, p.8

°
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practices. The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (1995)2 4 in particular establishes
guidelines for regional management and conservation of highly migratory fish stocks in
the high seas to ensure that the measures between high seas and EEZs are compatible. In
order to effectively implement the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Pacific Island States,
territories and other fishing nations in the region have concluded the Convention on the

Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory and Straddling Fish stocks in the
Western and Central Pacific (2000). The Convention sets the framework for tuna
fisheries management in the Pacific Islands region, which in tum will influence national
policy on tuna management and development for years to come.
Tuna from the Pacific Island States is largely targeted for overseas markets
either as direct national exports or transshipped as raw materials to foreign markets.
Access to the global tuna market requires not only meeting changing consumer demands
but also having the ability to sell at competitive prices. International trade in tuna is
increasingly brought under the purview of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
and the World Trade Organisation (GATT/WTO) regime, aimed at providing an open
trading system by reducing barriers to trade. The liberalisation of trade and investment
however, through their profit-driven motives, also raises concerns about environmental
sustainability because of the emphasis on growth oriented strategies to increase
productivity which accelerates natural resource extraction and increases environmental
degradation.
The globalisation of the food trade also exposes consumers to potential health
risks. Such concerns have led countries to develop national standards and regulations to
counteract the adverse environmental and health effects which can act as new technical
barriers to trade.
Government measures to protect domestic industries through subsidies and
government support schemes are seen as market distortions which in tum affect trade.
Government subsidies to the fishing industry have been blamed for the decline in major
global fish stocks and the over-capitalisation of the industry. Efforts are under way in
the international environmental and trade fora to reduce certain harmful subsidies. The
WTO Agreements provide a mechanism to address some of such concerns that affect
international trade either directly or indirectly. Tuna exports will increasingly become

24

Agreement for the Implementation of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea of IO December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.
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subjected to international trade rules, even if a Pacific Island State is not a member of
the multilateral trading organisation.
The changes being brought about in the tuna management and trade regimes will
impact the national policy frameworks for tuna industries. How will the development
aspirations of the Pacific Island States be affected? What challenges and opportunities
does the emerging policy framework present for Pacific Island States domestication
efforts? These questions will be investigated in the thesis.

Study aim and objectives

Against the background outlined above, the thesis analyses the domestic development
trends and constraints for the Pacific Island States since the maritime zones of
jurisdiction were extended under the Law of the Sea Convention. The thesis examines
Pacific Island States' efforts to derive greater benefits from their tuna resources by
"domesticating" the tuna industry. The thesis focuses on the following key questions:
what have been the domestic tuna development experiences of the Pacific Island States
since the establishment ofEEZs? To what extent have Pacific Islands States' aspirations
been fulfilled? What have been the major problems? Can these aspirations be fulfilled
and under what conditions?
The thesis points out that domestication efforts by Pacific Island States have not
been successful for a number of reasons. These include: limited capital, technology,
skills, high operating costs, inadequate infrastructure, high transport costs and poor
management and planning. With a few exceptions in the longline fishery, Pacific Island
States in general do not have the necessary capital, technology, technical capability and
economies of scale required to develop competitive tuna industries on their own.
Despite failures and criticisms of the adoption of production-based strategies, many of
the Pacific Island States continue to aspire to develop domestic tuna industries through
their national strategic plans and tuna management plans. The thesis argues that while
some of these constraints persist, new external challenges are emerging which will
influence the domestication process. Resource sustainability, increased competition in
the global tuna market, gradual decline in preferential trade arrangements, decline in
foreign aid and subsidies, and increased demand for higher product safety and
environmental standards are among the key driving forces for tuna industry
development. The thesis points out that the Pacific Island States must address these
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external issues in their domestication policies to achieve their goal of deriving greater
benefits from the tuna resources.
The thesis argues that co-operative approaches among Pacific Island States will
be needed to address a number of the emerging policy concerns that deal with
domestication. These include the need for training and capacity building, the need for a
common approach in the international fora for Pacific Island negotiating positions and
more importantly the need to establish an effective rights-based fisheries management
regime.

Structure of the thesis
Industry development of highly migratory fish stocks cannot be undertaken purely
within an economics framework or entirely within an ecological or political context. An
integrated approach is necessary to fully conceptualise the conditions under which the
tuna industry operates. This provides the basis for the analytical framework for the
study in chapter one.
Despite tuna's critical importance for the Pacific Islands' economic and social
development, most studies on Pacific Island tuna industry are either government reports
or restricted technical consultancy studies. These reports, constrained by their scope,
often present limited views of the aspirations of the Pacific Island States. This in tum
clouds the understanding of the development policy approaches for domestication.
There are no studies so far that look at tuna industry development in a comprehensive
manner by identifying the various inter-sectoral influences that drive the policy process.
Drawing synergy between the key sectors helps to identify the policy issues affecting
the tuna industry. This, in tum, provides the direction towards their harmonisation to
achieve sustainable and viable domestic tuna industry that can maximise benefits for the
Pacific Islands. This study is an attempt to provide this perspective. To address the
thesis questions, first the setting of a sustainable tuna industry within the context of a
'fisheries system' is provided to determine the key components of the industry and their
interactions. In tum this provides the framework of analysis to identify the important
drivers guiding the tuna industry development. This systematic approach pinpoints the
key policy issues for consideration in the study.
Chapter two sets the scene by describing the background to Pacific Island States'
aspirations to develop domestic tuna industries. It gives an overview of the

characteristics of Pacific Island economies and the role of tuna fisheries for their
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economic and social development. The status of the tuna resources, the type of fishing
activities and the structure of the tuna fishing industry are described to outline the
general development experience.
Chapter three examines the national strategies to develop domestic tuna
industries. A review of national development plans and the more recent tuna
management plans is provided to illustrate the policies and strategies on domestication.
Two national case studies on domestication efforts are analysed in chapters four and
five. The case studies on Fiji and Kiribati show the difficulties faced by these Island
States and identify the underlying reasons for their lack of success. The case studies also
shed light on the current domestication efforts, which demonstrate the adaptive nature
of strategies used by the Pacific Island States to address their policy aspirations.
Regional co-operative efforts on domestication are the focus of chapter six. The
implementation of the Forum Fisheries Agency Convention, The Palau Arrangement
and the Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement are analysed. The chapter argues
that while the policy instruments exist, their implementation has been somewhat
constrained and therefore their objectives have not been fully achieved.
Chapter seven discusses the interdependence between management and
conservation of the tuna resources and the development of a sustainable tuna industry.
The chapter draws attention to the fact that Island States can no longer deal with
development of the tuna industry alone or ensure the long term sustainability of the
resources within their own jurisdictions. The implications of the Western and Central
Pacific Fisheries Convention on domestic tuna industry are analysed. Within the
:framework of the Convention, the effects of a rights-based management system as a
broader means of domestication are explored.
Chapter eight argues that the impact of the global market on domestication has
more profound effects through market prices that determine the viability of the tuna
industry. The chapter reviews the experience of Pacific Island States in export trade as a
strategy for domestic tuna development. The chapter points out that preferential trade
agreements that facilitate the domestication process will gradually be eroded under the
liberalisation of global trade. Rather, trade in tuna will be influenced by the
GATT/WTO regime, which poses new challenges to the domestication efforts.
In analysing how the GATT/WTO :framework would impact on exports and

trade in tuna from the Pacific Island States, four key issues are identified in chapters
nine, ten and eleven. Chapter nine analyses the implications of the WTO subsidies and

9

investment measures on domestication. New challenges are presented in terms of
increased cost for domestic operators. A number of policy issues are identified for
consideration that point to the need for greater regional co-operation to address
subsidies and investment issues that are currently subjects of debate at the WTO.
In chapter ten, product certification and labelling are explored as issues that can

also affect the exporting of tuna that is dependent on developed country markets where
consumers are increasingly becoming aware of environmental issues. While these
would seem to be future issues, discussion on how trade negotiations could resolve
these are subjects that will lead to environmental and technical standards that will be
applied as benchmark rules and guidelines which exporting countries will need to
follow. The chapter recommends that a pro-active co-operative intervention in the early
stages of the debate would be a more effective strategy to enable Pacific Island States to
integrate their interests and common concerns in the various international fora.
Seafood safety and quality are also important considerations that Pacific Islands
States cannot ignore whether they are members of the WTO or not. Chapter eleven
points to the challenges posed by increased regulatory demands on food safety in the
important tuna markets. Implementation of Hazard Analysis of Critical Control Points
(HACCP) based systems have become a necessity. Pacific Island States need to address
this issue for continued access to the tuna markets. Co-operative approaches to capacity
building to provide economies of scale and national institutional frameworks for the
. establishment of a competent authority are raised in the chapter as policy issues for
consideration.
The thesis concludes that domestication must be understood in the broader
context of industry development. Co-operative approaches between Pacific Island States
would be necessary to facilitate their greater involvement in tuna industry development.
Innovative strategic partnerships between foreign investors and domestic operators for
developing viable domestic tuna industries are also a pre-requisite for achieving the
domestication objectives. The conclusion also provides new directions for future
research on Pacific Islands tuna industry development.

10

Chapter 1: Study Approach and Methodology
1.1

Introduction

This chapter explains how the study is conceptualised and how it is undertaken. First,
the term 'domestication' is defined followed by a review of studies on domestic
development of tuna in the Pacific Islands region. The limited literature in fact provides
the basis for the study.

There are no studies so far that analyse tuna industry

development in a comprehensive manner by identifying the various inter-sectoral
influences that are driving the policy process. The policy setting of a viable sustainable
tuna industry is elucidated within the context of the fisheries sector conceptualised as a
'fisheries system' to determine the key components of the tuna industry. This provides
the framework of analysis necessary to identify the important forces influencing the
tuna industry.

1.2

Domestication defmed

Domestication was the development that made possible the emergence of pastoral and
agricultural economies and therefore made populous and complex human societies
viable. 1 Isaac argues that domestication has proved to be the single most important
intervention man has ever made in his environment. 2 Isaac's explanation is the more
widely understood version of the word 'domestication'. It is a term that is more often
used to describe the process of bringing a plant or an animal under human control. 3
In the Dictionary of Finance and Banking, 'domestication' is defined as ''the

purchase of foreign assets in a host country by that country in order to protect such
national assets as property, technological development, or natural resources which may
have been acquired by foreign owners". 4 This definition more closely reflects the
process of nationalisation that is characteristic of a State-led development policy.
Nationalisation was a distinctive feature of the economic development strategy in
a number of developing countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, from the mid to
late 1900s. In the 1960s and 1970s, a number of mineral-rich countries either fully or
1

E. Isaac, Geography ofDomestication, Prentice-Hall Inc, Englewood, Cliff, N. J., 1970, p. l.
Ibid.
3
S. Mayhews, A Dictionary of Geography, Oxford University Press, London, 2002.
4
A Dictionary ofFinance and Banking (2nd edition), 2002,
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/GLOBAL.html> (accessed 16th Oct 2002).
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partially nationalised their foreign dominated resource industries in the hope of reducing
their economic "dependency'' and increasing the benefits they derived from these
economic activities. 5 Moran points out that, "as Chilean competence in carrying out
operations at the production stage increased, the political appeal of national take-over
became irresistible. Chilean leaders could not refuse the opportunity to 'recover' control
over the country's basic natural wealth and 'restore' sovereignty over the cause of
national development". 6 The Chilean experience is described by Moran as an example
of economic nationalism. 7 Fitzgerald likewise describes the nationalisation process of
key industries in Peru, and the gradual reduction of foreign equity through the Andean
Pact. 8 In the case of the oil industry, Turner describes the experience of governments
with multinational oil giants which ultimately led to their expropriation and the creation
of a number of State or national companies such as occurred in Uruguay, Peru, Bolivia
and Mexico. 9
Schurman refers to the process of nationalisation as "industry domestication". 10
Caron looks at the domestication of technology in the context of technology adoption. 11
New technology and its innovation go through several phases including the
"domestication phase" before they are integrated into the ongoing pattern of household
or industrial activity. The domestication phase is critical in the process of adjustment by
people to the technology, and to the fine-tuning of the technology before its full
adoption. Yener discusses metallurgical development in a cultural context by analysing
the domestication of metals through the archaeological findings of complex metal
industries in ancient Turkey. 12 Yener argues that the cultural and environmental factors

5

Cited in R. A. Schurman, "Tuna dreams: resources, nationalism and the Pacific Islands' tuna industry'',
Development and Change, (29), 1998, p.131. For example, the nationalisation of the copper industries in
Chile, Peru, Zambia and Zaire. Also see: N. Gitvan, Corporate Imperialism: Conflict and Expropriation,
White Plains, NY, 1976; T. Moran, Copper in Chile: Multinational Corporation and the Politics of
Dependence, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1974; M. Shafer, Capturing the mineral
multinationals: advantage or disadvantage, International Organisation, 37(1), 1983, pp.93-119.
6
T. Moran, op. cit., n.5, p.8.
7
Ibid.
8 E.V.K. Fitzgerald, The Political Economy of Peru: 1956-1978, Cambridge University Press, London,
1979.
9 L. Turner, Oil Companies in the International System, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
George Allen & Unwin, London, 1980.
·
10 Schurman, op. cit., n.5, p.132.
11 A. H. Caron, The domestication of a new communication technology: the videoway system, in E.
Mackay, D. Poulin and P. Trudel (eds.), The Electronic Superhighway: The Shape of Technology and
Law to Come, Kluwer Law International, 1995, pp.37-53 .
12 K. A. Yener, The Domestication of Metals: The Rise of Complex Metal Industries in Anatolia,
Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, Netherlands, 2000.

12

behind the strategies of organising and selecting technology provide an alternative view
to the understanding of the use of technology in metallurgy development.

13

The term 'domestication' is frequently used in the discussions on tuna industry
development in the Pacific Islands. For example, it is used to describe the tuna industry
development policy in Papua New Guinea. 14 The aim of Papua New Guinea's policy of
fishery domestication is to increase the level of economic activity in Papua New Guinea
through the direct involvement of local operators. 15 Section 15 of the National Tuna
Fishery Management Plan of Papua New Guinea sets the guidelines on the
domestication policy. It states:
The Minister may, time to time; (a) announce major initiatives designed to boost the
development of the domestic tuna industry, and to maximise benefits to Papua New Guinea
from the management and development of PNG's tuna stocks; 16 (b) announce policies setting
out conditions of operation for the domestic charter of vessels, including fees and charges to
17
be paid, provided that an increase in this category reduces foreign access.

In recent times 'domestication' frequently refers to the process of developing

domestic industries through providing incentives for foreign fishing vessels to re-locate
to Pacific Island ports, and the associated development of infrastructure and facilities to
support their operations. Hunt refers to the process as the "localisation" of foreign
fleets. 18 With reference to purse seine vessels in Papua New Guinea, McCoy uses the
term 'domestication' to refer to vessels that become eligible for a "domestic fishing
licence". 19 In a recent study, Petersen describes domestication as "large-scale public
investments in fishing vessels, public investment in aeroplanes, port infrastructure, and

13
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Gillett, Preston and Associates Inc., A Report on the Financial Viability and Domestication Policies for
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1999.
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Section 15.l(b) - Fisheries Management Act (1998) No.48 of 1998: The National Tuna Fisheries
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School of Economics and Management, Australian National University, 1998, pp.52-91.
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the Forum Fisheries Agency, Gillett, Preston and Associates, Inc., 1998, p.55.
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bases from which tuna can be processed for shipping". 20 This definition is very similar
to that used in an earlier study by Schurman. 21
In order to capture the development of domestic tuna industries in the Pacific
Islands States over time, this study adopts the broader general usage of the term
'domestication' to describe the process of the development of tuna industries in the
Pacific Island States. The usage encompasses the nationalisation concept as well as the
new forms of development arrangements of recent times in the Pacific Islands. Prior to
the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) concept, industrial tuna fishing in the Pacific was
almost exclusively conducted and controlled by foreign distant water fishing nations
(DWFNs). Soon after the EEZs were declared, Pacific Islands States wanted to develop
their own domestic tuna industrial capabilities through various strategies. These
included forming joint ventures with foreign companies, establishing State and public
enterprises initially using foreign expertise and charter arrangements, and establishing
locally-based foreign operations in contrast to granting rights to fish under fee payment
access arrangements. 22
'Domestication', according to this thesis, refers to the process of developing
local tuna industries and industrial capability with the expectation of retaining a greater
portion of the benefits within the domestic economy. 23 The term 'domestication' also
includes developing infrastructure and domestic technological capability to support
local industry development. Domestication is aimed at creating employment, generating
wages and spending, which in turn, through the multiplier effect, can provide the spill
over benefits to other industries and to the economy as a whole. Increasing income and
other benefits in the economy through domestic value-adding means, in practical terms,
the employment of locals, increased down stream processing, export development, inport transshipment of catch and increased local control and ownership.

20

E.H. Petersen, "Economic policy, institutions and fisheries development" in the Pacific, Marine Policy,
(26), 2002, p.318.
21 Schurman (1998), op. cit., n.5, p.115.
22 To a lesser extent, elements of domestication are also found in the Access Agreements but for the
purpose of this study, foreign fishing under Access Agreement is seen as a separate category unless
specifically discussed in the context of domestication.
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1.3

Studies on domestic development of tuna in the Pacific Islands

Much of the literature on tuna fisheries in the Pacific Islands region focuses on aspects
of regional co-operation, the politics of tuna fisheries or on scientific assessments of
stock. 24 Studies on tuna industry development are few and far between, and are mostly
in the form of restricted government technical reports and consultancy studies
commissioned by financial institutions and donors to identify constraints and options for
investment and loans.
One of the first studies on the tuna fishing industry in the Pacific was carried out
in 1984 by Doulman on the Papua New Guinea fisheries. 25 The study provides a review
of the development of access agreements with DWFNs and the government's
dissatisfaction over foreign fishing. The study also examines government policy
objectives which seek to develop domestic tuna fisheries through foreign joint ventures
as a means of domesticating the tuna industry. Doulman documents the government's
disappointments with foreign companies who failed to discharge their joint-venture
obligations. 26 With the downturn in the skipjack market, fishing operations ceased by
the end of 1981. Doulman' s study therefore aims to provide a planned direction for tuna
management and development by proposing a revised institutional and administrative
framework to develop the domestic fleet, cannery facilities, and to manage the foreign
fishing fleets in Papua New Guinea.
In 1986, Waugh reviewed the development of offshore fisheries in Fiji, Solomon

Islands, Vanuatu, Western Samoa and Tonga, and concluded that expansion of offshore
fisheries should be based on exploitation by foreign fleets, and on the collection of
resource rent by Pacific Islanders. 27 Waugh's conclusion is based on the lack of capital
and expertise required to operate the industrial tuna fishery. Waugh argues that capital,
23

This process of industry development is differentiated from the gradual progress where small-scale
fishers over time accumulate knowledge and capital and expand into medium and then to large-scale
ventures. An example of gradual development progress is the tuna longline fishery of Samoa.
24
See for example G. Kent, The Politics of Pacific Island Fisheries, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado,
1980; W. Sutherland and B. M. Tsamenyi, Law and Politics in Regional Co-operation: A case study of
Fisheries Co-operation in the South Pacific, Pacific Law Press, Hobart, 1992; S. Tarte, Japan's Aid
Diplomacy in the Pacific Islands, Pacific Policy Paper 26, National Centre for Development Studies,
Australian National University, 1998; T. Aqorau, Analysis of the Responses of the Pacific Island States to
the Fisheries Provisions of the Law of the Sea (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis), University of Wollongong,
1998; Also see Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Yearbook on Tuna Fisheries Statistics (annual
issues); Overview and Status of Tuna Fisheries of the Western Central Pacific Ocean (various issues).
25
D. J. Doulman, The Development of Papua New Guinea's Domestic Tuna Fishery: a proposal for
future management, Ph.D. Thesis (unpublished), James Cook University: Townsville, 1984.
26
Ibid., p.84.
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a scarce commodity in the Pacific Islands, should be used instead to support an artisanal
commercial fishery that could cater for the domestic market.
In 1987, Doulman also co-ordinated another study commissioned by the Standing
Committee of the Pacific Island Conference based at the East West Center in Hawaii. 28
The study highlights the role that multinational corporations could play in development
of the tuna industry in the Pacific Islands. A second report from the East-West Center in
1987, also co-ordinated by Doulman, examines various aspects of the development of
the tuna industry, including the need for greater co-operation between DWFNs and the
Pacific Island States in order to derive greater economic benefits from tuna resources.

29

An Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) funded
project, with the purpose of determining the economic feasibility of the tuna industry
development in Papua New Guinea, was carried out in 1994. The study indicates that a
cannery operation in Papua New Guinea would be financially viable only if prices for
canned tuna are able to be set under duty-free access to the EU market, under the Lome
Convention. The low labour productivity was also raised as an area of concern for
cannery development. 30
Geen, in 1994, looks at the domestication of the tuna industry through a coordinated approach by drawing attention to a number of regional initiatives under the
Nauru Agreement. 31 Geen argues that Pacific Island States have viewed the licensing of
foreign fleets to exploit the tuna resources in the fishing zones as an interim measure,
pending development of domestic industries.

32

The report attempts to show that with

regional agreements in place, Pacific Island States would be better able to benefit from
the experience and capital of foreign operators.

33

In 1995, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) commissioned a regional study to
examine critical issues and options for tuna industry development in nine Pacific Island

27

G. Waugh, The development of fisheries in the South Pacific region with reference to Fiji, Solomon
Islands, Vanuatu, Western Samoa and Tonga Islands, Australian Research Project Paper 86/2, 1986.
28 D. J. Doulman (ed.), The Development of the Tuna industry in the Pacific Islands Region: An Analysis
of Options, East-West Center, Hawaii, 1987.
29 D.J. Doulman (ed.), Tuna Issues and Perspectives in the Pacific Island Region, East West Center,
Hawaii, 1987.
30 H.F. Campbell and A.D. Owen (ed~, The Economics of Papua New Guinea's Tuna Fisheries,
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR), Canberra, 1994.
31 G. Geen, Tuna Industry development in the South Pacific: A Coordinated Approach, FFA Report
94/19, 1994.
32 Ibid., p.3.
33
Ibid., p.5.
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States. 34 The backdrop to these studies was the World Bank requirements for structural
economic changes and reforms following the debt crisis. The aim of the study was to
consider how to improve the investment climate to attract more private capital. The
reports are highly critical of government policies and the dominant role played by
government in industry development and its consequent inefficiencies. In the light of
developments in the locally-based tuna industry, the report concludes that, given the
nature of the tuna industry and the status of the region's private sector, initial direct
foreign investment is essential. 35 The recommendation stresses the need for economic
re-structuring and providing incentives to attract foreign investment.
The second phase of the ADB study in 1998 investigates the current levels of
industrial profitability of the various sub-fisheries in order to identify the development
opportunities that each presented. 36 The report is useful in providing technical
information on the financial feasibility of various sub-fishery groups. While the report
does not directly address Pacific Island aspirations, it nevertheless points out those
ventures that pose higher risks for domestic development.
Wright expresses similar views to Geen while discussing the background to the
development of the Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement in 1995.

37

Wright

states that besides developing a more active harvesting sector, there is also a need to
develop linked industries that can support the region's tuna industry. 38
In another study in 1995, with reference to the findings of the ADB report, Wright

outlines some of the challenges for domestic industry development. 39 Wright points out
the need for policies, legislation and infrastructural changes to encourage private
investment. Wright also argues that in the event of increased private sector development
at the domestic level as proposed by the ADB reports, Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA)
member countries may find themselves in direct competition with one other, and that
34

Tuna Industry Development Study, Country Profiles: Fiji, Palau, FSM, Cook Islands, Kiribati, PNG,
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Marshall Islands and Forum Fisheries Agency (Confidential Reports). A
synthesised regional report was prepared by Stephen Pollard as FFA Report 95/66, Tuna Industry
Development Study Regional Report, Forum Fisheries Agency, November, 1995.
35
Asian Development Bank, The Pacific's Tuna: The Challenge ofInvesting in Growth, Office of Pacific
Operations, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 1997, p.85.
36
Forum Fisheries Agency, Development Opportunities in Selected Tuna Fisheries for Pacific Island
Countries, FFA and ADB, Honiara, Solomon Islands, 1998. The sub-fisheries include fresh sashimi
longlining, frozen sashimi longlining, frozen albacore longlining and purse seining.
37
A. Wright, Recent Developments in the Central and Western Pacific Fishery from the Perspective of
FFA Member Countries, FFA report 95/61, Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, 1995.
38
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39
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Report 95/47, Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, 1995.
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the private sector is likely to play a more significant role in regional negotiations in the
medium term.

40

Wright's study, however, does not suggest how to deal with this

potential intra-regional issue.
Bostwick's conclusions on the Pacific Islands tuna fishery are similar to Waugh's
study, although seen from a different perspective some eight years later. 41 Bostwick
argues that an access fee under a multilateral approach offers the better option to
maximise benefits from tuna resources for the Pacific Island States. 42 Bostwick's
reasoning is that the tuna industry itself is highly transboundary where fleets are highly
mobile and markets are dynamic. Small island States are unable to control or compete
because they lack capital and capacity to exploit their own resources. 43 Referring to the
gains from the US Multilateral Treaty,44 Bostwick adds that multilateral agreements
provide more leverage to gain benefits than individual bilateral agreements. 45 Local
participation and industry development should be part of access agreements where
preferential access should be provided for vessels that provide local benefits such as the
employment of locals. 46
Schurman describes Pacific Island States aspirations as ''tuna dreams" in the
context of resource nationalism. 47 Schurman states that despite gaining extended zones
of maritime jurisdiction, Pacific Islands States as resource owners have to not only
develop expertise to manage their resources but also need to understand the organisation
and operation of the tuna industry. Schurman's discussion is based on the analysis of the
tuna industry from a commodity chain perspective. Shurman argues that the Pacific
Island States' emphasis on entering the industry at the point of harvest is most risky and
least profitable. 48 This is further compounded by lack of experience and skills and by
poor planning and management of enterprises by governments. 49

40
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The Foreign Investment Advisory Services of the World Bank commissioned a report in
2000 that focuses on the policy instruments available to Pacific Island States to capture
the benefits from tuna resources and the implications of those instruments for foreign
direct investment. 50 The report is a general checklist of policy instruments applicable to
rent capture in natural resource industries, and to domestic industry development. The
report indicates that because of the scale of investment, considerable knowledge and
skills are required in harvesting and marketing. For this reason foreign direct investment
would be important in the utilisation of the resources. The report does not analyse these
policies in the context of Pacific Island aspirations, but instead develops broader criteria
against which these instruments are assessed.
Based on an ADB development strategy to pursue economic reform in the Pacific,
Duncan and others 51 focus on trade and investment liberalisation using the comparative
2

advantage framework. The report reflects on the earlier findings of the ADB study5 and
argues that the bilateral approach as opposed to a multilateral approach offers better
prospects for Pacific Island States. The report is highly critical of governments' direct
involvement in the fishery and their domestic development initiatives. The report
recommends that governments should focus instead on tax and investment reform to
allow private sector development.
More recently, Petersen argues that one policy instrument cannot be used to
achieve more than one policy objective. 53 Petersen refers to the policy objective of
maximising economic rents and the objective of establishing domestic-based industry
through encouraging foreign direct investment as not being complementary. 54 A far less
risky policy option is for Pacific Island governments to focus on maximising resource
rents derived from access fee from both DWFNs and local fishing nations [local
fishers], and re-orienting government spending and revenue into indirect support for
domestic markets. 55 Petersen asserts that a sound policy environment alone is unlikely
to lead to sustainable economic development, that there is need for strong institutions in
so Foreign Investment Advisory Service, Capturing Economic Benefits.from Tuna Fisheries, International
Finance Cooperation and the World Ban1c Washington, 2000, p.1.
si R. Duncun, S. Cuthbertson and W. Bosworth, "Comparative economic advantage and its application to
fisheries," Pursuing Economic Reform in the Pacific, Pacific Studies Series, No.18, Asian Development
Bank, Manila, 1999, pp.86-137.
si S. Pollard, Tuna Industry Development Regional Report, FFA Report 95/66, Forum Fisheries Agency
Honiara, 1995. On the ADB Bank's Policy see Asian Development Bank, The Bank's Policy 0~
Fisheries, Asian Development Bank: Manila, 1997.
s3 Petersen (2002), op. cit., n.20.
4
S Ibid.
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order to bring about broader social and economic co-ordination. This is because
institutions designed to maximise access fees, such as through the auctioning of fishing
rights, are being ignored due to policies designed to encourage locally-based foreign
direct investment through cheap access and the offer of side payments (bilateral aid) to
resource managers. 56
A review of specific case studies of domestication gives mixed views on the
relative benefits of the domestication initiatives in some of the Pacific Island States.57
Among the studies that provide a positive assessment of domestication is the study by
the Palau Conservation Society. 58 Using vessel expenditures as indicators, the study
estimates the net benefits to be approximately $9 million out of an average annual gross
value of$28 million for Palau's locally-based longline fishery. 59
-

Using a socio-economic analysis, Barclay and Yoshikazu's study asserts that
Solomon Taiyo Limited (STL) has been an overall economic success for the Solomon
Islands. 60 On the other hand, Grynberg' s assessment of STL presents a more negative
picture stating that, while the Company was established in 1973, it has only recorded a
taxable profit on three occasions to 1991. 61 The incentives to generate profits were
constrained by the high management cost structure and the ad valorem duties by the
government. 62 The synthesis of these two studies indicates that while STL provided an
important source of income and employment, it nevertheless resulted in considerable
costs due to loss of efficiency on the joint-venture.
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McCoy conducted a study on the assessment of benefits from tuna purse seining
for Papua New Guinea. 63 While acknowledging that the conclusions are based on
limited data, the study concludes that the costs to Papua New Guinea in the
domestication of the purse seine fleet were going to be significant in terms of loss of
revenue from potential foreign fishing license fees. 64
Another study, focussing on the financial viability and domestication policies for
tuna fisheries in Papua New Guinea, concludes that the cost of concessions granted to
domestic industries outweigh the benefits derived. 65 The long-term costs to Papua New
66

Guinea are estimated to be between 12 to 16 million kina per annum. The study also
concludes that domestication should be seen as a long-term legitimate strategy for
Papua New Guinea, but cannot be achieved quickly. 67
The literature shows some consistent assessments in areas such as the role of
government, the lack of capital and infrastructure, and diseconomies of scale. The
existing studies also illustrate some contradictions concerning the role of foreign
fisheries in domestic development. Views differ depending on the time period the study
was undertaken. Divergent views about the role of foreign fisheries are generated from
the different development experiences, the study evaluation methods used, and the
research purposes and the approaches used by the writers. For example, those studies
which support domestic development initiatives seek their justification in the problems
encountered by Pacific Islands with foreign fishing activities,68 and in the sovereign
rights of Pacific Island States to develop their own resources under their national
jurisdiction in the face of limited economic options. 69 The alternative argument evident
in the studies is that Pacific Islands States do not have the necessary infrastructure,
capital and expertise and therefore must rely on private investments, or more
specifically on foreign investment, for domestic development. 70 Some take this
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argument still further

71

and assert that even the latter may be less viable than providing

access to foreign vessels.
Such varied approaches give mixed signals as to what may be the appropriate
policy direction in achieving Pacific Island States' aspirations to develop their domestic
tuna industries in the face of global influences. The term "domestication," although used
frequently within Pacific Islands tuna discussion forums, 72 is less well understood and
used by different writers to mean different things or processes. The above studies, while
adequate for their purposes, address only specific issues of industry development and
are therefore, as a whole, fragmented. None of the studies comprehensively examine the
domestic development of the tuna industry over time, and the underlying reasons behind
the policies that were undertaken so as to provide some consistent guidance.
Issues relating to domestic tuna development are essentially policy related and
therefore can only be effectively addressed within a policy context. They lead to the
immediate question as to what are the general features of a viable sustainable tuna
industry and the factors that influence the industry dynamics in the Pacific Island
situation. First, given the global significance of the Pacific Island tuna resources and the
over-exploited nature of many commercial fish stocks elsewhere, there will be increased
pressure by both the distant water fishing nations and the Pacific Island States
themselves to utilise the resources. 73 Second, that sustainable resource use
(incorporating both ecological and economic sustainability) has become a fundamental
principle of the economic development agenda. 74 Third, that tuna exports from the
Pacific Islands States are largely dependent on overseas markets and are thus strongly
influenced by the global demand for tuna. Fourth, the viability of the tuna industry is
highly dependent on specific requirements such as high capital, technology, skills, and
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infrastructure. These tuna industry imperatives need to be assessed in light of the
physical, economic and social characteristics of small island economies.
Any policy development or analysis must synthesise the above key influences
that underpin the tuna industry in the Pacific Islands. This requires some systematic
understanding of the complexity of the tuna industry within the context of the tuna
fisheries sector. 75 Such an approach also provides an appreciation of why the policy
focus on tuna industry development is intrinsically linked to the management of tuna
resources.

1.4

Contextual setting of the tuna fisheries sector

Understanding the underlying factors and dynamics of the domestic industry
development of tuna requires a comprehension of the tuna fisheries sector as a whole.
The sector can be viewed as webs of interrelated, interacting ecological, social,
economic, cultural and biophysical components, not as fish separate from fishers,
processors, consumers or the ecosystem. 76 A study by the United Nations Industrial
Development Organisation (UNIDO), in co-operation with the Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO), also analyses the fisheries sector as a system of integrated
components while identifying the development needs of the sector. 77 The study provides
an assessment of and strategy design for the development of the industrial system
related to the fisheries sector of 64 developing countries. The purpose of the study is to
identify the needs of the fisheries sector to determine the investment and technical
assistance requirements for its industrial components. The study recognises the linkages
of the fisheries activities with other industrial activities such as processing,
boatbuilding, and fuel needs, and so on. 78
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More recently, Charles echoes a similar need for understanding fisheries as a
system.

79

A systems perspective is an integrated one, facilitating the assessment of

management and policy measures in terms of implications throughout the system.80 In
explaining this integrated view of the fisheries system, its structure, dynamics and its
various components, Charles uses three categories to describe the system. These are: the
natural system, the human system, and the fisheries management system. 81
The natural system consists of fish,
environment.

82

ecosystems and the biophysical

The natural system requires an understanding of the fish stock dynamics,

its biology and ecology. For example, knowing the growth rate of the stock is the key to
determining the sustainable harvest levels per period. The robustness of a target stock is
dependent upon the health of other species critical in its food chain. Environmental
conditions such as the weather, seasonal influences, and temperature variations all affect
the fishing patterns and productivity levels. The complexity of the fishing grounds and
fish behaviour will determine the type of technology, equipment and skills needed for
the capture of the species.
The human system consists of the socio-economic environment that incorporates
the fishers, consumers, the post-harvest sector, and marketing and technological aspects
of the fisheries. 83 The focus is on interactions between harvesters as groups and
associations and the organisation of their vessels, equipment and technology. The postharvest sector consists of processing, distribution and marketing and the community at
large that presents the demand. The institutions, culture, social and economic forces of
society are the key mechanisms that guide human behaviour and its interaction with the
physical system and management system. For example, a highly priced fish would be
sought by fishers to increase their returns. Technology and equipment will be mobilised
to target such fish. The high price could be a result of one or several factors, including

FIS approach depends, however, on the feasibility of properly identifying a system's components and
their interrelationships.
There are nine components that have been chosen as most appropriate for describing the system:
resources, extraction/production, processing, distribution and marketing, consumption, industrial inputs,
government policy, industrial organisation and the foreign sector." The analysis of the FIS is reduced to
analysis and evaluation of each of these components and their linkages.
79 Charles's study is simpler and more clearly depicts the current climate of the fisheries development
ideology by focusing on sustainable systems whereas the UNIDOIFA 0 study, while broad and exhaustive,
gives weight to development of industry infrastructure (reflecting the purpose and the time in which the
reports have been done). [Emphasis added].
8
Charles (2001), op. cit., n.76.
81
Ibid.
82
Ibid.
83
Ibid.
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taste, cultural preferences, nutritional value and delicacy presented as consumer
preference. The level of demand will also determine the rate of exploitation and
therefore the type of management needed.
The components of the management system form the 'guidance mechanism' for
the complex fishery system with its inherent natural and human dynamics.

84

The

management system is what directs the fishery towards achieving society's objectives.
According to Charles, the fisheries management system consists of four components:
the strategic management (policy and planning), fisheries management (operational
aspects), fisheries development, and fisheries research. 85
Figure 1.1 below is a diagrammatic illustration of the fisheries system. The
intersection depicts the interdependence of factors and elements that straddle between
and among the three systems. The management system drives the fishery through its
policies, laws and regulations, their enforcement and implementation. The human
system represents the actors, their decisions and processes that influence the
organisation and conduct of the industry. The natural system presents the boundaries,
resource potential and physical constraints.
Figure 1.1

The Fisheries System

System

Ensuring that p oductive benefits are achieved
Source: Charles, A., Sustainable Fishery Systems (200 l ).

The human system and the natural system defined as fish, fishers, fishing activities,
market and consumers, represent the "productive" side of the fishery, while the
management system aims to ensure that the "productive" benefits are obtained. 86 using

84

Charles (2001), op. cit., n.76, p.69.

85

Ibid., p.70.
Ibid.
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Charles's basic premise of fisheries as a system, policy factors are seen in the context of
the management system and in its interface with the human and natural system.
Charles's categorisation is generic and can be applied to any fishery. The
characteristics and complexities of interactions within the three systems will depend on
the type of fishery, the scale of operation, spatial dimensions, and market orientation,
target species and technological demands.
The FAO also increasingly emphasises the systems approach to understand the
dynamics of fisheries sector. 87 The concept of long term ecological and economic
sustainability underpins the use of such approaches. Based on Charles's basic
categorisation, Table 1.1 presents a simple modified version of the tuna fishery system
of the Pacific Islands.

Table 1.1

The Tuna Fishery System of the Pacific Islands

The natural system:
• The tuna stock and population dynamics;
• Large marine ecosystem as fish habitats; and
• The oceanic environment.
(external influence- climatic changes)
The human system:
• The fish harvesters -fishing associations, crew, managers, fishing fleet,
technological influences;
• The post-harvest sector - processing, marketing and distribution;
• International trade - consumer demand, preferences;
• Multiple users - distant water interests, coastal State interests, conflicts; and
• Fishing communities - nutritional and socio-economic needs.
(external influence - macroeconomic policies)
The fishery management system:
• Fishery policy and planning - fisheries objectives, plans, fisheries management
institutions, legislative framework;
• Fishery management - management control of input and output, surveillance,
enforcement;
• Fishery development - post-harvest support, infrastructure development,institutional
enhancement, human resource development, statistics and information support,
direct support;
• Fishery research- stock assessments, disciplinary and multi-disciplinary research.
(external influence- regional and international.fisheries and related agreements)
Adapted from: Charles (2001) Sustainable Fishery Systems, p.3.

F AO, Indicators for Sustainable Development ofMarine Capture Fisheries, F AO Technical Guidelines
for Responsible Fisheries (No.8}, FAO Rome, 1999.
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As indicated earlier, and from the categorisation in Table 1.1, under the fisheries
management system, fisheries policy (defined as strategic management) and the
management aspects (defined as fisheries operational activities) are linked in a complex
way to the development aspects of the industry. A number of studies on the economics
of fisheries management highlight this interdependence between the development and
management of fisheries. 88 For example, fish stocks, while a renewable resource, can
easily be depleted if exploitation is not controlled, as seen in the case of an open access
fishery. 89 Furthermore, control of the rate of exploitation is essential if the maximum
benefits of the fishery are to be derived in the long term (taking into account the growth
rates, price of inputs and outputs, and market conditions). Moreover, the conflicting
biological, social, economic and cultural goals must be balanced through management if
total fishery benefits are to be maximised. 90 Any study of viable sustainable fishing
industry development needs to be understood within the context of the fisheries system
as a whole.
This thesis is set within the broader context of the understanding of the fisheries
sector as described above. Therefore, the thesis differs from earlier studies described on
domestic industry development in the Pacific Island States where the focus has been on
some specific developmental aspect, or on some technical issues relating to industry
development. The thesis provides an important understanding through a mix of
disciplinary factors drawn from fisheries economics, law, trade and resource
management policy that integrates a variety of perspectives to explain the dynamics of
the tuna industry development.

1.5

Framework of analysis

Given the above contextual setting of the tuna fisheries sector, the domestic
development of tuna fisheries requires an effective policy framework underpinned by an

88

See for example, Anthony Scott, "Development of Economic Theory on Fisheries Regulations'',
Journal of Fisheries Research Board of Canada, (3), 1979, pp. 725-741; A. T. Charles, "Irreversible
Investment and Optimal Fisheries Management: a stochastic Analysis", Marine Resource Economics
1(3), 1985, pp.247-264; C. W. Clarke et al., "The optimal exploitation of renewable resource stocks;
problem of irreversible investment", Econometrica, (47), 1979, pp.25-47; L. G. Anderson (ed.), Fisheries
Economics, volume I, International Library of Environmental Economics and Policy, Asgate Publishing
Company: Burlington, USA, 2002, pp.i-xlix.
89
For example in the cases of Northern. cod of ~e Grand Banks and the Alaskan Pollack and herring in
the donut hole. Other cases are also discussed m P. Weber, Net Loss and Fish Jobs and the Marine
Environment. Worldwatch Institute, Washington, DC, 1994; World Wildlife Fund, Footprints of Distant
Water Fleets on World Fisheries, World Wildlife Fund International, United Kingdom, 1998.
9
Charles (2001), op. cit., n.76, p.69.
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enforceable legal regime that can drive its related management system. Much of the
legal framework underpinning the tuna industry in the Pacific Islands States involves a
series of regional and national legal instruments. Therefore a policy assessment of the
domestication process is most usefully carried out at a regional and national level. The
Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) Convention, the Palau Arrangement and the Federated
States of Micronesia Arrangement are analysed as instruments of a regional policy
framework that seek to facilitate the domestication process. The national policy context
of domestication is derived from analysis of national development plans and national
fisheries legislation of some of the Pacific Island States.
Recognising that diverse and complex interactions exist within the fisheries
systems, it is however not possible within the scope of this study to incorporate all such
detailed aspects. For this reason three key issues are used as focal points of analysis.
These are the industry factors of production, trade, and resource sustainability which are
all identified by the literature as crucial influences on the tuna industry dynamics. 91
Given the importance of overseas markets for tuna and the technological demands of the
tuna industry, domestic tuna development in the Pacific Islands States requires an
understanding of the international tuna trade, and the related technological,
infrastructural and capital requirements of the industry. These issues present the focal
points of analysis of the human system.
Technological and infrastructural issues in this study are seen in light of product
development, market demand and capital constraints. These are analysed by looking at
the shifting production patterns, technological developments from pole and line to purse
seining and longlining, changes in demand for canned and fresh tuna products, and the
influences of global competition.
Trade issues are analysed by considering the factors that drive the international
tuna market. Thus while trade straddles the three boundaries, it is still largely
considered as a market issue and thus falls under the jurisdiction of the human system.
Key factors that have influenced the exports of tuna from the Pacific Island States have
been the high demand for sashimi tuna in the Japanese market and the preferential
market access to Europe under the African Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) Lome
Convention, and to a lesser extent the US market. However, the trade issues are
increasingly brought under the discipline of the World Trade Organisation
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(WTO/GATT) global trade regime which calls for greater liberalisation of trade. This
regime will have a number of direct and indirect consequences for the exports of tuna
from the Pacific Islands. While the impacts of the global trade regime are complex and
difficult to predict, four key areas have been chosen for analysis to demonstrate the
emerging trade issues that will influence domestic tuna industry development and, more
specifically, the achievement of the domestication objective. The key areas are foreign
direct investment, subsidies, seafood safety and quality assurance, and product
certification and labelling.
The transboundary nature of tuna and its long-term sustainability require an
understanding of the conservation issues that form the elements of the physical system.
This issue was brought to the attention of the global community at the Earth Summit in
Rio in 1992 in Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 (Programme Area C) on the management of
high seas fisheries resources. This eventually resulted in the establishment of the
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Straddling Stocks and Highly
Migratory Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPF Convention) in
2000. The objective of the Convention is to ensure the long term sustainable use and
conservation of the highly migratory fish stocks in the Western Central Pacific Ocean,
based on the principles outlined in the Law of the Sea Convention (1982) and on the
United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (1995). The main focus of the WCPF
Convention is on the need for co-operation between coastal States and fishing States to
ensure conservation and optimum utilisation of the highly migratory stocks throughout
their entire range. The WCPF Convention also covers areas of the high seas.
Management and conservation measures must be based on the best scientific
information available and stock assessments must apply precautionary principles where
information is not readily available. The WCPF Convention establishes and defines a
system of rights and obligations under which fishing should take place. These in turn
provide the conditions under which tuna industry development is likely to take place.
The WCPF Convention provides the basis for analysis of the emerging policy issues
relating to resource sustainability that will influence the domestic development of tuna,
and also for the achievement of the domestication objective.

91

Production - labour, capital, technology, infrastructure; Trade - export and market development·

Resource sustainability - resource conservation and management.

'
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1.6 Scope and limitations
This study, while based on the Pacific Islands, is limited to Forum Fisheries Agency
member States. Fiji and Kiribati are the two FFA member States used to illustrate the
national approaches to domestication of tuna in the Pacific Islands region. Fiji is a
diversified island State that has a domestic tuna industry while Kiribati is a small atoll
island State, highly dependent on tuna. The two case studies present good examples of
divergent environments for domestication initiatives. Approval from the senior
government officials in the two States was also an important factor in determining the
study sites. Papua New Guinea, the Federated States of Micronesia and Solomon Islands
are other Pacific Island States that have given high priority to domestication initiatives
in the last decade. However detailed studies were not possible during the study period
in these Island States because oflogistical, political and budgetary constraints. 92
A thorough evaluation and comparison of the costs and benefits of foreign
fishing and domestic fisheries initiatives over time has been constrained in the literature
because of lack of adequate data. There is a general paucity of historical records and
documentation of industry operations. Tuna industry information and databases at
national fisheries administrations are often limited. With few staff and resources,
monitoring of industry operations by fisheries staff is often limited. Co-ordination and
feedback from line ministries were found to be irregular and limited.
The focus of national fisheries administrations and even the regional fisheries
organisations dealing with tuna fisheries data in the Pacific Islands region has been on
regulating foreign fishing vessels while improving the understanding of the biology and
ecology of tuna stock. Information relating to profitability and efficiency of fishing
operations to determine management policy options is scant. Where such information
exists, it is often treated as highly sensitive and confidential. Access to national data at
regional organisations requires prior approval of national governments, which is not
often granted or the requests for approval are ignored.

92

Due to major restructuring in the Papua New Guinea Fisheries Authority key informants were no longer
accessible as they had moved from their original positions. In the case of Federated States of Micronesia
there were a number of continual communication problems. The political tension and the sensitive nature
of the Solomon Taiyo operations in the Solomon Islands during the study period prevented conducting
any detailed investigation even though two visits were made to the Forum Fisheries Agency amidst the
political tension.

30

1.7 Study methods
Two major study methods were used. The first was a literature review covering library
research and government official reports and documents, including what could be
termed 'grey literature' unavailable in the public domain. The second study method
involved a series of informal discussions and interviews with key government officials
from the Pacific Islands region, industry personnel engaged in tuna fishing and
processing operations, and experts working at regional organisations dealing with tuna
fisheries issues. Fieldwork included visiting Fiji, Kiribati and the Forum Fisheries
Agency in the Solomon Islands. Electronic mail contact was also used during the study
period to clarify and cross-check details in respective Island States. Discussions
incorporating broader regional perspectives were possible on two occasions through
attendance at a regional workshop and an international conference.
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The next chapter reviews the significance of the tuna industry for the Pacific
Islands region.
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First Regional Workshop on Rights-based Fisheries Management, Nadi, Fiji, 19-23 June 2002 (the
Workshop was organised by the Forum Fisheries Agency and attended by Senior Fisheries Officers from
the FFA Member States); Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and
Trade, Wellington, New Zealand, 19-22 August 2002 (this Conference was attended by 20 Pacific Island
Fisheries Officers and regional researchers on tuna issues - funded by the New Zealand Government).
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Chapter 2: An Overview of the Tuna Industry in Pacific Island States
2.1

Introduction

This chapter presents the background to Pacific Island aspirations to develop domestic
tuna industries. The characteristics of the Pacific Islands States are outlined to
demonstrate why tuna resources are of significant importance to the economic and
social development of the small island States.
The tuna industry provides an important source of employment, income and
foreign exchange to the island economies. Access revenue from foreign fishing vessels
is also an important source of government revenue for a number of smaller island
States. While recognising the economic importance of this source of revenue for the
national economy, most island States nevertheless aspire to ,develop domestic tuna
industries in the hope that a greater portion of the benefits from tuna are retained in
local economies. The greater the income flow in the local economy through
employment, the more likely other linkages and spin-off benefits will be generated for
the rest of the economy. The chapter points out that the production and the control over
the technology is still largely exercised by the distant water foreign fishing nations that
have predominantly fished in the region prior to the establishment of the Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZs) under the Law of the Sea Convention. There are however
recent developments in the domestic industry through increase in longline operations.
This increase in domestic industry also parallels an overall increase in interest by new
distant water fishing nations.
While the tuna industry plays a significant role in the national economies of
most of the Pacific Island States, it is often argued that the portion of net benefits that
accrue from the industry does not reflect the true opportunity cost to the resource
owners. 1 This is particularly seen in the light of the value of tuna from the region which
is worth over a billion dollars in the global tuna market, and represents a significant
portion of the global tuna catch. This also heightens the aspirations of the island States
to derive greater benefits by developing their own domestic industries.

1 G. Van Santen and P. Muller, Working Apart or Together, The Case for a Common Approach to
Management of the Tuna Resources in Exclusive Economic Zones of Pacific Island Countries, Pacific
Islands Discussion Paper Series (10), East Asia Pacific Region, World Bank: Washington, 2000, p.16;
1
World Bank, Pacific Island Economies: building a resilient economic base for the 2 J5 Century, East Asia
Pacific Region, Report No.13803 -EAP, World Bank, Washington, DC, 1996, p.53.
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Figure 2.1 South Pacific Maritime Zones

32

33

2.2

The Pacific Islands

The Pacific Island region (Figure 2.1) covers an aggregate area of over 31 million km2
of which only 555,400 km is land. 2 Except for Papua New Guinea, which accounts for
83% of the region's total land area, all the other islands are small, but with their
geographic dispersal many of the States possess vast EEZs. 3 With the exception of a
few high volcanic islands in the Melanesian Group, most islands are small land masses
that are geologically young and have a narrow resource base, which in turn restricts the
range of development options. 4 Reliance on marine resources becomes critical for both
economic development and sustenance. Resource development is closely linked with
integrated marine and coastal management because of the strong interdependence
between land and sea. The Pacific Island States5 statement to the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (1992) clearly indicates the importance
of their marine environment. 6 The Pacific Islands urged the international community
" to respect their dependence on the marine environment and recognise that the health of
the marine environment and its resources were essential to their well being."7
Average population growth rates in the Pacific Islands are high by world
standards. 8 This in turn puts additional pressure on demand for marine resources to
provide for food and employment. Scattered over vast areas of ocean, the Pacific Island
States are not only isolated from each other, but also from major metropolitan markets.
This in tum results in high infrastructure, transportation and communication costs. 9 As

2

T.I.J. Fairbain, C.E. Morrison, R.W. Barker and S.A. Groves, The Pacific Islands: Politics, Economics,
and International Relations, East West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1991, p.3. The Pacific Island region
covering the SPC area includes 22 island States and Territories. Refer to Figure 2.1 (The Pacific Island
Region).
3
Ibid.
4 Most of the small islands are upraised atolls and low coral limestone islands with poor soils and lack
basic raw materials for industrial development, for example, Tuvalu, Marshall Is, Niue and Tokelau have
land area below 300 Km2 . See for example M. Rapaport (ed.), The Pacific Island: environments and
society, The Bess Press, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1999.
5 The Pacific Island States in this study specifically refers to developing FFA member States unless it is
specified to mean the wider Pacific Island States and Territories as depicted by the Secretariat of the
Pacific Community's Statistical Area. The study focus is on the following Island States: Cook Islands,
Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. The study also includes Tokelau which is a selfgoverning Territory of New Zealand and which joined as FFA member in 2002.
6 South Pacific Regional Environment Programme, Fourth International Inter-governmental Meeting 3-9
July, Noumea, New Caledonia, 1991, p.52.
7
Ibid.
8 South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), Pacific Islands Development, Report to the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, SPREP, Apia, Samoa, 1992.
9 T. Aqorau, Analysis of the Responses of the Pacific Island States to the Fisheries Provisions of the Law
of the Sea Convention, Ph.D. Thesis (unpublished), University of Wollongong, Australia, 1998, p.5.
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small, largely open economies, the Pacific Islands are also vulnerable to world market
forces and related influences that can significantly affect the level of economic
activity. 10 The Pacific Island States suffer from low literacy rates to low rates of
domestic savings, economic dependence on foreign aid and lack of financial and
technical expertise to develop their physical and human resources.

11

Low domestic

savings are reflected by such factors as low per capita incomes, weak personal saving
habits, and underdeveloped capital markets, thereby causing scarcity of capital funds.
•
.
tm t
This leads to higher dependence on foreign aid and private .c.iore1gn
mves
en ·
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Besides development capital constraints, shortage of basic inputs such as human
resource skills and expertise are also limited.
Table 2.1 on page 36 gives a general indication of the land area, population size
and per capita gross domestic product of the various island States and territories that are
members of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC). The EEZ area is
comparatively large for most of the archipelagic Island States in relation to their land
area.
While sharing many common basic features of small islands, the Pacific Island
States also exhibit great diversity in terms of culture and history. For example, there are
three broad cultural groups - Melanesian, Polynesian and Micronesian, which each have
their own different cultural and social institutions. Likewise, the Island States, whether
fully independent or self-governing, generally have adopted governmental systems
modelled on the structure and processes of their metropolitan powers. 14 Historical
developments not only have an impact on their political alliances but also affect trade
and economic relations. For example the major trading partners are France, the UK,
Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the US.
Other emerging problems that Pacific Island States have to address are land
degradation, climate change and sea-level rise. Some States have also experienced
elements of bad governance and poor management of public funds, which have

Ibid., p.40.
S. Siwatibau, The South Pacific Countries and Regionalism, Paper presented at the Symposium on Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific, East-West Center, Honolulu, 7-10 May 1990.
1
Fairbain (1991), op. cit., n.2, p.41.
13
Pacific Island countries are among one of the highest recipients of foreign aid. Foreign investment
inflows have resulted in foreign domination of key sectors such as mining, hotels, trading, banking and
telecommunications. See explanation in T.l.J. Fairbain and T.T.Parry, Multinational Enterprises in
Developing South Pacific Region, Research Report Series, No.1 , Pacific Islands Development
Programme, East West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1986.
14
Fairbain (1991), op. cit., n.2, p.19.
lO
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consequently led to financial instability, increased civil unrest, and crime. These small
island economies now face the new challenges of globalisation.
Irrespective of the differences in policies and political status, Pacific Island States
have shown an interest in regional co-operation through participation in a range of
regional meetings and organisations including the South Pacific Forum, Secretariat of
the Pacific Community, South Pacific Regional Environment Programme, the Forum
Fisheries Agency, and the University of the South Pacific. The islands States pursue
regional co-operation primarily as a means of performing a variety of specific tasks that
contribute towards national development goals and related objectives both among the
regional members and in the international sphere. 15 Co-operation offers the opportunity
to share common services and facilities on a cost-effective basis in areas such transport
and communication, education and training, research and information sharing. A
common position in the international fora strengthens the island States' bargaining
power in negotiations over issues such as trade, foreign aid and resource exploitation.
The diversity of the islands States is seen as a two-edged sword. On the one hand
regionalism is seen as ''unity in diversity" because of common problems, interests and
viewpoints. Diversity on the other hand can be an obstacle to the vast expanse of the
region and its differing political status and future expectations. Feelings of economic
vulnerability can also weaken the incentive for regional co-operation, favouring instead
alternative strategies that may limit the process of regional co-operation. 16 However,
one of the aims of the South Pacific Forum through the Forum Secretariat is to minimise
some of such negative effects by providing a mechanism for harmonising economic and
political policy making in the region. 17

15

Ibid., p.67.
Ibid.
17 For example the Council of Regional Organisations for the Pacific (CROP) formerly known as South
Pacific Organisations Co-ordinating Committee (SPOCC) aims to bring about harmonisation and
integration of policy formulation and implementation. The Marine Sector Working Group of CROP has
been working in formulating a regional ocean policy.
16
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Pacific Island Countries Principal Physical and Economic Features

Table2.1
Country

Land

Sea Area

Area

(EEZ)

(Km2)

000 Km2

2000 Population Estimates

Total

Gross Domestic Product

Density

Annual

Total

Per

(persons/

Growth

AUD

capita

Km2)

Rate

$(000)

(AUD)

Year

(%)
American Samoa

200

390

64,100

321

2.9

135,000

3,453

1985

Cook Islands

237

1,830

18,700

79

-0.5

128,785

6,778

1997

Federated States of

701

2,780

118,100

168

1.9

268,987*

2,463*

1996*

Fiji Islands

18,333

1,290

824,700

45

1.6

2,429,533*

3,118*

1997*

French Polynesia

3,521

5,030

233,000

66

1.6

4,674,473*

21,028

1997*

Guam

541

218

148,200

274

1.0

3,999,067

26,795

1995

Kiribati

811

3,550

90,700

112

2.5

59,236

756

1996

Marshall Islands

181

2,131

51,700

286

2.0

121,295

2,022

1997

Nauru

21

320

11500

548

1.8

206,250

35,144

1989

Niue

259

390

1,900

7

-3.l

8,835

4,229

1991

New Caledonia

18,576

1,740

212,700

11

1.8

4,418,888

22,454

1996

Northern

471

777

76,700

163

5.5

732,432

13,231

1994

Palau

488

629

19,100

39

2.2

183,671

10,377

1996

Papua New Guinea

462,243

3,120

4,790,800

IO

2.3

6,371,028*

1,478

1997*

Pitcairn

39

800

47

-

-

-

-

-

Samoa

2,935

120

. 169,200

58

0.6

224,740

1,361

1996

Solomon Islands

28,370

1,340

447,900

16

3.4

421 ,106

1,139

1993

Tokelau

12

290

1,500

125

0.0

-

-

-

Tonga

649

700

100,200

154

0.6

2331,196

2384

1997

Tuvalu

26

900

9,900

381

0.9

15,966

1698

1995

Vanuatu

12190

680

199,800

16

3.0

346,584

1,956

1997

Wallis & Futuna

255

300

14,400

56

0.5

-

-

-

Micronesia

Mariana

Islands (CMI)

* Provisional estimates
- Not available
0 or less than half the smallest unit recorded
GDP estimates at market prices
Source: SPC. South Pacific Economic and Social Statistics, 2 November 2000.
<http://www.spc.org.nc/statsen/english/publications/spessl4/tables/tablel_e.htm>
2.3

The Law of the Sea Convention and the Forum Fisheries Agency

One of the most significant outcomes of the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) is the
Exclusive Economic Zone regime in Part V of the Law of the Sea Convention. Under
Article 55 of the LOSC, the EEZ is defined as an area that is adjacent and beyond the
territorial sea to a distance of 200 nautical miles. However, the rights of coastal States
are also subject to other provisions of the LOSC, reflecting the view that management
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of tuna and other highly migratory species is not merely a jurisdictional issue but also
must be considered as a whole [in its entirety]. 18 The rights of coastal States to increased
jurisdiction in the EEZ are defined in Article 56 as sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources. Coastal States
also have the right to determine the allocation of catch of living resources in their EEZs
and to determine its capacity to be harvested.
The Coastal States are also obligated to promote optimum resource utilisation in
the EEZ and where they do not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch,
they are required to give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch. 19 The
establishment of the EEZ regime, while providing the opportunity to exploit the vast
tuna resources in the EEZs, imposed new responsibilities and obligations on
management and conservation.
Around the early 1970s, world tuna prices were high and the number of Distant
Water Fishing Vessels (DWFVs) in the South Pacific region was rapidly increasing. 20
With decolonisation peaking around the same period, the newly independent island
governments, seeking to evolve viable developmental strategies, turned their attention
to marine resources in the light of the extended jurisdiction resulting from the Law of
the Sea negotiations. 21 Individual island States, constrained by their limited financial
and technical resources, saw regional co-operation as the most feasible option to take
advantage of the extended jurisdiction.
The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) was established in 1979 as a regional
organisation in response to the desire by the Forum Island States to promote regional
co-operation and co-ordination in respect of fisheries issues, and in response to their
concern to secure maximum benefits from the tuna resources. The achievements of FFA
are well documented in a number of reports. 22 Among the major achievements include
18

F. Gubon, The Development of the International Law of the Sea and the Pacific Island States, Paper for
Law of the Sea Course, University of Papua New Guinea,[nd], p.18.
19
Article 62 (2) - Law of the Sea Convention (1982).
20 DJ. Doulman, Distant Water Fleet Operations and Regional Fisheries Cooperation, in D.J. Doulman
(ed.), The Development of the Tuna industry in the Pacific Island Region: An Analysis of Options, East
West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1987, pp.333-52.
21 w. Sutherland and B. M. Tsamenyi, Law and Politics in Regional Co-operation: A Case Study of
Fisheries Co-operation in the South Pacific, Pacific Law Press, Hobart, 1992, p.2.
22 For example see R. Herr (ed.), The Forum Fisheries Agency: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects,
Institute of Pacific Studies, Uinversity of the South Pacific, Suva, 1990; W. Sutherland and B. M.
Tsamenyi, Law and Politics in Regional Co-operation: A Case of Fisheries Co-operation in the South
Pacific, Pacific Law Press, Hobart, 1992; Aqorau (1998), op. cit., n.9; W. M. Sutherland, "Coastal State
Co-operation in Fisheries: emergent regional custom in the South Pacific", International Journal of
Environmental Law,1986, 1(1), pp.15-28.
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the establishment of the Harmonised Minimum Terms and Conditions for Access of
Foreign vessels, the Regional Register of Foreign Fishing Vessels, a ban on driftnet
fishing in the Western Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO), the implementation of the Vessel
Monitoring System and Sub-regional Arrangements. The FFA has also played an active
role in the establishment of the new Tuna Convention.

2.4

23

Highly migratory characteristics of tuna

Tuna is a highly migratory fish that moves beyond national boundaries and straddles the
EEZs of other States and the high seas. Some of the key characteristics of tuna such as
distribution of stocks, distribution of spawning areas, the extent of mobility are
discussed in the various technical reports by the Oceanic Fisheries Programme of the
Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) which indicate the regional and global
character of the fishery. 24
The SPC's Oceanic Fisheries Programme has been collecting and analysing data
on catch and effort through logbooks, observer programmes, and scientific surveys and
tagging programmes. Stock assessment studies indicate that despite the large and
increasing catches of tuna in the WCPO, the status of stocks of most species, with the
possible exception ofbigeye tuna is generally considered healthy. 25
Fish-catch-per-effort distributions, tagging data, genetic and other biological data
can be used to define the distribution of stocks. Lewis makes the following conclusions
with respect to stock distribution of four main tuna species in the Pacific: 26
1.

All four tuna species are widely distributed latitudinally from at least 40° N to
40° S in the WCP, though less in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, with temperature

23

Convention on the Canservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and Straddling Fish
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (2000)
24
See for example: Secretariat for the Pacific Community (SPC), Report of the Thirteenth Meeting of the
Standing Committee on Tuna and Bill.fish, 5-12 July 2000, Noumea, New Caledonia; J. Hampton, K.
Bigelow and M. Labella, A Summary of Current Information on the Biology, Fisheries and Stock
Assessment of Bigeye Tuna (Thunnus obesus) in the Pacific Ocean, with Recommendations for Data
Requirements and Future Research, Technical Report No.36, Oceanic Fisheries Programme, Noumea,
New Caledonia, 1998; P. Lehodey and B. Leroy, Age Growth of Yellow.fin (Thunnus Albacares) from the
Western Central Pacific Ocean as Indicated by Daily growth Increments in Tagging Data, 16-23 June
1999, Twelfth Standing Committee on Tuna and Billfish, Tahiti; A. D. Lewis, The Status ofPaci.fie Tuna
Stocks: The Interaction of Biological, Boundary and Legal Issues in the Conservation and Management
of Highly Migratory Species, Paper presented at the IOI Pacem in Maribus Conference, University of the
South Pacific, Suva, November, 1999.
25
J. Hampton, A. Lewis and T. Williams, The Western Central Paci.fie Tuna Fishery: An Overview and
Status ofStocks, South Pacific Commission., Noumea, 1998; A. D. Lewis and P.G. Williams, Overview of
the Western and Central Paci.fie Ocean Tuna Fisheries 2001, Oceanic Fisheries Programme, Noumea
'
New Caledonia, 2002.
26

Lewis (1999), op. cit., n.24.
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generally limiting the polewards extent of their distribution. The majority of the
catch of two species, skipjack and albacore (>85%), occurs west of 150° W, in
theWCP;
2.

Albacore form separate northern and southern hemisphere stocks that extend the
full breadth of the Pacific in each hemisphere;

3.

Bigeye tuna are distributed throughout the Pacific with no apparent
discontinuities in catch and as a single basin-wide stock. Genetic studies have
thus far also demonstrated no evidence of stock structuring; and

4.

Skipjack and yellowfin are also distributed throughout the Pacific, but with some
discontinuity in surface catches at around 150° W, and in the case of yellowfin,
some genetic evidence of separate eastern and western stocks.

Such observations point to the wide distribution of stocks through an area that spans
from the Northern Hemisphere to the Southern Hemisphere. Effective management and
conservation of the stock will require a management regime that covers the entire range
of the stocks of the various species.
The increases in the catches of Pacific tuna and tuna-like species have resulted
from both intensification and expansion of existing fisheries, and the development of
new fisheries. These changes have led to overlap of areas of operation of large and
small-scale fisheries, as well as competition for the same tuna resources by large-scale
fisheries using different gear. 27 Hand describes these interactions :
Longliners catch substantial quantities of albacore, big eye and yellowfin, but very little
skipjack. Most of the pole, and line catch is of skipjack, although they also take some
yellowfin. Purse seiners catch consists of yellowfin and therefore there is a stronger
interaction with the longline fishery. Purse seiners also catch large quantities of skipjack and
therefore compete directly with pole and line fishery. In recent years purse seiners have
dramatically increased their catch ofbigeye by adopting deeper fishing techniques. 28

Longline tuna fishing is seen as the most important in terms of value as it is targeted at
the sashimi market and involves more local vessel operators. Purse seine, which is
highly capital intensive, has the highest catch by volume and targets the canning market
that is highly variable and competitive.
The complex biological and ecological characteristics of tuna creates a high
degree of uncertainty about the nature of resources and status of the stocks. 29 While the

27

R.S. Shomura, J. Majkoswki and S. Langi (eds), Interactions of Pacific Tuna Fisheries: Papers on
Biology ofFisheries. FAO Technical Paper 336(2), FAO, Rome, 1991 .
28 J. A. Hand, Optimal Exploitation of the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fishery, (unpublished Ph. D.
Thesis), University of Queensland, Australia,1998, p.6.
29 For example a study on the Age and Growth of Yellowfin from the WCPO makes the following

observation: "From the three oceans, different growth analyses lead to contradictory conclusions about
the appropriate growth model for yellowfin tuna," in P. Lehodey and B. Leroy, Age and Growth of
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SPC has been carrying out scientific studies and stock assessments, much is still
unknown about these pelagic resources which show wide variations in catch per unit
effort.

Seasonal and inter-annual variations including effects of large-scale

oceanographic changes also affect the availability of tuna in any given area.

30

Data on catch and effort is highly dependent on the return of log sheets from
foreign and local fishing vessels. Because access fees are generally based on the
expected value of the catch, which in tum is dependent on the previous catch records,
there is always an incentive to under-report the level of catch to keep the fee low. This
creates doubts about the reliability and accuracy of data that is submitted by some
foreign vessels. 31
Where gaps in biological data and scientific information are lacking, there is a
need to adopt a precautionary approach which can bring about a balance between use of
the resources and the protection of the resource environment. The regional and global
nature of the tuna stocks and the need for implementation of the precautionary approach
require collaboration of both coastal States and DWFNs which utilise the resources, and
therefore effective management of tuna would require a management regime covering
both EEZ and the high seas.
2.5

The tuna fisheries in the Wes tern and Central Pacific Ocean

The following section describes the production trends of various species, the main
fishing methods used, and a comparison of the level of foreign fishing nations' vessels
and Pacific Island States' vessels in the Western Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO).

2.5.1 Production

Extended maritime jurisdiction enables Pacific Island States to have strategic control
over a major part of the WCPO region and its rich tuna resources. The EEZs of Pacific
Island States only cover 50% of the WCPO but provides some 65%-75% of the total

Yellow.fin (Thunnus Albacares) from the Western Central Pacific as Indicated by Daily Growth
Increments in Tagging Data, SCBT 12, 16-23 June, 1999, Tahiti.
3
Foreign Investment Advisory Service, Capturing Economic Benefits from Tuna Fisheries, International
Finance Corporation and the World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2000, p.3. (For example the effects of
ENSO. During an El Nino period, the locus of tuna stocks moves eastwards and thus large amounts of
tuna are found in Kiribati EEZ. During a La Nina period, the locus moves westwards, benefiting FSM and
PNG.)
31
World Bank (1996), op. cit., n.1.

°
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regional tuna catches.

32

The main species of tuna targeted are skipjack (Katsuwonus

pelamis), yellowfin (I'huunus albacares), bigeye (I'hunnes obesusu) and albacore
(I'hunnus alalunga).

33

Figure 2.2 shows the catch of the four main species over time.

Skipjack has been the most dominant species by weight. The overall trends show an
increase in catches of all species. The WCPO accounts for about 30% of the global
yellowfin catch and is targeted by all the fishing methods. 34 The estimated total regional
catch of the four main species in 2001 was 1,914,000 metric tonnes (Mt). Skipjack was
1,206,000 (Mt) which accounted for about 63% of the total catch. The yellowfin catch
was estimated to be 476,000 Mt (25%), bigeye 115,000 Mt (6%) and albacore 117,000
Mt (6%). 35
Figure 2.2
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The main fishing methods are longlining, purse seining, pole and line fishing, and to a
lesser extent trolling and the use of artisanal gear. In 2001, the longline fishery
contributed to an estimated catch of 238,729 Mt (13%); purse seine accounted for
1,077,255 Mt (56%); pole and line catch was estimated at 329,901 Mt (17%). 36 The rest

32

R. Gillett, The Importance of Tuna to Pacific Island Countries, Report for the Forum Fisheries Agency,
Gillett, Preston and Associates Inc., 1997, p.5.
33
Hampton, Lewis and Williams (1998), op. cit., n.25, p.iii.
34
Lewis and Williams (2002), op. cit., n.25.
35

Ibid.

36

Ibid., p.1.
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of the catch was taken by troll and through the use of other artisanal gear which
accounted for about 14% of the total catch. 37
Figure 2.3 shows the total catch by the various fishing methods over time. Pole
line fishing has declined over the last decade. Much of the current pole and line catch is
contributed by Japanese vessels. Purse seine accounts for the largest catches by volume
with skipjack tuna being the dominant species.
Figure 2.3

Total Tuna Catch by Three Main Gear Types: Longline, Purse Seine
and Pole/Line in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean
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2.5.2

Gear and technology

Purse Seine - The majority of the WCP purse seine catch is taken by four main distant

water fishing nation fleets - Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the USA. In 2000 there were
approximately 140 foreign purse seine vessels and about 40 domestic-registered purse
seine vessels. 38 The Papua New Guinea purse seine fleet constitutes the largest Pacific
Islands domestic fleet, comprising 17 domestically-based vessels fishing under jointventure arrangements in Papua New Guinea waters, and five vessels that fish in regional
waters under the Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement. 39 The purse seine fleet in
the WCPO also includes vessels from the Philippines, USA and Spanish vessels

37

Ibid.
Ibid., p.3
39
Ibid., p.4

38
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licensed by Kiribati.
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Skipjack accounts for 70 to, 75% of the purse seine catch while

yellowfin accounts for between 20% to 25%. Bigeye accounts for only a small
proportion of the purse seine catch.

Pole and Line - Economic factors and technological advances in the purse seine
fishery has led to a gradual reduction in the number of pole and line vessels over the
past decade.

41

Pole and line fisheries in Palau, Papua New Guinea and Kiribati are no

longer operational, while Fiji and Solomon Islands have experienced a marked
reduction in their pole and line fleet. 42

Longline - There are two types of longline operations in the Pacific Island States:
distant water freezer vessels that are generally over 250 gross register tonnage (GRT)
and smaller offshore vessels less than 100 GRT which are usually domestically-based
with ice or chill capacity, and serve fresh air-freight sashimi markets. 43
The number of Pacific Island domestic vessels from Fiji, Samoa, New Caledonia,
French Polynesia and Solomon Islands have gradually increased over the last decade
and account for about 10% of the WCPO longline catch. 44 While the domestic fleet has
continued to increase, including increases in the Cook Islands and Tonga, in 2001
Taiwan shifted its distant water fleet from the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean to
the WCP0. 45 This accounted for an increase of 30% in the Taiwanese fleet in the
WCPO in 2001.46
Table 2.2 shows the Catch by Fishing Nations by Gear Type for 2001.' Taiwan
Distant Water and Japan Distant Water vessels contributed to the highest catches of
both longline and purse seine fisheries in 2001. Japan has been the dominant distant
water fishing nation accounting for the highest level of catch by all three gear types. The
size of the Japanese pole and line fleet is not available. Table 2.2 shows that French
Polynesia has the largest domestic fleet of pole and line vessels. The 148 longline
vessels registered in Samoa are the small-scale alia designed vessels that largely supply
frozen albacore to the PagoPago canneries.

40

Ibid.
D. J. Smith and J. Tamate, Fiji Islands Skipjack Pole and Line Fishery, Report for the Fiji Fisheries
Division, Government of Fiji, December 1999.
42 In Fiji, only one private pole and line vessel is operational and even that on a part-time basis. (Personal
Communication - Robert Stone, Ocean Traders Ltd., March 2002).
43
Lewis and Williams (2002), op. cit., n.25.
44
Ibid.
41

45

Ibid.

46

Ibid.
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Table 2.2

Catch by Fishing Nations by Gear Type in the WCP Ocean in 2001

Equipment

Country

No. of Active Vessels

Total Catch
(Mt)

Longline
A. Samoa
Australia
China
Cook Islands
Federated States of Micronesia
Fi ii
French Polynesia
Japan (distant water)
Kiribati
Korea
Marshall Islands
New Caledonia
New Zealand
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Taiwan (offshore)
Taiwan (distant water)
Tonga
USA (excl A. Samoa/ Hawaii)
(vessels
based
in
USA
Hawaii/California)
Vanuatu

67
197
ll7

3,689
6,999
7,682

NIA

NIA

23
101

774
12,219
7,811
53,719
(2000 est)
0
28,486

51

NIA
1

NIA
NIA

NIA

125

2,064
4,148
3,877
6,180
408
13,107
23,947
1,988
102
8,891

NIA

NIA

2
2
60

415

18
132
38
148
8

NIA
IOI
21

5

Pole and Line
Australia
Fiii
French Polynesia
Japan
Kiribati
New Caledonia
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Solomon Islands
Tuvalu

NIA

21
891
150,049
(2000 est)

-

-

12

4,710

3

497

-

-

-

Purse Seine
Australia (domestic)
Australia (outside EEZ)
China
FSM
Indonesia (distant water)
Japan
Kiribati
Korea
Marshall Islands
Mexico
New Zealand
Paoua New Guinea
Philippines
Russia
Solomon Islands
Spain
Taiwan
USA
Vanuatu

-

-

l

3,090
15,777

5

-

-

NIA

225,812
4,619
178,072
36,598

1
26

5

11
22
11

93,153
12,305

-

-

2
6
41
31

12,743
2,402
230,668
115,524

NIA

NIA

..

NIA not available, Domestic fishenes of Indonesia and Phihppmes are excluded .
Source: SPC Tuna Fishery Yearbook 2001.

45

2.5.3 Foreign fishing interests
There is a strong regional and international interest in exploiting the tuna resources in
the WCPO, as fleets that were initially fishing in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean
{ETPO) gradually move southwards due to declining catches in the northern areas. 47
The tuna industry in the Western and Central Pacific is dominated by foreign interests,
with DWFNs accounting for 90% of tuna harvested in the EEZs of member States of the
Forum Fisheries Agency. 48 The major DWFNs in the Pacific are Japan, Taiwan, Korea
and the USA, China, and the Philippines which began operation in the 1990s. Spain, as
a member of the EU, also has an access agreement with Kiribati since 1999. There were
949 foreign fishing vessels (FFVs) of good standing on the FFA Regional Register at
the end of August 2000.49 Table 2.3 provides the details of the various flag States for
vessel registration on the Regional Register. These vessels either operate under access
I

agreements in the EEZs or are locally-based in the Pacific Islands States.

Table 2.3

Tuna fishing Vessels on the FFA Regional Register,
as of A u2us t2000
Fishing Vessel Type
Longline

Country

Purse Seine

Pole/Line

Total

China

97

0

0

97

Japan

255

36

39

330

Korea

144

26

0

170

9

21

0

30

0

15

0

15

184

42

0

226

Pacific

Island

countries
Phillipines
Taipei, China
(Taiwan)
1

35

0

36

Other

26

19

0

45

Total

716

194

39

949

USA

Source: R. Gillett, M . .McCoy, L. Rodwell and J. Tamate, 2001, Tuna: A Key Economic Resources in the Pacific
Islands, p.13.

Figure 2.4 shows the percentage distribution of flag vessels in August 2000. Pacific
Island States accounted for only 3% of the total vessel registration on the Regional

47

Other reasons for fleet migration include the imposition of management regulations, such as bans on
catching tuna associated with dolphins, under the US Marine Mammal and Conservation Act.
48 Foreign Investment Advisory Service (2000), op. cit., n.30, p.2.
49
R. Gillett, M. McCoy, L. Rodwell and J. Tamate, Tuna: A Key Economic Resources in the Pacific
Islands, Asian Development Ban1c, Manila, Philippines, 2001.
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Register. This is partly because the Regional Register was initially established to
manage foreign vessels and it has not been compulsory for Pacific Island States to
register their domestic vessels on the Regional register.

Figure 2.4
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Percentage Distribution of Flag State Vessels on the Regional
Register, August 2000
USA
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The overall level of fishing interests in the WCPO in 2000 is presented in figures 2.5(a),
2.5(b) and 2.5(c) which show the active fishing vessels in the WCPO over time using
the three main fishing methods. The flag State of the active vessels in the WCPO are
categorised here as either a Pacific Island country vessels or a distant water fishing
nation vessels. These are vessels that have reported fishing activity in the WCPO and
which appear on the SPC database. 51• The active longline vessels show a slight reduction
of foreign-flagged vessels and a consequent increase in domestic longline vessels since
1994. The possible reasons for this trend include: re-flagging of foreign vessels as
strategy to domesticate the longline fishery and the decline in foreign frozen longline
fishery. In the case of purse seine, the graph clearly indicates the dominance of the
purse seine fishery by foreign flagged vessels.

so This is likely to change in the near future because WCPF Convention requires that all vessels follow

similar management rules.
st Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Tuna Fishery Yearbook 2000, Oceanic Fisheries Programme,
Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Noumea, 2001.
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Figure 2.S(a) Active Longline Vessels by Flag State in the WCP Ocean
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Figure 2.S(b) Active Purse Seine Vessels by Flag State in the WCP Ocean
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Figure 2.S(c)
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2.6 Economic and social importance of tuna to the Pacific Islands
The value of tuna caught in the Pacific Islands region represents about 11 % of the
combined GDP of all Pacific Islands of the region and is estimated to be worth around
50% of the value of all exports from the region. 52 Tuna is the most important fishery in
terms of value and volume of catch. It is estimated that in value terms, tuna is worth
seven times more than all other Pacific Island fisheries combined. 53

2.6.1 Exports
Tuna is the major export commodity from Samoa. In 1999, tuna accounted for 60% of
all Samoan exports. 54 In 1996, tuna accounted for 90% of the value of all exports from
the FSM. 55 In the Solomon Islands, tuna contributes nearly 50% of the total value of
exports. 56 Tuna is of extreme importance to local economies in Fiji and Papua New

52

Ibid., p.11. The Report estimates that the value of annual tuna harvest from the region to be around $1.9
billion. The combined GDP of Pacific Island countries and territories is estimated around $17 billion
which gives an annual tuna catch worth around 11 % of the region's GDP. The total annual exports from
the Pacific Island countries are around $4 billion with the bulk of tuna being exported. This value
accounts for roughly one half of the total exports.
53
Ibid. [These include the estimated combined monetary value of subsistence and small-scale artisanal
commercial fishing].
S4 Ibid.
SS Ibid, p.29.
56
Government of the Solomon Islands, Solomon Islands National Tuna Management and Development
Plan, Tuna 2000: towards sustainable fishery for the next millennium, Honiara, 1999, p. l .
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Guinea although, because of the diversified nature of these Island States, average
national tuna exports annually contribute only about 5% and 2% of total exports
respectively.
The quantity of tuna exports and the value of production derived from the Food
and Agriculture (FAO) database is presented in figure 2.6. 57 The figure shows an initial
increase in exports in the late 1970s58 and early 1980s until 1982. This increase was
largely due to the exports of canned and frozen tuna from Fiji and Solomon Islands
canneries. The figure indicates recent increases, caused by the high value sashimi tuna
exports. Major Island States that have exported tuna in the recent times include Fiji,
PNG, Solomon Islands, and Samoa.
Figure 2.6

Total Estimated Value and Volume of Tuna Exports from FFA
Member States
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FAO <http://www.fao/fi/statist/FISOFT/FISHPLUS.asp> (accessed 1st Apr 2002). Commodities trade
and Production 1976-1999. Countries include Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, FSM. Palau,
PNG, Solomon Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. These are FFA member States. Information
on tuna exports are not readily available on regional trade databases since tuna exports are aggregated
with all other fish exports. For this reason FAO Database has been used.
58 More recent FSM and Marshall Islands data exports data were not available for FAO estimates
although exports from these States are significant in their respective economies. Exports have also been
recorded in the Cook Islands and Tonga but these do not appear on the FAO records. The FAO estimates
are until 1999 whereas these latter longlining activities are only recent in the last couple of years.
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2.6.2

Employment

One of the key aims of developing domestic tuna industries is to generate local
employment. Employment in the tuna industry can be categorised into three broad
groups: direct employment in the production and processing chain, the horizontal
linkages in tuna related industries, and indirect spin-off benefits through linkages to
other sectors. Table 2.4 gives an indication of the activities that can generate direct and
indirect employment, although the spin-off linkages can be varied and are less visible.
There has been no comprehensive study to date to examine the status of employment in
the tuna industry in the Pacific Islands besides Gillett & McCoy's (1997) study which is
limited to the employment of Pacific Islanders on foreign vessels.

Table 2.4
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Areas of Employment in the Tuna Industry

Difect employment in catching and
processing
·
:: , ·..
.
-foreign fishing vessels-crew, officers

Tuna-related
·· Industries providing
services
-equipment and bait supplies

Spin-off
sectors

linkages

to

-retail and wholesale markets

-local tuna vessels - officers, crew,

-net repairs & boat maintenance

-transportation

managers

-vessel crew agents

-food and clothing

-artisanal vessels - owner, crew

-administration of fishing companies

-entertairunent for crew

-sashimi handling - processing labour,

- monitoring, control and

-education

surveillance work

managers
-canning - managers, process labour,

-fisheries training

technicians

- fisheries research

-tuna loining - process labour, managers

-fuel and ration supplies

-tuna jerky operations -

-port services

labour, managers

processing

other

-church/ charity

-marketing and transportation

The total direct employment in the FFA member States' tuna fishing and processing
industry in 2000 was estimated to be around 14,480.60 The spin-off linkages in
employment are varied and difficult to quantify. The greater the income retained in the
economy, the greater would be the spin-off benefits. The more labour-intensive the
greater the spin-off benefits with increase in local spending and purchases. 61 Hughes
estimates that the multiplier effect of employment in tuna fishing and processing would
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R.D. Gillett and M.A. McCoy, Employment of Pacific /slanders Abroad Foreign Fishing Vessels FFA
Report 97/11, Gillett, Preston and Associates Inc., 1997.
'
60
Gillett et al (2001), op. cit., n.49, p.17.
61
This is seen in comparison to purse seine fishing which is capital intensive and where much of the
expenditure is for imported products.
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be around 1:1 and 1:2. 62 Based on these ratio estimates of direct and indirect
employment, Gillett and others calculated the employment in tuna related industries to
be between 29,000 and 43,000 in 2000. 63 Table 2.5 presents the estimates of direct
employment in tuna fishing and processing in FFA member States in 2000 in more
detail. This employment represents between 8 to 11 % of all wage-paying jobs in the
Pacific Islands region. 64
In the Solomon Islands and Kiribati, employment in tuna fishing and processing

accounts for over 10% of the total employment. 65 The canneries at Levuka in Fiji, Noro
in the Solomon Islands and Madang in Papua New Guinea provide an important source
of employment for women. Women make up the bulk of the labour force in the canning
and loining plants. 66 In Kiribati, outer island people receive priority in the selection
process for jobs on Japanese tuna vessels, while in the FSM, men working on foreign
vessels are from outer islands. 67 These employment opportunities in the tuna industry
also serves important government objectives for enhancing employment for women and
helping to reduce the rate of urban drift from rural areas. For example during Pafco's
troubled years in late 1990s, the government sought to bail out the cannery through
continuous financial assistance because it was the major employer on the island and the
community and town were heavily dependent on the cannery.
Although possessing rich maritime cultures, Pacific Islanders' skills in fishing
have largely been limited to inshore and nearshore fisheries as opposed to industrial
tuna fishing and processing which is capital intensive and focuses on offshore areas. 68
Increasing employment opportunities also meant building a cadre of people who could
take up the jobs created by the developing industry. Direct training through the
establishment of fisheries training institutions, technical training programmes and
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Hughes (1997) cited in Gillett (1997), op. cit., n.32, p.15. Also see Gillett et al (2001), op. cit., n.49.
Gillett et al (2001), op. cit., n 49, p.18.
64
Ibid., p.17.
65
Ibid., p.19.
66 Ibid., p.21; Also see: R. Grynberg and M. White, "EU Tuna Preferences in Post Lome Environment", in
Forum Secretariat, The Lome Convention and the Pacific, Forum Secretariat and the University of the
South Pacific, 1998, pp. 68-87.
67 Gillettt (1997), op. cit., n.32, p.17.
68 Personal Conununication - Minoru Honda, Tuna Industry Advisor, Forum Fisheries Agency, February
2002.
63

52

attachments became necessary. 69 Investment policies and terms of access agreements in
most cases continue to favour employment of local labour as a condition of licensing.

Direct Employment in Tuna Fishing and Processing in FFA Member
Countries 2000

Table 2.5

'

Fishin2

Country

Cook
Islands
FSM

Total
jobs

Foreign
Fishing
Vessels

Trans

-

Longline

77

56

Fiji

1,407

340

462

Kiribati

1,193

350

519

14

I

Solomon Is

2,853

138

15
12
(commercial
skiffs)
(semi
35
commercial)
10

340

75

240

135

750

25

Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Samoa

57
130
4,070

7
120
60

Total

14,480

1,183

140

2,500 (cannery)
15 (loining)
(export
60
orocessing)
1,450 (cannery)
40 (sashimi)

100
20

3

400 (PAFCO
cannery)
I30 (sashimi)
35
(nat'l fisheries
co.)
(tuna
8
jerky)
(loining
410
olant)

75

38

403

Tonga

25

20

20

Processing
and
Exports

178

25 (Kosrae)
100 (Chuuk)
45 (Pohnpei)
30 (Yao)
50

6

36
3,015

Tokelau

30

800

21
47

Palau
PNG

Others*

70

7
150

Nauru
Niue

Pole/
Line

Commercial

Ship
ment

614

Marshall Is

Purse
Seine

Smaller
Vessels
Artisan al

18
(commercial
alia ti.shin!?)

30

150
(Pago
Pago canneries)
80 (sashimi)

50

IO
455

45

1,706

* mcludmg unspecified smaller commercial vessels

240

785

1,360

80

55 (Apia)
3,500
(Pago
Pago canneries)
9,011

Source: Gillett et al (2001), p.17.
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R. Herr (ed.), "Ocean Resources Management Programme,"Appendix 3, The Forum Fisheries Agency:
achievements, challenges and prospects, Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific
Suva, 1990,pp.434-436.
'
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2.6.3 Access fee
The access fee paid by foreign vessels has been an important source of government
revenue for a number of Pacific Island States. Access is granted to foreign vessels under
bilateral or multilateral licensing agreements. States differ in the amount of access
revenue they receive with the FSM, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea and Marshall Islands
receiving the highest levels. 70 The value of access fees is difficult to estimate because of
the different methods of calculating access revenue and mode of payment. Various
forms of access fee exist but the region largely uses two particular types: lump sum
payments calculated on the basis of the number of vessels fishing, and per vessel per
trip. Under the lump-sum formula, the amount paid provides access for a maximum
number of fishing vessels for a specific period of time, usually a year. The per-vessel
per trip system relates to an access fee on the landed value of fish harvested. 71 Access
agreements between the Pacific Island States and DWFNs are either bilateral between
government to industry or government to government, or multilateral agreements. Often
access revenue is also accompanied by other side payments in aid and grants or
technical assistance. The Multilateral Treaty between the US government and all the
FFA member States provides an important source of government revenue to even those
States where no US purse seine vessels may operate. 72 A number of bilateral agreements
exist between individual Pacific Island States and foreign fishing interests. The access
fee under these bilateral agreements is also influenced by several factors ranging from
the status of the resource, prices of tuna, capital and fishing costs, to the negotiating
skills of business partners.
Access revenue from foreign licensing in 1997, 1998 and 1999 was US $54.7
million, US $53.9 million and US $60.3 million respectively. 73 In 1993, the total access
fees for the region were about US $56 million compared to the value of the total catch
of US $1.2 billion. 74 The average access fee was therefore 4.4% of the value of catch. 75

70

Personal Communication- J. Ta.mate, Project Economist, Forum Fisheries Agency, June 2002.
D.J. Doulman, Fisheries Access Arrangements between FFA Member Countries and the Distant Water
Fishing Nations, FFA Report 88/58, Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, 1988, p.1; Sutherland and
Tsamenyi, op. cit., n.21, p.19.
72
Of the total US access fee, 15% is divided equally among the FFA member States while the remaining
85% is distributed on a pro rata basis depending on the weight of tuna landed in each respective EEZ. The
fee consists of $4 million by the US Tuna Foundation as industry input and $14 million as economic
development assistance by the US government (Source: FFA, 2002).
73
FFA Estimates, 2002 - Josie Ta.mate, Project Economist, May, 2002. [Access fee is based on several
methods ranging from a lump sum payment, per vessels per trip to percentage value of catch based on
previous catch records] .
74
Ibid., p.53.
71
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Access fees for 1999 were estimated at US $60.3 million while the value of catch was
estimated to be around US $1.9 billion. This shows that the average value of access fee
is about 3.2% of the total value of catch. For a number of smaller Island States like
Tuvalu, Kiribati, Marshall Islands and the FSM, access fees are important sources of
government revenue. In the fiscal year 1999/2000, access fees accounted for 39% of
government revenue for FSM. 76 In Kiribati, foreign fishing access accounted for 58%
and 55% of government revenue in 1998 and 1999 respectively.

77

Access fees for the

Marshall Islands contributed about 25% of government revenue in the fiscal year
1992/1993. 78
The low level of access fees received by coastal States has generated much debate.
The Pacific Island States believe that their resources are underpriced.

79

However, the

DWFNs argue that the rent is fair given the price volatility of tuna and the high capital
requirements.80

Table 2.6

Access Fees Paid to Pacific Islands FFA Member States by Foreign
Fishin2 Interests in 1999 (US$)
Type of Vessels

Country

Longline

Purse Seine

Pole/Line

Total US (S)

Japan

5,128,000

9,1 99,000

1,405,000

15,732,000

0

16,693 ,026

0

16,693,026

Korea

3,492,000

6,250,000

0

9,742,000

Taiwan

2,099,000

10,642,000

0

12,741 ,000

USA

China

FSM Arrangement*
Others
Total

500,000

0

0

500,000

0

579,357

0

579,357

90,000

4,200,000

0

4,290,000

11 ,309,000

47,563,383

1,405,000

60,277,383

*Preferential access to purse seme vessels of Pacific Island States that are parties to the arrangement
Source: Gillett (2001), p.14.

Ibid.
Gillett et al (2001), op. cit., n.49, p.14.
~:Ministry of Economic Planning and Statistics, Kiribati Economic Survey Report, Tarawa, 2001 .
World Bank (1996), op. cit., n.1.
79 Ibid.
80
Ibid. [The rent is seen as the price of access to the tuna resources]. Some studies argue that access fee is
low because it does not reflect the true resource rent. The resource rent is effectively a percentage of net
revenue after cost is deducted from the gross revenue from fishing receipts. It is often argued that
res01.~rc~ . rent can increase if current effort levels are reduced. See for example, H. F. Campbell,
Maximising the Value of Transboundary Resource: the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries
P~per presented at the Conference on the Mana?eme_nt of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migrato~
Fish Stocks and the UN Agreement, Centre for F1shenes Economics, Bergen, Norway, 19-21May1999.
75
76
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The above table shows that, in percentage terms, Japan contributed about 26%, the US
28%, Korea 16%, and Taiwan 21% of the total access fee of the FFA member States in
1999. 81

2.6.4 Expenditure by locally-based vessels
In mid 2000, estimates indicated that there were 304 locally-based foreign fishing

vessels operating in the Pacific Islands States. 82 These consisted of 246 longline vessels,
26 purse seine and 32 pole and line vessels. 83 Palau had the largest number of locallybased foreign vessels (longline), followed by the FSM and Fiji. Solomon Islands had the
largest locally-based pole and line fleet while Papua New Guinea had the highest
number of locally-based purse seine vessels. Using studies on purse seine, longline and
pole and line vessels, Gillett and others estimate the expenditure by locally-based
vessels in the Pacific Islands region to be around $150 million annually. 84 A case study
on small-scale longliners in the FSM showed that the retained benefits per season from
one FSM-based longliner was estimated to be around $148,003. 85 The portion of
benefits to the local economy increases, as local business develops to cater for the
supply of services to the vessels. 86

2.6.5 Indirect benefits and spin-offs

Besides revenue through access fees, benefits to local economies also accrue through
other taxes such customs, port and immigration charges, and the provision of fuel and
food supplies, services and repairs, entertainment and other retail services. A ban on
transshipment at sea since June 1993 has resulted in an increase in port activity at
transshipment points. Most purse seine transshipments in the 1990s took place in the

81

However, the actual percentage of access fee based on volume of catch taken and value of catch varies
between 3% and 20%. [Personal Communication- Josie Tamate-Project Economist- Forum Fisheries
Agency, June 2002].
82
Gillett et.al (2001), op. cit., n.49.
83
Ibid.
84 Ibid., pp.20-29. For details on studies refer to R. Carter, Managing Purse Seine Shore-based
Operations, Working Paper, Fifth Cultural Values in the Age of Technology Conference, Maui, Pacific
Center, Hawaii, 1995; M. McCoy, Tuna Purse Seine Fishing in Papua New Guinea: An Assessment of
Benefits, A Report prepared for the FFA, 1998; P. Philipson, "The Fresh Sashimi Longline Fishing" in
Development Opportunities in Selected Tuna Fisheries for Pacific Island Countries, FFA, Honiara, 1998;
D. Smith and J. Tamate, Fiji Islands Skipjack Pole and Line Fishery. Fisheries Division, Fiji, 1999.
85 K. Lucas, S. Tiller and J. Swann, Background Report to the National Fisheries Policy Study, Volume 2,
Asian Development Bank, Manila, 1996.
86

Ibid. [The net domestic value added must also take into consideration the leakages in foreign exchange

when there is high dependence on supplies that are imported].
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FSM, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Marshall Islands.

87

Port calls by purse

seiners in the Pacific Island States resulted in payments of about $3,000 to $4,000 per
visit in government services and levies. 88 Payments to the private sector during port
calls for transshipment totalled around $4,000 per visit. 89 Country-specific information
on transshipments benefits is discussed in Gillett and others and in McCoy.
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Spin-off benefits filter through the local economies in other sectors outside of
fisheries when more revenue is spent on domestically produced goods

91

and services

directly, and in related industries such as shown in Table 2.4. These include
entertainment, food and clothing, transportation and so on.
Pacific Island States also derive revenue from fines resulting from successful
prosecutions. Of the 25 reported cases of illegal fishing activities within FFA members'
zones in 1996, 12 cases were successfully prosecuted generating US$3.9 million in fines
and vessel forfeitures. 92 In the FSM, more than $3.65 million in fines or settlements was
collected, and eight vessels were forfeited to the government since 1979.

93

In 1994

Nauru received US$1 million from Korean purse seiners charged with illegal fishing.

94

In 1998, Tuvalu received an out of court settlement of about $40,000 from a purse
seiner for allegedly fishing in a closed area. 95 A number of such cases exist throughout
the Pacific Islands region. It must however be noted that the benefits from such fines are
far less compared to the loss from illegal fishing which is often difficult to detect or
quantify.
Indirect social and cultural spin-offs also include the availability of infrastructure
facilities such as roads and ports in rural locations for general use. The social and
cultural importance of tuna is also recognised as a means of preservation of cultural
identity such as through craft, artifacts and fishing tradition. Anthropological studies
make reference to the importance of tuna fishing for sport and recreation. 96 These
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Gillett, et al (2001), op. cit., n.49.
Ibid.
89
Ibid.
90
M. McCoy, Tuna Purse Seine Fishing in Papua New Guinea: an Assessment of Benefits, A Report for
the Forum Fisheries Agency, 1998.
91
If goods purchased are imported, the net benefits are reduced due to leakage through import payments.
92
Gillett (1997), op. cit., n.32, p.20.
93
Micronesian Maritime Authority, 1999 MMA Annual Report, Phonpei, 2000.
94
Gillett, et al (2001), op. cit., n.49.
95
Ibid., p.32.
% For example see J. Hornell, Fishing in Many Waters, University Press, Cambridge, England, 1950· D.
Kennedy, "Field Notes on the culture of Vaitupu, Ellice Islands", Journal of Polynesian Society, 39(1)
1930; P. Buck, "Samoan material culture", Bernice P. Bishop Museum, Bulletin No.75, Honolulu, 1930. '
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recreational aspects of tuna fishing have continued both as part of traditional culture and
modem gamefishing activities.
This latter activity is closely associated with the development of the tourism
industry. The value of expenditure in gear and equipment and facilities in this sector is
also beneficial to local economies.

2.6.6 Domestic market and nutritional importance

Fish is an important commodity in the diet of Pacific Island people and tuna contributes
a substantial portion of all fish consumed, especially in the small island States. It also
forms an important component of catch by artisanal and subsistence fishers in the
Pacific Islands. A study by Dalzell and others (1996) shows that tuna and other
scombrids make up a large portion of the catch: Fiji (29.7%), PNG (84.6%), Samoa
(86%), Tokelau (100%), Tuvalu (79.4%), Nauru (88.5%), Palau (45.9%, Niue (85.9%),
Wallis & Futuna (52.9%), Kiribati (77.8%), Tonga (98.4%), Vanuatu (92.9%) and Cook
Is (97.6%). 97 In the FSM, 30% of the subsistence fish catch consists oftuna. 98
Some Pacific Island States such as Fiji, Kiribati and Samoa have embarked on
small-scale tuna fisheries development using artisanal technology such as alia vessels,
prototype canoes, and motorised punts. These developments also take advantage of the
infrastructure and facilities provided by the industrial scale tuna activities such as access
to ice, freezing facilities and markets. For example in Fiji, Kiribati, the FSM and in
Papua New Guinea, artisanal fishers also take advantage of the longline fishery
development infrastructure. Surplus catch is sometimes directly sold to fish processing
plants.
Food security is also an important aspect of the fishery particularly in places
where tuna represents an important component of local diet and source of protein. While
tuna is predominantly an export commodity, there is also a growing Pacific Island
market for canned and frozen tuna, and by-catch and rejected fish not suitable for
export. In the Solomon Islands, 20% of canned tuna production is consumed
domestically. 99 In Fiji, approximately 11 % of the production from Pafco is consumed
domestically accounting for about 6% of the total canned tuna supply in Fiji.
97

100

P. Dalzell, T. Adams and N. Polunin, Coastal Fisheries in the Pacific Islands, Oceanography and
Marine Biology: An Annual Review, ULC Press, 34, 1996, pp.395-531 ; Gillett (1997), op. cit., n.32.
98
Gillett (2001), op. cit., n.49, p.37.
99
Ibid.
100 Ibid.
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2.7

Tuna development experience

Japanese fishermen started exploiting the tuna resources of the Pacific Islands region in
the early 1900s. 101 There was unrestricted movement of Japanese Distant Water Fleets
following the reconstruction programme in Japan after World War 11.

102

This was

followed by Taiwanese and Korean longliners. Tuna bases were established to supply
tuna to canneries in American Samoa Hawaii and the West Coast of the USA after
World War 11.

103

'

The continued demand for tuna led to the establishment of pole and line fleets in
Fiji (1963), Papua New Guinea (1970) and the Solomon Islands (1973).

104

Shortage of

baitfish and the rising fuel and labour costs in the early 1970s prompted the Japanese to
initiate purse seine fishing. 105 Since the late 1970s purse seine vessels have been based
or registered at several ports in the region including American Samoa (1980), Guam
(1980), Nauru (1982), Papua New Guinea (1981) and Vanuatu (1984).
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The

establishment of the EEZs meant tuna fishing grounds that were originally open access
to DWFNs came under coastal States' jurisdictions for which the DWFNs had to seek
access if they wanted to fish.
Following the declaration of EEZs in the late 1970s, Pacific Islands region became
the focus of international tuna interest with a range of multi-national corporations
indirectly financing or directly initiating ventures. 107 The US ventures in the region
focussed on acquiring fish for processing at American canneries based in American
Samoa and Hawaii or canneries in other locations in the USA and in Puerto Rico. 108
Japanese tuna processing interests in the Pacific Island region included two jointventure canneries, a joint-venture tuna transshipment facility, and several fishing
operations. 109
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D.J. Doulman, Distant Water Fleet Operations and Regional Fisheries Cooperation, in D.J. Doulman
(ed.), The Development of the Tuna Industry in the Pacific Islands: An Analysis of Options, East West
Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1987, pp.33-52.
02
~ Ibid., p.36.; See also, M. Yoshiaki, ''Post war Development and Expansion of Japan's Tuna Fishery",
m D. J. Doulman (ed.), Tuna Issues and Perspectives in the Pacific Island Region, East West Center
Hawaii, 1987, pp. 71-92.
'
103 Ibid.
104
Ibid., p.11.
105
D.J. Doulman, Development and Expansion of the Tuna Purse Seine Fishery, in D.J.Doulman (ed.),
Tuna Issues and Perspectives in the Pacific Island Region, East West Center, Hawaii, 1987, pp.133-160.
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D.J. Doulman and R.E. Kearney, Domestic Tuna Industries, in D.J. Doulman (ed.), Tuna Issues and
Perspectives in the Pacific Island Region, East West Center: Honolulu, Hawaii, 1987, p.7.
107
For more discussion on multinational corporations see Doulman (1987), op. cit., n.43.
108 Ibid., p.31.
109
Ibid., p.41.
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In addition to access fee payments, the DWFNs also provided development
assistance to the Pacific Island States. In most cases, this was targeted at fisheries
development projects such as the provision of goods and services, training and
research.

°For example the fleets in the Solomon Islands, Tonga and Tuvalu have been

11

directly established through bilateral aid programmes with J apan. 111
Initially some Pacific Island States made attempts to establish their own domestic
fleets using pole and line method. The South Pacific Island governments viewed this
method as technically appropriate: " .. .it represented an intermediate step between
artisanal operations and sophisticated purse seining" .112 In most cases these industries
have been established in co-operation with Japanese or US corporations, some of which
were world leaders in the tuna industry. 113
By 1984, operations in Papua New Guinea, Palau, Fiji, Vanuatu and the Solomon
Islands started facing difficulties that were further exacerbated by a decline in global
prices for tuna. The increased supply from new competitors forced prices down and
diminished returns, causing investment plans to be scrapped or deferred. Those
operations that survived required continued government support and capital injections
such as cannery operations in Fiji and the Solomon Islands, and the fishing operations in
Kin'bat'1. 114

Schurman argues that by the time the Pacific Islands States were ready to invest,
tuna harvesting and canning had become unprofitable and that only the raw material
trading or retail distribution were the profitable activities in the industry. 115 She argues
that even if Pacific Island States went into the latter business they would not stand a
chance because they had to ' compete against large, well-established and diversified
multi-national corporations with deep pockets. 116 Practical constraints to the
development of tuna industries have been documented by the Asian Development Bank

Ibid., p.41.
Doulman and Kearney (1987), op. cit., n.106.
M.C. Tagalo, "A Summary of Domestic and Distant-water Fishing Industries" in D.J. Doulman (ed.),
The Development of the Tuna Industry in the Pacific Island Region: An Analysis of Options, East West
Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1987, p.56.
113
Doulman (1987), op. cit., n.105 .
114
Tagalo (1987), op.cit., n.112.
115 R. Schurman, "Tuna Dreams: Resource Nationalism and the Pacific Island Tuna Industry",
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Development and Change, (29), 1998.
116

Ibid., p.123.
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following a review of domestic industry development experience in some of the Pacific
Island countries. 117
Much of the development efforts in the 1990s sought to bring about structural
changes in the industry through the reduction of the direct role of governments, and by
encouraging private sector development.

Table 2.7

Summary of Current Domestic Tuna Fisheries Development
Activities in Selected FFA Member States
Fish Processing/other activities

Country Domestic Fishing Activities
ca sma -sea e ong mmg or sas 1m1 tuna
- locally owned vessels
- locally-based foreign fishing vessels

an or
facilities

omestlc ong mmg
- locally-based foreigtl vessels
- locally owned vessels
- foreign longliners servicing local processors

-a out
pnvate exporting companies
registered for sashimi tuna to Japan, US and
Europe
- Pafco Fishing Co (current cannery
OJ!erations are scafed down)
- facility leased to US company for export of
frozen foins to US

ge ore1gn purse seme eet supp ymg
overseas processors
- Domestic-based foreign longline vessels

- ommg p ant
- transslnpment
- sashimi exports to Japan, Guam, US

ca y- as
p 1 1pmo purse seme vesse s
serving local cannery
- Domestic-based foreign longline
- Domestic-owned longline vessels

- loining plant
- sashimi exports to Japan

-

cannery

- transs 1pment
- freezing and cold storage
- growmg sas 1m1 export to
- frozen albacore to PagoPago canneries

exporting sashimi
o processmg
oprocessmg
o processmg
ore1gn vesse s usmg

anuatu

- ovemment-own
ong me vesse
- Domestic artisanal fleet
- Domestic based foreign vessels under Tongan
Fla

sas 1m1 tuna
- ree pnvate companies exporting sas 1m1
tuna to US
- frozen albacore to PagoPago cannery

Source: Personal Communication - Josie Tamate, Project Economist FFA, June 2002; G. Van Santen and P. Muller,
2000, pp.46-47; R. Duncan, 1999, p.113.
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Developments in the fresh and chilled tuna market for sashimi also saw an increase in
domestic longline fisheries in a number of Pacific Islands States and an increase in
'
foreign vessels re-locating to Pacific Islands and using the flags of Pacific Island States.
Table 2. 7 shows the current tuna fishing and processing interests in selected FFA
member States. It is evident from the table that most of the FFA member States have
embarked on a domestic-based longline industry. Except for Tuvalu, Niue and Nauru,
there is some processing facility for handling sashimi tuna in all other FFA member
States. Fiji, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea have secondary tuna processing
plants such as canning. The FSM, Papua New Guinea, Fiji have tuna loining plants.
2.8

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to illustrate the underlying reasons why Pacific
Islands States have high aspirations to develop their domestic tuna industries.
Constrained by their geography, most island States have limited natural resources, apart
from tuna, in their fishing zones. The tuna industry provides an important means of
economic development in all the Pacific Island States. The contribution of tuna to food
security to the Pacific Island States is also critical.
The chapter has shown that Pacific Islands region is the most important tuna
fishing area in the world, contributing a significant proportion of the global tuna supply.
While there is a growing domestic longline industry, tuna fishing in general is
predominantly carried out by DWFNs. The returns from the industry through access
fees have been considered by the region to be generally low. This dissatisfaction,
together with the growing economic and social pressures to generate employment and to
provide for social services for the rapidly growing population, makes it necessary for
the Pacific Island States to opt for the development of domestic tuna industries to
capitalise on the benefits from their tuna resources. For a number of smaller island
States, there are very limited alternative economic opportunities besides tuna. Given the
above background, it can be readily understood that despite the mixed results of
developments so far, the Pacific Island States continue to have high aspirations to
develop their tuna industries.
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Chapter 3: National Policies on Domestication of the Tuna Industry
3.1

Introduction

The aspirations to derive greater benefits from tuna resources figure highly in the
1

national development plans of all the Pacific Island States. These plans provide the
basis for national tuna development policy frameworks. This chapter examines the
influence of national development plans on the tuna fisheries sector. Domestication of
the capture fishery and shore-based processing is seen in the context of strategies used
to nationalise the industry, the localisation of fishing operations, and the development of
new initiatives to achieve greater control through the securing of fishing rights. The
chapter first outlines the policy framework, followed by a review and discussion of
domestic development efforts over time by looking at examples from some FFA
member States in the region where domestication initiatives have been undertaken or
are planned. The chapter concludes that the general development experience so far
shows that domestication of the tuna industry as envisaged in the development plans has
not been achieved and that it continues to be a major development aspiration for the
Pacific Island States.
3.2

National development plans

As is characteristic of developing economies after World War II, national development
plans have provided the policy framework for accelerating economic and social
development of the Pacific Islands States. The feasible rate of growth in an economy
was determined by the 'leading' sectors of that economy such as the primary production
and manufacturing sectors. 2 In principle, focusing on key sectors was seen to help the
planning process to identify major opportunities and constraints in the development
process. The national development goals and objectives (derived from economic, social
and political processes) were then translated into objectives and policies at the sectoral
level. Strategies to implement the given policies through programmes and projects
provided basic guidance concerning the development paths of the various sectors,
including fisheries.
1

L. Clarke and J. Stanley, The problems facing small island countries in the management of their EEZ, in

Land and Marine Resources in the South Pacific: New Solutions to Problems of Old and New. Suva, Fiji,
October, 1984.
2
M. McQueen, The Economics of Development: Problems and Policies, Redwood Press Limited
Trowbridge, Wiltshire, 1973, p.126.
'
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The Pacific Islands States were also influenced by the general development
approaches that guided their national development. 3 Development plans existed from
the time of the colonial administration in the form of capital development budgets to
seek financial aid. By the end of the 1960s, as pressures increased for independence,
comprehensive medium term plans were developed, aimed at generating economic
growth and to provide progress towards self-reliance. As the island colonies became
self-governing States, the government took the lead role in capital developments and in
guiding investment decisions to achieve national goals.
However by the mid 1980s, with poor growth, high unemployment, high inflation
and huge national debts, there was pressure to implement measures to stabilize the
economies and to focus on sustainable growth. The aim of the development plans was to
design policies to bring about structural changes such as the privatisation of government
assets and macroeconomic reforms that would reduce the national debt and generate
employment. The focus of the reforms has been to create incentives for market-led
development where the private sector could play a key role in the generation of
economic growth. Different uncertainties arise in the planning process of each national
economy given their unique character, resource endowment, capabilities and political
commitment. Plans have to be more flexible to adapt to such uncertainties. This
necessitates national planning machinery to specify medium to long-term strategic
directions for the various sectors.
In the case of the fisheries sector, the strategic development plans focused on re-

structuring State investments and promoting private sector-led export development. By
the late 1990s and into the present period, a number of Pacific Island States have taken
steps to develop their national tuna management and development plans (referred to as
tuna management plans). The tuna management plans are not only an outcome of
internal national interests but also part of an international obligation towards adopting
sustainable management and conservation practices for global resources. These tuna
management plans now provide the policy framework and strategies for national tuna
industry development.

3

General development approaches during this period were largely influenced by two major schools of
thought: the industrialisation theory associated with capitalism, and the dependency theory associated
with socialism. Many of the Pacific Island States chose a mixture of strategies from both ideologies.
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3.3

Strategies for domestic industry development

Strategies such as the creation of various types of joint ventures, State fisheries
corporations, vessel charters, contracts and access agreements have been used by the
Pacific Island States to derive greater benefits from their tuna resources. Sutherland and
Tsamenyi classify these strategies into two broad categories: access-based and
production-based. 4
The development process guided by the development plans, is characterised into
three periods: 1970s to 1980s, the 1990s decade, and the current period starting from
2000. These periods reflect both the influences of different economic development
approaches and changes in the fishery. The diverse nature of the Pacific Island States,
resulting from their different resource endowments, historical and political influences,
level of economic development and the relative importance of tuna, places the island
States at different stages of domestic industry development process. The following
discussion reviews the implementation of the various strategies by analysing the
development experience over time in some of the Pacific Island States using Sutherland
and Tsamenyi' s classification. 5
3.3.1

Access-based strategies

Access-based strategies are those designed to allow foreign fishing vessels to harvest
some or all of the allowable catch within the zone of extended jurisdiction, subject to
the payment of fees to the coastal State. 6 All Pacific Island States have some form of
access agreements with one or more DWFNs or foreign fishing companies. Access
agreements are preferred by States that do not have the financial and technical expertise
and capabilities to exploit the entire allowable catch of the fish stock within their zones.
Access agreements have been the dominant means of obtaining fisheries revenue for
Papua New Guinea, the FSM and the Marshall Islands in the 1970s and 1980s and still
remain a dominant means of deriving revenue for a number of smaller Pacific Island
States. 7

4

W. Sutherland and B.M. Tsamenyi, Law and Politics in Regional Co-operation: A Case Study of
Fisheries Co-operation in the South Pacific, Pacific Law Press: Hobart, Australia, 1992, p.14.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid, p.17.
7
World Banlc, Pacific Island Economies:building a resilient economic base for the twenty first century
World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1996.
'
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Besides generating revenue an access agreement serves two purposes. First, it
provides the legal framework for regulating the foreign fishing vessel in national waters.
Second, it provides indirect benefits either as part of the agreement or as a side payment
during negotiations. These indirect benefits take such forms as the provision of goods
and services, training and employment of locals, infrastructure development, market
access and other non-fishery benefits. Some of these indirect benefits are seen as a
means of providing transfer of technology and providing the necessary infrastructure
and training for domestic development. For example, a special development assistance
fund is allocated to each of the Pacific Island member States under the US Multilateral
Treaty, besides the access fee. These funds are largely used to enhance domestic
capabilities such as facilitating fisheries training and purchase of gear and equipment. 8
Bilateral access agreements also result in benefits such as the provision of goods
and services, foreign aid, grants and technical assistance. 9 While the indirect benefits
provides assistance towards development of domestic tuna industrial capability, these
have been criticised. 10 The key point of criticism is that most of the agreements have not
provided the benefits envisaged.11 Another criticism is that the DWFNs use these
indirect benefits as leverage to keep access fees low. 12
Licensing of foreign vessels has been regulated under national fisheries laws
which specify the terms and conditions for access. To facilitate the development oflocal
fishing, since the 1990s a number of the Pacific Island States have established shorebased facilities and have resorted to forms of licensing arrangements whereby foreign
vessels are required to land catch in domestic ports, employ certain percentage of local
crew and use shore-based facilities. For example in Fiji, the Taiwanese longliners were
required to land catch at the Pafco cannery in lieu of paying a 5% access fee. These are
seen as indirect forms of domestication under access agreements that could generate
spin-off benefits to local economies. (For further discussion of this point in the regional
context, see chapter 6).

8

Personal Communication - Josie Tamate, Project Economist, Forum Fisheries Agency, June, 2002.
For example, bilateral access agreements with Japan where a number oflsland states has been recipients
of ice plants, port infrastructure, storage facilities, fishing vessels and technical assistance.
1 For example see S. Tarte, Japan's Aid Diplomacy in the Pacific Islands, Pacific Policy Paper 26,
Australian National University, Canberra, 1998; S. Tarte, "In the Swim", in T. Teaiwa, S. Tarte, N.
Maclellen and M. Penjueli (eds), Turning the Tide: Towards a Pacific Solution to Conditional Aid,
Chapter 1, Greenpeace, Suva, 2002, pp.14-24.
11
Ibid.
12 Ibid. '
9
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Access-based strategies have been perceived as an interim measure pending the
development of local industries. The indirect means of deriving benefits is difficult to
determine since a number of different types of agreements exist with different levels of
domestic commitments. Most bilateral agreements are highly confidential documents
that are not easily accessible. As such, it has not been possible to analyse the net
benefits derived by the Pacific Island States from access agreements. In any case, it is
beyond the scope of the thesis to examine access agreements thoroughly.

3.3.2

Production-based strategies

Production-based strategies focus on the harvesting of tuna and/or processing, and
require the development of shore-based infrastructure and facilities. The main drive for
these strategies is to develop a vertically integrated industry that could create
opportunities for greater involvement of locals. With capital and technical resource
limitations, the Pacific Island States initially required co-operation with foreign interests
through joint ventures and charter arrangements. This was seen to facilitate the
transition to a viable domestic harvesting and processing industry.

3.3.2.1 Development period: late 1970s-1980s

This development period is characterised by the establishment of national fishing fleets
and processing plants by the government as sole owner and operator or in joint ventures
with foreign companies. The dominance of public investment has occurred because of
lack of domestic private capital and the availability of development finance through
foreign aid. Other factors included the existence of foreign fishing bases that were
already servicing the Japanese and other foreign fishing vessels, and initial positive tuna
resource surveys. A number of the Pacific Island States also had preferential access to
the European market under the Lome Convention as members of the African Caribbean
and Pacific (ACP) Group.
The tuna development experience in Fiji, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Papua New
Guinea, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu is briefly discussed.
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Fiji - With positive survey results of skipjack tuna in the Fijian waters, the National
Development Plan Seven covering the period 1976-1980 stated the following specific

objectives with regard to the tuna fisheries sector: 13

•

maximise the overall benefit to the national economy;

•

maximise employment of local people;

•
•

develop exports with maximum value added;

•

produce fishmeal for local use; and

•

provide local share participation.

substitute for imports of canned fish;

The strategies adopted to implement the above objectives were the establishment of a
State-owned national fishing corporation (IKA Corporation Ltd) and the formation of a
government joint venture Pacific Fishing Company Ltd (Pafco) with a Japanese
company to develop a cannery. The cannery joint venture provided a means of
overcoming the lack of adequate capital and the transfer of technology. The joint
venture terms included equity participation by the government, an assurance on
progressive localisation, a timetable for cannery development, and an obligation to
purchase skipjack and other tunas from local fishermen and enterprises. 14
The task of the wholly government owned fishing corporation was to contract
foreign vessels in the initial years, supply domestic markets and the Pafco cannery,
identify the type of vessel most suited for local conditions and to promote the locally
owned fishing enterprise. 15 A timeline was provided for a vessel construction
programme and for the employment of locals. 16 Achieving the above objectives of IKA
and Pafco and the subsequent implementation of the national development plans for Fiji
are discussed in chapter 5 under the case study of Fiji.

Solomon Islands - Parallel production-based strategies through joint venture with a
foreign company, and development of a national fishing corporation were established in
the Solomon Islands. The broad policy aims of the Solomon Islands government had
13

Central Planning Office, Fiji's Seventh National Development Plan, Government Printer: Suva, 1975,
p.93.
14
Ibid., p.94.
IS Ibid.
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been to attract foreign capital, increase expertise, localise employment progressively,
increase foreign exchange and tax revenue, and decentralise development.

17

Solomon Taiyo Limited (STL) was established in 1973 as a joint venture between
the Solomon Islands government and Taiyo Gyogyo Kabuki Kaisha of Japan, to operate
initially with eight Okinawan pole and line boats. 18 The Solomon Islands government
was given 25% of the equity in lieu of access by the company to the EEZ of the
Solomon Islands. 19 In exchange, the Taiyo Company provided the start-up capital,
vessels and crew, and a commitment to build a cannery and support facility at Tulagi.
STL exported canned tuna, frozen tuna and small amounts of arabushi (smoked dried
tuna). The Company also operated a fleet of pole and line vessels, including the
chartered Okinawan pole and line vessels, and later included a group of purse seiners in
its fleet. The first joint venture agreement expired in 1982 and was replaced by a second
joint venture agreement for ten years. The Agreement specified the following
conditions: 20
•

nationalisation of fisheries;

•

construction ofNoro Cannery;

•

majority control of STL by Solomon Islands government; and

•

expansion of fishing activities and diversification of fishing methods.

Maruha Corporation of Japan took over the Taiyo Company in 1994. During the second
agreement, and with the take-over by Maruha, a number of changes were introduced to
make the company profitable. 21 Until the closure of the STL in August 2000, the
cannery was the second largest employer in the Solomon Islands after the public

16

Increase in the number of vessels from one in 1975 to nine by 1980 with the number of trained fishers
to increase from 18 in 1975 to at least 120 by 1980. [Central Planning Office, Seventh Development Plan
1976-1980, Government Printer, Suva, 1975, p.95).
17
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Brief on Historical and Policy Context of Solomon Taiyo
Ltd, 18 March 1992.
18
See a detailed description on the operations of Solomon Taiyo Limited's during 1972-1987 in AV.
Hughes, "High Speed on an Unmade Road: Solomon Islands Joint venture, Route to a Tuna Fisheries
Industry" in D.J. Doulman (ed.), Tuna Issues and Perspectives in the Pacific Islands Region, East West
Center: Hawaii ,1987, pp.203-224.
19
Ibid, [The Solomon Islands government shareholding was increased to 49% in 1979 and to 51% in the
second joint venture period].
20
Asian Development Banlc, Solomon Islands 1997 Economic Report, Pacific Studies Series, Asian
Development Bank, Manila, 1998.
21
Ibid - See details on the number of major changes to cannery operations.
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servtce, and the largest single employer of women. 22 Several studies quantify the
benefits to the owners of STL, the local economy and the national economy. 23 The
· exports of tuna from STL accounted for 11.5 % of the GDP of the Solomon Islands in
1995.24
Despite the vanous economic and social benefits to the Solomon Islands'
economy, the joint venture operation never reached its full potential. 25 The original
objectives envisaged by the Solomon Island government of localising the cannery and
operating it as a viable industry under the effective control of Solomon Island nationals
was not achieved. The localisation objective and the financial performanceof STL are
discussed below to demonstrate the reasons behind its failure to achieve government
objectives.
Targets for localisation of employment were set in percentage terms for vessels
and shore-based operations. 26 This is interesting because the employment of Solomon
Island nationals had progressively increased in areas of unskilled labour supply such as
crew and cannery workers. However, executive positions, senior technical and
supervisory positions were still largely held by expatriates. There was very limited
localisation at the senior management and marketing level. The corporate plan indicates
that of the 12 senior management positions, Solomon Islanders filled two. 27 In the
domestication of a cannery that is export oriented, crucial positions where expertise is
needed most are the senior management and marketing areas. In the case of STL, the
Japanese partner continued holding control over management and marketing positions.28
The reasons cited by the company were lack of local experts, skills and experience. 29

22

T. Aqorau, "Sustainable management and development of Solomon Islands Fisheries Sector'', Pacific
Economic Bulletin, 2001, 16(2), p.121; K. Barclay and K. Yoshikazu, "Solomon Taiyo: tuna dreams
realised'', Pacific Economic Bulletin, 2000, 15(1), pp.34-47.
23
See for example R. Gillett, M. McCoy, L. Rodwell and J. Tamate, Tuna: A Key Economic Resource in
the Pacific Islands, Pacific Studies Series, Asian Development Bank, Manila: Philippines, 2001.
24
D. Forsyth, "The Impact of Lome Development assistance on Pacific ACP Budget", in Forum
Secretariat (ed.), The Lome Convention and the Pacific, Forum Secretariat and University of the South
Pacific, Suva, 1998, pp.19-51
25 The STL generates an estimated net foreign exchange of $30-$35 million annually, employs more than
2000 locals and makes annual purchases of about $40-$45 million worth of goods and services
domestically, and pays $6 million annually to national and provincial governments and the national
provident fund. See details in Asian Development Bank (1998), op.cit., n.21.
26
Hughes (1987), op. cit., n.19, p.206.
27
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28 K. Barclay and K. Yoshikazu, "Solomon Taiyo: tuna dreams realised", Pacific Economic Bulletin,
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STL's financial performance has also been poor. Hughes describes the financial
history of the company as a saga of deficits on shareholders' funds and that its solvency
crises would have sunk any normal private enterprise. 30 Huge accumulated losses have
been recorded despite restructuring, conversion of debt to preference shares, equity
injection, rebate of commission by the Taiyo Company, and tax concessions by the
Solomon Islands government. 31 From 1973 to 1993, STL made a total profit of$ 7.9
million and accumulated losses totalling $107.2 million. 32 Major investment loans were
financed by Japanese yen, Okinawan crew were paid in yen and most of the external
supplies of goods and services were also from Japan. 33 These contributed to a high cost
structure that worsened when the yen appreciated in the late 1980s and 1990s.

34

Sales

commission for the Taiyo Company and export tax for the Solomon Islands government
were paid from cash flow rather than profits which undermined the profitability of the
venture. 35 Although the Maruha Corporation tried to bring about structural changes
during the second joint venture period, the accumulated losses continued to reduce the
profitability of the company.
In terms of return on investment from STL for the government as the majority

shareholder since 1982, one can say that the outcome is negative. The investment has
left the government exposed to huge debt. 36 The Maruha Corporation has withdrawn its
operations, and the Solomon Islands government and the Western Province now own
the cannery and operate under the name of Soltai. Operations are scaled down and
largely cater to the domestic and regional markets although attempts are being made to
revive trade to UK under the ACP-EU Preferential Agreement. 37
A State fishing corporation, National Fisheries Development (NFD), was
established in 1977 by the Solomon Islands government to accelerate the nationalisation

30
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of the tuna industry.

38

NFD was seen as a potential vehicle for developing local fleet

capacity, providing training, and to assist in speeding up development of national
management capability in the tuna industry. 39 NFD is based in Tulagi where it has
collection and transshipment facilities, cold storage, and a repair and maintenance
facility. It operated a pole and line fleet and two purse seine vessels. The pole and line
fleet has become obsolete, with the purse seine and longline vessels currently in
operation. In the initial years of its operation, most of the catch of NFD went to the STL
cannery which had 25% shareholding in NFD. Most of the catch now goes to canneries
in the Philippines and Thailand.40
Since the start of the operations, NFD has faced financial problems. The ferrocement pole and line boats were poorly designed and therefore not cost effective. 4 1
Losses in 1988 were $2.6 million when two purse seiners were added to the fleet. By
1990 the liabilities of the company increased to more than $9 million. 42 Operating losses
were incurred in all years between 1979 to 1989, except in 1984, with accumulated
losses of $12.2 million by the late 1980s.43 The problems encountered byNFD included
the high freight cost to and from Honiara, high labour absenteeism, poorly designed and
old pole and line vessels, and inconsistent policies regarding fees and charges. 44 In
1990, the NFD was sold to BC Packers of Canada and in 1998, it was taken over by the
Tri Marine International that operates as a locally-based foreign company. 45
The experience of NFD also indicates that while benefits have accrued to the
Solomon Islands in terms of providing employment and foreign exchange, the
operations led the government into long-term debt, resulting in ultimate take-over by
foreign companies to keep the fishing fleet and the Tulagi fishing base operational.
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Kiribati - The Kiribati National Development Plan (1983-1986) stated: ''The Kiribati

government is committed to fisheries development as its most important single
development objective, and success in this area is critical for the economic survival of
Kiribati.''46 "The main vehicle for development of Kiribati industrial tuna fisheries is
7

the government owned national fishing company Te Mautari Limited (TML).''4 (The
domestic development experience of Kiribati tuna industry is discussed in the case study
in chapter 4).
Papua New Guinea - In the early 1970s four foreign companies had formed joint

agreements with the Papua New Guinea government, then under Australian control, to
operate a pole and line fishery. 48 The terms of the joint agreements were:

49

•

progressively bring the fleet under the Papua New Guinea flag;

•

develop a localisation programme for the employment and training of Papua New
Guinea nationals;

•

subject to resource surveys and land availability, base vessels in other areas of the
country apart from Kavieng;

•

progressively increase the proportion of catch processed in Papua New Guinea;

•

purchase tuna from national fishermen at an acceptable price; and

•

purchase as many supplies domestically as practicable.

The Papua New Guinea government agreed to facilitate land, access to PNG waters and
exclusive access to bait. When Papua New Guinea became self-governing in 1972, it
announced an eight-point plan that outlined the socio-economic development goals of
Papua New Guinea. The eight-point plan stressed equality, self-reliance and rural
development. 50
Only two companies established shore-based facilities in Papua New Guinea, the
New Britain Fishing Industry (a subsidiary of Gollin Kyokuyo), which operated a
katsubushi plant, and Star-Kist (PNG) which had a cold storage facility in Rabaul. By

46

Republic of Kiribati, Kiribati National Development Plan (1983-1986), approved by Maneaba Ni
Maungatabu, 1985, p.96.
47
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48
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the end of 1979 the katsubushi plant closed down and by 1982 both companies had
terminated their operations. The reasons for the withdrawal of Star-Kist were that the
company was re-structuring and wanted to phase out its pole and line fishing activity. 51
The canneries it operated were being supplied instead with purse seine catch by the US
purse seiners that were more cost effective than pole and line vessels. 52
The closure of the domestic fishing operations affected about 1200 Papaua New
Guinea nationals and commerce in Rabaul and Kavieng where the tuna fleets were
based.

53

With depressed world prices for skipjack tuna in the early 1980s the Papua

New Guinea government placed greater attention on deriving revenue from access
agreements. 54
The major internal constraints hindering the development of the domestic tuna
industry included the lack of adequate skilled labour, lack of infrastructure such as
wharves and utilities, high cost of inputs, and government's inconsistent policies on
equity participation, the deteriorating law and order situation, and the lack of coordination between central and provincial governments. 55

Tuvalu - Three programmes were identified for the fisheries sector under the Third
Development Plan of Tuvalu covering the period 1984-1987. These included licensing

of foreign vessels, development of small-scale fisheries, and development of exportoriented commercial tuna fishing. 56 A 170 gross register tonnage (GRT) pole and line
vessel was acquired with Japanese aid in 1982 as a fisheries training vessel. A national
fishing corporation was established to assume responsibility for the management of this
vessel named "Te Tautai".
Due to poor trial operations and lack of bait, the vessel signed an agreement with
the IKA Corporation of Fiji at the end of 1982. The vessel has also been used to fish in
Solomon Islands and Kiribati waters, and has been leased by the Secretariat of the
Pacific Community (formerly known as the South Pacific Commission) for use in
conducting tuna research.
Ibid.
Ibid.
s R. Kuk, "The Papua New Guinea Tuna Fisheries: an Overview", in H. Campbell and A. D. Owen
(eds.), The Economics of Papua New Guinea's Tuna Fisheries, The Australian Centre for International
Agricultural Research, Canberra, 1994, p.25.
s4 Ibid, p.24.
ss Ibid. Also see Forum Fisheries Agency, Tuna Industry Development Study, Papua New Guinea, FFA
Report 95/36, Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, 1995.
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The commercial fishing operations of the "Te Tautai" have not been profitable due
to its large size resulting in high operating costs, and also because of depressed skipjack
prices. 57 In the subsequent Development Plan period (1988-1991), the government's
focus shifted to artisanal fisheries development and deriving benefits through licensing
of foreign vessels. 58
Vanuatu - Like Tuvalu, the Vanuatu government initially had similar high aspirations

to develop the domestic tuna industry. The First National Development Plan (19811986) identified the need for the development of a locally-based industrial-scale fishery
to exploit the tuna resources within its EEZ, and to develop a domestic tuna processing
facility. 59 As starting projects, the plan identified feasibility studies and operational
trials. However, not much actual implementation took place during this period.
The aim of the Second Development Plan (1987-1991) was to consolidate gains
achieved during the First Plan period and where possible diversify in areas that received
little priority previously. The Second Plan's objective was to begin the development of
a small locally-based tuna fishery and to revive the operations of the South Pacific
Fishing Company based at Palekula on Espirito Santo. 60 The Plan further reiterated that
vessels for experimental trials would be crewed by experienced Ni-Vanuatu (Vanuatu
citizens) distant water fishers with assistance initially from an expatriate captain and a
.
.
semor engmeer.
Due to the low tuna prices during the plan period, the projects for domestic
development of shore facilities and fleet operations did not go ahead. With low catch
rates of tuna in its fishing zone and limited domestic capital, Vanuatu has relied on
licensing of foreign vessels by operating an open vessel registry.
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3.3.2.2 Development period-1990s to 2000
Consolidation of development initiatives continued from the previous period into the
1990s for Fiji and the Solomon Islands which operated a tuna cannery, and a pole and
line fleet. Other island States that had previously relied on access agreements resorted to
development policies that required foreign vessels to re-locate to domestic ports. These
included the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea and the Marshall
Islands. New public investments in vessels, cold storage, port infrastructure and
fishbases were established in the Federated States of Micronesia, Solomon Islands,
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, and Tonga. Domestic private investment initiatives were also
undertaken predominantly in Fiji and to a lesser extent in Papua New Guinea and the
Solomons Islands. The following section outlines some of these developments
experiences of the Federated States of Micronesia, Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands,
Papua New Guinea and Tonga.

Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) - Strategies to develop domestic tuna
industries included the establishment of public enterprises and joint ventures as well as
the construction of shore-based facilities for transshipment of catches through domestic
ports and lease of airfreight planes. 61
The policy established by the FSM Congress before the termination of the
trusteeship with the USA was that of maximising net returns from FSM's EEZ through
access agreements. 62 The strategy was to establish the Micronesian Maritime Authority
(MMA) to develop Micronesian capability to manage fisheries, to conduct monitoring
and surveillance and to carry out negotiations with foreign companies. 63
The FSM central government and individual State governments 64 felt that fishing
opportunities were being lost and that policies were needed that gave weight to
increasing domestic employment as opposed to maximising income from access. 65 The
objectives of the commercial fisheries sector, stated in the Second Development Plan,
(1992-1996) include the following:

61

66

Micronesian Maritime Authority, Annual Report, 1995, p.11.
E.D. Miles, A Fisheries Policy for the Federated States of Micronesia, Microneasian Maritime
Authority, Federated States of Micronesia, 1991, p.6.
63
Ibid.
64
State governments include: the States ofKosrae, Chuuk, Ponape and Yap.
65
Ibid.
66 Office of Planning and Statistics, Second National Development Plan (1992-1996), Government of the
Federated States of Micronesia, 1992.
62

76

•

substantial domestic involvement in the tuna fishery to be attained within 10 years;

•

tuna-related on-shore capital investment including processing, should be made in
each State;

•

tuna resources should be managed for long term sustained yield; and

•

liaison should be further developed between the government, the States, the MMA,
the NFC, and other involved entities.

The National Fisheries Corporation (NFC) was established in 1987 to facilitate
commercial fisheries development in the FSM. Among the functions of the NFC were
included: 67
•

facilitating transshipment of catches by purse seine vessels within the FSM Zone;

•

training ofFSM nationals in purse seine technology;

•

developing port and support infrastructure for commercial purse seine operations;

•

developing locally-based processing and marketing facilities under joint venture;

•

developing locally-based longline industry under joint venture;

•

developing a regular and reliable air freight capability for longline fishery; and

•

expanding economic and employment opportunities for the FSM.

The NFC was financially assisted by the government to establish joint ventures and to
68

promote domestic fisheries development through the use of Compact Funds. All FSM
State governments and the central government have invested in either purse seine and/or
longline operations and have cold storage and transshipment facilities. 69 The
investments are either as sole owners and operators or held in majority shares in joint
ventures with either national governments and/or foreign partners. 7° For example, the
NFC has been a partner with the Caroline Fishing Corporation (CFC) 71 and the Yap
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Fishing Corporation {YFC) all of which operated purse seine vessels. The Taones cold
storage facility in Chuuk which was constructed in 1986 with Japanese aid, is owned by
the Chuuk State government and NFC. 73 The facility was of little use until Ting Hong, a
Taiwanese company, leased the facility as its local base. 74
In 1993, the FSM government banned transshipment of purse seine catches on the
high seas and required vessels to transship in designated ports. This was to provide
better monitoring of catch and facilitate the creation of shore-based linkages from
provisioning and servicing of the vessels. 75 However, the nature of purse seine
operations is such that they make very limited use of shore-based facilities since it is
more cost effective for these vessels to conduct their activities on the high seas. 76
Therefore the contribution to the local economy from the use of shore-based facilities
by purse seiners has been limited. In 1996, when the government required the largest
longline foreign fleet, Ting Hong, to use the State's on-shore facilities, the company
pulled out from FSM, and moved to the Marshall Islands. 77
As a means of increasing benefits through providing services such as fuel, food
supplies, bait and ice; concessionary licences were granted to longline vessels that
utilised FSM ports. However, longline fishing is a highly risky business that requires a
high degree of logistical co-ordination from production to final market destination. 78
With the lack of skilled labour, and the government bureaucracy, high transport costs,
and the lack of direct frequent flights to Japan or to Guam, vessels have often
transshipped directly in Guam. 79
The FSM government has invested over US $100 million in developing a
domestic fishing industry by building onshore support facilities, infrastructure, and
through the acquisition of vessels for fishing. 80 Investments however have not yielded
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the desired results. The 1996 Annual Report of the MMA states "that studies on these
investments show that most are either failing or have already failed, and it will be only a
matter of time before others fail unless the government infuses more public funds to
keep operations going". 81
This lack of success can be attributed to several factors at both the operational and
the strategic level. Among the problems are the lack of effective project planning and
advice by consultants on appropriate investments. 82 Projects were put together without
proper assessments to take advantage of the Compact Funds provided by the US
government. 83 "Based on such advice, most of the FSM's investments in purse seine
boats turned out to be either the wrong type or wrong size for the area's tuna stocks and
local conditions, and/or were tremendously overpriced."84 During the time vessels
became operational, skipjack tuna prices had begun to decline which also ultimately
contributed to the high cost of operations. 85 Other factors related to the lack of skilled
personnel available for large-scale tuna operations, jurisdictional conflicts between State
governments and the national government, and inadequate law enforcement. 86 Practical
problems such as inadequate docking space in Chuuk, mechanical breakdown of ice
plants, deteriorating quality of the runway in Yap, and variability in catch levels also
contributed to low returns. 87

Solomon Islands - One of the key policies for the Solomon Islands government has
been the decentralisation of development through the provincial governments. For the
exploitation of tuna resources a national quota was determined and allocated to STL and
the provincial governments. The provincial governments established a number of purse
seine joint venture operations with foreign companies. For example, in 1992, Russfil
Marine Inc., a Manila-based company, formed a joint venture with Malaita Province
called the Malaita-Russfil. The joint venture was to engage in tuna fishing in the
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Solomon Islands EEZ; to purchase other marine products for export; and to establish a
shore-based facility in Auki with a refrigerated warehouse and an office. 88
Several weaknesses have been identified in the joint venture agreement, ranging
from the legality of the arrangement to the inadequacy of project appraisal. 89 For
· example, Russfil had the power to determine the level of management and operating
expenses, and to establish accounting practices. There was no specification regarding
the nature and extent of technology transfer or the capital structure of the joint
venture.

90

This gave the company powers to determine the level of payments without

any consultation with the Province. At the end of 1993 the company withdrew its
operations, claiming that it was faced with technical problems and a lack of skilled
crew.

91

However, it proposed that a new fleet would commence operations under a

revised financial arrangement, but the agreement was terminated because the Province
had received no payments and no shore facilities were established as required under the
joint-venture agreement. 92 The Solomon Islands' government had granted a five-year
tax holiday, full import duty concessions on capital goods and 50% remission on fuel
import duty. 93 The benefits from the joint venture, if any, were insignificant.
In 1990, a joint venture between Makira Province and the Frabelle Fishing

Company of Manila was formed. The project involved a three-phase development:
purchase of two purse seine vessels, establishment of a fresh water farm, and a
cannery. 94 It was anticipated that some 130 expatriate and 44 local workers would be
employed, by the Frabelle Fishing Company and that the balance would shift over time
so that by the fifteenth year, only 47 expatriates would remain, and about 203 locals
would be employed. 95 To expedite this process, the company was to provide training
programmes on all aspects of management and operations. 96
When fishing started in 1991 all employees were expatriates and all transshipment
was carried out on the high seas since shore facilities were not available. 97 In 1994, the
Minister of Fisheries terminated the agreement because the company was making losses
88
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and had no investments in the Solomon Islands. The venture was seen merely as a
foreign partner seeking access. 98 A number of other similar joint ventures were
established at the Provincial level, most of which failed to deliver the benefits expected,
and many of which ceased operations after one or two years.

99

Several reasons contributed to the failure. These range from lack of availability of
crucial inputs, lack of integration of policies at the national and Provincial government
levels on industry expansion, and various types of corrupt practices.

°For example, the

10

foreign companies complained of a lack of skilled local workers and a lack of
entrepreneurship among local people, but they took no steps to provide the needed
training. 101 The Provincial governments were in weaker negotiating positions because of
their lack of understanding of the operation of foreign firms or of the tuna industry.
Consequently they accepted agreements that were vague in terms of commitments by
foreign partners. 102 In some cases local signatories looked for short-term gains rather
than the long term interests of their provinces. 103 Aqorau argues the period between
1991 to 1997 in the Solomon Islands tuna fisheries development could be labelled as
"... the period of tuna disintegration because of the vigorous push to domesticate the
tuna industry''. 104 There was abuse of ministerial responsibilities because of corrupt
practices. 105 The Tuna Management Plan (1999) confirms: " ... in wake of the joint
ventures, the early 1990s were characterised by excessive issue of quotas (~700,000
t[onnes] compared with a total allowable catch of ~129,000 t[onnes]), arbitrary issuing
of licences and the over-riding individual interests." 106 These were further exacerbated
by inadequate monitoring and the ineffective surveillance capabilities of the
government. 107
In 1994, a private fishing company, Solgreen, was established as a private joint

venture between Japanese and Solomon Islands' nationals. The venture targets
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yellowfin that is air freighted to the Japanese sashimi market. 108 The company is still
operational at a reduced rate despite problems with the transportation of catch amidst
the ethnic tension in the Solomon Islands. 109
In the Solomon Islands' experience, gains from domestication efforts through

State joint ventures were minimal because of lack of effective joint venture agreements
to derive any direct or spin-off benefits. None of the joint ventures with Provincial
governments made any permanent shore-based investments. Moreover, by 1997, the
Solomon Islands fishery resources were under threat as a result of unsustainable
harvesting and lack of management. 110

Marshall Islands - The Marshall Islands Development Authority (MIDA) was
established as a business arm of the government in 1984. It has been the key agency
involved in the development of commercial fisheries in the Marshall Islands. The many
functions of the MIDA include the development and implementation of projects alone,
or in association with other agencies and to improve the socio-economic status of
Marshallese people. 111 The strategies used include 112 :
•

advise and promote new business or expand existing business;

•

assist with subsidies to business enterprises;

•

make or guarantee loans for business development; and

•

form, or participate in, joint ventures.

MIDA invested in two 1200 tonne purse seiners in early 1990 and encouraged local
interests to invest in the longline fishery through loan assistance. None of these ventures
were successful and MIDA incurred hugh financial losses.

113

The Marshall Islands government's fisheries policies under its Second
Development Plan (1990/91-1995/1996) focussed on locally-based longline fishing and

the operation of a transshipment base. 114 In 1995, a Taiwanese Company, Tong Hong
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Ltd, negotiated a 20-year lease of the Majuro Fishbase 115 that was built under Japanese
aid but was under-utilised. 116 Under the terms of the lease, Ting Hong was given
exclusive rights to provide services on equal terms to all longline vessels using the
fishbase. 117 Ting Hong was also allocated 70 licences by the Marshall Islands Marine
Resources Authority. 118
A review of the operations of Ting Hong in 1997 revealed that while benefits were
positive, the operations were below that expected in the initial project.

119

Under the

agreement, training of Marshallese was required but up to the review period, there were
no indications that any formal training had taken place. 120 The review also pointed out
that sub-optimal results are partly attributed to weaknesses in the contract which did not
specify the extent of domestic services to be purchased by the vessels, the size and
number of vessels and the type of training needed. 121 The vessels using the
infrastructure and facilities have been mostly Taiwanese and smaller Chinese
longliners. 122 The crews of these vessels do not spend much while on-shore and make
only basic purchases since they repatriate their wages home to their families. 123
Attracting Marshallese crew onto these vessels has also not been successful since the
wages are below public service wages in the Marshall Islands. 124
The objective of the New Fisheries Strategy (1997) is to establish long term
arrangements with DWF vessels and companies, and have minimal government
involvement in the production and development of a competitive commercial
environment. 125 The aim is to improve foreign access agreements and to encourage
foreign fleets to base themselves in Majuro. 126
The initial experience of the Marshall Islands in direct public investments was
unsuccessful. However, with greater involvement of the private sector, there has been
115
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an increase in foreign interests that have led to an expansion of the domestic industry. 127
A review of the involvement of major locally-based foreign companies has shown that
while there are positive benefits, these benefits are less than was anticipated. 128 Training
and encouragement of Marshallese would be necessary if domestication continues to be
a desired goal. 129

Papua New Guinea - Many factors have contributed to the shaping of the fisheries
policies in Papua New Guinea in the 1990s. During the 1980s Papua New Guinea had
largely relied on access agreements to derive benefits from its tuna resources while the
Fisheries Department was focussed on the development of the inshore resources. 130
By the early 1990s, the Papua New Guinea economy was depressed and began

a

structural adjustment programme upon advice from the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. 131 National policies were designed to rationalise and
down size the public sector. An environment that stimulated economic growth became
necessary. Under the Fisheries Act (1994), the National Fisheries Authority was formed
to promote economic growth. The Authority was charged with promoting private sector
growth in fisheries development aimed at maximising Papua New Guinea participation
in terms of employment, commercial investment, economic returns, access to a cash
economy, and an improved standard of living. 132 The main focus for growth shifted to
offshore tuna fisheries through promoting direct domestic investments and encouraging
existing foreign operations to move their operations ashore. 133
Consequently, in 1995, the government banned the issue of distant water fishing
licences to longline vessels. 134 It was envisaged that this policy would allow the use of
the Papua New Guinea flag by foreign longliners and/or establish relationships with
offshore investors or vessel owners and Papua New Guinea interests to invest in Papua
New Guinea through joint ventures or charters.
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In 1995 the government licensed two large distant water purse seiners to fish in

Papua New Guinea under its flag. A Filipino purse seine venture also began operations
with medium sized vessels under access agreement and has gradually based its services
in domestic ports. 136 In 1996, a number of taxes and tariffs such as import and export
tax, and fuel tax were removed or reduced to provide incentives for foreign and
domestic vessels. 137
A review of the policy to ban the issue of licences to foreign longline operators
revealed that the domestication objective had not been achieved and the outcome was
sub-optimal. 138 The domestic sector was not able to take the place previously occupied
by foreign operators within the review period. 139 The reasons for the lack of success
were low investment capital, infrastructure and marketing linkages, and limited skilled
labour. 140 Other problems related to a lack of co-ordination between Provincial
fisheries' departments and the National Fisheries Authority. 141 The loss of revenue in
taxes and incentives was higher than the total benefits in terms of linkages to the
domestic economy. 142
Following the review, the government changed its policy from banning longline
operations to a sliding scale licensing system based on time period and cost structure. 143
This allows for greater flexibility for foreign operations to identify local investment
opportunities. It also enables local interests to get better acquainted with the foreign
partners. 144
The Papua New Guinea government's current aim is to progressively domesticate
the longline fishery and conduct a staged domestication of its purse seine fishery. 145 As
part of the domestication strategy, onshore processing of catch is being encouraged
through the development of a tuna management plan.
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Tonga - The government strategy to develop the tuna fisheries before 1993 had been to
limit the involvement of the tuna industry to the State. 146 This had effectively ruled out
any foreign participation. 147
A longliner (Lofa) was acquired by the government in 1982. It carried out
seasonal commercial fishing trials. The catch was supplied to the Pago Pago cannery
and on a few occasions to Pafco. The operation of the vessel was not profitable, as catch
rates were poor. 148
The government established a State-owned fishing enterprise (Sea Star Fishing
Company) in 1990. The operations of the longliner were transferred to the company that
also acquired three more longliners that targeted albacore for canneries in Pago Pago
and Fiji. Sea Star had the sole right, granted by the cabinet, to fish in Tongan waters. 149
However, these rights were rescinded in 1993 and the government opened the Tongan
waters to other Tongan interests. Currently there are three fishing companies: two
privately owned companies that target sashimi tuna for exports and the government
owned Sea Star Company. 150
The Tongan experience is an example of a nationalistic approach to domestic
development where foreign involvement was initially excluded. Foreign investors need
to form joint-ventures with Tongan nationals or companies if they wish to operate a
commercial tuna fishery.

3.3.2.3

Development period - 2000 to present

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) carried out economic reviews in a number of
Pacific Island countries during the mid to late 1990s to identify strategies for economic
growth and reform. 151 One of the recommendations of the economic review reports was
the need to formulate a national tuna industry development strategy as a necessary
precursor to tuna industry expansion. As part of this recommendation and with parallel
development in the international and regional legal framework for management of
146
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highly migratory fish stocks, a number of FFA member States have developed, or are in
the process of developing, their national tuna management and development plans. The
tuna management plans provide the policy framework for managing and developing the
tuna industry. Based on the status of the tuna resources, the plans identify the annual
national total allowable catch and place limits on the number of licences, as well as
define the criteria for the allocation of licences. An important feature of the
management plans is the refinement of the aspirations of the Pacific Island States to
derive greater benefits from the tuna resources for their nationals. The plans
acknowledge the sovereign rights of the Pacific Island States to manage their tuna
resources and develop their domestic tuna industries. In view of the highly migratory
nature of the tuna stocks, the management plans acknowledge the need for international
and regional co-operation. The strategies for domestic development include preferential
licensing, incentives for foreign operators to base in local ports, forming joint ventures
with foreign partners, training locals, development assistance to local operators, and
infrastructure development. The case of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands,
Federated States of Micronesia and the Cook Islands are discussed.

Papua New Guinea - The Tuna Management Plan consists of a management

framework and an application framework that specifically focuses on three dominant
type of tuna fisheries in Papua New Guinea longline, purse seine and pole and line
fisheries. The objectives include: 152
•

maximising benefits to PNG from sustainable use of its tuna resources;

•

satisfying PNG's regional and international management and conservation
obligations while ensuring national interest as being foremost;

•

minimising adverse impacts of tuna fishing and related activities on the marine
environment, and on artisanal and traditional fishing sectors;

•

improving decision-making in relation to management; and

•

ensuring that the Plan is implemented and administered in a cost-effective manner.

The Plan provides a list of management strategies. These include:
•

152

establish a national total allowable catch (TAC) for each fishery, or by licence
category;

Government of Papua New Guinea, Fisheries Management Act of 1998 (No.48of1998), The National

Tuna Fishery Management Plan, 1999.
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•

implement limits set on fishing effort that are consistent with the national TAC
levels;

•

encourage and facilitate sustainable development of PNG's domestic tuna industry;

•

develop and apply criteria for licensing which gives preference to PNG operators;
and

•

support fiscal and developmental incentives to invest in the domestic tuna industry.

The PNG Tuna Management Plan specifically identifies domestication as a means of
tuna industry development. Section 15.2 states: "notwithstanding the overall objective
of the National Tuna Fishery Management Plan, which is aimed at sustainable
exploitation of the tuna resource, the principal objective of this policy is to promote an
increased rate of participation by Papua New Guineans in the tuna industry". 153 The
guidelines and conditions that support this policy are given in part three (operational
framework) of the Management Plan.
For the longline, pole and line and purse seine fisheries, the Management Plan
outlines the allocation criteria for licences and specifies a set of guidelines for the
operation of the fishery. Licences for longline and pole and line fisheries would be
issued to Papua Guinea -registered and flagged vessels and locally-based foreign fishing
vessels operated by Papua New Guinea's companies. 154 Likewise, for the purse seine
fishery, first priority would be given to vessels registered and flagged in Papua New
Guinea and second priority will be to locally-based foreign vessels operated by Papua
New Guinean fishing companies.

Solomon Islands - The objectives of the Solomon Islands government in managing its
.
155
tuna fi sh enes resources are:
•

to ensure that the tuna resources of the Solomon Islands are not exploited beyond
their optimal sustainable yields; and

•

within the limits set, to harvest the resource in such a way that maximises the
economic and social benefits received by the people of the Solomon Islands.

Section15.2-The Papua New Guinea National Tuna Fishery Management Plan, 1999.
Section 24.1 and Section 41.1 - The Papua New Guinea National Tuna Fishery Management Plan,
1999.
155 Government of Solomon Islands, Tuna 2000: Towards a Sustainable Fishery for the Next Millennium,
Solomon Islands National Tuna Management and Development Plan, Honiara, Solomon Islands, 1999,
p.10.
153
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Seven management goals are identified in the tuna management plan. These are
sustainable stocks; minimal environmental impacts; increased domestic participation;
increased foreign revenue; minimal social, cultural and gender impacts; administrative
and funding support, and accountability in decision making.
Under the Plan's goal of increased domestic participation, the government aims to
expand the domestic industry with a long-term view of using local resources and
reducing reliance on foreign access. 156 With limited skilled labour, the government
intends to encourage more direct participation of Solomon Islanders in diverse sectors
of the industry, to promote higher level positions for Solomon Islanders in all sectors,
and to facilitate growth of domestic industry through private sector development.

157

To overcome the constraints to development, the government is to develop a
package of incentives for the fisheries sector and also invest in targeted education and
training programmes. 158 The incentive package (fiscal assistance through tax and duty
exemptions) would be developed following a review of the fisheries revenue
framework, and is anticipated to form the key incentive for development.

159

Facilitating and expanding existing domestic operations including small-scale
fisheries and targeted training to fulfill skilled labour requirements are part of the
development strategies. 160 Private sector development for shore-based facilities,
including a supply and service sector, is also included as part of the domestication
strategies. The Management Plan therefore addresses present barriers to development
efforts and introduces new management obligations and strategies to ensure greater
local involvement.

Federated States of Micronesia - During the 1990s, as an outcome of the Economic
Summit Conferences, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) adopted an Oceanic
Fisheries Policy that defined its national fisheries policy. 161 The focus of the policy was
to direct commercial fisheries development away from government ownership into
private sector development, promote Micronesian-incorporated enterprises and value-
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added investments, and implement uniform control of fisheries access. The
Management Plan, while incorporating this policy, places much more emphasis on the
management of the tuna resources. Like other national tuna management plans, the FSM
Tuna Management Plan seeks to develop sustainable national fisheries that also meet
international and regional obligations. 162 However, there is an emphasis on management
to support national goals and objectives such as obtaining benefits from access
agreements. The principle which guides this goal is that maximum revenue from access
would only come from a well-managed fishery.
Access fees are seen as an important means of generating government revenue for
the FSM. However the relationship between foreign access and local development is
made more explicit under this Plan. Unlike the previous policy of encouraging foreign
vessels to base their operations in the FSM in lieu of access, the tuna management plan
requires carrying out an analysis of the relative benefits of local basing options against
access fee generated. Other new strategies also include limiting non-cash payments of
access fee to situations where net benefits are clear. 163 This aims to keep the access fee
separate from indirect benefits such as aid and grants.
Goals that encourage domestication include encouraging investment in enterprises
related to tuna and promoting employment opportunities. EmploYlllent of FSM citizens
on overseas vessels and shore-based facilities would involve improving labour
productivity through training, providing compatible wages and improved industry and
labour contacts with foreign vessel owners. 164 Investment opportunities would be
encouraged by creating a stable and favourable investment climate, making
infrastructure available at commercial rates, and by providing a competent work
force. 165
Cook Islands - In light of increased local and foreign interests in the Cook Islands
EEZ, the FFA carried out a review of the domestic policies in the Cook Islands in April

162

The specific goals adopted by the FSM for tuna fisheries management are to: (a) ensure that tuna catch
does not exceed sustainable levels, (b) obtain national revenue from foreign fishing access agreements,
(c) support development of FSM-owned and/or foreign FSM-based fishing enterprises, (d) encourage
investment in enterprises related to tuna fisheries, (e) promote employment opportunities, (f) enhance
international relationship beneficial to FSM. [Micronesian Maritime Authority, Plan for the Management
of Tuna in the Federated States ofMicronesia, November, 2000].
163
Ibid., p.28.
164 Ibid.
165
Ibid., p.16.
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2002. 166 The main purpose of the review was to determine if taxation, foreign
investment and lending policies were comparable to those operating in Fiji's and
Samoa's longline fisheries. A number of recommendations were made including the
need for a development strategy to guide domestic tuna industry development.

167

In response to the FFA review, a draft strategy has been developed for commercial tuna

longlining fisheries development (2003-2005). The principal objective of the strategy is:
To realise the long term economic development potential of the fishery by building a
national tuna longline industry that will benefit all Cook Islanders, paying special attention
to the development of commercial tuna fishing in the outer islands, taking into account the
realities existing on each island. 168

The draft strategy is seen as an interim measure that would provide the necessary
information for preparation of a long-term management regime.

169

The strategy takes

into account the development aspirations and the management and conservation
obligations. It specifies financial incentives, limits the number of licences, specifies
criteria for allocation of licences, fee structure, and the institutional arrangements
needed to develop the domestic tuna industry. 170
Under the domestic development initiatives, no foreign fishing vessel will be
licensed for tuna longlining. Preference will be given to vessels that are "local fishing
vessels" as defined by the Marine Resources Act of 1989. 171 A vessel that uses the Cook
Islands flag is eligible for $10,000 rebate on its access fee.1 72 A crew rebate of $10,000
is also allowed if at least 50% of the crew are Cook Islanders. A $20,000 rebate is
granted if fish is landed in the Cook Islands. 173 There are also other incentives such as
value-added tax rebate, accelerated depreciation, and duty-free import of equipment,
boats, bait and fuel for longline operations. 174

166

Forum Fisheries Agency, Cook Islands - Review of Domestic Policies, Forum Fisheries Agency,
Honiara, April, 2002.
167
Ibid.
168
Cook Islands Government, Commercial Tuna Longline Fisheries Development Strategy (2003-2005
draft), Raratonga, Cook Islands, 2002, p. l.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid.
171
Ibid. If a vessel is not categorised as a "local fishing vessel", other criteria such as the extent of its
ownership and control by Cook Islanders, whether the catch is landed in the Cook Islands, the extent of
employment of Cook Island crew and its contribution to outer island development will be taken into .
consideration. The licence would be for a year and would be phased by a vessel meeting the requirements
for a local fishing vessel.
172
Ibid.
173
Ibid.
174 Ibid.

91

3.4

Analysis of domestication experience

During the 1970s and 1980s, government management of the economy was the way not
only to run a modem economy, but also to transform a backward economy into a
modem one.

175

For the market to operate, government intervention was seen as

necessary. As McQueen notes:
For the intervention to be effective the government must have some overall plan to ensure
consistency among policy instruments such as taxation, interest rates, trade controls, and
among policy objectives such as growth of output and employment, and between policy
instruments and policy objectives. 176

The arguments in favour of planning were that planning addressed imperfections in the
factor and goods market such that account was taken of resource costs. 177 Planning also
addressed the externalities of efficient resource allocation, provided the knowledge and
expertise for talcing risks and for attracting foreign aid. 178 In the Pacific Island States,
governments took the lead role in industrial tuna development.
An analysis of the implementation of the development plans indicate that past

development efforts through national fishing corporations and State joint ventures in
processing have not achieved the development objectives as planned during the 1970s
and 1980s. A number of factors have contributed to the lack of success. These include
ineffective government management, poor project design, lack of essential inputs such
as skilled labour supply and capital, inadequate supplies of raw material, and
diseconomies of scale in production, all resulting in high unit cost of production. 179
While there have been specific problems unique to individual States, a number of
problems are common to most of the island States. These include infrastructure and
transportation problems, lack of entrepreneurial experience, high labour costs, lack of
.
.
. 180 These probl ems were
proper management, and mcons1stent
government pol"1c1es.

175

M. Spencer and J. Bacher, "Fundamental themes", in M.C. Spencer (ed.), Encyclopedia of
Nationalism, volume I, 2000, p.125.
'
176 M. McQueen, The Economics of Development: Problems and Policies, Redwood Press Ltd,
Trowbridge, Wiltshire, 1973, p.13.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
179 S. Pollard, Tuna Industry Development Regional Report, FF A Report 95/66, Forum Fisheries Agency,
Honiara, November, 1995. See also a synthesis of the major constraints in Asian Development Bank, The
Pacific's Tuna: The Challenge of Investing in Growth, Office of Pacific Operations, Manila, Phillipines,

1997, pp.27-62.
180

Ibid.
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further compounded by the nature of the global tuna industry that is highly competitive
and characterised by wide fluctuations in productiop. and prices.

181

The domestication of the tuna industry in the 1990s was driven by the economic
pressure to generate sustained growth under economic reforms. Some Pacific Island
States, namely Solomon Islands, the FSM, Marshall Islands and Tonga invested in
vessels and shore-based infrastructure. States that invested in capital-intensive purse
seine vessels and related shore-based activities experienced negative results. The
investments were costly, catch rates and tuna prices were highly variable and there was
a lack of skilled labour. The small size of island environments presented several
logistical problems for large-scale vessels to operate efficiently.
Towards the end of the 1990s most Pacific Islands adopted more flexible
strategies to attract foreign investment and began revising their investment policies for
the economy. The main thrust of structural adjustment and economic reform policies
has been towards greater involvement of the market through private sector development.
During this period there was also technological development in the tuna fishery with a
move towards longline fisheries.
While a domestic longline industry has developed in a number of Pacific Island
States, the actual net benefits to the national economies is still unclear due to incentives
given such as tax and duty concessions in lieu of access fees. Potential opportunities do
exist in the longline fishery but there are also a number of constraints to develop a
competitive longline fishery for sashimi tuna. The constraints include the need for an
effective and reliable transportation system and quality control.
The current period starting 2000 is largely influenced by the need to develop a
sustainable tuna industry by taking into account management and conservation aspects
of the fishery. This results from international and regional legal obligations for tuna
resource management, as well as from the need to create employment and generate
economic benefits. National strategy plans provide the strategic direction for domestic
tuna industry development. The policy direction in the national tuna management and
development plan is seen in the context of defining and securing fishing rights through
licensing arrangements. Domestication is seen as providing greater benefits for local
Pacific Island nationals through securing their access rights. The management plans are
evidence of the continued desire of the Pacific Island States to optimise benefits from

181

Ibid.
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their tuna resources. These plans are at an early stage of their development and/or
implementation. The main objective of the management plan is to achieve management
and conservation goals and to develop a system of limiting entry by creating "rights."

3.5

Conclusion

Through a review of the implementation of the national development plans, this chapter
has shown that Pacific Island States' aspirations to develop domestic tuna industries
have so far not been achieved. The development experiences show that the State-owned
enterprises such as domestic fleet and cannery operations, while fulfilling a vital socioeconomic role, nevertheless did not meet the planned objectives of progressing into
viable sustainable domestic tuna industries. The development of the sashimi longline
industry through private capital and private joint-ventures shows some potential gains
for local economies, and is therefore seen by nearly all Island States as a "model
strategy'' for tuna development. Most of the Pacific Island States are now vigorously
trying to develop their longline industry by providing incentives for foreign vessels to
base their operations in domestic ports.
The analysis of the development plans shows that each Pacific Island State is
focussing on consolidating its own longline industry. Domestication strategies in the
purse seine fishery include providing vessel servicing facilities and shore-based
infrastructure and requiring in-port transshipment of catch.
By defining rights through a comprehensive licensing process under the tuna
management plans, the Pacific Island States intend to derive greater benefit from their
tuna resources. Preferences are given to nationals and to those foreign investments with
significant local equity participation.
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Chapter 4: Case Study on Domestication Initiatives - Kiribati

4.1

Introduction

Kiribati is an atoll island State that has a large fishing zone and is highly dependent on
its marine resources for its overall economic and social development. Since
independence, Kiribati has had a clear policy to develop its own tuna industry; thus
Kiribati provides a good case study for the thesis. This chapter analyses the attempts to
domesticate the tuna industry and the major constraints that have contributed to the lack
of success. The chapter shows that foreign fishing under access agreements remains the
dominant strategy for deriving economic benefits, as the domestic industry contribution
to production, employment, and revenue remains relatively insignificant.
The chapter first examines the significance of the tuna fisheries sector in the
economy. This is followed by an outline of the policy framework for domestication. The
chapter shows the various attempts to facilitate domestic development of the tuna
industry. The domestication experience through the development of a national fishing
fleet is analysed. The chapter concludes that despite the lack of success, the objective of
domestic industry development still continues to be the desired goal.
However, based on past experience, the government is now more cautious about
large-scale capital investments. Commercialising the artisanal tuna fishery and
integrating the small-scale fishers into the industrial sector remains an important
strategy for developing the tuna fisheries. Government policies also aim to promote
private sector development but initiatives have been limited so far. The Kiribati
government continues to play a lead role through the establishment of the Central
Pacific Producers Limited. Domestication benefits are also pursued through indirect
means such as through the provision of labour and services to foreign vessels under
access agreements. These are seen as a means to facilitate domestic value added
linkages and the transfer of technology to local economies.
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Figure 4.1

Republic of Kiribati - The Exclusive Economic Zone

Source: FF A Report 95/2 (1995).

The Kiribati EEZ consists of 3 fishing zones: waters covering the Line Group, the Phoenix Group and the Gilbert
Group.

4.2

Kiribati - general

The Republic of Kiribati consists of abo~t 33 islands scattered in three main groups: the
Gilbert, Phoenix and the Line Islands as shown in figure 4.1. The islands lie between
!attitudes 4° North and 3° South of the equator, and 172° and 177° East longitude. 1
Except for Banaba (Ocean Island) which is an upraised limestone island, all the other
islands are low-lying coralline atolls. 2 Their rocky substrate, with only a thin layer of
topsoil, severely limits arable land for cultivation. 3 The only natural freshwater is
limited ground water in the form of a lens which floats on the higher-density saltwater

1

Integrated Marine Management Limited (IMM Ltd), Kiribati Marine Resources Sector Study, Report for
the Government of Kiribati, 1993, p.23.
2
c. Browne, and D. A. Scott, Economic Development in Seven Pacific Island Countries, International

Monetary Fund, Washington, 1989, p.61.
3

Ibid.
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beneath the atolls. 4 Given the limitations on agriculture and other land-based
development options, Kiribati focusses much of its hopes for economic development on
its fishery resources. 5
The islands, with a total land area of 811 square kilometres are dispersed over an
ocean area of over 5 million square kilometres. 6 The land sea ratio is 1:4300 square
kilometres. 7 The EEZ of Kiribati is the largest amongst the Forum Island States and the
second largest in the world, 8 covering an area over 3.5 million square kilometres.
Around each of the island groups, areas of high seas separate the EEZ as shown in
figure 4.1.
Kiribati's population in 1999 was estimated to be 87,900 with an annual growth
rate of 2.3%. 9 Almost 37% of the people live in South Tarawa, the urban and
administrative centre of Kiribati. Formal employment as a percentage of the working
age group in 1999 was estimated to be around 18 .3 %. 10 Kiribati ranks lowest amongst
the five least developed Pacific Island countries and had a per capita Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) of AUS$652 in 1998 whereas Gross National Product (GNP) per capita
was estimated as AUS$1312. 11 The major exports are marine products and copra with a
value of AUS$ 9,410,000 in 1998. 12 Major sources of government revenue are the
Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund, 13 remittances from fishers and seamen working on
foreign vessels, foreign fishing access fees and overseas development assistance. 14

4

Overseas Fisheries Co-operation Foundation (OFCF), Republic of Kiribati - Fisheries Handbook,
OFCF, Suva, 1997, p.1.
.
5
T. I. Fairbain, The Kiribati Economy: development options and prospects for economic growth.
Australian International Development Assistance Bureau, Canberra, 1992. Kiribati economy and its
limited development opportunities are highlighted in: The State of the Environment Report, Government
of Kiribati, 1991.
6
Ibid, p.1.
7
OFCF (1997), op. cit., n.4, p.l .
8
Republic of Kiribati, National Development Strategies 2000-2003 , Uataboan Te Rikirake Ao Te Rau,
October, 2000, p.56.
9
Ibid, p.39.
JO Ibid.
11
National Economic Planning Office, Government of Kiribati- Economic Statement 1998, National
Planning Office, Bairiki, 1999, p.4.; D. Throsby, "The Kiribati Economy: performance and prospects'',
Pacific Economic Bulletin, 16 (1): 1-18. Higher GNP is due to interest income from Revenue Equalisation
Reserve invested overseas and remittances from I-Kiribati working on foreign vessels.
12
National Economic Planning Office, Kiribati Survey ofAnnual Data, 5 February 2001.
13
Trust Fund based on the proceeds from past phosphate sales invested overseas for the future
development of the country.
14
OFCF (1997), op. cit., n.4.
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4.3

Status of the tuna resources

The oceanography and assessment of tuna stocks in Kiribati are discussed in a country
15

report by the SPC. The interaction of the currents, climatic conditions and thermocline
are believed to have considerable impact on the distribution of fish in the EEZ and their
seasonal availability for harvesting. 16 Based on recent regional stock assessment studies
by SPC, it is estimated that current catch levels of skipjack are sustainable given the
large biomass and its high productivity. 17 The average annual skipjack catch from 1992
to 2001 in Kiribati was estimated to be 100,000 tonnes. 18 While there are no estimates
for yield levels for yellowfin, there is some concern over the regional bigeye stock. 19
Annual variations in current strength and sea surface temperature lead to
pronounced local seasonality in the abundance of tuna schools amenable to capture by
surface fishing gears. 20 Irregular inter-annual occurrences of El Nifio and La Nifia have
a much stronger influence on temperature changes than the intra-annual seasonal
variations. 21 During El Nifio, with the rising thermocline, tuna catches in Kiribati
increase, as shown on the next page in Figure 4.2. Catches increased around 1993 and in
1997 from the El Niiio effect. In 1995, catches declined because the pattern of stock
distribution changed with weather changes. 22 Figure 4.2 shows estimated tuna catch
patterns in Kiribati which reflect the influence by oceanic climatic conditions.

15

South Pacific Commission, Kiribati Confidential Country Report, Tuna and Billfish Assessment
Programme Country Report No.4, South Pacific Commission, Noumea, New Caledonia, 1991.
16 Integrated Marine Management Ltd., Kiribati Marine Resources Sector Study, Report prepared for the
Government of Kiribati, 1993, p. 46.
17 A. D. Lewis and P. G. Williams, Overview of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean Tuna Fisheries,
2001, Oceanic Fisheries Programme, Noumea, New Caledonia, 2002.
18 A. Langley, Scientific Paper on Tuna Fishes Stock Assessment - Working Paper for Kiribati,
Secretariat for the Pacific Community, 2002.
19
Lewis and Williams (2002), op. cit., n.17.
20 MacAlister Elliott & Partners, Evaluation of a proposal to establish a longline fishing base in Tarawa.
Centre for Development of Industry, Government of Kiribati, 1997, p.4.
21
Ibid.
'
22 A. Aaheim and L. Sygna, Economic Impacts of Climate Change on Tuna Fisheries in Fiji Islands and
Kiribati, Center for International Climate and Environment Research, Oslo, Norway, Report No. 4, 2000.

98

Figure 4.2

Estimated total tuna catch in the Kiribati EEZ in tonnes
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Table 4.1

Percentage Catch Composition of Tuna Catch in Kiribati EEZ

Fish

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Skipjack
Yellowfin
Bigeye
Billfish

84.5
8.3
5.3
0.2

77.9
18.l
3.0
0.1

70.2
26.5
2.6
0.1

68.9
23.5
6.4
0.1

54.3
18.2
19.0
0.5

67.7
22.5
6.4
0.2

Others

1.6

0.9

0.6

1.1

6.4

1.2

:
1

Source: Overseas Fishery Co-operation Foundation of Japan. Fisheries Handbook. 1997, p.10

Skipjack is the largest purse seine catch and predominant species in the pole and line
23

fishery.

Table 4.1 shows the species composition of the catch. In 1996 skipjack

accounted for about 68% of the total catch while yellowfin was around 23%. Much of
the tuna caught from Kiribati waters has been for the canning market although a small
portion of the tuna catch from the Kiritimati atoll goes to the Hawaii and US markets as
chilled tuna together with other marine products. 24
In the early 1990s, the catches of Te Mautari Limited (TML) boats decreased, as

did the catches of artisanal vessels, while the corresponding catches of foreign purse
seine boats increased. 25 This led to a study in 1995 by SPC on fisheries interactions26
which examined the impact of large-scale purse seine operations and concluded that a
local fishery could be managed by creating exclusion zones of 60 nautical miles (nm)
around areas of local operation.

27

Consequently, foreign vessels are restricted from

operating inside a 60 nm limit around Tarawa, Kiritimati and Kanton Islands. 28

4.4

Contribution of fisheries to the Kiribati economy

The following provides an assessment of the economic importance of tuna to the
Kiribati economy. The contribution to GDP, to national revenue and as a proportion of

23

Breakdown of species composition prior to 1990 has not been available. Purse seine catch in Kiribati
has increased by foreign vessels under access agreements since the 1990s. See: MacAlister Elliot and
Partners. Evaluation of a Proposal to Establish a Longline Fishing Base in Tarawa . Report prepared for
Te Mautari Limited and Government of Kiribati, June 1997, p.7.; Aaheim and Sygna (2000); op. cit. n.
22, p.12.
24
Personal Communication - Baie Teanako, Acting General Manager, Te Mautari Limited (TML),
February 2001.
25 MacAlister Elliot & Partner (1997), op. cit., n. 20.
26 J. Hampton, T.Lawson; P.Williams and J. Sibert Case Study of Fisheries Interactions in a Pacific
Island Country: Kiribati. Second FAO Expert Consulation on Interaction of Pacific Island Fisheries,
Shimizu, Japan. 23-31Janauary,1995.
27 MacAlister Elliot & Partner, Evaluation of a Proposal to establish a longline fishing base in Tarawa,
Centre for Development of Industry, Government of Kiribati, 1997, p.10.
28 Personal Communication - Kaburoro Ruaia, Permanent Secretary for Ministry of Natural Resources
Development, Government of Kiribati, January 2001.
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the recurrent budget is illustrated. Some comments on exports and employment are also
provided.

4.4.1

Nominal contribution of fishing to GDP

The contribution of the fisheries sector to GDP is overshadowed by a large subsistence
sector and a relatively limited domestic industrial fishery. Production from the
subsistence sector represents around 70% of the total fisheries production.

29

Table 4.2

shows that commercial fishing contributed to approximately 3.3 % to 5.5 % of the GDP
between 1990 and 2000. Commercial fishing includes other fisheries products from the
artisanal sector such as reef fishes, lobster and shark fin. No disaggregated figures are
available for total local tuna production. It is however deduced that local commercial
tuna production would be much less than the total marine products. Since fisheries are
an important part of Kiribati socio-economics, the total contribution to GDP including
the subsistence sector is also shown in Table 4.2. This raises the contribution of
fisheries to between 11 % to 16 % of total GDP. 30

Table 4.2

Nominal Contribution of Fisheries to Kiribati Economy
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Total
Monetary
GDP AUS$ (m)*

31.75

38.7

41.01

43.01

48.57

56.15

57.66

60.15

66.96

73.86

71.73

Commercial Fishing
A$(m}

l.24

l.97

2.24

2.25

2.21

2.62

2.46

2.08

2.63

2.63

2.35

Commercial
Fisheries as % of
GDP

3.9%

5.1 %

5.5 %

5.2%

4.5%

4.7%

4.3 %

3.5%

3.9%

3.6%

3.3 %

5.78

5.90

6.0

6.14

6.28

6.44

6.44

54.36

62.06

63.66

66.29

73.24

80.30

78.17

15%

14%

13.3 %

12.4%

12.2%

11.3 %

11.2 %

Subsistence Fishing 4.65
4.76
5.15
5.59
AUS$(m)
43.46
46.16
48.60
Total GDP AUS$ 36.4
(m)
16%
16%
16%
Fisheries as % of 16%
Total GDP+
*market prices;+ rnonetarv and non-monetary GDP.

..

Source. Mm1stry of Fmance and Economic Plannmg, Statistics Report, 2001 .

Overs~as Fishery Co-operation Foundation, Republic of Kiribati- Fisheries Handbook,1997.; R. Gillet
and C. Lightfoot, The Contribution of Fisheries to the Economies of Pacific Island States, A Report for
Asian Development Bank, Forum Fisheries Agency and World Bank Bank, August 2001 p 65
30
'
' •
•
Tuna is an important component of the subsistence catch and domestic consumption. [Personal
Communication-Teema Tuake, Fisheries Officer, Fisheries Division, Kiribati, February 2001].
29
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4.4.2

Fisheries in relation to national revenue and recurrent budget

The table below shows that licensing of foreign vessels provides a crucial source of
government revenue. The contribution to government revenue from domestic fisheries
and local licenses is comparatively insignificant.

Table 4.3

Fisheries in Relation to National Revenue and Recurrent Budget
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

25.8

28.9

27.6

32.5

32.5

40.7

27.l

54.5

67.7

58.8

Fish Sales AUS$ (000)

36.4

32

34

22

30

(26)

(45)

(46.2)

40.0

52.6

License Fee AUS$ (m)

3.97

11.92

12.96

14.13

18.0

18.80

6.20

29.4

40.32

31.93

Transshipment Fee

222

281

24

6

32

41.6

36.5

105.4

304.2

0.9

21.6

13.6

13.3

23.9

28.5

29

24

82

18.9

30

4.25

12.24

13.03

14.18

18.1

18.9

6.3

29.6

41.0

32.01

16.5%

42.3%

47.2%

43.6%

55.7%

46.4%

23.3%

54.3%

60.0%

54.4%

15.4%

41.2%

47%

43 .5%

55.4%

46.2%

22.9%

54%

60%

54.3%

22.85

24.77

25.76

26.54

32.76

46.9

49.7

51.2

57.0

68.6

18.6%

49.4%

50.5%

53.4%

55.2%

40.3%

12.7%

57.7%

72.%

46.6%

Total Government
Revenue AUS$ (m)

AUS$ (000)
Local Licences &
Pleasure Fishing
Licenses AUS$ (000)
Total Direct Fisheries

I

Revenue AUS$ (m)
Fisheries Revenue as %
of Total Revenue
License fee (Access)
Revenue) as% of Total
Revenue

Recurrent Budget AUS$
(m)

Fisheries Revenue as %
of Recurrent Budget

..

..

Source: Repubhc ofK.inbati, Budget Reports for 1996 - 2001; Mtmstry ofFmance & Economic Planning, Statistics
Report 2001; Fisheries Division Annual Reports 1998, 2001 (draft); Fairbain (2002), pp. 43-63; Overseas Fisheries
Co-operation Foundation Handbook, 1997; Government ofKiribati, 1998 Economic Statement.
()estimates.

Table 4.3 shows that the fisheries sector contributed to just over 50% of the total
government revenue since 1991 except in 1996 when the contribution declined to 23.3%
because of reduced license fees. 31 Other major sources of government revenue include
the Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund, remittances from fishers and seamen working
on foreign vessels and overseas development assistance.

32

From table 4.3 it can be

worked out that over 95% of the fisheries revenue consists of license fees through
access arrangements with foreign fishing vessels to fish for tuna in the Kiribati EEZ.

31
32

This period is marked by a low fishing season because of unfavourable climatic conditions.
A number of I-Kiribati work as crew on foreign fishing vessels and as seamen on other foreign vessels.
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Fisheries revenue is also an important source of the government recurrent expenditure.
In 1998, fisheries revenue was equivalent to 72% of the recurrent expenditure. A large
part of the recurrent expenditure supports the public service through wages and
salaries. 33

4.4.3

Fisheries exports
34

Kiribati's main exports are copra, marine products and handicrafts.

Marine exports

include fish, seaweeds, shark-fin and aquarium fish. Figure 4.3 gives the value and
volume of Kiribati fish exports from 1990 to 1998. These exports include a variety of
reef fish, lobster and tuna. This indicates that the relative contribution of tuna to total
exports is much less. The high exports in 1990 were due to fish exports from the Outer
Island Fisheries Project under the TML operations.

Figure 4.3

Total Volume and Value of Fish Exports from Kiribati (1990-1998)
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Exports of marine products vary but on average account for about 30% of the total
exports of Kiribati. The variability is indicated in figure 4.4 which shows that total
marine exports accounted for only 6% of total exports in 1997; while in 1998, they
increased to 41 %. The increase in 1998 reflected the increase in fish exports from
33

Throsby notes that of the formally employed people in the workforce in 1995 (most recent census
data), 39% worked for the Central Government, 26% for public enterprises, and 12% for island councils
giving an aggregate proportion of total employment by the public sector to be 77% [See, D. Throsby'
"The Kiribati Economy-performance and prospects", Pacific Economic Bulletin, 16(1), 2001 , pp.1-18]. '
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Kiritimati Island. Aquarium fish and seaweeds have also gradually increased in the
value of their contribution to total marine exports. The contribution of fish to total
exports has ranged from 2 % to the 12.3% recorded in 1998. Tuna is included with other
reef fish, so the exact amount of tuna exports is not known. Tuna jerky has also been
exported in small quantities to Australia, Korea and Fiji by a small-scale private
processing company. 35

Figure 4.4

Percentage Contribution of Fish to Total Marine Exports and Total
Domestic Exports
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The above graph shows that the contribution of fish to total exports has remained well
below 10% since 1990 except for 1998 when it increased to 12.3%. The percentage
contribution of marine products as a whole has been variable due to fluctuations in
production and exports of commodities like beche-der-mer, seaweeds and aquarium
fish, which are highly price-sensitive.

4.4.4 Employment
Employment figures in the fisheries and related activities are difficult to obtain because
of the large subsistence and artisanal sector where many households fish either part-time
or full-time. 36 According to the 1995 population census report, 11,920 households were
reported as fishing households owning fishing equipment such as skiffs, boats, outboard

34

Ibid., p.6.

35

Personal Communication - Maruia Kamatie, Chief Fisheries Officer, Fisheries Division, January 2001.

36

Ibid.
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motors, fishing nets and cooler boxes. 37 The total labour force was estimated to be
45,701 of which 801 were engaged in formal cash employment in the marine and
fisheries industry. 38 Gillett and others (2001) estimated that the number of people
employed directly in tuna fishing and processing in Kiribati was around 1, 193 in
addition to about 350 employed on foreign vessels in 2000. 39 About 800 were estimated
to be engaged in the artisanal commercial sector, 35 at the national fishing company
(Central Pacific Producers) and 8 in the tuna jerky trade. 40 Te Mautari Limited (TML),
the national fishing company, employed about 160 people around the mid 1980s but the
number was reduced to 75 by 1997

41

and was further reduced to 35 under the

consolidated operation in 2000. 42
The Marine Training School and the Fisheries Training School provide
vocational training for both seamen on foreign merchant vessels as well as fishermen on
foreign fishing vessels.43 A study undertaken by the Asian Development Bank states
that ''there in no shortage of skilled fishermen and seamen but skill shortages occur in
the areas of engine mechanics, refrigeration and commercial management.',« The
Kiribati fisheries sector employs the second largest formal labour force after the public
service. Besides the artisanal sector, employment of crew on foreign fishing vessels is
most significant in providing a steady source of income. 45

4.5

Policy Framework - National Development Plans

Kiribati independence in 1979 coincided with the cessation of phosphate mining. 46 The
three development plans during the British administration period focussed on alternative

37

Statistics Office, Report on the 1995 Census of Population, Volume 1, Basic Information and Tables
'
Ministry of Finance, November, 1997.
38
1bid., p. 102.
39
R. Gillett, M. McCoy, L. Rodwell and J. Tamate, Tuna: A Key Economic Resource in the Pacific, Asian
Development Bank, 2001, p.17.
40
Ibid
41
MacAlister Elliott & Partners (1997), op. cit., n.20, p.18.
42
Gillett et al (2001), op. cit., n.39.
43
Personal Communication - Baie Teanako, Acting General Manager, Te Mautari Limited (TML)
January,2001.
'
44
Forum Fisheries Agency, Tuna Industry Development Study, FFA Report No.95/16, Forum Fisheries
Agency, Honiara, 1995, p.12.
45
Personal Communication - Baie Teanako, Acting General Manager, Te Mautari Limited (TML)
January,2001.
'
46
Asian Development Bank, Economic Report on Kiribati, Asian Development Bank Manila
Philippines, 1980, p.3.
'
'
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sources of national income. These plans were limited because of the administration's
failure to identify any new source of income at the end of phosphate mining. 47

Development Plan (1979-1982)
The first comprehensive Development Plan (1979 -1982) for Kiribati was prepared in

1979, the year of Kiribati independence. The objectives reflected a mixture of
economic, social and political aspirations of a newly independent country in the light of
conditions in Kiribati.

48

In order to provide economic independence, the plan focussed

on the development of new and existing industries based on marine and other resources,
and the encouragement of foreign investment. 49 Several high priority projects, most of
them related to tuna industry development such as research on resources and bait
fishery, continued to receive attention together with the establishment of a fisheries
training school. Baitfish culture expanded during this period following a successful
survey of surface-swimming tuna close to Kiribati waters. 50 A report by the Chief
Fisheries Officer outlined the specific aims for development of the tuna fishery for the
period 1979 to 1982. These included growth in the operation of Te Mautari through the
acquisition of pole and line catcher boats, construction of tuna fleets, training of !Kiribati and research into wild bait stock. 51

National Development Plan (1983-1986), (1987 -1991)
The subsequent National Development Plan (1983-1986) placed emphasis on the
national fishing company Te Mautari Limited (TML) established during the previous
development period to provide the main vehicle for development of Kiribati industrial
tuna fishery. The Plan stated that the advantages of Te Mautari included its proximity to
rich tuna fishing grounds, the experience and tradition of Kiribati fishermen, and the
commitment of the government to such growth.

52

The strategies of 1983 -1986 were

perused more vigorously during the Sixth National Development Plan period (1987 -

1991). The objectives specified in Plan were ... "to promote greater national self

47

Ibid., p.38.
Ibid., p.40.
49
Ibid., p.40.
so Ibid.
si B. G. P. Dalley, End of Contract Report- ChiefFisheries Office, Fisheries Division, 1982, p.5.
52 Republic of Kiribati, Sixth National Development Plan (1987 - 1991), National Planning Office,
Ministry of Finance, 1986.
48
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reliance and to improve the quality of life of the Kiribati people".

53

Several strategies

were identified to achieve the given objectives. High priority was placed on the need to
further exploit the country's natural resources, particularly fisheries; to develop the
outer islands; to strengthen infrastructure; and to encourage private sector
development. 54 A detailed work programme specifying the individual projects to
facilitate the development and consolidation of TML was outlined in the Plan.

55

Development Plan Seven (1992-1995)

Achieving higher real economic growth, diversifying production to create greater selfreliance and cash employment, and improving living conditions and welfare were the
broad national objectives outlined in the Development Plan Seven (1992-1995). The
policies and strategies to achieve the given objectives stressed on expansion of domestic
resource-based production, privatising of public enterprises, promoting financial
stability and providing greater attention to outer island development. It was expected
that fisheries would have an annual growth rate of 8.6% through commercial seaweed
and other fisheries development efforts while the growth in overall GDP was to be
around 5%. 56
Marine Sector Study (1993)

The importance of fisheries resources to Kiribati economy was further addressed by
Fairbain in the report on Development Options and Prospects for Economic Growth.57
The report was one of the first, however, to signal caution in strengthening the capacity
of local fleet development, while stressing the need for continuous effort to negotiate
fisheries licensing arrangements with DWFNs to derive maximum financial benefits. 58
As a result, a comprehensive marine sector study was carried out in 1993 to draw a
detailed sector plan to support government initiatives outlined in Development Plan
Seven to develop the commercial fishery. 59 The study highlighted the need to establish
specific and targeted medium-term objectives as a means to implement and monitor the
53

Ibid., p. 19.
Jbid., p.136.
SS Ibid., pp.140-148.
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Integrated Marine Management Ltd., Kiribati Marine Resources Sector Study, Report prepared for the
Government of Kiribati, 1993, p. 25.
57
Fairbain, T. I. J. , Development Options and Prospects for Economic Growth, Australian International
Development Assistance Bureau, Canberra, 1992, p.23.
58 lb 1·d ., p .Xl.
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progress in the development projects. The Marine Sector Study outlined several policy
measures to increase the involvement of private sector by attracting foreign investment
and to improve the fisheries infrastructure. Strategies to achieve such policy objectives
included: 60
•

rationalisation of co-ordination linkages;

•

commercialising fisheries including private sector development;

•

instituting integrated training programmes;

•

use of appropriate technologies;

•

strengthening monitoring and regulatory control measures;

•

fisheries diversification and export development;

•

resource conservation and management; and

•

increasing investment and infrastructure support.

The policies and strategies in the report form the basis for fisheries development
planning and are reflected in the subsequent National Development Plans.

National Development Strategy (1996 -1999)
The National Development Strategy covering the period from 1996 to 1999
concentrated on increasing revenue from foreign fishing while at the same time looked
at ways to improve the domestic fisheries base. 61 The development strategies specified
under the Sectoral Plan included: 62
•

reviewing past relationships with commercial companies including TML, Outer
Island Fisheries Project (OIFP), Atoll seaweed, Kiritimati Marine Company Ltd;

•

restructuring the above companies to enhance and promote harvesting and
processing of domestic tuna and other marine resources by local people;

•

encouraging and supporting research and marketing of export commodities;

•

maximising the harvesting of marine resources through development of appropriate
projects and promotion of technology transfer;

•

training and upgrading of the skills of the Fisheries Division; and

59

Integrated Marine Management Ltd. (1993), op. cit., n. l.
Ibid., p.34 -35.
61 Government of the Republic of Kiribati, Eight National Development Strategy (1996 -1999), Ministry
of Finance and Economic Planning, 1996; Asian Development Bank, Kiribati: 1997 Economic Report,
Asian Development Bank, Manila, March 1998, pp.84 -85.
62
Government of Kiribati, National Development Strategy: Sectoral Plans (1996-1999), Ministry of
Finance and Economic Planning, August 1996.
60

108
•

developing new laws and regulations for conservation and management of marine
resources.

The above strategies aimed to increase local benefits from tuna resources. However, an
element of caution was highlighted from the previous development experience to relook at government's involvement in operating its own boats and facilities. The
alternative means to achieve the above domestication strategies was by forming joint
ventures with private foreign firms. The Economic Report in 1997 by the ADB stated
that while joint-ventures reduce risks, it also creates a problem of unequal footing and
still carries costs if its purpose is for technology transfer.63 The Report further suggested
that " ... [a]n overiding consideration should be the almost risk-free revenues to be
earned from licensing DWFNs vessels". 64 Fluctuations in foreign fishing incomes were
experienced due both to changes in production because of climatic and environmental
conditions, and with market price variations of tuna. 65

Medium Term Strategy (1998 - 2000)

A Medium Term Strategy covering period 1998 - 2000 was formulated as a means to
implement the economic reforms identified in the National Development Strategy (1996

-1999). Six key priority areas were identified. These included reducing the relative size
of government, reforming public enterprises, facilitating private sector development,
encouraging foreign investment, relieving population and urban development pressure
and ensuring that sectoral policies are consistent with national priorities. The report
stresses the role of the private sector in generating economic growth with a focus on
promoting joint ventures between foreign and domestic interests in fisheries,
agriculture, services and tourism. The key policy issues reflecting these are public sector

63

Asian Development Bank, Kiribati: 1997 Economic Report, Asian Development Bank, Manila, March
1998.
64
Ibid., p.85.
65
The National Development Strategies (2000-2003) states that fishing licenses are the largest single
source of government revenue but its variability makes revenue forecasting difficult. For example license
fee fell from $18.8 min 1995 to a low of $6.2 min 1996 before jumping to $40.3m in 1998. These were
partly due to variations in weather conditions explained earlier under the section on tuna resources of
Kiribati. Skipjack which is the major species in Kiribati waters was further affected by fluctuations in
price which had been low on average in 1996 and began to increase in the 1998 period. [See: A. Aahiem
and L. Sygna, Economic Impacts of Climate Change on Tuna Fisheries in Fiji Islands and Kiribati
Center for International Climate and Environment Research, Oslo, Norway, Report No.4, 2000, p .13].
'
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reform, creating an enabling environment for private sector development and human
resources development. The policy and strategies identified in the plan include: 66
•

promotion of private sector production and marketing of marine products;

•

identification of marine commodities having highest commercial feasibility and
target small number of these for development support;

•

according high priority to commodities that can be produced and marketed by outer
island people; and

•

formulation of strategies for promoting transshipment by foreign vessels and for
achieving greater utilisation of on shore facilities by these vessels.

The above policies and strategies reflect the government's desire to consolidate and
facilitate the development of fisheries within the given constraints of Kiribati's
smallness and fragility as an island nation. This is in contrast to the development
expectations in earlier Plans to strengthen the national fishing operations as a means to
develop the industrial base. The current plan aims to emphasise the need to attract
foreign investment and to build on the artisanal-commercial fisheries base. The latter
aims to provide more employment opportunities in rural areas as well as facilitate the
gradual development of the domestic industrial tuna base; The short to medium term
strategy also emphasises on increasing local benefits from foreign fishing through
increasing transshipment at local ports and by encouraging use of local storage, shore
facilities and services by foreign vessels. The Kiribati government is currently in the
process of developing its national tuna management and development plan. 67 The plan
will form the basis for future policy direction on tuna in Kiribati.
The various National Development Plans for Kiribati smce independence
represent the typical models of development strategies identified in chapter two of this
study. During the late 1970s to 1980s, there was much emphasis on State investment
into fishing fleet to develop the

indu~trial

tuna base. The 1990s represent the transition

period aimed at restructuring of public enterprises and reforms to make the State
investments viable. There was focus on improving the infrastructure that was seen as an
inhibiting factor. A joint venture was established with a foreign company to test the
viability of new purse seine technology. The 1996 National Development Strategy
aimed to provide the strategic direction to overall economic development. The aim was

66

Republic of Kiribati, National Development Strategy (2000-2003), October 2000.
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to achieve both the private sector developments through foreign investment as well as to
create economic opportunities in rural areas. As will be shown in the next section,
despite restructuring, government still plays a dominant role in trying to establish viable
industries.

4.6

The legal framework

The basic fisheries law in Kiribati is the Fisheries Ordinance (Chapter 33) which was
enacted in 1978 to replace the Fisheries Ordinance of 1940. Under section 3(1) of the
\

Act, the Minister responsible for fisheries can take such measures as he may see fit to
promote the development of fisheries and fishing in Kiribati to ensure that the fisheries
resources of Kiribati are exploited to the full for the benefit of Kiribati. The Minister is
empowered to appoint the chief fisheries officer and licensing officers to carry out the
provisions of the Fisheries Act. The Fisheries Act gives the Beretitenti (President),
acting in accordance with the advice of the cabinet, wide powers to make regulations
relating to inter alia: 68

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

training of fishermen;
procedures relating to the issue of licences and permits;
conditions to be observed by foreign fishing vessels;
conservation and protection of all species of fish;
establishment of closed areas, seasons, size and amount limits on catch;
organisation and regulation of marketing, distribution and export of fish and fish
products;
control on handling, landing and transportation of fish and fish products;
methods and procedures for fish storage and processing;
inspection of fish processing establishments and minimum standards in relation to
quality of fish and fish products;
granting of exemption to any vessel or class of vessel or fish processmg
establishment from all or any provisions of the Ordinance.

The Fisheries Ordinance creates a general regulatory framework for the licensing of
domestic and foreign fishing vessels, enforcement of monitoring and surveillance and
the operation of fish processing establishments.

67

Personal Communication - Les Clarke, Fisheries Management Adviser, Forum Fisheries Agency
Honiara, July 2002.
'
68
Fisheries Ordinance (1978)- chapter 33, (Rev. Ed, 1998): Section 22.
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A licence is required for all local vessels over 7 metres. 69 Local fishing vessels
are defined in the Act as "vessels wholly owned or controlled by the government or
citizens of Kiribati; or a company, society or other association of persons incorporated
or established under the laws of Kiribati, at least 49 % of which is beneficially owned
by citizens or government of Kiribati or held by citizens or government of Kiribati".

70

A local fishing vessel can also be defined as a ''joint venture, consortium or partnership
arrangement or agreement between two or more parties, where at least 49% of the
beneficial ownership and control is vested in or held by citizens or the government".

71

The chief fisheries officer, with the approval of the Minister, may grant permits
authorising fishing by foreign fishing vessels. 72 Transshipment of fish or loading and
unloading of fuel within the EEZ is prohibited unless the vessel is authorised by a
permit to do so. 73 Foreign fishing permits are subject to such conditions as may be
prescribed and to such further conditions as may be endorsed on the permit by the chief
fisheries officer. 74 To date, no regulations have been made prescribing the general
conditions applicable to foreign fishing permits. 75 This allows the government to deal
with terms and conditions through administrative procedures and bilateral negotiations.
Foreign investment in Kiribati is governed by the Foreign Investment Act
(1985). The Foreign Investment Council approves investments up to $250,000 and any
investment above that needs Cabinet approval. 76 Section 10 of the Foreign Investment

Act contains guidelines that the FIC must consider when dealing with applications:
•

potential employment for I-Kiribati;

•

net export contribution;

•

balance between local exploitation and size of foreign investment;

•

potential for transferring to I-Kiribati foreign managerial and technical skills
required in the enterprise;

•

the extent of competition with local enterprises; and

•

impacts on social and natural environments.

69
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73
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75 Mathilda Maria-Tairea, Fisheries Legislative Pro.file - Republic of Kiribati, FFA Report 95/2, Forum
Fisheries Agency, Honiara, 1995.
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Section 9A.1 of the Foreign Investment Act states that investors can seek a range of
incentives by writing to the Foreign Investment Council. Incentives are not automatic
and are granted on a case by case basis. 77An examination of the fisheries and foreign
investment legislation shows that the government aims to have control and allow itself
flexibility in making decisions on matters dealing with foreign fishing and foreign
investment. 78 The government at the time of study was reviewing its investment policies
and legislation to make the process more attractive and transparent to foreign
investors. 79

4. 7

Domestic fisheries development experience

A fishery survey unit was established in Kiribati in 1970 to look at the potential for
tuna fishery. Trials undertaken by an American Tuna Company (Van Camp) indicated
that tuna was abundant. 80 Japanese DWF vessels fishing in the region subsequently
confirmed this. 81 Prior to the establishment of the Kiribati EEZ in 1978, Taiwanese,
Korean and Japanese distant water vessels fished close to the islands. A series of
surveys were carried out in 1977-1978 by the Japanese to re-assess the availability of
wild bait and to test the culture of milkfish. They concluded that wild bait resources
supplemented by cultured milkfish, would support a maximum of eight medium-sized
pole and line boats. 82

4.7.1

Te Mautari Limited (TML)

In 1979, the United Kingdom donated a pole and line vessel for experimental fishing.83
In 1980, a second pole and line vessel (120 GRT) was delivered under Japanese
fisheries aid. 84 In 1981, the National Fishing Company, Te Mautari Ltd (TML) was

76

Foreign Investment Act (1985)- Section 12.
Foreign Investment Amendment Act ( No.5 of2000) - Section 9A.
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tonnes using brine freezers.
84
Dally (1982), op. cit., n. 51.
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incorporated to operate a commercial pole and line fleet. 85 The objectives of the
company had been defined as follows: 86
•

develop a viable national pole and line fishing industry;

•

develop other fishing methods;

•

export fisheries products;

•

develop domestic market for fish;

•

promote artisanal fishery development by providing a market outlet; and

•

train I-Kiribati in all aspect of commercial fishing and develop higher technical
skills.

The company took over the operations of the two vessels which indicated positive catch
results during their initial operations. 87 By 1983, two more vessels under Japanese aid
were added to the fleet. 88 A cold store facility was also constructed89 in 1981 and later
expanded in 1984.90 The high aspirations to develop the domestic tuna industry were
reflected in the National Development Plan (1983-1986) which states the following:
At the level of operation of 8 pole and line catcher boats, TML is expected to employ around
300 staff with the projected level of 100 artisanal fishermen in 1986 and a projected level of
employment generated by the 3 projects which TML has been associated with should exceed
the reported level of around 450 jobs lost when phosphate operation ceased in 1979. 91

The overall catches increased, but fluctuated greatly from year to year and the earlier
vessels lost fishing time due to breakdowns. 92 Two new vessels were added to the TML
fleet in 1987, giving a total of six vessels with a new wharf constructed at Betio. 93 A
refrigerated carrier vessel "Moamoa (400 GRT) was acquired to overcome transport
problems for shipping TML catches to the buyers. 94 Figure 4.5 shows the TML catches
over the years.

85
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Due to the limited storage facility, vessels lost fishing time ta1cing their catches to the buyers and/or for

transhipping to Majuro. This necessitated a carrier vessel to transport TML catches to the buyers.
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Figure 4.5

TML Pole and Line Catch from 1981 - 1997
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Figure 4.5 shows that TML catches in 1989 was 2,273 tonnes, the highest catch
attained. By 1996 catches declines to less than 20 tonnes. In 1989, TML's facility was
further upgraded under Japanese aid by refurbishment of the cold storage with increased
capacity to 600 tonnes.
Catches however declined to 569 tonnes in 1990.95 The two original vessels
were decommissioned because of persistent breakdowns and the high cost of repairs.96
Two of the four remaining vessels were re-located temporarily to the Solomon Islands
and Fiji and the TML operations were scaled down. 97 The catches in 1991 were 178
tonnes and 542 tonnes in 1992 from these vessels. The availability of bait, fluctuations
in stock due to climate and environmental changes and a series of mechanical
breakdowns forced TML to discontinue fishing at the beginning of 1991. 98 Figure 4.6
shows a further comparison of catch levels by the domestic pole and line fleet of the
TML and the foreign pole and line fishing vessels in Kiribati's EEZ under access
agreements. The TML catches are shown from 1981 to 1992. The figure indicates the
dominance of foreign pole and line actitivies in Kribati EEZ.

95

Integrated Marine Management (1993), op. cit., n. l.
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Figure 4.6
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A major review of TML was done in 1988 - 1989 to assess the general
operational constraints and find the means for its improvement. 99 The report
recommended a major re-organisation of the company to improve some of the
management constraints.
A feasibility study was also carried out to investigate the operation of ultra low
temperature (ULT) tuna longline vessels as the technology had become popular for the
Japanese frozen sashimi industry around that period. 100 The report stated that options
such as use of ULT sashimi longlining and purse seining involved high investment, and
required highly skilled personnel which were not available and therefore Kiribati would
have had to be dependent on outside management. 101 "Under such circumstances, TML
has little control over the apparent viability of such operations which could lead TML
vulnerable to decisions of the foreign partners" .

98
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One of the pole and line vessels was converted for tuna longlining under a
Japanese fishing master to carry out trials. However, due to continuous breakdowns the
project was abandoned. 103 Only two pole and line vessels continued fishing for various
periods from the mid 1990s. One of these vessels has since sunk and the other was
damaged on the reef. 104
All the major developments to TML operations were externally funded.

105

By

1993, the Japanese government had provided grant aid to finance infrastructure
including 3 catcher vessels; shore based handling facilities and a carrier vessel.
Japanese government also provided technical co-operation personnel.

107

106

The

The United

Kingdom assisted in providing grant aid during the initial trials, facilitated research and
the construction of a catcher boat. 108 The United Kingdom also assisted in the initial
running costs, working capital and in the construction of a jetty.

109

Canada, the

European Union (then known as the European Community) and the US also contributed
towards acquiring capital assets. 110 During the first ten years of TML's operation, the
company was provided with a number of full-time expatriate advisers and executives.
These included the general manager, the refrigeration engineer, the accountant, the fleet
manager, the fleet engineer, the vessel engineer, and master fishermen and bait
chummers. 111 The total funds provided to TML since its establishment up until 1993
was estimated at A$ 20. 73 million.11 2 Subvention payments were made to provide the
working capital for the company which amounted to A$2.13 million by 1990. 113
From 2000, the remaining operation of the TML (charter of reefer vessel,
transshipment services, marketing of the catch from OIFP, provisioning of crew for
foreign vessels) came under the umbrella of the Central Pacific Producers (CPP)
Limited.
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Personal Communication - Tetoaiti Tabokali, Senior Resource Economist, Ministry of Natural
Resources Development, February, 2001.
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107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
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Ibid. [The exact level of development assistance through the life of TML has been unavailable.]
uo By 1993, the total capital assets were valued at A$ 11.9 million. Integrated Marine Management
(1993), op. cit., n.l, p.187.
Ill Integrated Marine Management (1993), op. cit., n.1, p.56.
112 Ibid.
ll3 Ibid.
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The operation of the TML was never profitable despite re-structuring and
continued assistance. The major constraints that inhibited the success include the strong
seasonal fluctuations in catch with long periods of low catch rates and mechanical
problems causing increase in vessel down time and inadequate bait supply. Fluctuations

in the global market price for tuna, high operating costs, high transport cost and poor
management were other problems. High fuel costs resulted in high cost for vessel
operations and electricity supply at the shore facility
TML's production was largely frozen skipjack that received a low price relative
to most other forms of tuna product. The distance to major markets also led to high
operating costs which further exacerbated price competition from the Asian producers.
The global market price for frozen skipjack also began to decline with increased supply
from the purse seine fishery. Cannery prices fell by 40 % in mid to late 1980s.11 4 By the
end of 1988, the financial losses of TML were in excess of US$ 5 million. 115
Problems were also compounded by lack of entrepreneurial skills, low
productivity and lack of continuity in management as a government venture. The above
problems consequently affected the efficiency and created cash flow problems. Cash
flow problems were further complicated by the company operating as a government
venture as it had to fulfil its other objectives such as rural development while still faced
with financial problems. The outer island projects were also not viable.
The above problems were also manifested by the fact that while catches were
low, more pole and line boats were acquired, and freezing and storage capacity
expanded in anticipation of increased catch. This further added to the operation costs.

4.7.2

Outer Island Fisheries Project (OIFP)

The Outer Island Fisheries Project (OIFP) started in 1986 as an extension of TML and
was aimed at providing an outlet for fish from the outer islands to supplement TML
catches for exports. 116 In 1988 preservation facilities were established in Butaritari and
Abemama. 117 The centres were designed to have a throughput of 250 tonnes per year.
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MacAlister Elliott & Partners (1997), op. cit., n.20, p.13.
Ibid, p.13
116 Ibid·
117
Each Centre had a 1.5 t blast freezer, 2 x 12.5 t cold stores, 2 x 750 kg/day dry flake ice making
machine (salt water) a 72 KVA and 12.5 KVA generator, an office, gear and fuel store and housing for
manager. Integrated Marine Management. Report on the Marine Sector to the Government of Kiribati,
p.41.
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Integrated Marine Management (1993), op. cit., n.1.
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With low catches and difficulties in transportation of catch, the storage facilities were
under-utilised and consequently poorly maintained. 119 Artisanal catches to TML were
around 175 tonnes per year from 1988 to 1990. Catch from OIFP to TML dropped to 20
tonnes in 1991 and 1992, and were less than one tonne in 1993. 120 By the beginning of
1993, the centres were closed. 121
With high priority to develop rural areas, the Fisheries Division continued the
OIFP but with much smaller ice plants installed on Abaiang in 1992, Maiana, Kuria and
Aranuka during 1996. 122 All these centres have experienced problems not only with
transportation of catch to Betio in Tarawa but also in maintaining the equipment.
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Attempts to airfreight through the inter-island carrier have been hampered because of
limited space and irregular operations. Two closer centres transported catch by boat
while those further from Tarawa filletted and vacuum packed to reduce transport
costs. 124 The OIFP was transferred to TML in 1999 and re-structured under a new three
year Japanese project in 2000. Through Japanese assistance by the Overseas Fisheries
Co-operation Foundation (OFCF), one-tonne ice machines have been installed to keep
fish fresh until transport becomes available. 125 Currently major markets for these
commodities are government institutions like hospitals, the teachers college and the
retail outlet at the TML base. 126 Catches have improved more recently and there is a
regular flow of fresh fish in Tarawa. 127

4.7.3

KAO Fishing Company joint-venture

In November 1993, the Kiribati government entered into a 15-year joint venture (49 -

51 %) Fisheries Agreement with Otoshiro Fishing Company of Japan and established the
KAO Fishing Company to operate a purse seine vessel (700 GRT). The vessel was
provided by Otoshiro Company at a cost of six million dollars and is now registered as a
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Personal Interview- Mr. Baie Teanako, Acting Manager, TML, February 2001.
Overseas Fisheries Co-operation Foundation (OFCF), Interim Report for COFDA 's Project, April_
September 2000, January, 2001.
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Personal Interview, Mr. Baie Teanako, Acting Manager, TML, February 2001.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
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Personal Communication - Marnia Kamatie, Chief Fisheries Officer, Fisheries Division, Kiribati
January 2002.
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Kiribati vessel.
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According to the proposal for the joint venture, the rate of return was

estimated to be around 9 % and increasing after the three-year loan repayment period. A
schedule with crew to be localised by the fourth year of operation was also proposed. 129
A review of the operations of the vessel shows that management of the vessel is
by Japanese personnel while the vessel crew is largely I-Kiribati. Since the
commencement of vessel operation in 1997, KAO No 1 has fished in Papua New
Guinea, Marshall Islands and Tuvaluan waters under the FSM Arrangement to catch
skipjack and yellowfin tuna. 130 The catch from the purse seiner since 1997 has gradually
increased to 6,877 tonnes in 1999 but declined in 2000 to 3,075 tonnes.13 1 While the
joint venture had anticipated additional vessels, so far this has not happened. 132 Shorebased activities are limited to administration of the vessel from Otoshiro's office in
Tarawa; profits have been less than projected; and on-shore training has been limited.133
Catch is landed directly in Japan where vessel repairs, refuelling and re-provisioning are
also done.
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There is loss of effective fishing time while the vessel is travelling back

and forth. 135

4. 7.4

Small-scale tuna longlining

The Fisheries Division, in association with the South Pacific Commission (SPC), made
several attempts to develop small-scale tuna fishing using outrigger canoes with both
sails and outboard engines. 136 Trials using fish aggregation devices (FADs) and
different types of bait have also been conducted since the 1980s.
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When the OIFP was

.

established in Abemama and Butaritari to develop small-scale tuna fishery, these centres
were served by the canoes and skiffs introduced by the Fisheries Division.
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Personal Communication - Kaburoro Ruia, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Natural Resources
Development, Kiribati, January 2001 .
129 Personal Communication - Senior Fisheries Officer, Fisheries Division, Kiribati, January 2002.
130 Personal Communication - Kaburoro Ruaia, Permanent Secretary, Minister of Natural Resources
Development, Kiribati, 31 January 2001.
131 Ministry of Natural Resources Development - Licensing Unit Data, January 2001.
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133 Review of KAO Joint-venture Operations-1997-2000, Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, 2001.
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136 Personal Communication - Marnia Kamatie, Chief Fisheries Officer, Kiribati Fisheries Division,
Kiribati, January 2001 .
137 Ibid.
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The Fisheries Division has also carried out trials for medium-scale tuna
longlining using a locally constructed 12-metre twin hull catamaran.
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A smaller

modified version of the vessel was constructed in 2000 and trials in Tarawa were
favourable. 140 Major hopes are held for trials using Japanese fishing masters in
Kiritimati that will be the basis for developing the longline sashimi tuna for exports to
Hawaii. 141 These vessels are scaled-down versions of the industrial longline vessels with
142
the intention that local fishers can enter the fishery with a relatively low cost. Much
of the current longline development aspiration hinges upon the successful trials by these
vessels.

4.7.5

Central Pacific Producers (CPP) Limited

The CPP has evolved after the government set up a task force to look at domestic tuna
fisheries development following the collapse of the TML. 143 CPP was created as a
government venture in 1999 as an amalgamation of all government commercial
fisheries projects under one umbrella. The main activities carried out by the CPP
include providing vessel and agency services, operating the central fish market and a
fishbase on Kritimati. 144 Vessel and agency services involve managing the operation of
the TML carrier vessel and acting as agents for other foreign vessels to provide
stevedores for transshipment services in port. The central marketing arm is part of the
OIFP. It facilitates the transportation of catch from outer islands and organises
marketing from its Betio base. 145 The operations on Kiritimati focus on export of
various fisheries commodities such as lobsters, reef fish, aquarium fish and some
tuna.146
The establishement of the CPP is another indication of the government's
continued desire to establish the domestic tuna industry even though the level of
domestic fisheries production has remained small compared to foreign fishing.
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Personal Communication - Johnny Kirata, Senior Fisheries Officer, Fisheries Division, January 2001.
Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
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Personal Communication- Tetoaiti Tabokai - Senior Resource Economist, Ministry of Natural
Resources, January 2001.
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Ibid.
145 Ibid.
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Personal Communication - Marnia Kamatie, Chief Fisheries Officer, Fisheries Division, Kiribati,
February 2001.
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4.7.6

Teikabuti Fishing Company

Teikabuti Fishing Company is a small-scale privately owned company established in
1990. It exports deepwater snappers, lobsters, tuna and other marine products including
tuna jerky (dried tuna snack). The company's employment has ranged between 6 and 40
people during low and high periods. 147 Exports to Hawaii were abruptly halted in 1995
when Air Nauru discontinued its service from Kiritimati and the access route through
Majuro stopped in 1994. 148 The end of airfreight options to Hawaii led the company to
develop longer shelf-life product. 149 The company produces and exports tuna jerky in
small quantities. 150 The waste product of tuna jerky is processed into a cat snack product
for export. 151
The main constraint faced by Teikabuti has been the unreliable air transport
linkages to export markets. Other problems have been the limited availability of ice,
lack of access to credit and high import taxes on bait. 152

4. 7. 7

Bait for tuna

The early survey on surface tuna trials in the 1970s had already indicated that while
adequate supplies of tuna close to the islands existed, baitfish resources were inadequate
to support a large scale fishing industry. Trials on using baitless techniques and on the
feasibility of culturing baitfish began in 1975 under a UK-funded project with technical
assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Successful
results from experimental ponds using milk fish for bait led to the establishment of an
80 ha pond at Temaiku in anticipation that the pond would become fully operational by
1980 to supply bait to the pole and line fleet.
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The Economic Development Report

stated the following- "[t]he successful cultivation of baitfish removes what has been
regarded as the major obstacle to development of a tuna fishing industry in Kiribati".
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However, due to decline in pole and line catch, the baitfish production focused on

M. A. Savins, "Private sector participation in fisheries development in P/Cs: a case study of the
Teikabuti Fishing TFC Limited, Kiribati", Regional Workshop on the Constraints, Challenges, and
147

Prospects for the Commodity-based Development and Diversification in the Pacific Island Economies,
18-20 August, 2001.
1481bid.
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153 Asian Development Bank, Economic Report on Kiribati, Manila, Philippines, 1980, p. 54.
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cultivating milkfish as food fish for local consumption and as an export to neighbouring
Pacific Island States.

4.8

Foreign fishing

Kiribati has continued bilateral access agreements since the 1970s with Japan, since the
1980s with South Korea and Taiwanese industry associations, and more recently with
Spain and now with the EU. A number of Pacific Island vessels also fish in Kiribati ' s
EEZ under the FSM Arrangement. 155 Kiribati is also a member of the US Multilateral
Treaty together with other Pacific Island States. Foreign fishing through access
agreements has been a major source of income for Kiribati and remains the backbone of
the Kiribati industrial fishery.

4.8.1

Access agreements

In 1998, there were three major access agreements with Japanese Fishermen's

Associations: Kinkatsukyo for longlining; Mikatusren for pole and line; and Kaimaki
for purse seining. 156 Three major types of access agreements included: agreements with
Korean Deep-sea Fishermen's Association for longlining, Ocean Bridge Company for
bunkering and individual boat owners for purse seining. 157 There are also individual
agreements between boatowners from Taiwan and the Kiribati government for purse
seining. An access agreement also exists with a Singaporean company for bunkering
services in Kiribati waters. 158 In 1997, Kiribati also negotiated a bilateral agreement
with Spain to operate purse seine vessels. 159 This agreement has since come under the
umbrella of the EU.
The government Budget Report for 2000 stated that licensing foreign vessels
should also be seen as targeting to increase the number of I-Kiribati crew on these
fishing vessels and encouraging foreign vessels to tranship in designated ports through
licensing agreement.
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The two major transshipment ports are Betio in Tarawa and Port

London on Kiritimati Island. Transshipment services are also provided at Canton in the
Phoenix Group. This follows from the policies and strategies outlined in the National
155

Personal Communication- Johnny Kirata, Senior Fisheries Officer, Fisheries Division, February 2001.
Government of Kiribati, Fisheries Division Annual Report, 1998; p. 37.
157 Ibid.
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Personal Communication - Rimeta Tinga, Fisheries Enforcement and Licensing Officer, Ministry of
Natural Resources Development, February 2001.
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Ibid.
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Development Strategy (2000-2003) which states the need for ... "formulating strategy
for promoting transshipment by foreign vessels and for achieving greater utilisation of
onshore facilities by these vessels." 161 The level of transshipment fee over the years has
steadily increased as well as the level of access revenue from foreign fishing vessels
(see table 4.2). Section 4.4.2 also shows that access fees contribute 50 to 60% of total
government revenue and are therefore the most important source of government
recurrent budget. Figure 4. 7 represents the trend in the level of access fee by foreign
fishing vessels. The trend shows a steady increase since 1989 except for 1996, when
catch levels in Kiribati waters were low, and for 2000, when there was a slight decline
again in the catch which also shows the corresponding decline in the access revenue for
those years (see table for catch 4.2)

Figure 4.7
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Access agreements are predominantly for access to the fishery by foreign vessels and
are independent of domestic industry development. However, assistance to domestic
fisheries research and a training levy for local crew are also included in some access
agreements especially in those countries that have high aspirations to develop domestic

160 Republic
161

of Kiribati, Budget as presented to the Maneaba Ni Maungatabu, 21 November 2000.
Republic of Kiribati, 2000, National Development Strategies (2000-2003), p.56.

124
industries. 162 In Kiribati, access agreements likewise contain elements of assistance to
fisheries development projects, and encourage vessels to use local ports for
transshipment and to use local crew. 163 Some of these requirements are directly
negotiated into the agreement while others may be negotiated as part of side agreements
as forms of indirect assistance. An example of this is the access agreement between the
EU and Kiribati. The Annex of the Access Agreement outlines the conditions governing
fishing activities by Community vessels within the Kiribati fishing zone. Article 12.1 of
the Access Agreement requires that each Community vessel employ two Kiribati
nationals as crew. 164 "In case a EC vessel is not in a condition to employ a Kiribati
national, the owner is obliged to pay wages lump sum wages equivalent to wages of two
crew for the duration of the fishing season in Kiribati zone."

165

The Agreement further

has provisions encouraging the EU vessels to use local services and transshipment.
While access agreements have been seen as directly opposite to domestic development,
the gradual modifications and flexibility within the agreements have elements that can
indirectly facilitate domestic development.

4.8.2

Level of foreign fishing

A foreign fishing vessel is defined in the Fisheries Ordinance Chapter 33 as any vessel
that is not local. In other words, it is a fishing vessel that is not owned by the
government of Kiribati or its citizens, or where there is 50% or more ownership by nonKiribati Government, or non Kiribati citizens or company. 166
The number of foreign vessels registered to fish in Kiribati EEZ is shown in
figure 4.8 The major types of fishing activities are purse seine and longline. Until 1999
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J. Tamate, and G. Joshep, The Pacific Experience and the WWF Handbook, in Proceedings of the
Workshops on Fisheries Access in West Africa, Saly Portudal, Senegal, March and November 2000, pp.
90-92.
163
The Fisheries Act does not specify details on regulatory requirements by foreign fishing vessels. The
terms and conditions for access are determined by the Chief Fisheries Officer under the direction of the
Minister responsible for Fisheries. The Kiribati Bilateral Access Agreements with DWFNs are
confidential documents and unavailable for analysis. However, it is understood that development funds
and employment of locals are important components of the access agreements either negotiated as part of
the access agreement or as separate side-payments.
164
"Agreement between European Community and the Republic of Kiribati in fishing within Kiribati
fishing zone", in WWF/EU, EC Fisheries Access Agreements: A negotiating resources for Pacific Island
Countries, Worldwide Fund for Nature -South Pacific Program, WWF- US, 2003.
165
Ibid, -Annex -12.2.
166
Cap.33 revised edition (1998). No.1 of 1995 s.2 amended the definition of a "local" fishing vessel.
Previously a local fishing vessel was any vessel owned by persons resident or domiciled in Kiribati or a
company registered or incorporated under the Laws of Kiribati with principle place of business in
Kiribati.
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Japanese vessels also carried out pole and line fishing. Licences are also needed for
bunkering services by foreign vessels. 167

Figure 4.8

Number of Foreign Fishing Vessels under Bilateral Agreements in
Kiribati
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Longling operations have been largely carried out by foreign vessels in Kiribati waters.
Longlining was only briefly introduced by TML by refitting a pole and line vessel but
due to mechanical problems fishing operations were discontinued. Korean and Japanese
vessels have been the major longline fleets operating in Kiribati EEZ.
There is only one domestic purse seine vessel registered under the Kao joint
venture arrangement in Kiribati. The most dominant purse seine operations in Kiribati
are by US purse seine vessels under the US Multilateral Treaty. All purse seine vessels
have experienced wide fluctuations in their catch levels over the period. Figure 4.9
shows the catch levels using the three major fishing methods by the foreign fishing
vessels in Kiribati EEZ. The pole and line was the dominant method until 1982. This
was taken over by purse seine operations which continue to be the major method of
fishing in Kiribati EEZ.

167

Republic of Kiribati, Fisheries Ordinance Cap 33, Section 2.- the definition of a fishing vessel includes
any "support vessels."
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Catch using Major Fishing Methods by Foreign Vessels Fishing in
Kiribati EEZ

Figure 4.9
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The marked increase in catches by purse seine from 1990 in figure 4.9 is due to the
increase in US purse seine vessels which overshadowed the catches by other fishing
nations until 2000.
The total catch of tuna from Kiribati EEZ by foreign and domestic vessels is
given in figure 4.10. The figure clearly indicates that foreign vessels have been
responsible for production of tuna throughout the ·development period in Kiribati. Note
that the catch by foreign vessels is given in thousands of tonnes while the catch by
domestic vessels is in tonnes for ease of graphical comparison. These should however
been seen in perspective in their relative actual amounts. For example in 1981, the
domestic vessels contributed to 1% of the total catch, 6% in 1990 and 5% in 2000 thus
indicating that over 95% of the catch is taken by DWFNs under access agreements. The
domestic catch includes both the TML catch and the purse seine catch by KAO No. I.

168

A point of qualification should be noted. The catch by various foreign vessels has been extracted from
Fisheries Division records and other official sources as indicated. However, it should be noted that the
actual levels of catch by foreign vessels in Kiribati EEZ is unclear due to poor reporting of catch by
foreign vessels at that time as enforcement and monitoring procedures were limited.
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Figure 4.10

Comparison of Foreign and Domestic Tuna Catch in Kiribati EEZ
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4.9

Current initiatives for domestic development

There are currently four major strategies adopted for developing domestic tuna
industries. The first is the gradual approach through the medium to small-scale
longlining that is still undergoing trials. Once trials and feasibility studies prove positive
(of which the government is hopeful), incentives such a low-cost loans, training and
technical assistance will be facilitated to fishers to take up commercial tuna longlining
targeting the sashimi market. 169
The second strategy is through licensing of foreign vessels under access
agreements. Through conditions of access in the agreements, foreign vessels are either
required or encouraged to use local ports for transshipment and to use other shore-based
facilities. Employment of locals on foreign vessels is an important means of providing
income to local economies and for capacity building which can provide the needed
skills base for establishing domestic fishing operations.
The third strategy is to promote private sector development and encourage
foreign investment through the Foreign Investment Act (1985) which provides for the
supervision and control of foreign investment. A Foreign Investment Council is
established to liaise between the local government councils and the cabinet.

128
Section 11 of the Foreign Investment Act provides for a range of incentives but
it is the investor's prerogative to initiate any requests. The incentives are issued on a
case-by-case basis and the FIC facilitates such requests once the investment is
approved. Import duties are exempted on fishing gear and imports under foreign aid
projects. Partial to full exemption is available on import duties on capital goods and
there is tax relief for projects that have pioneer status.
The fourth strategy is the consolidation of all fisheries related operations under
the management of the government administered Central Pacific Producers limited.

4.10

Conclusion

Kiribati's reliance on fisheries for employment and revenue is understood in terms of its
limited alternatives given its geographical constraints. The objective of creating
employment and revenue by direct participation has remained the central theme
throughout the development period.
The national development plans in the early 1980s saw the establishment of the
TML as the main vehicle for development of the Kiribati industrial fishery. Specific
projects such as TML cold storage expansion, pole and line fleet renovation and
expansion, TML longline development, TML training centre, TML management and
staff training and TML outer island fisheries development all looked at development
and consolidation of TML. The operation of TML in association with the OIFP was
seen as a means to increase employment of local people including those in the rural
areas to engage in commercial fisheries development. Fish production and exports,
employment and income were the major goals of the government in its attempt to
establish a viable export industry. Furthermore, the domestication initiatives were also
seen as a means to provide for transfer of technology and skills to commercial artisanal
fisheries. Foreign capital and technical assistance were used extensively to establish the
tuna industry
The analysis on Kiribati's development experience so far, has demonstrated that
the EEZ is still largely fished by foreign vessels. Except for one purse seine vessel
under the joint venture agreement, there are no domestic industrial tuna vessels.
Domestic production from TML operations has steadily declined. All domestic tuna
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Personal Communication - Maruia Kamatie, Chief Fisheries Officer, Fisheries Division Kiribati
February 2001.
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production now is by artisanal fishers who sell their catch domestically except for those
on Kiritimati who export small quantities together with other marine products.
Employment at TML has also never reached its targeted level as expected in the
National Development Plan (1983-1986). 170 The artisanal sector has the largest number
of fishers who mostly operate on a semi-subsistence basis. Despite the large production
of tuna from Kiribati's EEZ, exports have been negligible. Distances to major markets
result in high transport costs. This is further compounded by fluctuations in catch levels
and low volume of export that further make transportation unreliable.
The analysis has shown that the bulk of the government revenue comes from
access rather than from domestic fishing. The establishment of TML was negative and
costs incurred were much higher than the anticipated benefits. While private sector
development is accorded a high development priority in principle, incentives to attract
private sector and foreign investment are limited. The major constraint that inhibits
private sector development is the lack of reliable and affordable air transportation. Other
problems are the lack of fresh water supplies, lack of availability of land, uncertainty
surrounding land titles, and high input costs such as fuel, bait and other supplies which
are all largely imported.
However, the aspirations to develop domestic tuna industries still remain high on
the national development agenda as seen by the formation of the Central Pacific
Producers Limited, the OIFP and the current review of Foreign Investment regulations
and the development of the Tuna Management Plan.
Unless the underlying problems of high transport costs, high input costs due to
reliance on imports and inadequate access to basic facilities and infrastructure such as
water supply, electricity and land are addressed, these factors may continue to constrain
domestic development.
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Republic of Kiribati, National Development Plan (1983- 1986), Kiribati, p.104.
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Chapter 5: Case Study on Domestication Initiatives - Fiji Islands
5.1

Introduction
This chapter analsyes the domestication experience of Fiji. First, the significance

of the fisheries sector in the economy, in particular the contribution by the tuna
fisheries, is examined. This is followed by an outline of the policy framework for
domestication. The chapter goes on to show that the earlier attempts to domesticate have
incurred a considerable cost and most of the original objectives have not been attained.
The cannery and fishing fleet operations required continuous government support, as
both ventures could not maintain their commercial viability. This earlier experience has
therefore undermined the real significance of the tuna fisheries sector in Fiji's economy.
The fresh tuna longline industry however has achieved some positive result of
domestication but the real overall costs and benefits of the industry needs to be more
comprehensively assessed.
The chapter concludes that despite the presence of a domestic tuna industry in
Fiji, domestication continues to be the desired objective for maximising benefits from
tuna resources in the EEZ. This is seen in the context of current policies to attract
foreign investment, greater private sector involvement, together with measures to
increase direct participation by nationals to address social equity concerns.

5.2

Fiji Islands - general

Fiji is an archipelagic State comprising about 322 small islands lying between latitude
12° - 22° south and longitude 177° west and 174° east, including Rotuma. 1 The Fiji
group includes two large high islands, several medium-sized high islands, and numerous
small islands and atolls. The total land area is 18,272 square kilometres and the EEZ is
about 1.3 million square kilometres.2 The EEZ is the eighth largest in the South Pacific
region and represents around 4 % of the total in-zone area. 3 Figure 5.1 shows the
regional position of Fiji's EEZ with its neighbouring States.

1

D. Stanely, South Pacific Handbook. (7th Ed.), Avalon Travel Publishing, California, USA, 2000, pp:
547-712.
2
Ibid.
3
Oceanic Fisheries Programme, Tuna Resource Analysis - Fiji, South Pacific Commission, Noumea
New Caledonia, April 1996, p.11 .
'
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Figure 5.1

Fiji Exclusive Economic Zone

•
'

,-

Source: South Pacific Commission (1994).

Fiji shares BEZ boundaries with Vanuatu, Tonga, New Caledonia, Solomon Islands,
Tuvalu, Wallis & Futuna. Fiji also has more than 40% of its boundary bordering
international waters. 4
Fiji's total estimated population in 1999 was 806,223 and the average annual
rate of population growth is around 0.8 %. 5 Fiji has a multi-ethnic population of which
45% live in urban areas. 6 Fiji has a standard of living of a lower-middle-income
developing country. 7 The GDP per capita in 1999 at market prices was estimated to be
F$ 3889.2 or about US$ 1968.50.8

4

Ibid.
Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, Key Statistics, Government Printing Department, December 2000, p.3.
6
Ibid.
7 World Bank, Pacific Island Economies: building a resilient economic base for the twenty-first century.
World Bank, Washington, 1996, p.103.
8
Reserve Bank of Fiji, Quarterly Review. December 2000, p. A21, A49.
5
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5.3

Status of tuna stocks

Fiji's EEZ is only moderately productive compared to the equatorial western Pacific
where most regional tuna production originates. 9 The status of the tuna stocks is
discussed in detail in the National Tuna Assessment Report by the SPC.

10

Surface tuna

fishery in Fiji is seasonal while longline fishery is carried throughout the year.

11

According to recent regional level studies, the four major species of tuna

12

are in

relatively good condition in that the biomass appear to be at or above the level that is
consistent with long term sustainability, but there are concerns about the negative trends
in the bigeye and yellowfin stocks. 13 In the case of pole and line fishery which was
carried out until the mid 1990s, skipjack accounted for over 80% of the catch while
yellowfin catches ranged from 9% to 15%. 14 Table 5.1 shows the catch composition of
the longline fishery, which is currently, the dominant tuna fishing method used in Fiji.
Albacore is the major species caught by longline vessels in Fiji's EEZ in the 1990s
except for the 1995-96 period when yellowfin catch was much higher. Currently, the
Fiji catch rates of albacore account for around 15 % of the total regional catch.

15

Table 5.1

Species Composition of the Longline Fishery (Percentage)

Species

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Y ellowfin (%)

19

15

18

23

25

26

31

31

23

18

14

22

Bigeye (%)

26

17

21

21

16

10

12

13

10

10

9

6

Albacore (%)

6

43

36

27

36

35

23

32

43

44

45

65

Other(%)

49

25

25

29

23

29

33

24

24

28

32

7

Source: Secretanat of the Pacific Commumty, Tuna Fishery Yearbook, 2001 .

9

Oceanic Fisheries Programme (1996), op. cit., n.3 , p.11.
South Pacific Commission, Fiji - National Tuna Fisheries Assessment, Country Report 7,
(Confidential) Oceanic Fisheries Programme, Noumea, New Caledonia, 1994.
11
Oceanic Fisheries Programme (1996), op. cit., n.3, p. 12. Wide seasonal variations in sea surface
temperature and the presence of strong prevailing southerly winds in winter months have a negative
influence on the surface fishery.
12
Skipjack (Katsuwnus pelamis); yellowfin (Thunnus a/bacares); albacore (Thunnus alalunga) ; bigeye
(Thunnus obesus).
13
Standing Committee on Tuna and Billfish Programme, Report of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Standing
Committee on Tuna and Bill.fish Programme, Executive Summary - yellowfin and bigeye research group,
5 - 12 July, 2000, Noumea, New Caledonia, Government of Fiji, Fiji- Tuna Development and
Management Plan, A National Policy for the Development and Management of Tuna Fisheries, 2002,
~3..
This is analysed from the Tuna Fishery Yearbook 2001- [T. A. Lawson (Ed.), Tuna Fishery Yearbook
2001, Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Noumea, New Caledonia, 2002].
15
Ibid. [The report indicates that since the results of stock assessments and production are preliminary
and based on constant recruitment rates, in case there is a reduction in recruitment of albacore, catch
levels are likely to decline.]
10

pp·2

.
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Yellowfin is an important species for the longline fishery because of its high value. 16
Catches of yellowfin in Fiji are low in comparison to those in the equatorial regions.
Bigeye is also relatively important in terms of its high value in the longline fishery but
catch rates are low and decreasing as shown in table 5.1. In terms of skipjack, which is a
major catch of the pole and line fishery, the resource is being under-utilised because of
the limited pole and line activities since the late 1990s. 17
Based on the SPC provisional assessment, the average Total Allowable Catch
(TAC) for skipjack in 1995 was estimated as 16,000 tonnes, yellowfin as 6,000 tonnes,
bigeye as 2,000 tonnes and albacore as 3000 tonnes. 18 In the more recent Tuna
Management Plan (2002), an annual catch limit of 15,000 tonnes is placed for years
2002 and 2003 for the combined catches of bigeye, albacore and yellowfin. 19 Figures
5.2 (a) and (b) show the total catch by longline vessels and pole and line vessels in Fiji's

°

EEZ. 2 Figure 5.2(a) shows that there has been a steady increase in longline catch and
vessel numbers or fishing effort (except in 1997) over the period with a rapid increase
more recently since 2000.
Figure 5.2 (a) Total Catch by Active Longline Vessels in Fiji (Tonnes)
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16

C. Lightfoot, Fiji Sashimi Longline Fishery, (draft report), Fiji Fisheries Division, May.291998.
Malakai Tuiloa-Acting Director of Fisheries, Fiji Fisheries Division, March 2002.
18 Fiji - Guidelines on Licensing for Offshore and EEZ Tuna Fishery: adopted by Cabinet December
1994, Annex 4, p.16.
19 Government of Fiji, Fiji-Tuna Development and Management Plan, 2002, p.10.
.
20 Purse seine trials were carried out in the 1980s with low catch rate results. Currently there 1s no purse
seine fishing carried out in Fiji.
17
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Figure 5.2 (b) Total Catch by Active Pole and Line Vessels in Fiji (Tonnes)
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In figure 5.2 (b), from late 1970s to 1980s shows fluctuations in catch levels of
pole and line fleet until 1995 and a rapid decline thereafter. The level of total catch has
therefore not exceeded the catch limit of 15,000 tonnes that is currently in place under
the Tuna Management Plan.

5.4

Contribution of fisheries to the Fiji economy

The Fisheries Division categorises the fisheries sector into 4 sub-sectors: industrial,
artisanal, subsistence and aquaculture. 21 The following section analyses the significance
of the fisheries sector, more specifically, the contribution of industrial tuna fisheries to
Fiji's economy.

5.4.1

Contribution of tuna catch to total fisheries production

Table 5.2 presents the total production of fish and fisheries products by variou8
categories. The table shows that tuna production by volume accounts for almost one
third of the total fisheries production in Fiji.

21

Fisheries Division, Fisheries Division Annual Reports, (various issues). See for example: Fisheries
Division Annual Report 1997, 1998.
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Table 5.2

Estimated Tuna Production by Volume as a Percentage of Total
Fisheries Production in Fiji by Major Categories

Year

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Artisanal Fish and nonfish(Mt)

6868

6377

6513

6010

6515

6212

7328

7384

7297

5820

6812

Total Industrial
Fisheries (Mt)

9175

9598

7351

8578

9418

8581

9390

13521

14734

8174

14138

Subsistence Production
(est) in <Mt)

15600

15800

16000

16200

16400

16600

16800

17000

17200

17400

17600

Total Artisanal and
subsistence Production
(Mt)
Estimated Total
Fisheries production
<Mt)
Total tuna fisheries
Production as % of total
fisheriees
Production ( by
volume)

22468

22177

22513

22210

22915

22812

24128

24384

24497

23220

24412

31643

31775

29864

30788

32333

31393

33518

37905

39231

31394

38550

29%

30%

25%

28%

29%

27%

28%

36%

37%

26%

37%

'

l.Artisanal fishenes mcludes fin fish and non-finfish such as seaweeds, shellfish and crustaceans
2. Total industrial production consists of pole and line, purse seine, foreign longline and domestic longline and
excludes imports to canneries
3. Purse seine catch unloaded at Pafco is included although fish may or may not have been caught in Fiji waters but
vessels contracted to supply Pafco. Some initial purse seine catches are in Fiji waters while the origin of more recent
catches is not known.
Source: Fisheries Division. Annual Reports. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests.

5.4.2

Contribution of fishing to GDP

Table 5.3 indicates that fishing contributes close to 2% of the GDP. 22 Fish processing
which is an important part of the fisheries cash economy is not shown within the
fisheries sector but is categorised under the manufacturing sector. Thus the real
contribution of the fisheries sector to GDP is not apparent from commercial fishing
activity because it does not include the subsistence fishery and the fish processing sector
which are two important components of the fisheries sector.

Table 5.3

Contribution of Fishing to Gross Domestic Product (GDP)*
1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999(0)

1,568

1,664

1,708

1,794

1,839

1,896

1,879

1,906

2,058

15.l
1%

16.3
1%

17.1
1%

23.4
1.33%

25.1
1.36%

28.8
1.52%

24.9
1.33%

26.2
1.37%

36.5
1.77%

1991
Total GDP F$
(m)
Fishing F$(m)
Fishing as %
of GDP

* GDP by Activity at 1989 prices.

22

..

Source: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, Key Statistics, and December 2000 .

The contribution of commercial fishing to GDP does not include subsistence but the total GDP
calculation includes the subsistence component. According to Fisheries Division Annual Reports,
subsistence fishing is estimated to contribute to about half the total fisheries production by volume.
Therefore, the contribution of fishing to GDP underestimates the real value of fisheries contribution to the
economy.
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Table 5.3 shows that tuna fishing that falls under the industrial sub-sector has
contributed slightly less than 2 % to GDP since 1991.

5.4.3

23

Tuna fisheries exports

The major commodity exports from Fiji include sugar, gold, timber, garments and fish.
In 2000, sugar contributed 25.6%, garments 25.3%, canned fish 2.32% and other fish

2.86% to total domestic exports. 24 Table 5.4 shows the percentage contribution of fish
exports to total domestic exports by commodity. 25 Table 5.4 shows that the contribution
of fish exports to the total domestic commodity exports ranged from 13.5% in 1994 to
6% in 1999. Fish exports include tuna and a variety of marine products.

26

The contribution to total exports of canned tuna, fresh and chilled tuna and
frozen tuna exports would therefore be less than 7% to 8% of total commodity exports
given that fish exports accounted for above 7% of the total exports from 1995.

Table 5.4

Total Fish Exports as a Percentage of Total Domestic Commodity
E xpo rts
1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

555
551
588
554
586
Total
Domestic
Exports
by Principle
Commodities
$F(m)
39.3
43.2
49.2
46.6
Fish 44.8
Total
Exports F$(m)
Fish Exports 7.7% 8.4% 8.4% 7.1% 7.3%
as a% of Total
Commodity
Exports
Source: Reserve Bank, Quarterly Revtew, December
Bulletin, 1995, 10(1): 101-138.
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1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

471

765

823

758

906

948

1026

63.4

63 .9

60.4

50.4

49.5

57.5

88.8

13.5

8.3%

7.3%

6.6%

5.5%

6%

8.7%

%

2001; A Latukefu, Statistical Annex, Pacific Economic

Employment

The diverse nature of the fisheries sector with a large subsistence, artisanal-commercial,
and an industrial harvesting and processing component makes recording of employment
a difficult task. The 1996 Fiji Census Report estimated that there were around 6,246

23

This low figure does not capture the real contribution of the industrial tuna fisheries sector to the GDP.
Some degree of caution is therefore required when using such indicators to determine the importance of
tuna fisheries in the economy.
24
Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, Key Statistics, Government Printing Department, 2000, p.60.
25
The total domestic exports by commodity include gold, sugar, garments, fish, timber, molasses and
coconut oil.
26
The marine products primarily include reef fin-fish, crustaceans, aquarium fish, shark fin, trochus,
mother of pearl shells and beche-der-mer.
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people employed in the fishery sector. Of this, 5,052 were involved directly in fishing,
1, 181 in crab, prawn and shellfish production, and 13 in smoking and curing fish. 27 The
6,246 people represented 2.22% of the 280,505 people formally and informally
employed in Fiji in 1996.

28

In addition, the Census Report under the manufacturing

category indicated that I, I 00 people were employed in "fish processing" and the
estimated "paid employment" in fishing (excluding subsistence) to be 340. 29 The direct
employment in tuna fishing and processing in Fiji has been estimated to be around
1,407 in 2000.

30

These consisted of 340 crew on foreign fishing vessels, 462 on longline

vessels, 25 in pole and line fishery, 50 in artisanal, 400 in Pafco and 130 in sashimi
processing and marketing. 31 In terms of direct employment, the 1,407 people
represented 0.3 % of the total employment of the economically active population in
2000.

32

This figure is underestimated considering the employment at the Pafco cannery

has ranged from 500 to 1,000 and employment is Fiji Fish Company of about 700
workers. 33

5.4.5

Fisheries revenue in relation to national government revenue

Government revenue in Fiji is derived from both direct and indirect taxes, fees and
grants. Direct revenue in Fiji mainly comprises company and personal income taxes
while indirect revenues are mostly through customs and value added tax on
consumption.

27

34

Fees, fines and other administrative charges, dividends and grants also

Bureau of Statistics, Annual Employment Survey 1996, Government Printer, Suva.
R Gillett, and C. Lightfoot, The Contribution of Fisheries to the Economies of the Pacific Island
Countries, A Report for Asian Development Bank, Forum Fisheries Agency and the World Bank, July
2002.
29
Bureau of Statistics, Annual Employment Survey 1996. This seems a low estimate as it only considers
fishing and does not take into account the people employed at the canneries or processing plants. Also
this figure is underestimated for fishing because in 1996 according to Fisheries Division Annual Report
(1996), there were 1,630 licenses issued to artisanal fishers and 3,432 crew were registered. There were
42 domestic longline vessels and 7 pole and line vessels. The employment of crew on these vessels is not
even recorded.
30
R. Gillett, M. McCoy, L. Rodwell and J. Tamate, Tuna: a key economic resource in the Pacific
Islands. Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines, 2001, p.17.
31 Ibid.
32
This is derived from the Population Census estimates given in the Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, Key
Statistics, 2000, p.3.
33
Personal Communication - Deo Chandra, Manager - Production and Marketing, Fiji Fish Marketing
Company Limited, February 2002; [There were over 19 companies registered exporting fresh and frozen
tuna in June 2001, therefore employment in these operations, both part-time and full-time would represent
considerable proportion of fisheries sector employment that is not apparent].
34
See for example: Reserve Bank Quarterly Reports (various issues); Reserve Bank of Fiji, Quarterly
Report, (Table A32), December 2001.
28
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contribute to normal government revenue. Assessment of tuna fisheries revenue is
therefore complex given the varied sources of revenue.
Fiji does not rely on access agreements except under the US Multilateral Treaty
and a bilateral agreement with Japan. 35 It is estimated that Fiji received US$ 212, 000 in
access fees in 1999 and US$ 844,000 in 2000 through the US Multilateral Treaty.

36

In Fiji, until 2001 fishing licence fees were not related to resource rent, but a

nominal charge for administration of fishing effort. Under Section 10 of the Marine

Spaces Act (1985) Cap J58A, a foreign fishing license costs were FJ$50 plus 5 % of the
landed market value of the catch taken from the EEZ per licensing period (ie a year).

37

In 1996, fishing license fees were increased from FJ$50 to FJ$200 for vessels requiring
an offshore or EEZ license. 38 Table 5 .4 provides details of the level of revenue
generated from administering the offshore and BEZ licenses from 1994 until 2001. In
2002, under the Tuna Management Plan, offshore license fees have been increased from
FJ$200 to FJ$20,000 for vessels greater than 20 meters in length and FJ$15,000 for
vessels less than 20 meters. 39 In addition there is a management fee of FJ$6,000 for all
vessels. 40

If for example, the current fee level is applied to 2001 licenses, (excluding
rebates and assuming vessels are over 20 meters in length), the fees would be close to
$2.3 million. This figure accounts for about 130% increase in license fee from the 2001.
fee charges. The main reason behind this potential loss of revenue has been largely
government policy to increase domestic fisheries development by requiring foreign
vessels to land catch at the Pafco cannery or to fish under charter, lease arrangement or
joint ventures with domestic companies as part of government efforts to domesticate the
foreign fleet.
35

The contribution from the US Multilateral Treaty to Fiji is largely from the Project Development Funds
because very limited if any purse seining is done in Fijian waters. Under the Japanese bilateral agreement,
there is only occasional seasonal fishing. [Personal Communication - Senior Fisheries Officer, Fisheries
Division, February 2002.]
36
R. Gillett, The Economic Importance ofFisheries in the Pacific Island Economies-Fiji, 2001, p.15; M.
Pretes and E. Petersen, Rethinking Fisheries Policy in the Pacific. Resource Management in Asia-Pacific,
Working Paper No.39, Australian National University, Canberra, 2002, p.15.
37
Under the Marine Spaces Act, section 10 states that the Minister may require a part of the catch taken
by the vessel to be landed for processing at a port in Fiji and under such circumstances, may allow
exemptions from all or some of the provisions of paying such fees. In practice, Government has
encouraged foreign vessels to land catch at domestic ports in lieu of 5 % fees on landed value of catch.
38
Personal Communication- Anare Raiwalui, Licensing Unit, Fiji Fisheries Division, May 2001 .
39
Anon, ''96 Seek 16 fishing licenses", The Daily Post, Wednesday 3 April 2002; Government of Fiji,
Fiji-Tuna Management and Development Plan (2002), Section 6.8.9.
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Table 5.5

Year

Number of Offshore and EEZ Licenses and Estimated Level of
License Fees generated as Revenue
No. of Offshore and EEZ Licenses

Estimated License Fees as
RevenueF$

1994

50

2,500

1995

78

3,900

1996

76

15,200

1997

80

16,000

1998

81

16,200

1999

69

13,800

2000

77

15,400

88

2001

...

17,600

...

Source: FtJt Ftshenes D1vts10n Register of Licenses (Revenue is estimated based on the levels of licensing fee)

It is difficult to calculate the actual economic contribution the tuna fishery, to the
national economy without detailed case studies on the multiplier effects. This is also
because of the complex nature of various fishing and related activities that fall under
different ministries' portfolios. 41 Other commodity exports such as sugar and garments
have had a much greater impact than fisheries or the tuna fishery. However, the trends
in production from the longline fishery and the change of the Pafco partnership with
Bumble Bee Company indicate that fisheries are likely to play a much greater role in the
medium term. Some of the reasons for the overall limited economic impact will be
discussed under the section on tuna development experience.

5.5

Policy Framework - national development plans

The following discussion outlines the policy framework for domestic industrial tuna
fisheries development in Fiji through the various national development plans over time.

It will be shown that the underlying rationale for the policies and strategies has been the
desire to domesticate the tuna industry in order to achieve greater flow of benefits to the
local economy.

40

There is a rebate for Fiji owned vessels of $10,000 and a 50 % rebate for Fiji vessels in their first year
of operation.
41 For example "fishing and catch records" are kept with the Fisheries Department, "trade and
employment records" with Bureau of Statistics, "revenue and income" data with the Finance Department.
Data often is aggregated into general fisheries data making meaningful analysis difficult.

140

Development Plan Six (1971 -1975)
Fiji's Sixth Development Plan was the first plan after gaining independence from
Britain. A key objective of this Plan was to reduce the disparities between rural and
urban incomes under the colonial administration. 42 Emphasis was on industries with
export potential, especially those that used domestic raw materials. During this Plan
period, a UNDP skipjack tuna and live bait fishery survey was conducted.

43

The project

indicated that a commercial venture was viable and recommended the establishment of a
tuna fishery based initially on 8 to 10 medium-sized vessels with catch up to 5,000 tons
offish annually. 44

Development Plan Seven (1976-1980)
Development Plan Six's main objectives of developing local and export markets
continued into the Development Plan Seven period. Several more specific objectives
were outlined for both coastal and industrial tuna fisheries. Those relating to industrial
fisheries included: 45
•

development of the capability by local people to fish skipjack tuna;

•

encouragement of domestic processing of fish and fishery products; and

•

maintenance of close liaison with other regional agencies involved in investigating
the fisheries resources.

Based on the positive survey result during the previous Plan period, the government
decided to develop a skipjack tuna industry to achieve the following objectives: 46
•

maximum overall benefit to the national economy;

•

maximum employment of local people;

•

exports of products with maximum value added;

•

substitution for imports of canned fish;

42

Agricultural development, education and training were seen as avenues to tackle the need for creating
employment opportunities for the rapidly growing population in urban areas and to reduce the urban drift
from rural areas. Ministry of Finance, Fiji's Sixth Development Plan (1971-1975) - Chapter 2
Government Printer, Suva, 1970, pp.17-21.
'
43
Central Planning Office, Fiji's Seventh Development Plan 1976 - 1980, Government Printer, Suva
1975.
'
44
Ibid., p.92.
45 Ibid.
46
Ibid., p.93.
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•

production of fish meal for local requirements; and

•

local share participation.

As a result, the Pacific Fishing Company (Pafco) was developed as a joint venture
between the government and Japanese companies to operate a tuna cannery in Levuka.
A wholly government-owned fishing corporation (IKA Corporation) was also
established to undertake fishing operations to supply fish to the cannery.

Development Plan Eight (1981 -1985)
Development Plan Eight stated that the major economic potential of the fisheries sector
lay in the development of the industrial fisheries. 47 An important objective during this
Plan period, therefore, was "consolidating and expanding as rapidly as economically
feasible tuna fishing operations."48 This was to be achieved through five major activity
areas that included construction and purchase of tuna vessels, provision of port facilities
and freezers, providing training on skipjack fishing and marketing oftuna. 49

Development Plan Nine (1986 -1990)
Development Plan Nine proposed the continuation of projects from the Development
Plan Eight period but with emphasis on processing and marketing to increase value
added production and localisation of the industry. The projects focussed on
consolidating the operations of the IKA Corporation and Pafco. 50 However, the military
coup in May 1987 created much political and economic instability and affected the
implementation of the Plan.

Fisheries Sector Plan for the 1990s
In 1990 the Ministry of Primary Industries and Co-operatives prepared a Fisheries

Sector Plan covering the period 1990 to 2000. The policy objectives of the Sector Plan
were: 51
47

Central Planning Office, Fiji's Eight Development Plan 1981- 1985, Government Printer, Suva, 1980,

E.146.
8
Ibid, p.147.
49
Ibid.
5 Central Planning Office, National Development Plan Nine 1986- 1990, Government Printer, Suva,
1985.
51 Fiji Fisheries Division, Fisheries Sector Plan for the 1990s, Ministry of Primary Industries and Cooperatives, 1993, p.10.

°
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•
•
•
•

to further develop EEZ and territorial water fisheries;
to improve quality of, and increase value added to exports;
to regulate and control all fisheries on the principles of optimum utilisation and
long-term sustainability; and
to encourage the implementation of sound business management methods by, a~d in
co-operation with, local fishers and to devolve government activities to the pnvate
sector.

The strategies to accomplish the objectives of the Fisheries Sector Plan included:

52

•

the installation of urgently needed infrastructure to support the offshore fishing
fleet;

•

the deployment of more Fish Aggregation Devices (F ADs );

•

rationalisation of the Fisheries Act and improvement in fisheries law enforcement
capabilities; and

•

encouragement of the role of Fiji as a regional centre for fisheries products,
processing and marketing.

National Development Strategy (1997)
The National Development Strategy 1997 outlined policies for sustainable growth.
Policies and strategies relating to industrial fisheries include expanding and
consolidating tuna fisheries in the BEZ under an industrial fisheries programme, 53
improving the quality and value-adding of exports and regulating and controlling all
fisheries using the principles of optimum use and long term sustainability. 54 Efforts to
overcome the constraints to export development of tuna include provision of berthing
facilities for longline vessels, review of fisheries regulations and consideration of
options for improving Pafco's long term viability and competitiveness.

Strategic Plan for the New Century: policies and strategies for sustainable
development of Fiji (1999)
As a step in implementing the National Development Strategy 1997, the 1999 Strategic
Plan identified key performance and accountability indicators. These included
52

Ibid. [The Fisheries Sector Plan for the 1990s remained an internal document for the 1990s rather than
a public official document].
53
Under the reform programme, the government had initiated a Commodity Development Fund that
would accelerate growth in new and existing areas in the primary sector. In the are of tuna fisheries funds
were allocated to develop the sashimi exports and to assist rural fishers to venture into nearshore tuna
fishing. The fund was known and the Commodity Development Framework (CDF) fund.
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increasing marine exports by 75% by 2001, achieving sustainable profits for Pafco, and
increasing rent from foreign vessels. 55

Strategic Development Plan (2002 - 2004)

Fiji was again caught up in political chaos and civil unrest in May 2000 that affected its
economic performance and has resulted in recession.56 Strategic plan 2002- 2004 was
released with the aim of building confidence, stability and growth in the Fijian
economy.

57

Policies and strategies relevant to the tuna fisheries include: 58

• promoting and expanding sustainably competitive exports of living marine
resources, technologically appropriate, safe and cost-effective fishing vessels,
particularly for industrial fisheries;

• providing assurance of adequate air freight space [for sashimi exports] by attracting
more tourism; and

• encouraging local value-adding and down-stream processmg with the aim of
maximising the value of products.
The Plan anticipates greater expansion of the fresh tuna longline industry from the high
value sashimi exports and an improvement in Pafco's profitability under a new
agreement with Bumble Bee Company for operating a tuna loining plant.

Tuna Management and Development Plan (2002)

The Tuna Development and Management Plan (2002) was approved by Cabinet in
August 2002 as the national policy document for tuna management and development in
Fiji. The broad objectives of the plan include ... "setting of harvest levels that will not
damage stocks and putting into practice a licensing policy that will ensure that
maximum benefits from fishing are enjoyed by Fijians". 59 Development strategies under
the Tuna Management and Development Plan include infrastructure support, training,
social awareness, small-scale fisheries training, setting up a seed capital fund, and

s4 Ministry of National Planning, Development Strategy for Fiji: policies and programmes for sustainable
growth, December 1997, pp. 82-84.
ss Ministry of National Planning, Strategic Plan for the New Century: Policies and Strategies for
Sustainable Development of Fiji, 1999.
s6 Ministry of National Planning, Strategic Development Plan (2002-2004): Rebuilding Confidence,
Stability and Growth. Government Printing Department, Suva, November 2001, p.3.
s7Ibid.
SS Ibid, p.99.
s9 Government of Fiji, Fiji - Tuna Development and Management Plan, Suva, Fiji, Section 4.2, p.9.
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addressing issues relating to air cargo space. 60 The Plan also includes limits on the
number of licenses and outlines the criteria for allocation of licenses with preference to
local nationals.

5.6

Legislative framework

Tuna fishing in Fiji is governed by the Fisheries Act (Chapter 158) and the Marine
Spaces Act (Chapter J58A). Regulations relating to foreign fishing vessels are contained

in the Marine Spaces Act and the Marine Spaces (Foreign Fishing Vessels) Regulations
whereas regulations relating to Fiji Fishing Vessels are in the Fisheries Act. Except for
its licensing provisions, the Fisheries Act also applies to the foreign fishing vessels
licensed under the Marine Spaces Act. Three categories of tuna fishing vessels are
licensed in Fiji - Fiji Fishing Vessels61 registered in Fiji, Fiji Fishing Vessels not
registered in Fiji 62 (where local share equity in business is at least 30%) and Foreign
Fishing Vessels.
There are specific provisions and modifications either in the regulations or
through Ministerial Guidelines to facilitate the tuna domestication objective. For
example, the low level of equity required for registration as a Fiji Fishing Vessel allows
foreign vessels to base their operations in Fiji as a domestic based foreign fishing
vessel. A technical report reviewing the licensing practices for offshore fishing vessels
stated, "[a]s the fishing becomes more fully developed, there should be mechanism to
encourage increasing localisation and greater local commitment of foreign
involvement". 63 The report further recommended that the degree of access to Fiji waters
should be proportional to the benefits and commitment to Fiji. 64
In order to allow more competitive advantage for non-Fiji registered Fiji Fishing

Vessels, the Ministerial Guidelines stated that these vessels should be allowed access to
60

Ibid, p.9-10.
A definition of a Fiji Fishing Vessel was inserted in the Fisheries Regulations in 1990. [Fisheries
(Amendment) Regulations 1990 (Notice 25/90)]. Forum Fisheries Agency, Fiji - National Fisheries
Legislation - < http://www.ffa.int.fi%20.pdf.>, p.ii (accessed 12 February 2003).
A Fiji Fishing Vessel is defined as, "any fishing vessel which is registered in Fiji or the operators of
which are based on a place in Fiji and which is wholly owned by a natural person who is a citizen of, or a
company, which is at least 30% owned by Fiji citizen, or incorporated in Fiji." A non-Fiji Registered
Fishing Vessel therefore qualifies as a "Fiji Fishing Vessel" because the business has a local share equity
of at least 30%.
62
Under Fisheries Act Section 5 (4) a Foreign Registered Fiji Fishing Vessel is required to seek prior
approval from the Minister of Fisheries.
6
R. Gillett, A Review of Licensing Practices in Fiji for Offshore Fishing Vessels and for the Export of
Fish Products, Technical Report 2, Food and Agriculture Organisation, Rome, 1995, p.4.
64
Ibid.
61
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the territorial sea and EEZ.

This would allow greater mobility of foreign vessels that

base their operations in Fiji to engage in the longline fishery.
Section 10 of the Marine Spaces Act states that an EEZ license requires a fee of
$50 plus 5 % of the value of the catch. 66 Furthermore, the Minister may require that a
proportion of the vessels' catch be landed for processing at a port in Fiji. 67 In such
circumstances, the Minister may exempt all or any of the provisions of the regulation. 68
To facilitate the basing of foreign vessels at local ports, amendments to section
10 of the Marine Spaces Act on charges were recommended by the Fisheries Division as
part of the policy guidelines. 69 Fiji-based foreign operations without local processing
pay 4 % of the landed market value of the catch taken from the EEZ, foreign fishing
operations which sell to the local cannery 1%, and foreign fishing operations which are
Fiji-based and oriented to the export of sashimi pay 1%.70 This refle~ts that all foreign
fishing vessels pay according to their different levels of domestic commitment. A
foreign fishing vessel with no shore-based contact is required to pay 5% of the value of
catch. 71
Domestication strategies are further enshrined in the preferential licensing criteria
established under the current National Tuna Development and Management Plan which
incorporates both the Ministerial Guidelines adopted by Cabinet in December 1994 and
the Social Justice Act (2001). Foreign-owned vessels are required to pay full access fee
72

while Fiji-owned fishing vessels are subject to a rebate.

5.7

Domestic tuna fisheries development experience

Fiji adopted a production-based strategy to develop its domestic tuna industry with the
aim of creating local employment and income and exports to earn foreign exchange.
This development experience is discussed below.

65

Guidelines on Licensing for Offshore and EEZ Tuna Fishing - Ministerial Guidelines presented to the
Fiji Cabinet, December 1994.
.
66 This was increased to $200 license fee and 5 % of the market value oflanded catch m 1996.
67 Marine Spaces Act - Part III, Section 10.
68
Ibid.
69
Gillett (1995), op. cit., n.63.
...
.
70 Offshore Fisheries Licensing- Ministerial Guidelines presnetd to the F1J1 Cabmet, August 1996, p .24.
71 The Ministerial Guideline was brought about to reflect the changes required as and a step towards
policy formulation on foreign fishing and to facilitate the development of the l~nglin~ fishery. Section 10
of the Marine Spaces Act was never really applied as foreign vessels were landmg their catch to the Pafco
cannery. And were not required to pay 5% access fee.
72 Fiji - Tuna Development and Management Plan (2002) - Section 6.8 .
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5.7.1

Pacific Fishing Company Limited (Pafco)

In 1964 a joint venture between the colonial government of Fiji and C. Itoh company of

Japan, known as the Pacific Fishing Company Limited (Pafco) was set up to operate a
cold store base on the island of Ovalau. By the late 1960s, with the downturn in copra
exports on which the local economy was dependent and the shift of the administrative
capital to Suva, there were limited alternatives left to support the people of Ovalau and
surrounding outer islands. 73 By this time Japan had developed ultra low temperature
freezing technology which allowed vessels to stay at sea longer.

74

Korean and

Taiwanese fishermen also adopted this technology which consequently led to an
increase in number of vessels using the fishing base. The capacity of the base was
expanded in 1972 to 12,000 tonnes to accommodate this increase.

75

The existence of

this expanded fishing base with its sheltered harbour and wharf meant that a fishing
industry was the obvious means to support the local economy.

5.7.1.11975-1986 period
With the positive survey results of tuna stocks (during Development Plan Six period),
the government was keen to establish a local tuna industry in Levuka on the island of
Ovalau. Foreign firms were to comply with the criteria stated earlier under the

Development Plan Seven such as maximising local employment and local share
participation. 76 Pafco, which was already operating the Ovalau fishing base, won the bid
to establish a cannery operation. A 10 year joint venture agreement between the Fiji
government and C. Itoh Company of Japan was established. 77 Besides equity
participation by the government, the joint venture agreement included an assurance on
the progressive localisation of personnel employed, the adoption of an agreed timetable
for the development of a cannery and an obligation for the joint venture to purchase
skipjack and other tuna from local fishers and fishing enterprises. 78 Exports of frozen
tuna were to be gradually reduced as canning progressed. Fishmeal for local

73

T. A Donnelly, ''The Tuna - Fishing Industry in Fiji", The Transactions and Proceedings of the Fiji
Society for the years 1973 to 1977, (13), 1998, pp.1-16.
74
Ibid.
75
Ibid.
76
See for example the objectives outlined in Fiji's Development Plan Seven; D. J. Robinson, Notes on the
Development of the Skipjack Tuna Industry in Fiji, Fisheries Division, Suva, 1975, p.2.
77
The existing Pafco at that time was re-capitalised with C. Itoh as the major shareholder with 61 %
shares, Nichiro Co with 10%, Fiji Government 25% and local citizens 4%. Inter-Ministerial Working
Group, Renegotiation ofPafco Agreement, Central Planning Office, Suva, 1984, p.11
78
Central Planning Office (1975), op. cit., n.38, p.94.

147

consumption was also to be produced. A 35 to 40% rate of substitution was also
envisaged for imported canned fish to meet local demand. 79 By 1979, it was hoped that
92% of the people employed by Pafco would be locals with an anticipated employment
of 400 people by that time. 80
The early years of Pafco coincided with the peak years of world recession.
Depressed tuna markets

81

together with a sudden increase in fuel prices led to a decline

in the number of longline vessels that supplied catch to Pafco. 82 In 1982, Pafco's
production declined by 3% and export earnings fell by 30% due to a decline in market
prices that affected canneries worldwide. 83
During the first nine years of operation under the joint venture, profits were
recorded between 1976 to 1979 but were held as working capital or transferred to an
asset diminution fund. 84 The Fiji government received dividend payments in 1981 and
1982 at 6% and 12% respectively. 85 By 1983 while the number of local employees
increased to 338 out of 352, there was only one local at a supervisory level. There were
no locals in the senior management and technical levels. 86 Table 5.6 summarises Pafco's
production, exports and level of domestic sales. The table shows that Pafco' s raw
materials supplies also came from foreign longline vessels and from imports. The local
demand for fish meal was met but the local sales of canned fish was relatively small
compared to cheap imports of mackerel from Asian countries. 87 Tuna exports accounted
bewteen 6% to 11 % of total domestic exports.

79

rbid., Inter-Ministerial Working Group, Re-negotiation of Pafco Agreement, Central Planning Office,
Suva, 1984.
80
Ibid.
81 p. C. Hunt, Pacific Fishing Company Limited - Marketing Study, Ministry of Primary Industries, Suva,
June 1985, p.4.
82
Ibid.
83
Inter-Ministerial Working Group (1984), op. cit., n.79, p. 13.
84
Ibid, p.36
85
Ibid.
86
87

Ibid.
Ibid.
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Summary of Pafco's Production, Exports and Domestic Sales (19771986)
1985 1986
1983 1984
1977
1978
1979 1980 1981 1982

Table 5.6

Landin2 (t):
Longline
5,556
(foreiim)
Pole & line
1,711
Imported pole
&line
Imported
purse seine
Total
7,267
Production (t)
Sales $(m):
Export
5.5
canned fish
Frozen fish 3.9
exports
Local sales
0.174
Fishmeal
NIA
Fish oil
Tuna Exports 7.5%
asa %of
total
domestic
exports

8,418

3,575

5,737

3,220

2,139

1,384

1,432

2,106

1,237

2,524

3,495

2,547

5,829

4,664
664

5,469
368

4,572
577

3,235
693

3,119
5,924

772

1,007

1,006

10,942

7,070

8,284

9,821

8,474

8,227

6,581

6,030

7,480

9.67

10.5

8.7

15.5

11.3

17.2

16.09

12.5

19.5

4.23

1.16

5.4

2.79

0.74

0.53

0.65

1.8

1.8

0.163
0.167
0.01
11.4 %

0.084
0.229

0.077
0.157

0.088
0.279

0.11
0.330

0.12
0.313

0.12
0.337

0.12
0.325

0.16
0.394

7%

6.1 %

9.4%

6.6%

9.7%

8.4%

7.5 %

8.8%

..

Source: Fisheries Division Annual Reports - various issues, Inter-Mimsterial Working Group Report (1984) .
National Centre for Development Studies, South Pacific Economic and Social Database: Fiji, Australian National
University

At the end of the 10-year period of the joint venture in 1986, C. Itoh pulled out of the
joint-venture agreement and the Fiji government nationalised the operations of Pacfo at
the end of 1986. 88

5.7.1.2 1987 - 2000 period
Pafco's ownership changed to the Fiji government with 98% of total cap!tal shares and
2% to local private owners.

89

Pafco recorded its most profitable years between 1987 and

1991, with accumulated profits after tax of approximately FJ$10 million over the fouryear period.

°From 1992, Pafco has consistently recorded deficits with a major loss of

9

$4.3 million in 1995.

91

Table 5.7 summarises Pafco's production, export revenue,

domestic sales and the status of its operating profitability. The export revenue has

88

Ibid., According to the Pafco Re-neogiation Report, C. Itoh staff claimed that it was not economically
feasible to continue business against the expanding capacities and aggressive marketing of low cost
canneries in Thailand, Philippines, Senegal and Ivory Coast. [See details in, P.C. Hunt, Pacific Fishing
Company Limited Marketing Study, Ministry of Primary Industries, Suva, June, 1985].
89
Arthur Andersen Corporate Finance, Review ofPacific Fishing Company, 8 October 1997, p.18.
90
Ibid., p. 28.
91
Ibid.
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domestic sales and the status of its operating profitability. The export revenue has
fluctuated over the period with an increase in 1994 of around 21 % from the previous
year. However, Pafco has recorded a major operating loss in the same year of $4.05
million. Losses have been recorded since 1992.

Table: 5.7

Summary of Pafco's Production, Exports, Local Sales and Operating
Income

Production
throughput (t)
Exports $(m)
Local Sales $(m)
Fish Meal $(m)
Net
Operating
Profit/
(Loss)
$(m)

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

15.857

10,263

10,540

11,468

12,786

10,392

47.7
1.3
1.09

32
1.1
0.84

30.4
1.7
0.86

36.8
2
0.8

32.02
2.9
0.52

29.02
3.9
0.51

0.93

(2.43)

(3.84)

(4.05)

(4.52)

(2.85)

Source: Arthur Andersen Corporate Finance (1997): appendix 3; Pafco Annual Reports; Fisheries Division Annual
Reports

One of Pafco 's major problems has been the inconsistent supply of fish from IKA
Corporation and the need for Pafco to maintain supplies of "originating fish" to fulfil its
market obligations under the ACP-Lome Convention to qualify for preferential access. 92
Pafco's operations were severely affected in 1991 when the supply of "originating fish"
from the Solomon Islands and supply from IKA were significantly reduced. The
reduced supply of originating catch caused loss of a major customer (Sainsbury) and
caused Pafco to rely on derogation in order to access the EU markets.

93

Pafco's problems were exacerbated by the acquisition of IKA in 1994 and with
the high cost structure of its subsidiary, Pacific Packaging Limited that produced the
tuna cans. 94 Pacfo also incurred losses in 1995 due to rejected shipments of poor quality
albacore exports to Canada. 95

92

"Originating fish" in the context of Protocol 1 of Lome IV means fish caught by Fiji vessels. Fiji
vessels are those with at least 51 % owned by Fiji citizens, or fish caught by foreign fishing vessels within
12-mile territorial sea of Fijian waters, or "originating" fish imported from another ACP or EU country.
93 Pafco can send non-originating fish under a quota allocated and once its is exceeded, it needs to seek
permission of the EU Council through the ACP-EU Customs Co-operation Committee.
94 Pacific Packaging Limited was the canning company with 55% ownership by Pafco. It produced cans
solely for Pafco and therefore its capacity was underutilized. A report on Pafco indicated that Pafco could
have got cheaper cans from elsewhere. In the case of acquisition of lka, there were significant
expenditures associated with increased maintenance of I.KA vessels while the catch levels were less than
2,000 t per annum.
95 Arthur Andersen Corporate Finance (1997), op. cit., n.89.
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The supply of"originating fish" became a major constraint to Pafco's operations
after IKA was dissolved because of its huge losses and because suppliers shifted to
producing tuna for the more lucrative sashimi market. 96 In 1997, Pafco was closed down
a number of times. 97 With constraints on the supply of its raw materials, the cannery
operated well below its capacity.
Besides problems of fish supply, another factor that negatively impacted Pafco
has been the high costs of operations. These include high transport and freight costs
between Suva and Levuka, high cost of electricity to keep its freezers operational, the
cost of cans, and relatively high stevedoring costs. 98 Pacfo has continued to rely heavily
on the government for financial assistance to provide for both working capital and
infrastructural development. 99 For example between 1994 and 1997, the government
injected over $11.5 million into Pafco. 100
The benefits of Pafco to Fiji's economy have been seen in terms of foreign
exchange from canned fish exports and its contribution to the local economy on Ovalau.
Pacfo is the major employer on the Island. The number of staff directly employed by
Pafco during any given period relates to the production load. In the early 1990s, there
were around 900 workers but by mid 1997, there were around 600 workers. IOI
In July 1997, Pafco re-opened with a skeleton staff to run trials on tuna loining.
In August 1997, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Pafco, FCF

Fishery Co Ltd of Taiwan and a US based company Bumble Bee Seafoods. I02 FCF
Fishery Co would supply fish and Bumble Bee would loin and export while Pafco will
provide the processing facilities and infrastructure. In 1998 a five-year agreement was
signed between Pafco and Bumble Bee for the latter to supply tuna loins 103 to its
cannery in USA. In March 2001 a further extension of the agreement was signed that

96

Ibid.
Ibid, p. 30-31.
98
Ibid.
99
See details of government support in Arthur Andersen Corporate Finance (1997), op. cit, n.89; InterMinisterial Working Group (1984), op. cit., n.87.
100
Arthur Andersen Corporate Finance (1997), op. cit. n.89.
101
Personal Communication - Chandra Prakash, Financial Controller, Pafco, Suva, Febuary, 2002.
102
Bumble Bee supplies 4% of the US canned tuna market and sells in Canada, Australia and New
Zealand. The FCF is one of the largest fishing companies in the world. [Anon, "Bumble Bee Deal
Guarantees PAFCOs Gilt-Edged Future: a new deal to run for seven more years" Pacific Magazine with
Island Business <http://www.pacificislands.cc>, May 2002. Accessed 2 February 2003.The Agreement
states that FCF would supply tuna to Pafco and Bumble Bee would provide technical operations manager
and take over the sales of tuna. Pafco will to process tuna into loins for Bumble Bee].
103
Tuna loins draw only 0.2% duty as against imported canned tuna which has a duty of 12.5%.
97
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expires in 2009.

104

As part of the agreement Pafco is to invest $7.2 million for further

expansion and improvement of its operations to meet sanitation and hygiene
•

requirements.

105

Pafco cleans, cooks, freezes and packs tuna loins for Bumble Bee. The

new partnership now employs about 800 workers and the facilities have already been
upgraded to meet the quality requirements for export to the EU market. 106 In 2001,
under the new agreement, Pafco paid $75,000 dividends to the Fiji government. 107

5. 7.2

IKA Corporation - national fishing fleet operation

It was government policy that harvesting of skipjack in Fiji waters should be confined to

local people.

108

As outlined under the policy framework, a wholly government-owned

corporation- IKA - was established in 1975 to develop a pole and line fishery to supply
the Pafco cannery. The objectives of IKA Corporation were, inter alia:
•

to engage in fishing, culturing and harvesting of all forms of aquatic life;

•

to engage in commercial skipjack tuna and bait fishing operations and generally
operate as a commercial fisheries operation;

•

to engage generally in the exploitation of marine resources within and in the vicinity
of Fiji waters;

•

to encourage and assist in the development of locally-owned fishing enterprises; and

•

to do all manner of things to stimulate the people of Fiji to exploit their own marine
resources and thereby contribute to the development of their general economic and
social situation.

The specific functions of IKA included contracting with foreign vessels to catch tuna in
Fiji waters during the developmental phase and engaging in commercial skipjack tuna
fishing operations to supply fish to the domestic market and for processing and
marketing by Pafco. 109 The functions also included promoting the development of a
locally owned fisheries enterprise and experience in the types of vessels and fishing
methods best suited to local conditions.
Because of the need for specialised expertise and capital to develop at a rapid
rate, IKA initially contracted foreign vessels (Hokuku Marine Products Company of

Ibid.
Ibid.
Anon, ''PAFCO Buzzes as Output Increases", The Fiji Times, Saturday 30 September 2000.
107 Anon, "Pafco Rakes in $400 million'',< http://www.fiiilive.com/news> (accessed 30 July 2002).
108
Central Planning Office, National Development Plan Seven, p.94.
104

105
106
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Japan) to meet its fish supply obligations to Pafco and as a means to develop local
skills.

llO

It was envisaged that top management and fleet supervisors and engineers

would be recruited from overseas who would train locals as part of the fisheries
development programme. 111 The planned targets for IKA were to expand its fleet to 9
vessels by 1980 and to increase the total trained fishers to at least 120. u

2

In 1976, IKA chartered its first vessel and also hired foreign fishing vessels to

fish in Fiji. By 1982, there were 17 vessels: 5 IKA-owned vessels, 7 chartered from a
Japanese company, 2 owned by a private company and 2 New Zealand purse seiners
chartered for exploratory fishing. 113
By the late 1970s, tuna prices had began to decline. In 1983, the average price of
skipjack fell by 11 % from US$1,000 per ton to US$890.1

14

IKA experienced other

problems such as low bait catches, low productivity, high operating costs and a lack of
dedicated fishermen!1 5 Figure 5.3 compares the average catch per IKA-owned vessel
and the Japanese vessels charted by IKA. The performance of IKA vessels was much
lower than the Japanese vessels.1 16 The wages were not linked to catch levels and poor
fleet repair and maintenance were largely a result of inefficient management by IKA.

109

117

Central Planning Office, An Economic Analysis of !KA Corporation, Report by the Central Planning
Office to the Cabinet, 1984.
110
Ibid.
lll Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114
Central Planning Office, An Economic Analysis of !KA Corporation, Report by the Central Planning
Office to the Cabinet, 1984, p.16. (A number of factors influenced the prices to decline. There was a
general world recession which resulted in lower demand and increased supplies. There was also a US
wheat embargo on Russia which resulted in cheaper grain stock in the US and consequently cheaper feed
for chicken, a major competitor for tuna). Consumers therefore switched to chicken, as price of chicken
relative to canned tuna was lower.
115
Ibid, p.16-20.
116
Even though the vessels were of similar capacity, Ika vessels spent less fishing time because they
were much older and were down for repair and maintenance. When the vessels were replaced
productivity was still low because the system of paying wages was not related to productivity. Thi~
created little incentive for captain and officers to perform.
117
A financial and organisational review of IKA by its Accountants in 1982 indicated that there was lack
of effective corporate planning and management. The duties of personnel were not well defined and there
were inadequate management practices. See: op. cit., n.103.
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Figure 5.3

Average Catch Per Vessel IKA-owned/chartered from Japanese
1500

....

cf

(i)

Q)
..c:
0 c

ag
Q)

1000
500

-

O> Q)
C1l Cl)
....

Cl)

Q)

Q)

>>

<!

0

,._

,._

CIC)

0

....

olll)

Cl.I

OI

OI

OI

....

OI

Ii)

....

olll)

....

......
olll)

OI

Ii)
olll)

....
OI

olll)
olll)

....

OI

0

OI
OI

....

Cl.I

OI
OI

....

Year
•Average Catch by IKA Vessels

Ga Average Catch by Japanese Charterd Vessels
Source: Fisheries Division Annual Reports (Figures for 1983/ 84 catches were unavailable)

By the mid 1980s, pole and line was being replaced by purse seine technology for
skipjack fishing in the Western and Central Pacific as it has a higher catch efficiency
due to the use of large nets. 118 The Japanese pole and line vessels therefore scaled down
their operations which further affected the catch levels of IKA.
A major review of IKA was carried out in 1984 resulting in the construction of
two new vessels and the scrapping of old vessels. 119 Ch~ges were made to the
management structure and the option to engage in purse seining was explored to keep
up with the changing global tuna fishing technology. Trial operations however did .not
show any major increase in catches of either the purse seine operations or of the new
IKA vessels. 120
In 1990 IKA was corporatised under the Companies Act with the Fiji

Government as the sole shareholder and management of the company was again reorganised. There were five IKA vessels operational at that time and two chartered
vessels. As part of the re-structuring plan, IKA vessels moved to the Solomon Islands
EEZ during the off season to increase production.

118

121

Under the re-structured plan it was

See for example, D. J. Doulman, ''Development and Expansion of the Tuna Purse Seine Fishery," in
Doulman, D. J. (ed.) Tuna Issues and Perspectives in the Pacific Islands Region, East West Center:
Hawaii, 1987, pp: 133-161.
119
Central Planning Office, An Economic Analysis of /KA Corporation, Report by the Central Planning
Office to the Cabinet, 1984.
120
Aurther Andersen Corporate Finance, A Review of Pacific Fishing Company, 1997.
121 Fishing in the Solomon Islands were halted because of poor productivity and mis-behaviour of crew in
Honiara (see details in Forum Fisheries Agency, Tuna Industry Development Study: Fiji, FFA Report
95135, Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, 1995).

154
hoped that IKA would operate as a commercial fishbase for industrial fishing vessels
providing a "one stop shop" for vessels. 122 The fishbase would prov1.de docking,
slipping, cold storage, engineering, and provisioning services.

123

The government had

continuously assisted IKA in its re-structuring. From 1976 to 1983, IKA received
around FJ$3 million in grants. 124 In 1986 it again received 2.6 million dollars for its
major capital development works and in 1993 it received a guarantee of FJ$1.5 million
for its overdraft. 125
Continuous poor financial performance finally saw IKA taken over by Pafco in
1994 to create a vertically integrated industry. 126 The 1997/1997 fishing season, IKA
was in no condition to weather the poor fishing condition caused by the El Nino
effect. 127 In 1997, IKA was finally bankrupt.

5. 7.3

128

Fresh/chilled tuna longline industry

In the early 1980s, fresh tuna longlining by Japanese using medium sized vessels had

been successfully operated in the Micronesian Islands. 129 As the deep-sea snapper
fishery was becoming marginally viable in Fiji by the mid 1980s, fishers using deep
bottom longlining techniques moved to target tuna. 130 By 1986, private pole and line
and deep-sea snapper operators moved to establish a fresh/chilled tuna longline industry
primarily for the Japanese sashimi market. 131
In 1987, following the coups, the Fiji dollar was devalued.

132

This provided the

price advantage to supply fresh and chilled tuna for the Japanese sashimi market. 133 The
122 IKA Corporation Limited, Corporate and Country Profile, Report prepared for the Board of Directors,
January 1991.
1231bid, p.5.
124 Central Planning Office, An Economic Analysis of !KA Corporation, Report by the Central Planning
Office to the Cabinet, 1984.
125 Forum Fisheries Agency, Tuna Industry Development Study - Fiji, FFA Report No.95/35, Honiara,
Solomon's Islands, 1995; Arthur Andersen Corporate Finance (1997), op. cit., n.120.
126 Pafco was facing severe shortages in fish supply and by acquiring IKA it hoped to sustain a continuous
supply offish. IKA's cost of management also needed to be reduced. The assumption was that by creating
a vertically integrated industry, the profitability would increase with the value added being captured by
Pafco's canning sector. However, IKA was riddled with debt and its performance was also poor.
127 D. J. E. Smith and J. Tamate, Fiji Islands Skipjack Pole and Line Fishery. Fisheries Division, Suva,
Fiji, December 1999, p.5.
128 Ibid.
129 C. Lightfoot, Fiji Sashimi Longline Fishery (draft report), Fiji Fisheries Division, May 29 1998.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
132 World Bank, Fiji: Restoring Growth in a Changing Global Environment. Report No. 13862 -FIJ, East
Asia Pacific Region, World Bank, Washington, p.10. [The Fiji dollar was devalued in two steps by 30%
in an attempt to stem the capital flight. This depreciation in the real effective exchange rate boosted Fiji's
competitive position to re-orient the economy towards export development].
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devaluation also provided additional air routes to Japan through an increase in tourists'
flows that consequently increased the cargo space for airfreight to Japan. 134 As outlined
under the national policy framework, the government had also begun its economic
reform around the same period to boost economic growth. Focus was on export-oriented
development of primary industries with the private sector playing a key role. 135 This
provided further incentives for the longline industry to develop. Incentives such as duty
exemptions on imports of specialised fishing equipment, bait, duty concessions on
import of fishing vessels, duty exemption on fishing vessels under contract to local fish
processors, duty rebate on fuel and income tax concessions were granted. 136 A tax-free
status was also granted in 1997 to assist local operators. Since the start of the industry,
fish exporters have been able to lobby government for further concessions that also
benefited the industry such as concessional licensing fee. 137
The longline industry expanded until 1995. By late 1996, limits on airfreight
space were experienced and operating difficulties encountered by some operators.
Weaker Japanese prices were experienced because the Japanese economy weakend due
to the Asian economic crisis. 138 Difficulties were further exacerbated in 1997 when the
catch of large yellowfin and bigeye contracted due to seasonal environmental
changes.
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The industry picked up again in 1998 with a 20% devaluation of the Fiji

dollar in March. Catches also improved during the year. 140
According to the Fisheries Division records, as of June 2001, there were 19
companies registered as fresh tuna exporters. There are currently five major companies
that have large processing and packaging establishments of which four operate their

134

Lightfoot (1998), op. cit., n.129.
Central Planning Office, Opportunities for Growth: Policies and Strategies in the Medium Term, Suva
Fiji, 1993.
136
Personal Communication- Malakai Tuiloa, Acting Director of Fisheries, Fisheries Division, February
2002. Details on concessions to the fishing industry is provided in the Fiji Islands Trade and Investment
Board, Fiji Product Directory 1999-2000, p.116 - 117. [For current concessions see: Fiji Islands Trade
and Investment Bureau (compiled), Incentives for Investing in Fiji, January, 2002].
137
For example, fuel rebate initially applied to foreign vessels, but was later extended to local vessels and
import of fishing vessels had a 5% duty while import of foreign vessels under contract for more than a
year was duty exempted. This was later changed where vessels could be imported duty free. (Personal
Communication- Robert Stone, Chair, Fiji Offshore Fisheries Council, March 2002). Local Fishing
vessels that landed catch at Ports in Fiji were exempt from paying access fee while foreign vessels were
required to pay 5% of the landed value of catch but this was in practice never applied as all vessels were
encouraged to land catch in local ports.
138
Lightfoot (1998), op. cit., n. 129.
139 Ibid.
135

14°Ibid.
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own fishing fleet. 141 Table 5.8 shows the catch for fresh and chilled tuna by longline
vessels. The table shows that the number of vessels has gradually increased except for
a decline in 1997. Catch of yellowfin and bigeye has fluctuated while albacore catches
show an increase in production.

Table 5.8
Year

Total Fresh Tuna Landings by Longline Vessels*

Vessels (No)

Yellowfin (t)

Bigeye (t)

Other (t)

Albacore (t)

26
1989
5
10
3
l3
39
1990
10
23
27
69
136
1991
18
208
106
123
352
1992
23
243
201
187
1993
320
21
324
205
330
1994
37
707
625
249
842
1,040
1995
48
949
702
378
1996
42
1 060
1,376
1,446
593
1997
34
1,039
404
1,750
963
1998
36
1,359
862
459
2,121
Source: Fisheries Division Annual Reports, 1993, 1998 *excludes landings at Pafco

Total (t)
52
158
573
883
1,179
2,423
3,069
4,475
4,156
4,80 1

Figure 5.4 shows the estimated value of exports of fresh fish. This largely consists of
fresh and chilled tuna but also include some reef finfish as well. 142 The major markets
for fresh tuna are Japan, Hawaii and more recently Europe. 143
Figure 5.4 Value of Fresh Fish Exports from Fiji
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These are Fiji Fish Marketing Group Limited, Solander (Paci.fie) Limited, Celtrock Holdings Limited,
Ocean Traders Limited, TriPacific Marine Limited. The latter does not operate its own fleet but contracts
other fishing companies for its supply.
142
Disaggregated figures on fresh tuna exports are unavailable in official Statistics. These figures are
based on customs data collected by the Bureau of Statistics. (The value of exports therefore is most likely
underestimated since the value of exports on the exports documents does not necessarily reflect the prices
paid at the fish auction market overseas).
143
Personal Communication - David Lucas, Managing Director, Solander Pacific (Fiji), March 2002.
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The Offshore Fisheries Industry Council 144 has expressed concerns over the expansion
of the domestic longline industry manifested by the increase in the number of new
foreign operators (mostly from China and Taiwan) setting up joint ventures. The
Council claims that some of these operations are sub-standard and do not meet the
quality standards required. 145 This has also created competition for air cargo space. 146
According to most of the current operators, this has become a major constraint to the
development of the longline industry in Fiji. 147 Other problems include port congestion
and inadequate facilities to offload catch, and limited effort to mobilise the institutional
framework for meeting the quality standards required in the EU and US markets. 148 In
2001, the number of processing licences and foreign vessels with domestic joint
ventures or on contracts operating in the fresh sashimi longline industry increased
considerably. After much protest by the Offshore Fisheries Industry Council and with
the New Tuna Management Plan underway, the number of licenses in the 2002 period
was reduced and the license fee substantially increased from FJ$200 to FJ$26,000 for
vessels greater than 20 metres. 149

5.7.4

Small-scale tuna fisheries

The domestic artisanal tuna fishery 1s a new initiative by government under its
Commodity Development Framework (CDF) programme to assist rural fishers develop
skills and generate local income. Rural youth groups receive a grant or a subsidised loan
to purchase a motorised punt to fish around FADs deployed in the nearshore areas. By
April 2000, there were 13, groups each comprising of about 30 members fishing under

°

the CDF Programme. 15 Catch is sold locally at the domestic markets or to local fresh
tuna processing outlets.

144

The Offshore Fisheries Industry Council has been established in 1998 as a joint industry and Fisheries
Division initiative with the aim of establishing a forum between the industry_operators and other interest
groups.
145
Personal Communication- Robert Stone, Chair, Offshore Fisheries Council,
146
Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 Personal Communication, Deo Chandra, Production Manager, Fiji Fish Marketing Limited, March
2002; David Lucas - Solander (Pacific) Limited, June 2001; Robert Stone - Oceans Traders Limited
February 2002, Suva, Fiji.
149
Fiji Tuna Development and Management Plan 2002- Section 6.8.
150 Lewa Sainimili, "Tuna Scheme Targets $50 million", The Fiji Times, 12 April 2000.

158

5.8

Foreign involvement in Fiji's domestic industry development

The underlying principle behind the establishment of IKA and Pafco was that these
operations would allow a gradual transfer of technology, capital and expertise and the
industry would be taken over by locals in order that maximum benefits would accrue to
the local economy. The Pafco cannery as a joint venture and the IKA Corporation as a
State enterprise both initially relied on use of foreign capital and expertise. IKA had
used chartered foreign fleet and hired Japanese engineers and captains for its operations
to supplement its contractual supply obligation to Pafco. In this way IKA benefited from
the higher productivity by the Japanese chartered vessels as shown in figure 5.3. Pafco
likewise depended on C. Itoh's parent company for management and marketing of its
products under the joint venture until its nationalisation at the end of 1986. Even after
the take-over by the Fiji government, Pafco continued to rely on C. Itoh Company for
marketing Pafco's products. Pacfo also continued to rely on contracted Taiwanese
longline vessels for supply of its raw materials. The cash flow problems and the demise
of IKA constrained the supply of raw materials to Pafco, which ultimately had to resort
to diversifying its operations into tuna loining with new a foreign partnership to rescue
it from collapse. While Pacfo' s shore-based operations were localised, it nevertheless
continued to rely heavily on contracted foreign vessels and imports for raw materials.
The point here is that while domestication was aimed for through direct national
ownership, the critical functions continued to be supported by foreign operators.
In the case of the fresh longline tuna industry, a number of local operators either

contract or lease foreign vessels not only to meet their capital and technology
requirements but also to share the business risk. The fresh tuna longline industry in Fiji
has been supported through the domestication of foreign vessels, which indicates that
there is a continued reliance of foreign involvement but in a different form. 151 For
example, a new definition of a Fiji Fishing Vessel was inserted into the fisheries
regulations in 1990 152 that accommodates this flexibility.1 53 Using the definition of a
Fiji Fishing Vessel, a foreign fishing venture located in Fiji with a foreign controlling
share capital and managed by foreign personnel can be considered as a domestic fishing
vessel. Another case of a domestic venture would be a joint venture where a local
151

There are a greater variety of joint-associations and agreements between foreign and domestic
ofierations with varying degrees of division of labor.
12
Forum Fisheries Agency, Fiji-National Fisheries Legislation, <http://www.ffa.int/fi%20.pdf >, p.ii.,
(Accessed 12 February, 2003).
15
~ See: op. cit., n.62 for definition of a Fiji Fishing Vessel.
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partner has contributed 30% of the share capital and he or she is .not actively involved in
the business operations. These are in effect domestic-based foreign operations.
The change in what is "foreign fishing" as opposed to domestic fisheries is
traced through time to reflect the changing strategies adopted by Fiji to achieve the
national aspirations to develop its tuna industries. The domestication process is thus
seen in the use of the term "national",

"local" and "domestic" 154 industries. The

domestication of Pafco and IKA fall within the context of national and local operations,
while the longline industry is categorised as a domestic operation. Therefore, the foreign
fishing sector is identified as those vessels with foreign flags that are contracted to
supply catch to local establishments and those operating under access agreements. A
foreign fisheries enterprise is one where there is less than 30% local equity. Figure 5.5
compares the catch landed at Pafco by domestic and by foreign vessels. The trend
shows that for 1976 until 1980, the foreign longline vessels contributed most of the
supplies for Pafco. IKA vessels contributed a higher proportion between 1981 and 1983
and thereafter Pafco relied on imported fish until 1995. This also illustrates the fact that
Pafco could not depend on any one source for a consistent supply of its raw materials.
The largest number of vessels fishing in Fiji waters has been foreign Taiwanese
longliners contracted to supply catch to Pafco and fish imports have largley been from
the Solomon Islands.155
In figure 5.6 the number of vessel registrations for offshore and EEZ licenses in

Fiji shows that the number of foreign flagged vessels was higher until 1998 declined in
1999 and 2000 but again increased in 2001. This shows on the reliance of the domestic
fishery on foreign vessels and the phase of 'domestication' of the foreign fishery.

154

Often these terms are used interchangeably but they each can be seen to reflect a different degree of
integration of foreign involvement. "National" often refers to State owned enterprise; "local" includes
State owned and those owned by Fiji residents living in Fiji, while "domestic" incorporates national, local
and other operations based in Fiji with 30% or more share-capital by Fiji residents or the State or Fijian

incorporated company.
155
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Fiji Fisheries Division, Fisheries Division Annual Reports -Production Figures (vanous issues).
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Figure: 5.5

Comparison of the Foreign and Domestic Vessels supplying tuna to
Pafco
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Figure 5.6

Number of Vessel Registrations in Fiji (1994-2001)
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5.9

Current initiatives on domestication

With the demise of IKA and with Pafco under a new partnership with Bumble Bee (a
foreign US based multinational company), the current focus on domestication is on the
fresh tuna longline industry which is export-oriented and driven by the private sector.
There are two major initiatives that address the domestication objective. One is through
the policies and strategies outlined in the Tuna Development and Management Plan and
the other is through the incentives to encourage foreign investment and private sector
development. These are discussed below.
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5.9.1

Incentives for domestication under the Foreign Investment Act (1999)

The Foreign Investment Act aims to facilitate the flow of foreign investment in Fiji. The
Fiji Islands Trade and Investment Bureau administers the approval of the foreign
investments through issuing foreign investment certificates. 156 The government favours
investment proposals that promote the following goals: 157
•

generate increased exports;

•

provide opportunities for significant local equity participation, particularly m
projects that involve use of the country's natural resources;

•

provide employment and training opportunities for local people;

•

involve maximum processing of products in Fiji; and

•

involve enterprise in the maximum use of facilities, such as roads and labour.

The fisheries sector and, in particular, tuna fishing, is part of the government's aim to
promote the export-oriented primary production sector. The government has introduced
a new incentive package from January 2001. The package includes low tax rates; for
example, a 3.3% reduction in income tax on corporate profits to 30% from 2003. 75%
of export income is tax deductible in 2003-2004 which will progressively decline to 0%
by 2009 to allow new investments to adjust. 158 There are low duty rates on production
inputs, construction, and capital materials. A deduction on investment allowance of 40%
for capital assets of more than $50,000 is allowed in the primary production sectors
such as the processing of marine resources.

Accelerated depreciation allowance,

investment allowances, duty-free input for exports and carry forward losses are also part
of the incentive package. 159 No withholding tax is payable on dividends if they are
distributed to shareholders after profits are taxed.

160

Value added tax that replaces

customs duty and excise duty and turnover tax is claimable from the Island Revenue
Unit and Revenue and Customs Authority. More specifically, in the fishing industry,
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Foreign Investment Act 1999, 29 October 1999 {Article 4). All foreign investments need to have a
Foreign Investment Certificate that ensures that foreign investments are screened and projects evaluated
as feasible.
157 Fiji Islands Trade and Investment Bureau, Fiji Product Directory 1999 -2000, p.31.
158 Ibid.
159 Fiji Islands Trade and Investment Bureau (compiled), Incentives available for Investing in Fiji Islands,

January 2002.
160

Ibid.

162
fishing vessels and specialised fishing gear and equipment, and fish for bait are exempt
from payment of customs duty.

161

Besides wages, the major operating costs associated with the tuna longline
industry include fuel, bait and vessel gear and equipment. All these now either have no,
or very low, duty rates. 162 Fishing vessel imports are duty exempt and so is the import of
vessels under contract that are engaged in export development.
that are not available locally have a low duty rate of 3 %.

163

Packaging materials
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The domestication objective can be seen in the context of the low local equity
requirement (30%), together with the incentives given above and the establishment of
the Fiji Islands Trade and investment Bureau as the intermediary to facilitate the
investment process. Table 5.9 shows the level of investment and employment generated
by foreign investments in the tuna fisheries sector. From the table it can be seen that
during the mid 1990s when the fresh tuna longlining industry was expanding there was
also an increase in capital inflows, whereas the civil unrest in 2000 coincided with a
marked reduction in foreign investment.

Table 5.9

Level of Investment and Employment Generated by Foreign
Interests in Tuna Fisheries

Year

Proposed
F$

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

1,000,000
565,000
130,000
0
4,100,000
770,000
5.922 000
3,575,000
1,300,000
2,900,000
710,000
910 000
200,000

Investment

Investment
upon
Implementation F$

Proposed
Employment (no)

750,000
900,000
1,282,107
0
4,100,000
540,000
1,810,000
1,565,000
900,000
200,000
782,000
950,000
300,000

109
28
22
0
148
42
262
106
21
310
160
27
8

' Employment
upon
Implementation (no)
31
53
51
0
148
27
82
47
21
NIA.
160
27
25

Source: Fiji Islands Trade and Investment Board database February 2001; NA- Not available

Ibid.
Ibid.
163 Ibid.
164
Ibid.
161

162

163

5.9.2

National Tuna Management Plan

To maximise the sustainable benefits from tuna resources the objectives of the Tuna
Management Plan set a licensing policy that aims at sustainable harvesting and also
attempts to address social inequalities. 165 Specific limits are placed on catch levels and a
preferential license criterion has been established. The Plan states that priority for
licenses will be given to local individuals or companies who are already in the industry
and indigenous Fijians. 166 The criteria for allocation includes nationality, history of
fishing activities and investment levels to determine the eligibility. 167 Within the limits
of the number of licenses issued, an application by an indigenous Fijian or company that
is minimum 51 % owned by an indigenous Fijian is automatically eligible for an
offshore license for tuna longlining. 168
Under the licensing fee structure, the Plan gives priority to Fiji flagged vessels,
vessels with Fijian crews and vessels that are Fijian owned. To encourage the use of
Fiji-owned vessels, a rebate of $10,000 applies to use of vessels that are at least 51 %
Fiji owned. 169 Indigenous Fijian vessels would not be subject to any access fee but pay a
$6,000 management fee. To provide relief for the first year of operation, the access fee
for all Fiji owned vessels are reduced by 50% while all foreign owned vessels are
subject to the full access fee. 170
Other domestication strategies under the Tuna Management Plan also include
development of a fisheries training school to meet the technical and managerial skill
requirements of the domestic industry. The deployment of Fish Aggregation Devices
(FAD) into rural fishing areas enable more Fijians to participate in the development of
the tuna industry. 171 The setting up of a revolving fund also provides seed capital to
support indigenous Fijians to establish fishing businesses.
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The above initiatives show

that while there is a domestic tuna industry in Fiji, domestication aspirations are yet to
165

This social dimension is another reflection of the domestication policy that aims to secure rights of
certain groups of people in order to reduce the income disparities in the economy. It is a more specifically
defined form of domestication.
166 This is under the Constitution Amendment Act 1997, Chapter 5 (Social Justice Act)- which calls for a
social justice and affirmative action plan. This policy provides a blueprint as a broad framework for
specific strategies to address the socio-economic disparities and to increase economic productivity of the
indigenous Fijians and Rotumans.
.
.
167 Government of Fiji, Fiji- Tuna Development and Management Plan. A national polzcy for the
development and management of tuna.fisheries (2002) - (section 6.3).
168 Ibid.
169
Ibid, Section 6.8.4.
.
l70 Annual access fee for vessels less than 20 metres is $15,000 and for vessels over 20 metres is $20,000.
171 Fiji Tuna Development and Management Plan, 2002 - Section 6.8.
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be fulfilled. This stems from the economic gap between indigenous population and
other non-indigenous nationals who currently control the fresh tuna longline industry.

5.10

Analysis of the domestic development experience

From the start Fiji had adopted a production-based approach to develop its domestic
tuna industry. The major contributing factors influencing this approach were the
existence of a foreign fishing base, the need to create rural job opportunities for the
growing population and the need for foreign exchange. However, from the analysis of
the contribution of tuna fisheries to Fiji's economy, the significance of the sector is not
apparent. The domestication experience by Fiji has been costly and undermined by the
real economic role that tuna fisheries could play in the economy.
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The government took the lead role in developing a vertically integrated industry,
aiming to capture the maximum benefits from the tuna resources of its EEZ. It formed a
joint-venture with Japanese foreign companies to operate the cannery and market its
product. It also established IKA Corporation as a national fishing fleet, and restricted
access to its territorial sea to its nationals. These operations continually required
government assistance to support their financial and infrastructural requirements. The
closely integrated nature of the operations meant that one was dependent on the other.
For example, IKA's sole buyer was Pafco, which dictated its market conditions. Pafco
on the other hand was highly dependent on the pole and line caught tuna to maintain the
high quality of the product as well as fulfil its criteria for "originating fish" for its
European market where it has a preferential access under the A CP-EU Lome
Convention.
IKA had a dismal operating history as it was neither a commercially viable
operation and did not develop a local entrepreneurship. By the time IKA was
established, the pole and line fis?ery had become marginal and skipjack prices had
declined because of a large oversupply by purse seine operations. IKA's problems also
related to ineffective management and the structure of its operations, which prevented it
from responding to the changing circumstances of the tuna market. For example,
payment of wages initially was not based on productivity but on a fixed rate which
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Ibid.
While some commentators may argue that this period represents a learning curve in the industrial
development process. This cannot be refuted but the opportunity costs associated with it in terms of loss
of revenue through aid and loss of dividends, as a major shareholder has been much higher.
173
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therefore did not give much incentive for crew and captains to catch fish. Inappropriate
vessels that required high maintenance and repairs and therefore reduced the actual
fishing days at sea also compounded IKA's problems. There was little availability of
baitfish and fluctuations in catch levels were affected by seasonal changes. IKA
Corporation continued accumulating losses and eventually went into receivership in
1997. The only positive outcome of IKA is perhaps on- the- job training and experience
gained by its officers and crew who have since moved to the domestic longline industry.
The early years of Pafco cannery also coincided with a depressed tuna market.
Preferential access to European markets as an ACP country and marketing, facilitated
by the parent company of the Japanese partner, meant that secure access to the top end
of the UK market was possible. Domestication of labour was achieved after the
nationalisation of the cannery. Pafco had to rely on outside sources such as the Solomon
Islands for "originating fish" and on foreign contracted vessels. Pafco also suffered
losses from its Canadian market because some shipments were rejected due to poor
quality.
In terms of achieving the domestication objectives, the National Development
Plans in the 1970s and 1980s placed much emphasis on the development of IKA and
Pafco with a detailed plan for localisation under each. Tue aim of Pafco was to export
canned tuna, provide for domestic needs to reduce imports and to operate the cannery as
a commercially viable venture. During the joint venture period, although over 90% of
the workers were locals but foreigners held all the key positions. Training of locals was
not carried out as envisaged in the localisation plan. However, the cannery was localised
when the government took over control. Exports of canned tuna continued but
fluctuated over the period due to changes both in the global tuna market and the level of
supply of its raw materials. From 1992 onwards, Pafco has continued to record losses
and has been unable to fulfil its market demand. Tue financial difficulties of Pafco also
negatively influenced its ability to pay its suppliers, thus losing its sources of supply of
raw materials. It also had several industrial disputes over wages claims, work conditions
and loss of jobs. While canned tuna was initially the major fish export by value
contribution, it has now been overtaken by fresh sashimi tuna exports.
Pafco has had high costs that have negatively affected its profitability. These
included the high cost of electricity, cans for packaging, and stevedores. High costs
were also associated with it remote location. Levuka was unable to handle container
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ships resulting in high transport cost between Suva and Levuka. Pafco also continued to
rely on government assistance for its continued operations.
The fresh tuna longline industry presents a case of domestication based on
private sector development. Various forms of joint ventures, contracts and agreements
exist between foreign operators and domestic interests. The longline industry so far has
had an overall positive experience, in that the industry has expanded over the years and
has stabilised because of constraints on airfreight space to major market destinations.
The major factors that have contributed to this domestic development have included
government incentives such as tax and duty exemptions and the devaluation of the Fiji
dollar.
In principle, government incentives help the development of the industry and
once the industry takes off, such assistance is withdrawn. However, in the case of the
longline industry, these incentives have continued for some time and the government
through its foreign investment package continues to further promote such activities. The
Offshore Fisheries Industry Council as the industry representative also continues to
lobby strongly for such benefits. While there are positive effects of this domestication
through creation of jobs and linkages to the economy, the actual real benefits that accrue
to the economy and costs associated with loss of government revenue through taxes and
resource rent have not been comprehensively determined. 174 As a result, the apparent
profits enjoyed by some exporters have also heightened the expectations of other
prospective investors. Fish exports have increased but the exact net contribution to the
local economy is not known. The new licensing criteria present another aspect of
domestication that is yet to be tested.

5.11

Conclusion

The domestication experience through the establishment of IKA and the Pafco under
government control has been negative overall, although the cannery has a positive
impact on the local economy of Ovalau. This comes as an opportunity cost to the
government. These experiences also undermine the real contribution of tuna to the
fisheries sector. The objectives as set out in the development plans for IKA were never
achieved, which also explains its eventual collapse.

174

Lightfoot (1998), op. cit., n.129. [The study by Lightfoot indicated that the domestic value added for
fishing vessels was around 40% of total income. This study looked at the direct value added from vessels
and did not consider the various effects of taxes].
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In the case of Pafco, from a national perspective, the cannery has generated very
limited benefits for the government as a major shareholder. The high cost structure of
Pafco because of its location and nature of operations has reduced major gains from
export sales. Pafco's reliance on "originating fish" and in particular on IKA for supplies
was another major cause of its failure.
Domestication of labour since 1987 (after the nationalisation of the cannery) was
achieved. However, Pafco' s inability to maintain its competitiveness against the low
cost Asian canneries shows that the beneficial results of this domestication have been
only short-term.
The domestication aspects of the fresh tuna longline industry are evident by its
expansion of fleet, number of enterprises and increase in exports. Government policies
to encourage private sector development and foreign investment have been instrumental
in this expansion process through providing tax and duty concessions, infrastructural
and technical support. The industry's expansion has been constrained by lack of
airfreight space and limited port infrastructure. This has created some competition,
resulting in the mobilisation of an industry interest group and the formation of an
industry council.
The tuna industry in Fiji now faces two parallel developments: a mature longline
industry with substantial capital investment, and government's new policy to address
domestication issues from a social perspective. In order to achieve the aspirations of
domestication of the tuna industry in Fiji, government must find a means to mutually
integrate the two parallel developments otherwise each may inhibit the development of
the other.
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Chapter 6: Regional Strategies for Domestication of the Tuna Industry
6.1

Introduction

Regional co-operation has been a key strategy adopted by the Pacific Island States to
overcome their economic, social, political and environmental problems resulting from
their smallness, isolation from major markets, and limited resources and capabilities.
The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) 1 established under the Forum Fisheries Agency
Convention (1979) and its sub-regional group, the Parties to the Nauru Agreement
(1982),2 provide the most noteworthy examples of regional co-operation on tuna in the
Pacific Islands. Under the framework of these agreements, two sub-regional
instruments, the Palau Arrangement3 and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM)
Arrangement4 specifically address the Pacific Islands' aspirations to domesticate the
tuna industry. This chapter describes the domestication efforts under these sub-regional
instruments and analyses their implementation.
The chapter first outlines the two legal instruments: the Forum Fisheries Agency
Convention and the Nauru Agreement as providing the institutional basis for the
regional approach to domestication. Under these instruments, the effectiveness of the
Palau Arrangement and the FSM Arrangement are analysed. The Palau Arrangement is
a means to domesticate the purse seine capture fishery while the FSM Arrangement is a
strategy to increase shore-based development. The chapter shows that these regional
strategies, so far, have been constrained in achieving domestication as envisaged. The
major underlying reasons behind their limited success are examined.

1

The Forum Fisheries Agency (FF A) was established by the South Pacific Forum as a regional
organisation consisting of independent Pacific Island States to deal with regional fisheries issues. Current
membership includes: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall
Islands, Niue, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Palau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Samoa, Solomon Islands
and Vanuatu. Tokelau has also become a member since 2002.
2
"The Nauru Agreement Concerhing Co-operation in the Management of Fisheries of Common Interest"
which entered into force on 4 December 1982 (PNA). [Parties include Federated States of Micronesia
'
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands Tuvalu and Kiribati].
3
"The Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery" entered into force
on 8 December 1995. [Members include Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea
Marshall Islands and Nauru and Palau. Tuvalu and Solomon Islands are signatories to the Palau'
Arrangement].
4
"The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access" entered into
force on 23 September 1995. [Members include FSM, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, and Marshall Islands
Solomon Islands, Nauru and Palau. Tuvalu is a signatory to the FSM Arrangement].
'
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6.2

Regional institutional framework for domestication

Regional efforts to domesticate the tuna industry evolved from the co-operative
strategies adopted under the Forum Fisheries Agency Convention and the Parties to the
Nauru Agreement. It is therefore important to understand this context to see how the
issues on domestication developed.

6.2.1

The Forum Fisheries Agency Convention

The idea to establish a South Pacific regional fisheries organisation originated at the
Seventh South Pacific Forum Meeting in Nauru in 1976. 5 There was much discussion
on the type of regional fisheries organisation that was needed with the views ofDWFNs
and in particular the US differing from most independent Pacific Island States. 6 After
three years of discussions it was decided to establish an organisation that could address
the Pacific Islands needs and enable Pacific Island States to band together to avoid
undercutting each other and thereby obtain maximum benefits from the resources. 7
The vast size of the EEZs posed problems of surveillance. Pacific Island States
would also have to negotiate fisheries access agreements with DWFNs because they
lacked capacity to harvest the resources themselves. 8 Pacific Island States also lacked
the information necessary to negotiate equitable agreements. 9 They needed various
types of information to assist in decision making about exploiting and developing the
resources such as quantity and quality of resources, how much fishing to be permitted
while sustaining the stocks, who fished the resources, where fish was sold, processed,
consumed and its market value. 10 It was therefore decided to establish an agency that
could facilitate such information needs. 11

5

See details on the history and formation of the FFA in: F. Gubon, "History and Role of Forum Fisheries
Agency'', in D. J. Doulman (ed.), Tuna Issues and Perspectives in Pacific Islands Region, East West
Center, Hawaii, 1987, pp. 245-256.
6 The DWFNs wanted a more broad-based type of organisation that fulfilled the requirements of Article64 of theLaw of the Sea Convention, aimed at ensuring conservation and promoting optimum utilisation
of the highly migratory species throughout the region by the membership of all States involved in the
exploitation of the fish stock. The Pacific Island States' intention was to ensure maximum benefits for the
coastal States of the region and to consolidate their position first before extending co-operation to the
DWFNs.
7 W. Sutherland and B. M. Tsamenyi, Law and Politics in Regional Co-operation: A Case Study of
Fisheries Co-operation in the South Pacific, Pacific Law Press: Hobart, 1992.
8
Gubon (1987), op. cit., n.5, p.249.
9
Ibid.
10

Ibid.

II

Ibid.
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The Agency consists of a Forum Fisheries Committee (FFC) and a Secretanat.

12

Policy co-ordination and fonnulation are the responsibility of the Committee and
technical advisory functions are carried out by the Secretariat, which reports to the FFC.
The Agency functions primarily as a consultative and advisory body. It takes its
direction from member governments through the FFC, which meets annually to review
work carried out and approve the following year's work programme and budget. Article
VII of the FFA Convention states that the FFC is to promote intra-regional co-operation
and co-ordination in a number of areas relating to harmonisation of fisheries
management policies and co-operation in relation to dealing with DWFNs. The
functions of the FFC also include co-operation and co-ordination in the promotion of
onshore fish processing and marketing. 13
One of the primary aims of the FFA was to secure the individual development
aims of the member States by achieving economies of scale which otherwise would not
have been possible. 14 The FFA provides a forum to discuss regional fisheries issues and
enables Pacific Island States to co-operate and co-ordinate their fisheries activities with
the goal of deriving maximum returns for themselves and for the region.
The core activities of the Agency include providing information and technical
advice on areas relating to management procedures, legislation and agreements,
statistical and biological information on highly migratory species and policy advice in
areas such as negotiations, licensing and fee issues, surveillance and enforcement. 15 The
Agency's functions also include providing information on pric((s, shipping, processing
and marketing of fish and fish products. 16
Under Article IX of the FFA Convention, FFA members are to provide the
Agency with "available and appropriate" information such as catch and effort statistics,
relevant laws and regulations, relevant biological and statistical data and information on
any action with respect to decisions by the FFC.

6.2.2

FFA Convention and domestication

The FFA Convention was not specifically designed to address domestication issues but
certain provisions of the Convention do provide the basis for facilitating advisory
12

The Committee consists of representatives of the Pacific Forum Island member States.
Forum Fisheries Agency Convention - Article V (2).
14
R. Herr, "Regional Co-operation in the 1990s," in R. Herr (ed.), The Forum Fisheries Agency:
Achievements, Challenges and Prospects, Institute of Pacific Studies, Suva, Fiji, 1990, pp. 341-351.
15
Forum Fisheries Agency Convention - Article VII.
13
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services dealing with the development of domestic industries. For example, intraregional co-ordination and co-operation on issues relating to onshore fish processing
and marketing.

17

The Agency collects and disseminates to its members relevant

information on prices, shipping, processing and marketing of fish and fish products. 18
These core activities directly relate to the development of domestic tuna industries.
They fall under the work programme of the Economics and Marketing Division. The
Division provides advisory services on industry development, marketing, and fisheries
management and access agreements. 19 Individual FFA members can request a range of
services from the Economics and Marketing Division such as project appraisals,
feasibility studies, technical aspects of access fee, marketing and price information and
vessel economics information. The range and variety of members' requests illustrate the
desire to develop national domestic industries. 20

16

Forum Fisheries Agency Convention-Article VIl (c).
Forum Fisheries Agency Convention -Article V (2) [d] and [e].
18
Forum Fisheries Agency Convention-Article Vll (c).
19
The FFA's Corporate Plan for 2002 - 2005 sets out the objective and strategies for the Economics and
Marketing Division, which in turn guides the Division's Work Programme. The Principle areas of focus
for the 2002 Work Programme were: Strategy 1: Development of Tuna Management Plans - conducting
regional fisheries workshops, assisting in development of the tuna management Plans;
Strategy 2: Development of domestic commercial tuna industry - carrying out in-country reviews (upon
request), improve the information base on the tuna industry;
Strategy 3: Disseminating marketing information to the government and the private sector in member
States - provide advice on marketing options, improve the flow of timely market intelligence from key
markets such as Japan, US, and EU;
Strategy 4: Assist member States to maximise national benefits from granting access - providing bilateral
access briefs, maintaining access data base;
Strategy 5: Training - strengthening capacity of the public and private sectors in the management and
development of tuna resources - facilitate attachments to FFA and other specialised institutions;
Strategy 6: Linkages - establish and maintain contact with fisheries scientists and other stakeholders in
the regions oceanic resources; attendance at SPC/FFA Colloquium, attendance at other regional and
international meetings, liasing with CROP and FAO and other tuna related institutions.
20 A sample of some of the requests received by FF A include requests from: Kiribati - A study on
development of fresh longline fishery, An assessment of Japanese Joint Venture Proposal for Purse
Seining; Marshall Islands - Economic evaluation of foreign owned domestically based longliners,
Review of Ting Hong Operations; Nauru - Study on Prospects for Development of Local Industry,
Feasibility of Longline Fishing; Fiji - Fiji's Skipjack and Pole and line Study, Review of Fiji's Longline
Fishery; Niue - Tuna Longline Joint-venture study; Palau - Review of Benefits from Longline Bases;
Papua New Guinea - Assessment of PNG Tuna longlining Development, Assessment of Papua New
Guinea's Purse Seine Study, A Feasibility of US- Taiwan Loining Project; Proposal Evaluation of Tuna
Transhippment (New Ireland Provincial Government), Evaluation of proposed project on Tuna Cannery
in East New Britain, PNG/ ACIAR Tuna Economics Study; Solomon Islands - Economic Appraisal of
Solomon Taiyo, Solomon Islands Tuna Policy Review, A number of joint- venture proposals from
various Provincial Governments; Tuna Industry Review; Tonga - Alia Development Study; Tuvalu Tuvalu Joint venture Assessment; Vanuatu - Assessment of Offshore Tuna Enterprises (Vanuatu)
Limited, Project on Flag State Study; Samoa - Evaluation of the Samoan Longline F~shery. [!he Tuna
Management Plan also falls under the Work Programme of the Economics and Marketmg Section of the
FFA]. {Note: The above sample is derived.from the database at FFA and most of the reports cited are
confidential and not accessible without prior approval of the respective government) .
17
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After negative initial experiences on domestic industry development m the
1980s, the FFA with assistance from Asian Development Bank was tasked to carry out a
review of national tuna industries to investigate the constraints and opportunities to
domestic industry development. 21 These national reports (confidential to the States)
were commissioned as an attempt to re-structure the domestic tuna industry to generate
economic growth. A synthesis of the regional report (which is a public document)
indicates that there were a number of common themes in the problems and constraints.

22

This study compelled the FFA to re-orient its policy advice towards private sector led
development.
Despite a key role played by the Economics and Marketing Division, the goal of
maximising economic benefits for the region as a whole through increased domestic
industry development by the FFA, has been somewhat constrained.

23

At the time of the

establishment of the FFA, domestication was not a key issue. The main purposes of
FFA was to co-ordinate and co-operate to provide a common front to deal with the
DWFNs in the exploitation of the tuna resources in their fishing zones. However, as the
work of the Agency progressed a few provisions within the FFA Convention have lent
support to the domestic development initiatives.
The primary function of FFA has been to act as a consultative and advisory body
through facilitating the information needs of its members. The FF A does not have any
administrative or legal powers to enforce its decisions on the members. It is up to the
members to request for information needs and take action on decisions by the FFC. The
requests are therefore on an ad hoc basis as and when need arises or when funds are
available. 24 In terms of domestication initiatives, members have seen the FFA as
providing the support through necessary data, information and technical advice. This
has indirectly given the FFA member States the motivation to pursue domestication,
seek out the options that may be available to them or consult on the strategic policy
direction they could take to increase local benefits.

The Study was conducted during 1994 -1995 period in a number of FFA member States by various
consultants.
·
22
Office of Pacific Operations, The Pacific's Tuna: the Challenges of Investing in Growth, Pacific
Studies Series, Asian Development Ban1c Manila, Philippines, 1997.
23
Some of the regional experiences outlined in chapter two and the case studies on Fiji and Kiribati also
show that initial domestic industry development efforts had failed.
21
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6.2.3

The Nauru Agreement concerning Co-operation in the Management of
Fisheries of Common Interest (1982)

A number of FFA member States near the equatorial zone that have contiguous EEZs25
realised that they could benefit more if they closely co-ordinated their approaches
towards DWFNs and in the management of their resources. Discussions between the
Group began in 1981 and focussed on the particular problems of the individual State's
relationship with the DWFNs fishing in their areas of the WCP Ocean. 26 Recognising
the fact that the DWFNs were able to weaken their negotiating positions by playing off
one State against another, the Group adopted a sub-regional co-operative strategy.
Within the framework of the FF A Convention, these States formed a sub-regional
Agreement known as the Nauru Agreement concerning Co-operation in the
Management of Fisheries of Common Interest, 1982 (The Nauru Agreement). 27 The
Agreement acknowledges the Parties' dependence on the rational development and
optimum utilisation of common stocks within their fishing zones. 28 The Parties to the
Nauru (PNA) Agreement recognise that obtaining maximum benefits can only be
assured by co-operation in the management of their fisheries. 29
The Nauru Agreement is an umbrella framework that provides for co-operation
m a broad range of areas for the Parties by way of concluding subsidiary and
implementing agreements to further advance its objectives. Article II and III of the
Nauru Agreement outline areas of co-operation such as the determination of the
minimum terms and conditions of access by foreign fishing vessels to the members'
EEZs and the standardisation of licensing procedures. Article II (a) of the Nauru
Agreement states that principles should be established for granting priority access to

24

This allowed the members to pursue their own national development agenda depending on their
resource status, economic needs and policies. In this respect, there was limited co-ordinated approach to
domestic industry development initiatives.
25
These States include: Papua New Guinea, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Palau,
Kiribati, Tuvalu, Nauru and Solomon Islands.
26
D. J. Doulman, "Fisheries Co-operation: The Case of The Nauru Group'', in D. J. Doulman (ed.), Tuna
Issues and Perspectives in the Pacific Island Region, East West Center, Hawaii, 1987, pp.257-279.
27 The Nauru Group (commonly known at the PNA Group) operates within the context of the FFA. The
Director of FF A is the Administrator. Many of the initiatives under the PNA such as the Minimum Terms
and Conditions of Access (MTCs) have become general FFA instruments. The Group plays an active role
in the FFC discussions.
28 Preamble - The Nauru Agreement concerning Co-operation in the Management of Fisheries of
Common Interest (1982).
29 The combined EEZs of Parties covers about 14 million square kilometers of the WCP or about 45% of
the total area of Pacific Island States and Territories and 72 % of the FFA Fisheries Zones. [Cited in: D. J.

Doulman, "Fisheries Co-operation: The Case of the Nauru Group", in D. J. Doulman (ed.), Tuna Issues
and Perspectives in the Pacific Islands Region, East West Center, Hawaii, 1987, p.258.
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fishing vessels of Parties to fish within the fisheries zones over other foreign fishing
vessels.
The First Implementing Agreement (adopted in 1983) provides for the
establishment of a Regional Register for foreign fishing vessels to be maintained by the
FFA. It also includes provisions relating to Minimum Terms and Conditions (MTCs) for
licensing, such as licensing procedures and requirements for data.

30

The Second

Implementing Agreement (adopted in 1990) incorporates additional terms and
conditions for foreign fishing vessels (FFV s) that include the prohibition of
transshipment at sea and placing of observers on board and requirements to provide
high seas catch data.
The Nauru Agreement does not specifically address domestication per se
although Article II(a) expresses the intention of PNA members to give priority to
member States' vessels over foreign fishing vessels. This issue is addressed lately by the
PNA under the Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement.

6.3

The Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific Purse Seine
Fishery (The Palau Arrangement)

The EEZs of the PNA and the adjacent high sea areas have been the primary purse seine
fishing grounds in the WCP Ocean. In 1980, there were 19 vessels which contributed
19,286 tonnes of tuna catch; by 1985, vessels numbers increased to 78 contributing
137,904 tonnes of tuna and by 1989, there were 126 vessels with a total tuna catch of
306, 437 tonnes. 31 The purse seine catch in 1980 represented 16% of the total catch of
the FFA region and in 1985 it represented 58%. 32 By 1989, the purse seine catch
accounted for 74% of the total tuna catch. 33 Figure 6.1 shows the rapid increase in the
total purse seine catch and effort in the WCP Ocean in the 1980s period. The number of
active vessels and catch increased until 1993, then stabilised due to decline in skipjack
prices. The major distant water fleets in the region have been Japan, USA, Korea and
Taiwan. One of the major concerns of the PNA was the increase in purse seine activities
by FFVs in PNA members' EEZs.

°

3

FFA members now adopt the MTCs and the Regional Register as a whole regional initiative including
non-PNA members.
31
Forum Fisheries Agency, A Review of Access Fee Arrangements and their Development in the FFA
Member Countries, FFA Report 90/81, Parties to the Nauru Agreement, Special Session, Ministerial
Level Meeting, 17 - 19 September, 1990, p.8.
32
Ibid.
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At the First Special Session of the PNA in 1982, Papua New Guinea presented a
paper outlining the basic elements of a joint agreement for the management of the purse
seine fishery in the EEZs of the PNA. The basic elements included the establishment of
a management area, a centralised licensing system and a formula for the division of
access fees. 34

Figure 6.1

Total Purse Seine Effort and Catch in the Western Central Pacific
Ocean
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The rapid expansion of the purse seine fishery raised concerns over the status of the
yellowfin stock and also over the lack of control of foreign fleets that posed a threat to
overcapitalisation of the purse seine fishery. It was felt that increased production would
not only depress the world tuna price and cause the market to collapse but also have a
flow-on effect by keeping the access fees low. Restricting vessel numbers was seen as a
way to improve the productivity of the resources and increase the profitability of
vessels.
At the Ninth Annual Meeting of the PNA in 1990, the members agreed as an
interim measure, to limit the number of purse seine licenses under bilateral agreement
by placing a cap on each fleet operating in the region.

33
34

Ibid.
Ibid, p. 11
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At the Eleventh PNA Meeting in Kiribati in 1992, the SPC presented a paper
that raised concerns about the rate of exploitation of tuna resources. The SPC reported
that while skipjack resources appeared to be robust, it was not clear whether yellowfin
stock could be sustained. 35 The PNA therefore adopted a precautionary approach to
limit the further expansion of the purse seine fishery. This finally led to the
establishment of the Palau Arrangement, which was signed in 1992 and entered into
force in November 1995. The biological and economic concerns of the purse seme
fishery therefore underpin the establishment of the Palau Arrangement.

6.4

The Palau Arrangement - provisions relating to domestication

The Palau Arrangement aims to increase the returns to PNA from licensing of foreign
vessels through the development of a more competitive and limited licensing regime.

36

The understanding is that a reduction of the fleet would improve the economic
performance of the fishery as a whole.

37

As a basis for distinguishing various vessel categories for licensing, Article I of
the Palau Arrangement provides a comprehensive definition of a "domestic vessel", 38 a
"locally-based foreign vessel"39 and a "foreign vessel". 40 Article 5 of the Palau
Arrangement provides for allocation of licences according to the following priority:
(a)

35

41

domestic vessels;

Cited in: M. W. Lodge, "The Development of the Palau Arrangement for the Management of the
Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery'', Marine Policy, 22(1), 1998, p.18.
36
Ibid, p.9.
.
37 Ibid
38
The Palau Arrangement - Article 1 (f) - " domestic vessel" means any fishing vessel i.
wholly owned by the Government of a party or by any public corporation or body established by
or under any law of a Party, all of the shares in which are beneficially owned and controlled by
the Government of the Party;
ii.
wholly owned and controlled by one or more natural persons who are citizens or permanent
residents of the Party in which the vessel is based under the relevant laws relating to nationality
and citizenship of that Party; or
m.
wholly owned and controlled by any company, society or other association of persons
incorporated or established under the laws of the Party in which the vessel is based.
39
The Palau Arrangement - Article 1 (g) - "locally-based foreign fishing vessel" means a foreign fishing
vessel which is based in a Party, lands all of its catch in that Party and/ or operates under a joint venture
arrangement in the territory of that Party which is approved by the Government of that Party or under
arrangement whereby the operator of the vessel is participating in shore based developments or is
otherwise making a substantial contribution to the development of the domestic tuna industry of the
licensing Party.
40
Article 1 (h) - "foreign fishing vessel" means any fishing vessel other than a domestic vessel or a
locally-based foreign vessel.
41
The Palau Arrangement - Article 5.
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(b)

domestic vessels of another Party to this arrangement or vessels jointly operated
by or on behalf of the government of the party in which the vessel is based and
one or more other;

(c)

locally-based foreign fishing vessels;

(d)

foreign fishing vessels with established access arrangements from previous years
and with good records of compliance with national laws, regulations, minimum
terms and conditions, and the reporting requirements of parties; and

(e)

new foreign fishing entrants to the fishery.

Under Article 6 members agree to limit the number of licences. There are limits on the
number of purse seine vessels that may be licensed, and caps on the number of licenses
for each fleet.

42

Table 6.1 details the various caps for the vessel categories outlined in

Annex I of the Agreement. The cap of 205 vessels has remained since 1993.

Table 6.1

Purse Seine Licences (revised 30 April 2002)

Category

Agreed
April 1999

Agreed
April 2002

Reported
March2002

1. Multilateral Access US Treaty
2. Bilateral Foreign Access:

50

40

29

- Japan
-Taiwan
- South Korea
- Philippines
Sub-total of (1+2)

35
40 (+2)
29
10
166

35
41
27
10
153

35
41
27
10
142

41(-2)

45

40

3
4

1

205

194

3. Domestic/ Locally-based
- All parties

4. New Bilateral Access*
- China
- European Union
Total (1+2+3+4)

205

*Special Arrangements: (This category will remain in force as long as the number of US vessels is below its
maximum. Source: Forum Fisheries Agency, 2002

Additional licences may be issued subject to a premium of at least 20% of the fee
payable. 43 All Parties must approve any changes to the allocation, including requests for

42

The Palau Arrangement - Annex 1.

43

The Palau Arrangement - Article 6.2. [This 20% premium payment is m addition to the normal hcense

fee].

. .

..

.
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additional licences. 44 The lowest priority is accorded to vessels with poor records of
reporting and compliance with national laws and regulations.

6.4.1

45

Analysis of the Palau Arrangement - the domestication experience

An analysis of the Palau Arrangement shows that domestication of the purse seine
capture fishery has been limited. The creation of a preferential licensing criteria that
would allow increase in domestic vessel category has not reduced the number of foreign
vessels under bilateral access agreements. Table 6.1 shows that of the 194 reported
active purse seine vessels in March 2002, 114 were under bilateral agreements. The
underlying reason for the limited success is examined below.
A review of the Palau Arrangement carried out in 1993 pointed out the failure to
limit purse seine effort. Some PNA only partially applied the procedures for the
Regional Register and issued licenses in excess of individual fleet allocation. For
example, in 1992, a member requested an increase in the Taiwanese cap from 30 to
44.

46

Agreed individual fleet limits were exceeded, which reduced competition for

licenses among the various fleets and consequently constrained any opportunity to
increase access fees. Since access fees were relatively cheap, 47 there was little incentive
for operators to establish joint ventures or shore-based operations. Concerns were also
raised over vessels that re-located by re-flagging to flags of convenience to gain
access. 48
Acess to the vessels of other Pacific Island States was limited because most of
these States did not own purse seine vessels. Only three Pacific Island States operate
domestic purse seine fleet - the FSM, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu. 49 There was
also some reluctance to forego revenue from bilateral access because locally-based
vessels meant giving up part of the access revenue.
To overcome the above problems, further changes to the Palau Arrangement to
provide greater incentives for domestic industry development were agreed. Measures
included the reduction of the number of licenses to the Korean fleet from 36 to 32 and

44

The Palau Arrangement - Article 6.3.
The Palau Arrangement - Article 6.5
~ This request was approved on the view that Taiwan had agreed to supply high seas catch data.
7
Access fee on average was around 5% of the value of catch.
48
Lodge (1998), op. cit., n.35.
49
Personal Communication- Joel Opnai, Deputy Fisheries Resources Adviser, Forum Fisheries Agency
Honiara, August 2002.
'
45
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the denial of licenses to foreign fishing vessels flying flags of convenience. so A major
strategy to encourage domestication was to classify domestic fishing vessels, locallybased foreign fishing vessels and vessels of other FFA member States in the same
category and allocate 24 licenses.s 1 The Parties also agreed to increase the number of
domestic and locally based licenses and reduce the number of licenses allocated to
bilateral foreign access by 10% effective from 1997. 52 These changes resulted in an
increase in purse seine joint ventures but the number of foreign licenses was not
correspondingly reduced. 53
The purse seine fishery has stabilised since 1995 with the decrease in canned
tuna prices and the fishing interest in some States being diverted to higher value sashimi
longlining.

54

The number of purse seine vessels registered under the Palau Arrangement

in March 2002 stood at 194, which is 9 below the cap as shown in table 6.1.
In principle, the structure of the Palau Arrangement does not allow new entrants,

thus any increase in the domestic vessel category will require a reduction in vessels
under bilateral access. In practice, new entrants would have to come under the domestic
or locally based category.ss In 1999, a number of licenses under the domestic category
were allocated to Vanuatu-flagged vesselss 6 which were effectively Taiwanese foreign
vessels which sought additional access beyond their cap limit under the Palau
Arrangement. 57 Kiribati also issued 14 licenses under bilateral access to Spanish vessels
since 1999. ss These developments have caused some degree of disagreement among the
of the Parties to the Palau Arrangement. At the PNA Meeting in Honiara in 2000,
Annex I of the Palau Arrangement was modified to include a new category for "new
entrants". This category is temporary and utilises the unused Korean and US licenses so
as not to exceed the cap of 205 vessels.

59

50

Thirteeth Annual Meeting of the PNA, 27-29 April 1994, Honiara, Solomon Islands.
Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53
Lodge (1998), op. cit., n.35, p.25.
54 Ibid.
55 In practice, however, since US vessels have not utilised their allocation, members have justified
accommodating new foreign entrants by arguing that the total effort does not reach the maximum cap of
205.
56 These are foreign vessels with Vanuatu flag that operate under an open International Vessel Registry
and these vessels have not contributed to any shore based activity.
57 Fourth Annual Meeting of the Palau Arrangement, Apia, 1999.
58 Kiribati issued 14 bilateral licenses since 1999 to Spanish purse seine vessels. At the April 2002
Meeting of the PNA, it was agreed that 4 EU vessels would be allowed under the ~ew bilateral access and
51

the number would only increase provided US vessels under licenses are below therr allocated number
59

Parties to the Palau Arrangement, Fifth Annual Meeting, FF A Report 00/12, 4 - 11 May 2000, Honiara.
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With the recent international development following the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement and the new WCPF Convention raising issues on resource sustainability and
the changes in the global tuna markets, a review of the Palau Arrangement has been
carried out. The review highlights several modifications to the Arrangement among
which the most significant is the allocation of effort based on number of purse seine
vessel fishing days. This is analysed in the next chapter under the WCPF Convention.

6.5

The Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement for Regional Access (The
FSM Arrangement)

A review of the Palau Arrangement in 1993 indicated that the distant water purse seine
effort continued to increase amidst high tuna prices but there was no corresponding
increase in access revenue. 60 At the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the PNA in 1994, the
Parties noted that despite strong encouragement, foreign vessels have been unwilling to
base their operations in the territories of PNA. The PNA agreed to develop appropriate
mechanisms to provide additional incentives to foreign operators to establish locally
based enterprises of long-term benefit to PNA. 61 Consequently, a PNA Task Force was
established to identify the criteria for domestic vessels that would provide substantial
long-term economic benefits to the Parties. This study led to the adoption of the
Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access (FSM
Arrangement), aimed at increasing domestic benefits. The Arrangement was seen as an
integral part of a long-term strategy to eventually phase out foreign fishing vessels
operating in the region. 62
The main objectives of the FSM Arrangement are:

•

to co-operate to secure maximum sustainable economic benefits from the
exploitation of the tuna resources in the WCP;

•

to promote greater participation of nationals of Parties and assist in the development
of national fishing industries; and

60

PNA, Status of Implementation of the Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific
Purse Seine Fisheries, Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the PNA, 27-29 April 1994, Honiara, Solomon
Islands.
61
Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the PNA, (Communique') Honiara, 27-29 April 1994, Honiara, Solomon
Islands.
62
P:~~A Record of Proceedings, ~eenth Annual Meeting of the Parties ~o the Nauru Agreement,
Honiara, Solomon Islands, 27-29 Apnl, Attachment D, FFA Report 94/14. Cited in: T. Aqorau and A.
Bergin, "The FSM Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access," The International Journal ofMarine and
Coastal Law, 12 (1), 1998, p.45.
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•

to es~ablish terms and conditions under which fishing vessels that provide long-term
sustamable and quantifiable economic benefits are granted preferential access to
EEZs of Parties.

Part II of the FSM Arrangement outlines the registration and licensing procedures for
vessels under the Arrangement. When a Party is satisfied that a fishing vessel fulfils the
eligibility criteria, the Party can apply to enter the vessel on the Register of Eligible
Fishing Vessels.

63

The vessel must be on the Regional Register of Foreign Fishing64

Vessels and the Regional Register of Eligible Fishing Vessels before the Administrator
grants a regional access license. 65 Article 3(3) details the conditions of entry into the
Regional Register of Eligible Fishing Vessels for Access such as the need to provide
regular and timely reports of catch within the Arrangement Area and while in the high
seas. The eligibility criteria are set out in Annex III (3) of the FSM Arrangement. Each
vessel or enterprise must score a minimum of 25 points to qualify for a regional access
license. The criteria have a number of fishery-related activities that are seen to increase
linkages to local economies, thereby providing domestic value added. These include:
amount of equity, number of nationals employed, level of local purchases, extent of
onshore investment, flag of the vessel, and level of skills and technology transfer. Table
6.2 presents the current point evaluation system criteria. Vessels are categorised either
as large purse seiners or small archipelagic purse seine vessels. In practice, to achieve
higher efficiency, the large seiners maximise their time at sea by having limited shore
based activities and by making most of their purchases at sea. The archipelagic seiners
operate within a narrower range closer to shore.
The vessels and fishing enterprises are reviewed annually. against the criteria and
if they do not meet the eligibility test, they can be deleted from the Register of Eligible
Fishing Vessels.

66

Vessels that meet the criteria can, with a single license, gain access

to the EEZ of the Parties. This provides an easy access to multiple fishing zones as
opposed to seeking several bilateral arrangements that can otherwise result in a high
transaction cost. The FSM Arrangement has a comprehensive compliance and

63

FSM Arrangement - Article 3 (2).
Regional Register of Foreign Fishing Vessels - The Regional Register is a database on foreign vessels
which has information about vessel owners, operators, masters and details on changes to vessel
information: Before a foreign vessel can be licensed, it must be in good standing on the Regional
Register. The intention of the Register is to shift the burden for compliance on the flag States or fishing
association. Good standing may be withdrawn or suspended if the vessel has created a fishery offence.
65 FSM Arrangement - Article 6 .1 .
64
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enforcement mechanism that takes account of Flag State responsibilities and also
requires Parties to develop regionally agreed procedures for surveillance and
enforcement in the Arrangement area under the provision of the Niue Treaty.

67

Table 6.2

Point Evaluation System Criteria for Determining Domestic
Commitments
Archipelagic Purse Seine Criteria
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Note:
I. "equity" means the percentage of the total capital invested by the Government or nationals of a Party in the
enterprise and the vessel. In cases where the vessel is owned by the enterprise, the measure is simply the percentage
of equity in the enterprise;
2. "Government revenue" means revenue from corporate tax and export tax paid by the enterprise;
3. The four management types are: payrolls, procurement, hiring and firing, and management of sales.
A score of25 points is required to qualify a vessel to be eligible under the Arrangement.

6.5.1

Analysis of the domestication strategy under the FSM Arrangement

The Pacific Island States view the FSM Arrangement as the main vehicle through which
their tuna industries can be domesticated. 68 Aqorau and Bergin argue that the criteria
66
67

FSM Arrangement - Article 6.4.
FSM Arrangement - Article 13 and 15.

183
present a framework to determine the eligibility of vessels and that it should be used by
Parties as an investment guideline. 69 The FSM Arrangement is seen as a response to
Pacific Island aspirations and frustrations over the problem of bogus joint ventures set
up by foreign enterprises which do not materialise into any local benefits. The number
of vessels on the Register of Eligible Fishing vessels during the seventh licensing period
(2001) stood at 21 compared to 5 vessels during the first licensing period (1995) 70 •
Several problems have constrained the domestication objectives of the FSM
Arrangement. The first constraint has been the lack of understanding of the dynamics of
purse seine operations. Vessels require large capital outlays, skilled labour, reliable
supply of inputs and a flexible operational mode depending on the seasonality of catch
and the market prices of fish for viable operations.71 Of the 20 vessels on the Register of
Eligible Fishing Vessels in March 2001, only six had Pacific Island equity in their
ownership structure.72 The low local equity and low employment of locals indicate that
achieving maximum benefits has been somewhat limited. Purse seiners often use bases
and ports that offer the best compromise of distance, price and services. In a number of
Pacific Island States, the availability of cheap supplies, port infrastructure and
availability of skilled labour have often been limited.73 The criteria based on a specified
range of domestic commitment within which the local purchases and onshore
development have to fall, in order to qualify for eligibility, were considered too rigid
and therefore provided little incentive for vessels to base their operations in domestic
ports. This was further compounded by lack of adequate information. The evaluation of
the eligibility criteria for a regional access license also depends on the supply of data, its
reliability and accuracy. One of the problems in the vessel review process has been the
74

poor reporting and lack of supporting documents to the Administrator.

The application of the eligibility criteria has also largely depended on the home
parties' domestic legislation and enforcement in relation to matters such as level of local
equity, employment and training.

68 T. Aqorau, and A. Bergin, "The FSM Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access", The International
Journal ofMarine and Coastal Law, 12(1), 1998, p. 44.
69
Ibid, p.56
70 Parties to the FSM Arrangement, Sixth Annual Meeting of Parties, 3 May 2001.
71 Forum Fisheries Agency, A Review of the Federated States of Micronesia for Regional Fisheries
Access, FFA Report 96/38, Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, 1996.
72 Parties to the FSM Arrangement, Sixth Annual Meeting, 3 May 2001.
73
Ibid.
74 This in turn delays the review process and the renewal of the regional access license. [Personal
Communication - Josie Tamate, Project Economist, Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, February 2002].
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Another factor that contributed to the low number of foreign vessel numbers
opting to base their operations under the FSM Arrangement has been the low level of
access fee levels under bilateral arrangements. The access fees on average have been
around 5% of the value of catch. 75 Under the FSM Arrangement, the access fee was also
calculated on the 5% value of the catch in addition the vessel was required to contribute
to shore-based development and activities.
The low number of local vessels and equity in the purse seine fishery is partly
due to the lack of capital and high risks associated with the purse seine operations that
have been characterised by erratic price changes since the mid 1990s.

76

Local investors

have opted for investments in the relatively more affordable longline fresh tuna
fishery. 77

6.6

Conclusion
Under the framework of the FFA Convention and the Nauru Agreement, this

chapter argues that Pacific Island States' attempts to domesticate the tuna fishery at a
regional level has been limited.
The Palau Arrangement while placing limits on vessel fleet category, provides a
preferential licensing criteria with high priority to domestic vessels of the Parties. The
aim of the licensing criteria has been to reduce the number licenses under bilateral

access agreements and consequently increase the number of licenses for domestic and
dometic-based vessels. Experience so far has shown that members continued to issue
bilateral access licenses. The increase in domestic vessel category has been due to reflagging of foreign vessels seeking access above their fleet limits and by
accommodating "new entrant" foreign vessels.
Under the FSM Arrangement, an eligibility criterion was established to ensure
that vessels that based their operations in domestic ports had long-term genuine interest
by creating shore-based activities. Practical and strategic constraints have both limited
this domestication process. The use of Pacific Island ports and establishment of shore-

75

An analysis of the criteria by McCoy and Gillett shows that the net benefits to foreign purse seine
vessels from re-locating to local ports compared to bilateral access was negligible. [See details in M.
McCoy and R. Gillett, The Purse Seine Fishery: Likely Profitability and Potential Development
Opportunities for Pacific Island Countries, Forum Fisheries Agency Report 93/3, Gillett, Preston &
Associates, 1998].
76 Ibid.
77
Personal Communication - Les Clarke, Fisheries Management Adviser, Forum Fisheries Agency
Honiara, February 2002.
'
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based facilities has been limited because of high cost structure due to distances, lack of
economies of scale, and limited infrastructure. Incentives for foreign purse seiners to
base their operations in Pacific Islands ports have also been limited due to relatively low
access fees under bilateral agreements which do not require the same level of domestic
commitments.
The high risk and capital intensive nature of the purse seine fishery together
with the downturn in the global demand for purse seine tuna in the mid 1990s also
prevented a number of Pacific Island States to invest in their own purse seine fishery. A
number of the Pacific Island States instead have resorted to the relatively less capital
intensive longline fishery. Overall the highly volatile nature of the purse seine fishery
with erratic changes in the supply and demand patterns has prevented purse seine
operators to long-term shore-based commitments under the FSM Arrangement.
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Chapter 7: Implications of the Western Central Pacific Tuna
Management Regime for Domestic Tuna Industry Development in the
Pacific Island States
7.1

Introduction

The successful negotiation of the Convention on Conservation and Management of

Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPF
Convention) in 2000 has resulted in new opportunities and challenges for the Pacific
Islands States in their effort to develop their domestic tuna industries. The WCPF
1

Convention demands increased obligations on members of the WCPF Commission to
implement management and conservation rules through a strengthened enforcement and
compliance mechanism and flag State responsibility. The management principles
outlined in the WCPF Convention require wide ranging changes in policy and practice
in the way tuna has been managed.
This chapter identifies the key management issues arising from the WCPF
Convention that are likely to impact on the domestication of the tuna industry in the
Pacific Islands region. The chapter begins with a brief background to the WCPF
Convention and a summary of the important features of the WCPF Convention. The key
provisions that have direct policy implications on domestication are analysed at the
national and regional levels. The chapter shows that while the WCPF Convention
presents several challenges for industry development, it also provides some
opportunities for the Pacific Island States. The options to develop rights-based fisheries
management systems as a broader means of domestication are explored. The chapter
points out that issues that will affect the development of the tuna industry will require
greater co-operative approaches among the Pacific Island States.

7.2

The Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPF
Convention)
The need for sustainable resource development was realised during the United Nations

Conference on Environment and Development (1992) which adopted Agenda 21. 2
Programme Area C in Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 specifically outlined the concerns
1

An agreement has been reached at the Third Preparatory Conference in Philippines in November 2002 to
set up the WCPF Commission in the Federated States of Micronesia.
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regarding overexploitation in the high seas and called for States to take effective action
to ensure that high seas fisheries are managed in accordance with the provisions of the
Law of the Sea Convention (1982). This led the United Nations to convene a conference
on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in 1993 in attempts to improve
the application of provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention relating to high seas.
The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (1995)3 aims to improve co-operation
between States through establishment of regional and sub-regional fisheries
management organisations (RFMOs) to ensure the long-term conservation and
sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. Under Article
7 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, co-operation between coastal States and DWFNs is
mandated to ensure the compatibility of conservation and management between EEZ
and high seas because of the biological unity of the stocks. Article 8(3) requires that
States fishing for the stocks on the high seas and the coastal States have a duty to cooperate on the management and conservation by becoming members of a regional or
sub-regional organisation (RFMO). Article 8(5) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement states
that where such a management organisation does not exist, that coastal States and those
fishing in the region shall co-operate to establish such an organisation or enter into
appropriate arrangements to ensure conservation and management of such stocks and
participate in the work of the organisation or arrangement.
Just as the Conference on Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks on the
High Seas was underway at the United Nations and with the Law of the Sea Convention
entering into force in November 1994, a high level multilateral meeting on South
Pacific fisheries was convened at the FFA in Honiara in December 1994. The meeting
discussed technical issues relating to the status of the fish stocks in the Westem Central
Pacific, the collection of data, transshipment, enforcement and monitoring and issues
4

affecting commercial tuna fishing.

The 1994 meeting in Honiara provided a common understanding between
coastal States and DWFNs on the need for sustainable management of tuna resources
Agenda 21 is a comprehensive Programme of Action for global change .in all a~eas of sustainable
development. The action agenda was one of the five agreements from the Umted Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (1992).
3 The Agreement for the Implementation of the provisions of the United Nations Conven~ion o.n the Law
of the Sea of 1O December 1982 relateing to Conservation and Management of Straddlmg Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. [The Agreement elaborates on the provisions relating to High Seas
(Article 116-120) and on the duty to co-operate (Article 64) of the Law of the Sea.]
2
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and the development of tuna industry in the region. 5 Between December 1994 to
September 2000, seven high level multilateral conferences (MHLCs) and several
technical consultations took place that focussed on the important elements highlighted

in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement relating to the principles of conservation and
management, the application of a precautionary approach and aspects of regional cooperation. The MHLC process involved negotiations on identifying the area of
application, the membership, the regulatory framework, the establishment of a
6

· commission and its various functions, and the decision making procedures. At the end
of the Seventh Session, on 4 September 2000, the coastal States and DWFNs as the
fishing States of the Western Central Pacific adopted the WCPF Convention.
The objective of the Convention is to ensure, through effective management, the
long term conservation and sustainable use of highly migratory fish stocks in the
W estem Central Pacific Ocean based on the principles outlined in the Law of the Sea
7

Convention (1982) and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (1995). The WCPF Convention
also recognises the economic and social dependence of small island States on the highly
migratory fish stocks and their need for assistance to effectively participate in the
management and conservation of the fish stocks. 8
Article 3 of the WCPF Convention defines the geographical boundaries of the
Convention Area9 and states that management measures apply to all stocks of highly
migratory fish except sauries. The main focus is on the need for co-operation between
coastal States and fishing States 10 to ensure conservation and optimum utilisation of the

4

Record of Proceedings of the Multilateral High Level Conference on South Pacific Tuna Fisheries, 5 -9
December 1994, FFAReport 95/1, Forum Fisheries Agency, 1995.
5
The two major parties (Pacific Island States as developing coastal States and Distant Water Fishing
Nations and developed fishing States). Pacific Island States have an interest to preserve their national
jurisdiction over tuna stocks and the desire to increase economic benefits from the tuna resources within
their EEZs. The DWFNs have an interest to secure access and therefore to have some control over the
management of tuna resources.
6
For details on the MHLC Process see: Proceedings of the Multilateral High-Level Conference on the
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific (First to Seventh Session), Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara; S. Tarte, A Duty to Cooperate: Building a
Regional Regime for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western
and Central Pacific, History/ Politics Department, University of the South Pacific, 2001.
7
WCPF Convention -Article 2, Article 30.
8
Preamble - WCPF Convention.
9
The boundary of the Convention Area is defined along the eastern and southern ends at 150°east
longitude and 55° south latitude. The Convention defines the northern and western boundaries by
reference to the migratory range of the stocks. Article 3(1).
10
The Convention consists of coastal States, fishing States, Territories and entities. Some of the fishing
States are also coastal States in that their coasts border the WCP Ocean. Taiwan (Chinese Taipei) has an
agreement for participation as a fishing entity. For the purpose of this study, the Pacific Island States and
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highly migratory fish stocks throughout their range. Part II of the WCPF Convention
specifically emphasises the application of the precautionary approach and the use of the
best scientific information available to ensure effective conservation. In this respect, the
guidelines set out in Annex II of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement form an integral part of
this Convention.

11

Article 6(2) of the WCPF Convention states that the absence of

adequate scientific information should not be used as a reason for postponing or failing
to take conservation and management measures. Furthermore, the WCPF Convention
recognises that effective and binding conservation and management measures can be
achieved only through co-operation between coastal States and fishing States in the
region, through the establishment of a regional fisheries management organsiation. 12
Article 8 of the WCPF Convention imposes a duty to co-operate to achieve
"compatible measures" for conservation and management of highly migratory stocks
that need protection in their entirety because of their biological characteristics.
Management and conservation measures that already exist both in the EEZs and on the
high seas that are in accordance with the Law of the Sea Convention (1982) and the UN
Fish Stocks Agreement (1995) will be taken into consideration when determining
compatible measures. 13
Part III of the WCPF Convention provides for the establishment of a
Commission. 14 The Commission will be the decision making body and will have a
permanent secretariat and two technical sub-committees; one dealing with compliance
and the other dealing with scientific issues. Article 10 details the various functions of
the Commission and its sub-committees to advance the objectives of the WCPF
Convention. One of functions of the Commission is to determine the total allowable
catch (TAC) or the total allowable effort (TAE) within the Convention Area.

15

The

Commission is required to develop, where necessary, criteria for allocation of the TAC

Territories are considered as "coastal States" and the Developed States are considered as "fishing States"
orDWFNs.
11
WCPF Convention- Article 6 (1) [a].
12
Preamble - WCPF Convention.
13 WCPF Convention - Article 8 (2b) (i & ii).
14 The Preparatory Conferences (Prep Con) to establish the Commission are underway. A decision has
already been made to establish the WCPF Commission in the Federated States of Micronesia. The Prep
Cons so far have focussed negotiations on administrative matters such as the budgetary requirements, the
rules of procedures for the work of the Commission and its various sub-committees.
15 WCPF Convention - Article 10 (1) [a]; Among other functions of the Commission include: adoption of
conservation and management measures for non-targeted species, dependent and associated species;
adoption of standards for collection, verification and timely exchange and reporting of data; establishing
co-operative mechanisms for monitoring, control and surveillance and enforcement, including VMS; and
evaluating scientific advice, reviewing the status of stocks and promoting scientific research.
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or TAE. 16 Article 10(3) outlines a range of factors to be considered in detennining the
allocation. These include the status of the stocks and existing level of fishing effort, the
historic catch of the area, the dependency of small island developing States on the
marine resources, and their interests and aspirations to develop tuna industries based on
the stocks that occur in their EEZs.
Part IV of the WCPF Convention outlines the obligations of the Commission
. members. The timely collection, compilation and analysis of data are central to effective
conservation of highly migratory fish stocks. Each member is required annually to
provide statistical, biological and other data listed in Annex I of the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement in addition to any other information that may be needed by the
Commission. 17 Each Commission member is required to inform the Commission of
steps taken to implement the conservation and management measures adopted by the
Commission. The range of measures include those taken by Commission members to
control nationals and their fishing vessels in the Convention Area.

18

The WCPF Convention also requires the collection and sharing of complete and
accurate data on fishing activities, vessel positions, catch of target and non-target
species, fishing effort and research information. 19 Fisheries data for stocks on the high
seas and those in areas under national jurisdiction are required and should be compiled

°

to enable statistically meaningful analysis. 2 Furthermore data must be provided in the
format required by the regional fisheries management organisation. The data must be
verified either through a vessel monitoring system (VMS), through observer reports or
port sampling and transshipment reports. The WCPF Commission obligates the national
fisheries administrations to require from their licensed vessels timely and accurate
information as a condition of granting licenses.
Commission members are required to exercise flag State responsibility over their
vessels in the Convention Area, including areas under the national jurisdiction and on
the high seas. Vessels must not engage in activities that undermine the effectiveness of

16

WCPF Convention- Article 10 (1) [g].
·
Basic fishery data includes time series data on catch and effort by fisheries and fleet, composition of
catch; Vessel data information include vessel type, identification, flag and port of registry, gear details
vessels specification, crew size, navigation and position fixing aids; Reporting requires States to send t~
the relevant regional fisheries management organisation log book data on catch and effort, including data
on fishing operations on the high seas as required by the organisation.
18
WCPF Convention - Article 23 (4) and Article 23 (5).
19
WCPF Convention-Article 5 (i).
20
United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement - Annex I: Article 1.
17
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management and conservation measures adopted. 21 Article 24(2) states that a member of
the Commission can only authorise the use of vessels flying its flag for fishing in the
high seas only when it is able to exercise effectively its responsibilities in respect of
such vessels. All vessels operating in the Convention Area are to comply with the terms
and conditions as outlined in Annex III (Terms and Conditions for Fishing) to the
WCPF Convention in addition to those that may already exist under minimum terms
and conditions of a licensing agreement. The measures include compliance with
national laws, reporting of vessel position, providing data on target and non-target
species, fishing effort and other fisheries data. The WCPF Convention also requires
members whose vessel fish on the high seas and in the EEZs of other Parties to use
near-real time satellite position fixing transmitters while in the high seas. 22
Part VI of the WCPF Convention outlines the compliance and enforcement
provisions for fishing vessels in the Convention Area. A Commission member is
required to investigate any alleged violation by fishing vessels flying its flag if
requested by another member. 23 The WCPF Convention also provides for the
development of procedures which allow for non-discriminatory trade measures against
any States whose fishing vessels undermine the effectiveness of the conservation and
management measures adopted by the Commission. 24 The compliance and enforcement
mechanisms include the establishment of a regional observer programme, the use of
vessel monitoring system (VMS), regulation on transshipment and boarding and
inspection of vessels on the high seas. Any member of the Commission has the right and
duty to inspect documents, fishing gear and catches on board any vessels entering its
port.2s
In recognising the special requirements for developing states, Part VIII of the

WCPF Convention calls for co-operation among members of the Commission to
facilitate technical assistance, human resource development, transfer of technology and
26
advisory and consultative services.
The WCPF Convention is not yet in force. The Convention will come into force
after three northern States (situated north of 20 parallel of north latitude) and seven

21

WCPF Convention - Article 24 (1) [a].
WCPF Convention - Article 24 (8) and (9).
23
WCPF Convention- Article 25 (10).
24
WCPF Convention - Article 25 (12).
25 WCPF Convention - Article 27 (2).
26
WCPF Convention - Article 30 (4).
22
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southern States (situated south of 20 parallel of north latitude) become Parties, or after
three years if any thirteen States ratify the Convention. 27 As at March 2003, the
Convention had been signed by 19 States with 5 ratifications. So far, four Preparatory
Conferences have been held with regards to setting up the Tuna Commission, and the
fourth preparatory Conference is planned to be held in September 2003 in the Cook
Islands.
7.3

Issues arising from the WCPF Convention for domestication

The WCPF Convention itself is not directed at domestication, but its provisions present
three broad areas for consideration for the development of the domestic tuna industry.
The first deals with the issue of allocation. The second relates to 'duties and obligations'
in exercising the given rights and the third deals with the need for co-operation between
coastal States and fishing States to ensure the effective implementation of the WCPF
Convention. These issues will simultaneously shape the future of domestic tuna industry
development in the region.
The potential implications of the WCPF Convention for domestication of the
tuna industry by the Pacific Island States need to be considered at the national and
regional level. However, any assessment at this stage requires qualification because it is
still not clear as to how the Commission will operate on issues of allocation. 28
Nevertheless, a number of domestication implications can be clearly drawn from the
WCPF Convention text and through the MHLC process.

7.3.1

Allocation

One function of the Commission is to determine the total allowable catch or total level
of fishing effort within the Convention Area and where necessary to develop criteria for
its allocation.

29

The issue of allocation is fundamental to the success of the tuna

management regime thus, the Commission needs to resolve it early.
In the case of highly migratory species, technical measures such as closed areas,

closed seasons and mesh and net sizes would be insufficient to manage and conserve the

27

WCPF Convention - Article 36.
L. Clark, "The Convention and National Fisheries Management," Paper presented at the FF N ADB
Workshop on the Implementation of the Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific, Apia, Samoa, 23-27,0ctober, 2000, FFA
Report No. 00/21, Honiara, 2000, p.10.
29
WCPF Convention-Article 10.1 (a) and 10.1 (g).
28
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resources.

30

L' . .
1m1tations on catch and effort or vessels capacity have been the major

means used to manage the tuna fishery. 31 Imposing limits essentially means excluding
some users from participating in the fishery. This is the core issue of allocation. A
criterion is needed to determine who to exclude and who to include in the fishery.
Therefore while the WCPF Convention aims at management and conservation concerns,
it is the provisions on allocation that will largely determine the extent to which the
Convention will benefit the individual member States. The potential opportunities for
the Pacific Island States in terms of gaining participatory rights, are to be achieved by
securing a national allocation of the catch within the overall regional limit and using the
national allocation to achieve domestication objectives.
The FFA member States argue that management measures already exist in the
EEZs under national jurisdiction and the main purpose of the WCPF Convention is to
ensure that the tuna stocks are not over-exploited on the high seas. From the Pacific
Islands States' perspective, the WCPF Convention is an initiative to implement the UN
Fish Stocks Agreement that focuses on the high seas. 32 They argue that the text of the
UN Fish Stocks Agreement states that high seas measures must be compatible with
those in the EEZ provided the latter complies with the principles and measures outlined
in the Law of the Sea Convention (1982). 33 This is supported by Article 4 of the WCPF
Convention. 34 Article 10(1) on the functions of the Commission also provides that the
WCPF Convention shall be ''without prejudice" to the sovereign rights of the coastal
States. On the other hand, Article 10(2), provides that the Commission can determine
the quantity of any species or stocks that is caught, the level of effort and limitations to
fishing capacity and other management measures in the Convention Areas in order to
effectively carry out its functions. This provision needs further clarification because it

30

Since it would be difficult to apply and monitor such management measures for tuna, which is a highly
migratory species and fishing activities are conducted over a wide ocean area. Fishers can more
intensively fish during the open season and drive down the stock or change gear combinations through
improvement in technology or by intensive use of gear that is not regulated. The implementation of such
measures would therefore be insufficient on its own to bring about effective management of tuna
resources.
31
Clarke (2000), op. cit., n.28 .
32 L. Cordonnery, "A Note on the 2000 Convention for the Conservation and Management of Tuna in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean'', Ocean Development and International Law, (33), 2002, pp.1-15.
33 I. Cartwright, The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency: Past, P_rese~t and Possible l!'uture Roles in
Fisheries Management in the Central and Western Pacific, Forum F1shenes Agency, Homara, November
1996, p.11.
34

"Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under the 1982

Convention and the Agreement." - Article 4 (WCPF Convention).
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has important economic implications for the Commission members in relation to the
share of the total allocation among States.
The different interpretations have led to differing views between the Pacific
Island States and the DWFNs on the issue of allocation during the MHLC process.
Clark sums up these differing views as either the "national/high seas model," where
allocation is by zones and is the option favoured by the Pacific Island States, or the
"Commission/Convention model," which is based on allocation by the flag State and
recommended by the DWFNs. 35
The scope for domestic industry development under the WCPF Convention is
dependent on the relative size of allocation. While there are a number of factors that
would be considered in determining the level of allocation, catch history nevertheless
has been a crucial determinant from previous fishery experiences and one that is
strongly pushed by the fishing States. 36 The major challenge that is presented by the
WCPF Convention with regards to allocation is that of having a catch history to secure a
future national allocation.
Under the 'flag State' allocation model, some coastal States would be
disadvantaged. Those coastal States that do not have their own fishing fleet, or those
States that have low levels of fishing or have not yet developed their fisheries would be
disadvantaged because they would not have adequate catch history. Those States that
are highly dependent on foreign fishing access would be the major losers since their
catches would have been recorded as having been caught by foreign fishing State's
vessels. 37

7.3.2

Opportunities for domestication

The WCPF Convention provides potential opportunities for Pacific Island States to gain
participatory rights by securing a national catch or effort allocation within the overall
regional limit and to use the national allocation to direct domestication. Whatever

35

Clark (2000), op. cit., n.28.[Clark further gives some examples of the various other types of models that
could be used in the allocation process which looks at various possible combinations of the
'national/high seas model' and the 'Commission/Convention model'].
36
For example the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and Indian
Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) have used catch history.
37
This method has a further disadvantage in that it is based on historical catches reported by Flags. A
large majority of these vessels are foreign fishing vessels. One of the major problems faced by the Pacific
Island States has been the under-reporting of catches by these vessels that have been licensed to fish in
the EEZs. Therefore this will lead to a further reduction in allocation of shares by proportions of their
under-reported amounts in their EEZs.
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criteria or formula is used to determine the TAC and its allocation, certain changes will
be inevitable under the application of a TAC management regime. This section of the
chapter reflects on the long-term domestication options once regional allocations are
determined.
With quota allocation, there will be a limit on the amount of fish taken and the
level of effort (capacity) applied in both the in-zone areas and on the high seas.
Individual States will have a right only to a specified quantity of fish or to a specified
level of effort under given conditions over a given time period. 38 This limitation on
catch and/or effort also introduces a second order 'right' under the system of RightsBased Management. 39 When the WCPF Convention comes into effect and the national
allocations are done, there will be potential to create a more powerful rights-based
system that can have greater flexibility and add a new commercial dimension to the
existing sovereign rights. The rights created can either continue to be vested in the State,
or allocated to communities and groups or to individuals. The latter type of rights can
empower nationals to benefit from the tuna resources directly. A brief background to
rights-based fisheries management systems and its possible options for domestication is
provided in the next section.
7.l.3

A Rights-based fisheries management system

Rights-based fisheries management refers to a system that creates an instrument giving
some parties the "right" to participate in the fishery while others are excluded. The
value attached to a right belonging to someone creates a form of property, and thus the
term "property right" is applied. The "right" can be a limited entry right, a catch quota,
an effort quota, a capacity quota, a license with a cap on total number of licenses or a
vessel with a cap on the total number ofvessels.

38

40

Since the productivity of the stock is an important variable in determining the TAC, where stock varies
such as the case of tuna, allocation of rights to harvests may be defined as percentage of TAC rather than
a fixed amount.
39 Under the Law of the Sea Convention (1982), the sovereign rights over the BEZ by coastal States is
seen as a first order rights where the rights have been vested in the State This right is more broad and
allows coastal State to use in any way provided it is compatible with the provisions of the Law of the Sea
Convention. These have been generally used as State- based rights management in the Pacific Islands
where the State has carried out fishing itself or issued licenses to others.
40 L. Clark, "Transformation and rights-based fisheries management regimes: application to the Western
and Central Pacific Ocean" in Workshop Report on Rights based Fisheries Management, 24-26 June
2002, Nadi, Fiji.
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The effectiveness of a right is dependent on the characteristics of the property
right. 41 According to Scott, the most crucial property rights characteristics are security,
exclusivity, permanence and transferability. 42 The more secure the right is, the greater
its exclusivity, the longer its duration. The higher the degree of transferability, the
stronger is the right. 43 For example, the Individual Transferable Quota Systems (ITQs)
are seen as the most secure form of right in commercial fisheries.

44

A number of

economists advocate adopting more powerful forms of rights particularly in stocks that
are overfished and where there is overcapacity of fleets.

45

Lane's central argument is

that the more complete a property right is, the more the fishery is likely to become
responsible and sustainable. 46
Fishing rights will become important base for managing the tuna fisheries of the
Western Central Pacific region as limits are applied more comprehensively, both at the
regional level and nationally.
There are several benefits from a rights-based fisheries management. These
include conservation of resources where incentives are created for right holders to
conserve the resources in their long-term interest. Fishers can choose when to fish to
optimise price in response to market opportunities. Economic advantages also arise
from cost reductions because fishers do not compete for a share of the TAC unlike in an
41

R. Amason, "Property Rights as a Means of Economic Organisation", in Shotton, R. (ed.), Use of
Property rights in fisheries management, Proceedings of the FishRights99 Conference, 11-19 November,
1999, Freemantle, Australia, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 404/1,2000, pp.14 -25.
42
A. Scott, "Introducing Property in Fishery Management'', in R. Shotten, (ed.) Use of Property rights in
.fisheries management, Proceedings of the FishRights99 Conference, 16-19 November 1999, Fremantle,
Australia, FAOTtechnical Paper 404/1, pp.1-13.
43
Security- a right that is secure enough to be mortgaged for a loan is more valuable than a right that can
taken away; exclusivity - a right that allows right holders to decide what boat to use is more valuable than
one that limits what boats to use; permanence - the longer duration of a right, the more powerful it is;
Transferability- a right that has the flexibility to be leased or sold is more valuable.
44
For a detailed discussion on ITQs, see: B. Kaufmann, G. Geen and S. Sen, Fish futures : individual
transferable quotas in fisheries, Fisheries Economics, Research and Management Pty Ltd, Australia,
1999; G. R. Morgan, Individual quota management in.fisheries: methodologies for determining catch and
initial quota allocation. FAO Fisheries Technical Report (371), FAO, Rome, 1997.
45
See for example: A. D. Scott, "The ITQ as a Property Right: where it came from, how it works, and
where it is going", in B. L. Crowly, (ed.) Taking Ownership: Property Rights and Fishery Management
on the Atlantic Coast, Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, Halifax, N. S., pp.31-98, 1996; L. G.
Andersen, "A Note on Market Power in ITQ Fisheries", Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, (21), pp. 291-296, 1991; R. Amason, The Icelandic Fisheries: Evolution and Management
of a Fishing Industry, Fishing New Books, London, UK, 1995; OECD, Individual Transferable Quotas:
The New Zealand Case, Directorate for Agriculture and Fisheries, Committee for Fisheries. AGRIFI/EG
(92) 22, 1992; Kaufmann et al (1999), op. cit., n.44.
46
D. Lane, "Applications of rights-based fisheries: experiences and consequences", in Hatcher, A. and K.
Robinson (ed). The Definition and Allocation of Use Rights in European Fisheries, Proceedings of the
second workshop held in Brest, France, 5 - 7 May 1999, Center for the Economics and Management of
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open access situation. Fishers can plan their capital investment to match to the level of
the TAC. In the case of an over-capitalised fishery, fleet reductions can also lead to
rationalisation of effort under a TAC/TAE system and eventually decrease costs of
operations, thereby improving profitability.

7 .3.3.1 Domestication options arising from Rights-based fisheries management
A rights-based management system can provide new opportunities for participation in
the fisheries by nationals who lack capital. It also provides opportunities for foreign
investment through mutually beneficial long term joint-ventures and charters. 47 The first
regional Rights-based Management Workshop held by the Forum Fisheries Agency
concluded that a rights-based management system has a greater scope of increasing
economic benefits through development of the national fishing industry. 48 Some of the
domestication opportunities that can arise from various rights-based systems are
examined below. This assumes that there is a national allocation of either a catch or
effort limit or a vessel capacity limit.

Bilateral access agreements
Those Pacific Island States that lack domestic capacity to harvest their quota can
allocate their quota to foreign fishing vessels under a stronger WCPF Convention
management framework. This may require setting catch limits or vessel limits (capacity
limits) for the DWP fleet from the national TAC.

The case study of Kiribati

demonstrates that domestication is possible through such access agreements provided
there are specific provisions that allow domestic capacity-building, such as employment
of nationals on foreign fishing vessels. The second option is through the provision of
services to foreign fishing vessels by providing port facilities for transshipment of catch
and purchase of supplies, which in turn create shore-based activities.

Phase-out access agreements
The prospects of developing a local fishing industry under access agreements are low
since foreign fishing fleets are generally mobile and unwilling to commit resources for

Aquatic Resources, Portsmouth, England, pp.19-64; Shotton, R., Case Studies on the allocation of
transferable quota right in Fisheries, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 411, FAO, Rome, 2001.
47
Clark (2002), op. cit., n.40, p.50.
48 Forum Fisheries Agency, 2002, Report of the Rights Based Management Workshop, 24 - 26 June 2002,
Nadi, Fiji.
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shore-based facilities. A preferential allocation of a rights system can be devised based
on, for example, the licensing system under the Palau Arrangement (see chapter 6 for
details of the licensing system). Rights such as licenses can be allocated in order of
preference with the highest priority to domestic vessels owned by Pacific Island
nationals, then to domestic based foreign vessels and lastly to foreign vessels. This form
of allocation provides the flexibility to exclude foreign fishing vessels as and when
domestic capacity is achieved. 49

Licensing limits

Once a national allocation is made, a limit on the number of licenses can be determined.
A licensing system can be devised that allows the existing and potential enterprises to
join either as individual operators or as joint-venture companies. They can either use
their own vessels, or lease or charter foreign vessels. A licensing limit system is much
easier to monitor than catch quota but its effectiveness can be compromised if the
vessels' catching capacity are not carefully regulated. 50

Individual Quota Management (/QM)

Once a TAC is set, it can be allocated to individuals, vessels, communities, enterprises
and so on and can be either transferable or non-transferable. The TAC can be a specified
quantity of fish or based on a percentage share of the TAC for a fixed period or
indefinitely. In an OECD study, 18 out of 24 countries reported using quota
management systems for at least some of their fisheries. 51 The most commonly used
form of quota management system is the individual transferable quota system (ITQ),
which is a powerful form of right-based management. One of the underlying objectives
of the ITQ system is maximising economic efficiency in the fishery. The ITQ system
aims to reduce excess capacity where it exists, improve profitability and therefore
generate economic rent. 52 The principle behind ITQs is that if a fishery is profitable, a

49

This strategy also has the potential to create discriminatory trade practices and therefore needs to
transparent.
5
Fishers can easily increase catching power of the vessels by increasing the amount and size of gear,
increase the engine power of the vessel and upgrade other technologies to increase catch per unit effort.
Thus with licensing limits, other subsidiary regulations may also be needed to effectively manage the
fishery.
51
OECD, Synthesis Report for the Study on the Economic Aspects of Management of Marine Living
Resources, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, France.
52
G. R. Morgan, Individual Quota Management in Fisheries: methodologies for determining catch and
initial quota allocation, FAO Fisheries Technical Report (371), FAO, Rome, 1997.
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rent capture mechanism can be devised to increase income through taxes that can
·benefit the coastal communities or society at large. 53 Quota holders are motivated to
harvest the available allocation as efficiently as possible to maximise revenue. This
allows the flexibility to choose when and how the rights holders utilise their quota.
Those quota holders that have high operating costs may choose to sell or lease their
quota to those with lower operating costs. Fishers also have the incentive to manage the
stocks in their long-term interest. 54
The problems with the ITQ system is that it can lead to greater monitoring costs
to ensure that fishers do not exceed their quota limits. 55 There are problems such as
hygrading and discarding. 56 The other challenge is the need for a comprehensive stock
assessment. Quota management systems rely on an accurate estimate of stocks and
periodic revision of the TAC. 57 Estimating TACs using fishery-dependent data to assess
stocks is costly. 58 Social and equity problems also arise with ITQ allocation. 59 Often the
implementation of an ITQ system in a community highly dependent on a fishery is
marked by increased social opportunity costs that may impair the effectiveness of the
ITQ programme. 60
In the light of the objectives of Pacific Island States to increase employment of

local fishers, income and linkages to local economies, ITQ systems will need careful
evaluation. Often increasing fishery incomes and direct employment in the fishery may
be contradictory objectives. 61 The experience of ITQs have shown this where fishers
who face high operating costs, lease or sell their quotas to those that can remain

53

R. Amason, The Icelandic Fisheries: Evolution and Management of a Fishing Industry, Fishing New
Books, London, UK, 1995; OECD, Individual Transferable Quotas: The New Zealand Case, Directorate
for Agriculture and Fisheries, Committee for Fisheries. AGR/FI/EG (92) 22, 1992; Kaufmann et al,
(1999), op. cit., n.44.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid.
56 Hygrading and discarding - In order to optimise the value of catch, often bycatch and under-sized fish
are discarded. Where there are more than one species involved, the higher value species are often
maximised with lower value species being discarded. Such actions of fishers are often hard to detect, but
in the case of tuna fishery with observers on board, such actions can be minimised.
57
Morgan (1997) op. cit., n.52.
58 M. King, Fisheries Biology, Assessment and Management, Fishing News Book, Oxford, England,
1995, p.289.
"
.
.. .
.
59 See for example, B. Kaufmann and G. Geen,
Quota Allocation and Litigation: an economic
perspective", Marine Resource Economics, 1998, 13 (2), ~p.1~3-157
.
. .
.
60 R. Shotton "The Development of Property Rights in Ftshenes Management and therr Role m F1shenes
Managemenf' in Report of the Rights Based Management Workshop, Forum Fisheries Agency, 24-26
June 2002, Nadi, Fiji, pp. 22-42.
61 S. Cunningham, ''Fishennen's Incomes and Fisheries Management", Marine Resource Economics,
1994, (9), pp. 241-252.
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competitive. 62 Eventually the fishery is operated by a small number of large and highly
efficient fishers or enterprises. 63 Employment may be indirectly generated by these large
fishing enterprises.
Quota allocation provides some yardstick on the limits of industry development
as against a situation where no upper limit existed that contributed to a system similar to
open access. 64 The fishing industry can adjust to capital and infrastructure developments
based on the size of their allocations. Small Island States like Niue, Tuvalu and Nauru
which are isolated and have problems with transportation and limited infrastructure can
also participate in the fishery. With flexible strategies that allow leasing or
transferability of the "allocated right", these States can catch their quota elsewhere
within the WCPF Commission Area such as the high seas or in another member' s EEZ.
States can trade their quotas depending on the movement of fish stock, thus allowing for
greater efficiency.
The greater flexibility also accommodates "new entrants". Article 11 of the UN
Fish Stocks Agreement and Article 1O(k) of the WCPF Convention allow new members
to participate provided they comply with the conservation and management rules of the
regional fisheries management organisation (RFMO). 65 The problem of new entrants
can be resolved through allowing them to buy or lease quotas from the original
members. 66

62

Lane (1999), op. cit., n. 46.
Policy options would means a careful analysis of the costs and benefits of a few large operations
(efficient and profitable where net benefits can also flow to the economy as a whole) to one of equity and
welfare of coastal communities.
64
The limits allow the industry to organise itself in terms of its needed resources like vessel size, crew
and so on, whereas the case of open access presents a race for fish. The industry is constantly trying to
improve its capital and technology and in the process becomes over-capitalised.
65
At the Fifth MHLC Meeting, the Conference members resolved that a moratorium would be placed on
new membership. Therefore, the EU's membership as a full member of the Conference was rejected.
66
Other conditions will also need to be complied with, such as management and conservation obligations
and making financial and technical contributions in the management of resources.
In principle there are arguments that an increase in the number of "participants" can allow the market for
quota to develop. This in turn can increase the resource rent and other benefits. From experience so far,
the EU has been keen to seek membership and engage in fishing operations in the region. The EU is a
major donor providing development assistance and will be a multilateral trade partner under the EU ACP
Partnership Agreement through the Cotonou Agreement. The EU is also an important market for tuna.
Since EU members have dependent territories in the region, it is likely that EU member vessels would
land and process the catch in those territories because of the close proximity of port locations to fishing
grounds within the region. This has the potential to reduce transport costs, thus providing greater
efficiency and therefore better returns; consequently, their contribution to shore-based activities in FFA
member States may be limited. There is a possibility that this will create shifts in industrial pattern of
activity particularly for the purse seine fishery under the FSM Arrangement and therefore impact the
domestication efforts of PNA States. However, with greater co-operation under the WCPF Convention
63
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7.3.4 Factors for consideration in the choice of a Rights-based management
system
The Pacific Island States see the WCPF Convention as securing participatory rights and
providing a framework for tuna industry development and an avenue for increasing
local involvement in the industry. Social and economic policies geared towards fisheries
management, together with a transparent allocation process and administration of the
rights, can facilitate greater benefits from the tuna resources.
Clark argues that governments can exercise substantial power over who gets the
rights and that such power can be used to promote indigenous participation in the
fisheries.

67

Either through policy directives that favour local participants or through the

allocation process, governments can promote local industry development. Such policy
approaches, however, need to be practical, achievable and geared towards efficiency, so
that medium to long-term benefits outweigh the short-term costs. For example, where
domestic capital is limited or where necessary technical skills are lacking, some form of
joint ventures with foreign operations or local non-indigenous interests should be
pursued. Training programmes to build local capacity should also be part of fisheries
policy to assist local entrepreneurial development. Flexibility in the leasing of rights
should also be explored.
The development of rights-based management systems in each Pacific Island
State will vary depending on its state of economic development and the nature of its
tuna fishing industry. A progressive approach would be more practical for those island
States highly dependent on access agreements. In island States like Fiji and Papua New
Guinea where a domestic fishery already exists, emphasis could be on improvements in
other areas such as limiting vessel capacity and developing the legislative framework
and enforcement capabilities.
An important consideration in the choice of the rights-based management system
will be the type of fishery under consideration. Several Pacific Island States have
ventured into developing domestic longline fisheries within their EEZs that target the

sashimi market. 68 Potentially, a longline fishery rights-based management system can

such activities may provide other potential advantages that could to be explored in the broader context of
domestication.
67 L. Clark "Developing the policy framework for rights based management in fisheries management",
In: Report ~n Rights Based Fisheries Management Workshop, 24-26 June 20?2, Nadi, Fiji.
.
68 See for example table 2.7 in chapter 2 which outlines the current domestic development efforts m the
Pacific Island States.
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not only achieve sustainable exploitation, but also accomplish the goal of domestic
industry development through placing limits on national catch and/or effort.
For purse seine operations, leasing quotas to reflect seasonal variations in catch
could help to maintain viable economic operations. Besides wide variations, in catch per
unit effort, seasonal and inter-annual climatic variations including large-scale
oceanographic changes, also affect the availability of tuna in any given area.

69

Given the

variability of catch, TACs would need some adjustments to ensure that resources are not
over-exploited. The variability in TACs may require continuous re-adjustments of
bilateral agreements to reflect changes in the quota. With high variability of catch, it is
possible that a TAC may be reached much more quickly, or may not be reached at all in
a given year. A flexible system which allows transfers of quota between time periods,
and between high sea areas and areas under national jurisdiction would be more
practical. For example, if one State's TAC has been reached within a short time while
another State does not have the capacity to harvest its quota within its zone, then leasing
of quotas will benefit both States. These flexible arrangements can only be built through
regional co-operation. These will have implications for the Palau Arrangement and the
FSM Arrangement, which are discussed in Section 7.7 under the heading Implications
of the WCPF Convention on Regional Arrangements.

7.4

Flag State responsibility

One domestication strategy pursued by some Pacific Island States is to re-flag foreign
vessels under the State's national flag as domestic (local) vessels, as is the case in
Vanuatu and Tonga. The general practice so far has been that domestic vessels have had
softer management obligations compared with those of foreign fishing vessels.70 With
the increase in relocation of foreign vessels to domestic ports, the situation is however,
changing, and all vessels, irrespective of nationality will need to be managed.
The WCPF Convention increases the responsibilities of flag States.71 Each
member has to ensure that fishing vessels flying its flag comply with the provisions of
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Foreign Investment Advisory Service, Capturing Economic Benefits from Tuna Fisheries. International
Finance Corporation and the World Banlc, 2000. (For example the effects of ENSO- during an El Nino
period, the locus of tuna stocks moves eastwards and thus large amounts of tuna are found in Kiribati's
EEZ. During a La Nina period, the locus moves westwards, benefiting FSM and Papua New Guinea) p: 3.
70
Th~ domestic vessels have been. mu~~ s~aller and ~ their developmen~l stages therefore did not pose
a maJor threat to resource sustamab1lity m companson to larger foreign vessels with much higher
capacities and sophistication in catching ability.
71
WCPF Convention -Article 24.
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the Convention on management and conservation and do not conduct unauthorised
fishing.

72

In addition, the WCPF Convention requires that a flag State member should

only authorise a vessel under its flag to fish in the high seas when it is able to exercise
effectively it responsibilities under the Law of the Sea Convention the UN Fish Stocks
'
Agreement and the WCPF Convention. 73 When fishing in another State's EEZ, a
member's flagged vessel must obtain license or authorisation from the State in whose
waters the vessel is to operate. 74 All flagged vessels must comply with the requirements
of Annex III of the WCPF Convention. 75 Vessels that fish on the high seas and in other
States' EEZs are required to operate a near real-time Vessel Monitoring System. Flag
States must respond to a suspected infringement by any of its flagged vessels, and have
the ability to prosecute in the case of an offence. 76
Compliance with the flag State responsibility rules is crucial where a vessel
wishes to operate in more than one fishing zone or to fish both in-zone and high sea
areas such as in the case of the purse seine fishery. In the case of a seasonal fishery or to
maintain viable operations under a quota management system, the vessel may also
require access to multiple fishing zones.
To support domestication efforts by allowing foreign vessels to fly national
flags, changes to national legislation will be necessary in order to meet the flag State
responsibility obligations. A vessel flying the flag of a Pacific Island State will be
required to provide data on catch and effort including details on species and by-catch
and must install and use a vessel monitoring system (VMS) for vessel monitoring.
One major domestication strategy currently implemented by a number of Pacific
Island States is the use of domestic-based foreign vessels where the beneficial
ownership may rest with the Pacific Island State but the legal ownership is foreign. This
includes vessels used under joint ventures, leases and charters. Since the flag State
responsibility for such vessels rests with the legal owner who may not be a party to the
WCPF Convention, it would be difficult for Pacific Island States to prosecute such
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WCPF Convention - Article 24.1 (a).
WCPF Convention - Article 24 (2). [There is also increasing requirements for vessels to comply with
flag State responsibility under the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the International
Plan of Action to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing]
74
WCPF Convention-Article 24.3 (a).
75 Under Annex Ill, vessels must comply with the terms and conditions of licenses or access agreements
under national laws. The operator of the vessel is also responsible for compliance by the crew. Vessels are
to place observers on board and co-operate and facilitate the work of the obs.ervers. Vessels are also
required to allow boarding and inspection by foreign enforcement officers on high seas. Vessels are also
required to report on catch details as stated in the Annex of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.
73
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vessels if there is an alleged violation of the Convention rules. Such a practice would
not only undermine the effectiveness of management measures but also expose
domestic operators to financial risks. To overcome such problems, licensing and
business agreements must be carefully defined and transparent so that such vessels do
not evade their management responsibilities. Alternatively, domestic operators using
foreign fishing vessels may find that they can reduce risk and costly litigation in the
event of violation if they contract or charter foreign fishing vessels from "responsible
States."77
The challenge presented by the WCPF Convention for domestication (seen
through greater use of national flags and domestic-based foreign vessels) is the capacity
required and the ability of the Pacific Island States to enforce and monitor their
obligations in respect of their vessels. The national fisheries administrations will not
only require an effective legislative framework but also improved monitoring and
surveillance measures both nationally and through regional co-operation.

7 .5

Monitoring and enforcement obligations

Financial and human resources and technological capability will be needed for the
effective implementation of the monitoring, control and surveillance measures. Vessels
flying the flag of a State will be required to install and use real-time satellite position
fixing transmitters to maintain communication with the fisheries administration when
fishing in the high seas and in other members' EEZs. 78 Observers will be required on
board fishing vessels. Other management obligations include monitoring of catch
landing in port and investigating any alleged violation of the WCPF Convention rules. 79
The increased management obligations need additional human resources,
technical expertise and financial resources. Some of such financial costs will inevitably
flow on to the industry as part of their cost of operating the fishery. Small-scale
domestic operators will find that the unit cost of management is much higher than those
faced by larger fishing operations.
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WCPF Convention - Article 25(4).
.
Resp?nsible. Sta~es are those S~tes who are. members of the Commission or who are Party to
International F1shenes Agreements like the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. This will mean that the use of
Flags of Convenience Vessels should decline.
78
WCPF Convention - Article 24 (9).
79
WCPF Convention-Article 25 (3) and (4); Article 28.
77
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The increased management obligations under the WCPT places further
challenges for domestication in terms of who would bear the increased costs. Without
government assistance (which may be in the form of subsidies) it may be difficult for
domestic fishers to discharge their management obligations (and therefore to participate
in the fishery). Certain forms of subsidies and government assistance programmes may,
however, come under the scrutiny of international trade rules. Further negotiations will
be required to seek workable options that satisfy the objectives of sustainable fisheries
management, promotes international trade and fulfils development aspirations.

7.6

Implications of the WCPF Convention for Regional Arrangements

The two regional arrangements that specifically target domestication are the Palau
Arrangement and the FSM Arrangement. Chapter six pointed out some of the
constraints in the implementation of both the Palau and the FSM Arrangements. The
WCPF Convention provides the opportunity to strengthen the effective implementation
of these Arrangements. Some changes and modification will be needed to make these
Arrangements compatible with the requirements of the WCPF Convention. The Palau
Arrangement can not only be used as a management mechanism but it can also form the
foundation for advancing allocation issues. The FSM Arrangement can be strengthened
through its ability to improve data requirements in the process of acquiring participatory
rights through allocation.

7.6.1

Palau Arrangement and the WCPF Convention

Article 8.2(a) of the WCPF Convention provides that in establishing conservation and
management measures in the Convention Area, the Commission shall take account of
the biological characteristics of the stocks, the geography of the region, including the
extent to which stocks occur and are fished in areas under national jurisdiction. Article
8.2(c) of the WCPF Convention also requires that the Commission shall take into
account previously agreed measures established and applied in accordance with the Law
of the Sea Convention (1982) and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (1995) in respect of
the same stocks by a sub-regional arrangement. These provisions are directly applicable
to the Palau Arrangement if it is made compatible with the principles and objectives of
the Convention. The WCPF Convention will strengthen the PNA's position for their inzone purse seine management because it reinforces the minimum terms and conditions
(MTCs) under the Implementing Agreements. One of the objectives of the Palau
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Arrangement has been to apply management measures to fishing vessels in the in-zone
areas and while fishing for the same stock in the adjacent high seas. Stronger
management measures in the in-zone and adjacent high sea areas will have the potential
to influence the Commission to positively consider allocation on the high seas for
members of the Palau Arrangement since a larger part of the Western and Central
Pacific purse seine fishery area also falls within the EEZs of the Parties.
To make the Palau Arrangement more effective and flexible, in light of the
recent developments in the international fisheries legal framework, a review was
conducted in 2000. The review recommends a change in the management method of
limiting effort from vessels numbers to national purse seine vessel days.

80

The main

features of this proposed management regime include:
•

setting by PNA of a sub-regional total allowable number of purse seine days that
controls the amount of in-zone effort;

•

sub-regionally co-ordinated TAEs that are seen by Parties as fair and consistent with
the WCPF Convention;

•

countries would not be restricted in their choice of which vessels to license on a
bilateral basis, or the number of vessels; and

•

national fishing days would be tradable with other Parties on a seasonal basis. 81

This allocation system based on purse seine days fished is highly dependent on an
effective monitoring, control and surveillance mechanism which would include the
implementation of a VMS. 82 The WCPF Convention explicitly emphasises the need for
an effective MCS. The FFA and the PNA in partic11lar already have in place most of the
features of such a compliance system through the Niue Treaty83 and by incorporating
the harmonised MTCs in their national legislation and Tuna Management Plans. An
effective implementation of these measures will complement and reinforce the
management measures at the Commission level. 84

80

G. Geen, Review of the Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific Purse Seine
Fishery, Fisheries Economics, Research and Management Pty Limited, 2000.
81
Ibid, p.22.
82 Ibid.
83
The Niue Treaty on Co-operation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South Pacific
Region (1993). The Treaty provides a framework for Parties to share their assets for fisheries surveillance
and enforcement.
84
This will apply to all national vessels and DWFNs vessels both in-zone and in the high seas at part of
the Convention Area.
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Greater co-operation will be required among the PNA members to agree on a
regional limit to the number of purse seine fishing days and decide on a formula for
allocating it between the members. An effective in-zone management strategy will have
several advantages for the PNA group and the FF A region as a whole. For example, it
will help to secure their commitment for the sustainable development of their domestic
industries and in the future bargaining for a share of allocation for the high seas (if and
when the Commission decides on its allocation). Since stock management will be based
on scientific assessments, there is potential also to integrate the management of other
important fisheries such as the longline catch and thereby extend co-operation to other
non-PNA FFA members. 85 As a mechanism for the management of in-zone fisheries,
the Palau Arrangement can also be used to manage the longline fishery because of its
close interaction with the purse seine fishery. Not only is the longline fishery the major
target for domestic industry development, but also the process will enable other FFA
members to participate in the management of the important fish stocks of the region.
The changed limit from vessel numbers to purse seine days also allows new members'
vessels or vessels from other States that are currently not part of the fleet category under
the Palau Arrangement to participate. It also provides greater efficiency for vessels'
operations as vessels can move around the various fishing zones with the purchase or
lease of purse seine days.
Co-operation to reach an Agreement on the limitation on purse seine effort and
the allocation of the given effort amongst the Parties to the Palau Arramgement is vital.
This calls for greater regional co-operation among the PNA and other FFA member
States.

7.6.2

FSM Arrangement and the WCPF Convention

Chapter six analysed the FSM Arrangement as a regional domestication strategy that
provided preferential regional access to foreign vessels with long-term commitments to
shore-based development. The WCPF Convention has both long term and short-term
implications for the FSM Arrangement. The short-term implications relate to
There are already concerns raised about the increased exploitation o~ juv~nil~ yellowfin and bigeye
stock because of increased purse seine activities. These have resource tmplicat1ons for both the fresh
sashimi longline industry and the purse seine fishery. [See stud.ies that po~t to .close intera~tion: A J.
Hand, Optimal Exploitation of the Western and Central Pacific :runa Ftshenes, (unpublished PhD
Thesis), University of Queensland, 1998; H. F. Campbell, M. Bert1gnac, J. Hampton and A J. Hand,
85
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strengthening the Arrangement to reflect Pacific Island States' aspirations to develop
their purse seine fishery and to prepare them in the lead up to negotiations for setting the
total allowable catch for the Convention Area. The long-term implications reflect on the
possible opportunities of the Arrangement to operate a regional or sub-regional tuna
consortium.
The determination of the TAC and its allocation will limit the catch. Vessels can
only operate under the FSM Arrangement if they are allocated a share of the national
TACs. Article 10(3) of the WCPF Convention outlines the factors that will be taken into
consideration in determining the criteria for allocation including the catch history.

86

As

indicated earlier, the type of data available will be an important determinant in the
decision on the allocation process. For example, the need for catch data will be central
to determine the history of fishing activities and fishing interests. Those Pacific Island
States with fishing vessels under their flags will be able to claim a higher allocation than
those that operate under bilateral access with foreign flags. Under the FSM
Arrangement higher points are granted for vessels that use domestic flags.
Domestic based foreign vessels also qualify for a Regional Access License often
by forming joint ventures with governments or local partners through capital equity
arrangements. The catch of such domestic based vessels is recorded as national catch.
The increased use of such joint ventures and charter arrangements encouraged under the
FSM Arrangement can strengthen the position of Parties to the FSM Arrangement in
building their catch history and interest in fishing operations.
Clark points out that catch data on the high seas and EEZs needs to be
segregated to determine the allocation in the respective fishing zones. 87 The more catch
that is landed at Pacific Island ports, the better control they would have in recording
data. Therefore, transshipment of catch through domestic ports as required under the
FSM Arrangement can assist in the provision of more reliable catch estimates and also
provide better provision of getting data for scientific purposes.

"Maximising Resource Rent from the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries", Marine Resources
Economics, 15(3), 2000, pp.151-177.
86
WCPF Convention - Article 10(3) states the factors that will be taken into consideration when
determ~g the criteria for allocatio~. These include: sta~ of the stocks and existing level of effort,
catch history, past and present fishing patterns and practices, record of compliance, contribution to
management and level of economic and social dependence on the resources.
87
Clark (2000), op. cit., n.28.
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The flag State responsibility rules under the FSM Arrangement88 is further
enshrined in the WCPF Convention. Parties will be able to enforce greater control on
the terms and conditions of access by exercising their flag State responsibilities.
Therefore foreign vessels that re-locate to local ports under a Party's flag will now have
to comply with national laws and regulations. The same conservation and management
measures will apply to domestic owned vessels and domestic based foreign vessels.
The long-term implications of the WCPF Convention for the FSM Arrangement
relate to the application of a quota system. Vessels under the Arrangement will require
an allocation of quota to be able to operate. A pooling of a certain percentage or share of
national quota for in-zone and high seas may be necessary for the vessels to maintain
viable operations under the FSM Arrangement for regional access. Pooling of quotas
can also encourage the purse seine fishery under the FSM Arrangement to form a tuna
consortium. This will not only enhance multilateral trade but also be able to regulate the
economics of the purse seine fishery in the WCP region and serve both the interest of
Pacific Island States and the foreign fishing nations.

7. 7

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted some of the 'implications of the WCPF Convention for
national and regional policies on domestication. While there are still uncertainties with
regards to the allocation issues, the Pacific Island States nevertheless have the
opportunity to strengthen and advance their objectives through a harmonised regional
policy approach.
Placing limits on the fishery to overcome open access problems provides
potential opportunities. The limits provide the basis for creating systems of rights-based
fisheries that can be directed towards achieving the aspirations of the Pacific Island
States to develop domestic their tuna industries. The WCPF Convention also presents
new challenges through increased management and enforcement obligations that require
additional human resources, technical skills and capital for effective implementation.
These are likely to raise management cost for fisheries administrations and for the
industry at least in the short to medium term. The limited domestic capability of
fulfilling increased management obligations will require development assistance. The
WCPF Convention allows for such development assistance to small developing States,

88

FSM Arrangement - Article 13 (3).
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but these may be found to be in conflict with the emerging international trade rules.
Greater dialogue will be needed between fisheries managers and trade policy advisers to
find practical strategies that can fulfil management obligations and remove trade
barriers.
To realise the potential development aims at the national and regional level,
however, largely depends on regional co-operative efforts of the Pacific Island States.
Greater regional co-operation is needed amongst Pacific Island States for the collection
of scientific data on stocks, for enforcement and monitoring of fishing operations, for
maintaining market stability by regulating the supply of tuna and for dealing with
DWFNs.
In establishing domestic tuna industries it has become clear that individual

Pacific Island States can no longer deal with development or the progress of their tuna
industries alone. Nor can an individual State ensure the sustainability of resources
within its own jurisdiction. The transboundary nature of tuna stock requires co-operative
strategies for its management, use and conservation. The interdependence between
management of resources and the development of the industry must be recognised.
Co-operation between DWFNs and fishing States is also crucial for determining
the TAC for the Convention Area and the criteria for its allocation. Pacific Island States
as developing small island coastal States also require co-operative approaches with
developed fishing States to secure financial and technical assistance during the
developmental stages of the industry to build the necessary capacity and identify mutual
beneficial development opportunities.
The WCPF Convention provides the mechanism to develop co-operative links
amongst the Pacific Island States themselves and with DWFNs to take advantage of the
new opportunities. Innovative ideas on how to co-operate are needed to develop the
domestic tuna industry in the region within the framework of the WCPF Convention.
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Chapter 8: Factors Influencing Tuna Exports from Pacific Island States
and Their Implications for Domestication
8.1

Introduction

Developing a vertically integrated tuna industry by engagmg directly in the capture,
onshore processing and export of tuna was seen by a number of Pacific Island States as a
means to achieve maximum benefits from tuna resources. 1 Domestication in this respect
was to be achieved through joint ventures with foreign companies for processing and
marketing. Domestic fleet development was to be met initially by charters, leases and
contracts with foreign vessels to acquire the necessary capital, technology and skills for
fleet operations. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have analysed aspects of such aspirations. These
chapters showed that the policies and strategies adopted by the Pacific Island States
concentrated on the development of industrial infrastructure and capacity for shore-based
development, domestic fleets, and training of nationals. These factors are largely seen as
endogenous or internal influences affecting domestication.
A number of exogenous or externally driven factors also affect the tuna industry in
small developing island economies. These include the influences of the global tuna market,
availability of foreign aid and development assistance, and exchange rate fluctuations. The
impact of the global market on domestication has more profound direct effects through
market demand and prices that ultimately determine the viability of the tuna industry.

2

How have the external global market influences affected the domestication objective and
what are the likely policy implications of the continued aspirations by the Pacific Island
States to domesticate the tuna industry?
This chapter shows that achieving domestication is dependent upon access to
international tuna markets. The chapter analyses how the market forces of supply and
demand have shaped the structure of the global tuna market. The chapter reviews the
experience in export development by Pacific Island States to determine the key variables
that influenced the tuna export trade. The chapter points out that preferential trade

1

Harvesting and processing of tuna as a primary export commodity provided the potential for direct valueadded to fisheries production, that would, as a consequence, increase the linkages to the rest of the economy
by creating employment and income flows.
2 Within the Fisheries System depicted in Figure 2.1, the market and global trade represent the "Human"
dimensions of the Tuna Fishery System.
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agreements played a key role in sustaining the tuna export trade in the Pacific Islands
States. The preferential trade agreements are, however, in a process of change as global
trade shifts towards more liberal strategies guided by the World Trade Organisation. The
impact of the international trade regime under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/
World Trade Organisation (GATT/WTO) provides the new institutional framework for
exports and trade in tuna and, therefore, are the major external factor that will impact the
domestication process. The chapter concludes that the likely influences of GATT/WTO,
while seen favourably in the global context for increased trade and welfare, pose new
challenges for export development of tuna from the Pacific Islands States.

8.2

Theoretical basis for trade and export development

The general understanding, as expounded by classical and neo-classical economists, is that
3

foreign trade could be a driving force in national development. More generally, classical
economists considered comparative advantage as determining the pattern of trade. It is not
the use of surplus resources as initially stated by Adam Smith but the reallocation of
resources that allows trade to benefit a country by enhancing a more efficient international
allocation of resources. 4 A country that engages in trade is able to enjoy a high real income
by specialising and trading in production according to its comparative advantage. Exports
allow the country to "buy" imports on a more favourable term than if produced directly at
home. 5 John Stuart Mill further points out the additional dynamics of trade that also provide
growth stimulus beyond the static gains. Mill states that the indirect benefits of trade on
development are: 1) those that widen the extent of market, induce innovation and increase
productivity; 2) those that increase savings and capital accumulation; and 3) those that have

3

G. M. Meir, Leading Issues in Economic Development, (6th Ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995.
For example see works by such economists as: Adam Smith (1776) Theory of absolute advantage; David
Ricardo (1817) Principle of comparative advantage; Heckcher - Ohlin (1933) Theory on factor proportions;
Samuelson (1948) and Stolper & Samuelson (1941) Factor price equalisation; Marshall, Edgeworth, Haberler
(1937) General equilibrium. Modern trade theories such as Linder (1961) Overlapping demand, Corden
(1974) Monopoly, Hufbauer (1966) and Vernon (1966 and 1974) Technology - based theories [See details on
the trade theories reproduced in: J. Bhagwati, "The Pure Theory of International Trade: A Survey", Economic
Journal, 1964, ppl-84; B. Sodersten and G. Reed, International Economics (3rd Ed.), St. Martin's Press New
york, 1994; R. N. Batra, Studies in Pure Theory ofInternational Trade, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1973.
Meir (1995), op.cit., n.3, p.459.
5
1bid.
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an educative effect in instilling new wants and tastes and in transferring technology, skills
and entrepreneurship. 6
Trade gives the opportunity for a poor country to remove domestic shortages, to
overcome the diseconomies of the small size of its domestic market and to stimulate the
'
"learning rate" of its economy. The advocates of trade therefore conclude that gains from
trade not only change resource allocation and transform existing production, but that trade
also increases the productivity of the economy over time. 7 Export-based models of growth8
show how an economy's growth can be determined by expansion of its exports. Exports of
primary products lower unemployment, induce a higher rate of domestic savings and
investment, attract inflow of factor inputs into the expanding export sector and establish
links within other sectors of the economy. 9 However, if the export sector is to be an
important force for development, an integrative process must be established that can spread
the stimuli from the sector and create responses elsewhere in the economy. 10 Depending on
the level of technological demands, different export commodities will provide different
levels of stimulus. 11 For example, the processing of primary products for exports by
modem methods can benefit other activities such as by technological transfer, training of
labour and acquisition of managerial skills. Hirschman (1958) points out the linkage effects
in the economy resulting from the processing of primary products.

12

These theoretical

principles also underpin the domestication aspirations of the Pacific Island States.

J. S. Mill, Principles ofPolitical Economy (1848) cited in G. M. Meir (1995), op. cit., n.4, p. 460.
J. N. Bhagwati and T. N. Srinavasan, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development, Columbia
University Press, New York, 1975; C. R. Milner (ed.), Export Promotion Strategies, Harvester Wheatsheaf,
Hemel Hempstead, 1990.
.
.
8 See also for example, W. M. Corden, Trade Policy and Economic Welfare , Oxford Umversity Press, Oxford,
1974.
9
Meir (1995), op. cit.n.3 , p.459.
IO Ibid.
11 A point to note in practice is that fluctuations in export.earnings can disrupt ~e flow o~foreign revenue.and
make the development process discontinuous, thus affectlng employment, capital formatlon, etc. Fluctuatlons
in the domestic economy can also likewise have a d~sruptiv~ effect. T?erefore, de~ending ~n the
characteristics of the country's exports, the strength of the integrative process m terms of stlmulus will also
differ among countries.
.
.
12 A. o. Hirschman, The Strategy ofEconomic Development, Yale Umversity Press, New Haven, 1958.
6

7
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8.3

Global trade in tuna

While the share of tuna in total world fish catch is estimated around 3%, its share in total
fish trade is around 10% (3% canned tuna and 7% frozen tuna).
trades as the second major fish commodity after shrimp.

13

Internationally, tuna

14

The global tuna market is broadly divided into three segments: fresh chilled tuna
(mostly air freighted); frozen tuna; and canned tuna. Figure 8.1 (a) shows the relative
quantities of major global exports of tuna in 2000. Frozen tuna accounted for just over half
of the total exports followed by canned tuna, which contributed 37% of total exports while,
fresh chilled tuna was 8%. Figure 8.1 (b) presents the relative values of the total global
tuna exports. Fresh chilled tuna represents twice the value compared to its volume indicated
in Figure 8.1 (a). Canned tuna represents a similar proportion both in value and volume.
What is not apparent from these figures is that frozen tuna is largely traded for the canning
market. Almost all frozen tuna is for canning with only a small amount used for sashimi
and sushi and other preparations. 15 Over 80% of the global tuna harvested is destined for
the canned tuna market. 16 Fresh chilled tuna is dominated by the Japanese demand for
sashimi. 11

Figure 8.1 (a) Relative Share of Total Tuna Exports in 2000 by Quantity
Canned Tuna
37%

Fresh Chiled
Tuna
8%

55%
Ill Fresh Chiled Tuna

• Frozen Tuna o Canned Tuna

Source: FAO FISHSTAT Plus (2000)

13

H. Josupeit, "An Overview on Tuna Markets'', in K. P. P. Nambiar and S. Pawiro (eds.) Tuna '97, Papers of

~e Fifth World Tuna Trade Conference, 25-27October1997, lnfofish,. Bangkok, Thailand, 1998, p. 116.

Ibid.
Ibid.
16
D. M. King, "Global Tuna Markets: A Pacific Island Perspective", in D. J. Doulman (ed.), Tuna Issues and
Perspectives in the Pacific Islands Region, Hawaii: East West Center, 1987, p. 280.
17
Sashimi is premium tuna sliced thin and eaten raw (or as sushi, served on top of seasoned rice). The raw
fish is fully bled and refrigerated at the time of capture to reduce spoilage.
More recently, ther~ is a growing d~mand for fresh and chilled ~a in the Western countries, including the
US State of Hawau and the Amencan West Coast where sushi bars are expanding into non-traditional
markets. [P. K. Batram, US Fresh Tuna Market Study, FFA Report 98/1, Forum Fisheries Agency Honiara
1998].
'
'
15
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Figure 8.1 (b) Relative Share of Total Tuna Exports in 2000 by Value

Fresh O'lilled
Tuna

Canned Tuna

Frozen Tuna

46%
Gil Fresh Chilled Tuna • Frozen Tuna

o Canned Tuna

Source: FAO FISH STAT Plus (2000)

Figure 8.2

Global Trends in the Quantity of Tuna Exports
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Figure 8.2 shows the global trend in the tuna market for canned, chilled and fresh
and frozen tuna by volume. The frozen tuna exports show annual fluctuations in the global
market, although the overall trend shows a gradual increase. Canned tuna exports show a
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steady rising trend. Josupeit indicated that the canned tuna trade is growing in quantity but
decreasing in value terms. 18 Fresh chilled tuna exports show a more stable market with a
slight decline in 1996, followed by overall marginal increases in quantity from 1997.
In 2000, among the top four major exporters of frozen tuna were Taiwan, France,
Spain and Korea. 19 The four major exporters of canned tuna were ThaiJand, Spain, France

°

and Cote d' Ivoire. 2 For fresh chilled tuna, Indonesia, Taiwan, Fiji and Spain dominated
exports in 2000. 21 In terms of value of exports of fresh and chilled tuna, Spain, Indonesia,
Australia and Taiwan were among the top four exporters. Europe and the US are the most
important markets for canned tuna while Japan is the dominant market for high value fresh
chilled tuna. 22

8.4

Level of tuna exports from the Pacific Islands States

The Pacific Islands region supplies 60 % of the global tuna for the canning market and 30%
of sashimi tuna for the Japanese market. 23 However, in terms of direct contribution to
global tuna exports, the Pacific Island States24 account for about 3% of the total global
market as indicated in Table 8.1 . In 1980, the Pacific Island States' exports accounted for
8.9% of global tuna exports. 25 This was largely due to exports of canned tuna from the
Solomon Islands and Fiji. However, as stated earlier, the relative export volume of canned
tuna from the Pacific Islands States since the mid 1990s has declined.

18

26

H. Josupeit, Global World Tuna Markets, Presentation at the Tuna Conference 2002, 30 May-1 June 2002,
Kuala Lumpur. < Http://www.globefish.org > accessed 3 March 2003 .
19
Fisheries Statistics Department, Fishery Information, Data and Statistics, FISHSTAT Plus: Universal
Software for Fishery statistical time series, Version 2.3, 2000, FAO Rome.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid. Fiji's exports increased in quantity by six folds from 1999. However, in terms of value contribution,
Fiji accounted for 1.7% of the global fresh chilled tuna exports.
22
Josupeit (2002), op. cit., n.18.
23
R Gillett, M. McCoy, L. Rodwell and J. Tamate, Tuna: A Key Economic Resource in the Pacific, Asian
Development Bank, Manila, 2001 , p.5.
24
Pacific Island States here refers to FFA member States: Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji,
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu,
Vanuatu, and includes Tokelau.
25
The Pacific Island exports includes exports from the developing FFA member States and excludes exports
from other Pacific Island States and Territories listed under the FAO classification of "Oceania".
26
The Political tension in the Solomon Islands has disrupted the cannery operations and the Japanese partner
Maruha left the Solomons. The cannery is operating at a much lower capacity under the Solomon Island
government management. In the case of Pafco, the continued lack of supply of originating fish had led the
cannery into financial crisis and the cannery is now focussing on Joining tuna on contract to the US-based
Bumble Bee Company.
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Table 8.1 Relative Contribution of Pacific Island Exports to Global Tuna Exports
Year

Total Quantity of Global

Quantity of Pacific Island

Percentage contribution

Tuna Exports (Mt)

States' Tuna Exports (Mt)

by Pacific Island States
to Global Tuna Exports

1980

654,754

58,794

8.9%

1985

840,492

40,850

4.9%

1990

1,524,856

28,251

1.8 %

1995

1,870,784

57,768

3%

2000

2,130,481

60,057

3%

Source: FAO, FISH STAT Plus (2000).

The total tuna landings by the Pacific Island States and the level of exports are presented in
Figure 8.3. The Figure shows that until 1991 the total landings and exports were almost
equivalent. This indicates that most tuna landed in the Pacific Island States was exported.
The trend since 1992 shows that landings have increased relative to exports. One possible
explanation for such a trend is the increased transshipment through local ports.27 Individual
countries such as Kiribati and Papua New Guinea show huge disparities between landings
(very high) and exports (very low). Besides transshipment of catches under access
agreements, exports may also be through third-party countries because of poor
transportation networks. 28 More than 90% of tuna caught in the region is taken by DWFNsowned or -flagged vessels and landed outside of the region, with the exception of canneries
in American Samoa. 29

27 Under Section 4 of the Harmonised Minimum Terms and Conditions for Foreign Fishing Vessel Access
(MTCs) adopted by the Pacific Island States, transshiping is only to be ~arried out in designated areas. and in
ports. The MTCs ban transshipment at sea. [FFA Report 03/10]. This therefore allows more landmgs at
domestic ports.
28 See, H. Joseipeit, (2000), "Fish Trade in the Pacific",
< http://www.globefish.org/presentation/Pacific/pacific.htm;> ,(accessed on 22/03/02).
.
29 I. Cartwright, and A. Willock, "Oceania's Birthright: the role of rights-based management of tuna fishenes
of the Western and Central Pacific", in Use of Property Rights in Fisheries Management, FAO Fisheries
Technical Paper404/1, Proceedings of the Fish Rights Conference, 11-19 November, 1999, p.183.
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Figure 8.3

Total Quantity of Tuna Landings and Level of Exports from Pacific
Island States
180,000

~:3

160,000

0

>

140,000

t

120,000

0

a. ~ c:
~
-0 c:
c: 0

co I.t: -

8u

:§
~

100,000
80 ,000
60,000
40,000 -

-

20,000 -

1--

0
0

co

0)

.....

•
II ~

-

1--

H~ - ~
1--

co
co
0)

N

co
0)

.....

.....

I-

1--

---c.o

0

0)
0)

0)
0)

.....

......

1--

-

-

~

....

co

0)
0)

......

Year
•Total Landings of Tuna (t)

o Total Exports (t)

Source: FAO, FISHSTAT Plus (2000), and SPC Yearbook on Tuna Fishery

Tuna exports from the Pacific Island States include canned and processed tuna, frozen
whole tuna, tuna loins and fresh chilled tuna. Figure 8.4 shows the relative exports of fresh
chilled tuna and canned tuna from the Pacific Islands States. Disaggregated exports data on
tuna is generally not available as trade reports only present summarised data on finfish or
prepared and preserved fish. FAO FishStat (2000) data is used as estimations for export
volume and value, although it is recognised that these data may present several limitations
in terms of accuracy. 3° Figure 8.4 shows that initially canned tuna dominated the tuna
trade. Since the early 1990s, fresh chilled tuna from longline fishing has increasingly
become an important component of tuna exports. This is evident from the domestication
strategies as presented in chapters 2 and 3.

30

See: T. A. M. Visser, Status of Fisheries Statistics in the South Pacific. Regional Office of Asia and the
Pacific, FAO, Bangkok, Thailand. RAP Publication 1997/30, 1997. [FAO relies on data from SPC and the
National Fisheries Administrations. The FAO notes that many South Pacific Island States do not monitor the
catch of their domestic tuna vessels; the use of log sheets for catch and effort data and the percentage of
observer coverage are low. There is also under-reporting and non-reporting of catches. (Visser) 1997, p.40.]
(With the improvement of national tuna management and use of Vessel Monitoring Systems, there are some
improvements in the data reporting by both foreign and domestic vessels - Personal Communication, Andrew
Richards, Manager, Monitoring Control and Surveillance, Forum Fisheries Agency, February, 2001).
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Figure 8.4
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For smaller island States, the option to develop canned tuna exports has been limited not
only by the lack of necessary capital and technology but also by the lack of land, adequate
water supply and infrastructure, 31 although more recently, exports of fresh chilled fish are
being actively pursued. 32 Larger island States such as Fiji, Solomon Islands and Papua New
Guinea have engaged in export-oriented production, processing and canning. Since the mid
1970s, the National Development Plans (as outlined in chapter 3) of these States have quite
explicitly stated these desired aims and objectives for industrial fisheries development with
major canneries being located in Fiji, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. 33 In the last
10 years or so, processing facilities for handling fresh chilled tuna have also been built in
most of the Pacific Island States, except for a few smaller islands like Niue, Tuvalu and
Nauru. (See table 2.5 in chapter 2 for sashimi handling and processing facilities in the
Pacific Island States).

31

Asian Development Bank, The Pacific's Tuna: The Challenges of Investing in Growth, Office of Pacific
Operations, Asian Development Bank: Manila, Philippines, 1997.
32 Exports of fresh chilled fish do not require relatively large investments of capital and infrastructure and
trade involves export of high valued commodities making export a more viable option compared to canned
tuna exports.
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In 1999, the top five fresh chilled exporters of bigeye and yellowfin from Oceania
into Japan were Guam - 7%, Australia - 3.7%, Palau - 3.7%, FSM - 3.1 % and Solomon
Islands - 2.4%.34 More recently, Fiji and Papua New Guinea have also increasingly
targeted the Japanese market. 35 The export volumes from the individual Pacific Islands
States are insignificant in terms of influencing average market prices. The prices of
individual consignments are affected more by short-term daily supplies linked to airfreight
services and daily market demand conditions than by monthly price variations.

Table 8.2

36

Total nominal value of tuna exports and total value of access fee for
selected Pacific Islands States in 1999

Cook Islands
Fiji
FSM
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Nauru
Niue
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands

Access Fee (US $)

Total Nominal
Exports (US $)*

169,072
212,000
15,400,000
20,600,000
4,982,600
3,400,000
151,793
800,000
5,840,000
188,616
273,458

1,000
18,317,000
435,000
4,128,000
1,433,000
0
0
41,000
9,148,000
10,936,000
9,233,000

value

of Tuna

Tonga
152,041
787,000
Tuvalu
5,900,000
0
Vanuatu
218,448
300,000
Total Estimated US$
58,342,787
54,759,000
* Exports are fob prices taken from FAO Fish Stat, 2000;
Access fee estimates are taken from R. Gillett, 200 I, The Economic Importance of Fisheries in the Pacific Islands, p.97.

Table 8.2 above shows that the estimated value of tuna exports by the Pacific Island States
was around 94% of the estimated value of access fees for the year 1999. The major cost of
exports, however, is transportation.

33

37

Therefore, prices inclusive of insurance and freight

Canning is also done is American Samoa.
Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation, Sashimi Air Freight Study, Paper prepared for the Forum Fisheries
Agency, September, 2000, p.25.
35
Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Federated States of Micronesia, Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands and Palau have
been exporting sashimi Japan. Tonga, Samoa and Cook Islands have also exported small volwnes to Japan.
[Forum Fisheries Agency, Tuna Market News, Annual Review 2002, 20 March 2003].
36
Personal Communication -Deo Chandra, Production Manager, Fiji Fish Marketing Company Limited, June
2002.
37
For example Grynberg and White state that the CIF prices of canned tuna products in the EUmarket from
Fiji and the Sol?mon Is!ands were a~110ngst the highest in Europe and the market was maintained only
because of the high quality pole and hne product that was targeted to cater for the high end of the product
34
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costs would give a better estimate of the comparative contributions of access fees and
export revenue to the total foreign exchange. 38 While access fees have been a major source
of foreign exchange for a number of smaller island States, the increase in export earnings in
recent times reflect the high value fresh chilled tuna exports from Fiji, Solomon Islands and
Samoa.

39

Increased export earnings have further motivated other Pacific Island States such

as the Cook Islands and Tonga to engage in the fresh chilled tuna trade. 40

8.5

Key external factors influencing trade in tuna from the Pacific Islands

Among the key external factors that have influenced the domestication process in the
Pacific Islands region are the availability of foreign aid and development assistance, the
fluctuations in the foreign exchange rates, and the dynamics of the global tuna market.
Aid from various sources and soft credits from international financial institutions
have been readily accessible to Pacific Islands States. 41 As a result of a lack of domestic
private capital, governments took the lead role in tuna industry development through use of
aid funds to develop the Solomon Taiyo and Pafco canneries. In most cases, the terms of
aid had a major influence on the way the Pacific Island States pursued investment in the
tuna industry. 42 Foreign aid from Japan and the US in particular played a significant role in
the domestication of the tuna industries during the 1970s and 1980s.43 While the
importance of aid in export development and facilitating access to global markets cannot be

market. (R. Grynberg and M. White, "EU Tuna Preferences in Post-Lome Convention," in R. Grynberg (ed.),
The Lome Convention and the Pacific, Forum Secretariat, Suva, 1998, p.71); In the case of sashimi tuna, an
analysis of medium-sized sashimi longline operations on Fiji, Tonga and Papua New Guinea indicated that
freight costs typically represented half of all marketing costs; (FFA, The Fresh Tuna Longline Fishing: Likely
Profitability and Potential Development Opportunities for Pacific Island Countries, South Pacific Projects
Facility of the International Finance Corporation, FFA Report 98/1, 1998, p.18).
38 Availability of such data is however limited and where it may be available, it has not been possible to
access such data. For example, a comparison of access fee and exports has not been possible because of the
lack of information on access fee levels for some of the Pacific Island States.
39 The above table is only illustrative and shows 1999 estimates. A more accurate estimate would be to
compare the real returns from access (including development assistance and aid benefits) and the real value of
exports over a longer period of time. Such information however is difficult to estimate, as it requires access to
various types of data that is not readily available.
40 Personal Communication - Les Clarke, Fisheries Resources Management Adviser, Forum Fisheries
,, .
Agency, Honiara, February 2002.
.
.
41 s. Siwatibau, "The Pacific Island Countnes: Economic Development Issues and Prospects , m R.
Grynberg, (ed.), Economic Prospects for the Pacific Islands in the 2P' Century. Ray Parkinson Memorial
Lectures University of the South Pacific, Suva, p. 35 - 100.
42 R. Schurman, "Tuna Dreams: resource nationalism and the Pacific Island tuna industry", Development and
Change, (29), 1998, pp. 107 -136.
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discounted, it is beyond the scope of this study to provide a detailed analysis of these
effects.
The effect of exchange rate fluctuations has a major impact on the receipts and the
level of exports from a country. While devaluation of domestic currencies may enhance
exports, it can also put pressure on operating expenses, particularly if a large part of the
input costs are import-related. In the case of Solomon Taiyo (Solomon Islands), exchange
44

rate-driven losses were incurred because a number of transactions were in Yen.

The

exchange rate-related losses were incurred as a result of the appreciation of the Yen against
the Solomon Island dollar. 45 High dependence on imports of fish as raw materials for
canning, fuel for power generation and empty cans have also contributed negatively to
Pafco's (Fiji) operation and more than offset the gains from the devaluation of the Fiji
dollar following the coups. 46 Therefore, the effect of exchange gains against exchange
47

losses is an important variable in determining the net benefits from exports. Exchange rate
influences are more complex because they are determined by the inter-play of both
domestic and external influences on price changes. While trends in relative price
movements are important for analysing the benefits from tuna exports, they are not seen as
the major factor directly influencing accessibility to foreign tuna markets.

48

This section examines the global tuna market as the principal influence on
marketing and trade in tuna from the Pacific Islands region. 49 It analyses whether the

43

Ibid.
R Grynberg, Macroeconomic Stability and Microeconomic Malpractice: the case of Solomon Taiyo
Limited, Economic Department, University of the South Pacific, [nd]; R. Grynberg, Lome Convention Rules
of Origin and the Solomon Islands Tuna Industry: Handicapped Infants and Delinquent Parents, Economics
Department, University of the South Pacific, [nd], p. 17-22.
45
Ibid.
RGrynberg, Lome Convention Rules of Origin and the Solomon Islands Tuna Industry: Handicapped Infants
and Delinquent Parents, Economic Department, University of the South Pacific, [nd], p.17-22.
46
Personal Communication - Peniasi Kunatuba, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and
Fisheries, Fiji, June 2001.
47
In terms of domestication, the net domestic value added would need to be carefully assessed if there is a
high dependence on imported raw materials or if there is high inflation in the domestic economy.
Domestication strategies will need to take into account the national macroeconomic policies that affect the
relative exchange rates in the economy, the cost of capital and the level of investment flows. These in turn
would need to be evaluated against the movements of price in the major tuna markets to achieve market
competitiveness and the long-run viability of the domestic tuna industry.
:: The relative ~rice movements do not restrict trade but will influence the profitability of the transactions.
It must be pomted out at the outset that there are many endogenous and exogenous factors that influence the
pattern of trade. For the purpose of this section of the study, focus is on trade instruments with only brief
discussion of other key factors that were instrumental in the development of exports.
44
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global market supply and demand of tuna enhance or impede the export development
strategy. First, factors influencing the supply and demand are briefly outlined to show the
effect of the global market in shaping the Pacific Islands tuna trade. Second, preferential
access under special tariff concessions between the Pacific Island States and major tuna
markets is analysed to show that these not only motivate the Pacific Island States to engage
in exports but also provide a secure market against global competition without which the
export industry could not have survived. Third, the discussion points out that trade patterns
since the 1990s show increased gains in high value fresh chilled tuna markets. While there
may be considerable export development potential for some island States, there are also
some strategic and practical risks associated with the domestication of this fresh chilled
tuna industry that need to be minimised.

8.5.1

The global tuna market - demand and supply for tuna

Pacific Islands States are small players in the international tuna trade, only accounting

for

about 3% of the global tuna trade. 50 With a relatively small quantity of direct exports,
Pacific Island States are price takers in the world markets because their level of trade has no
impact on the international price. 51 As rightly stated by King, ''whether an island State is
selling access to a distant water fleet, frozen tuna to a foreign cannery, or canned tuna to a
European or American wholesale market, the financial returns and economic impact of the
transaction are influenced by competitive forces in the global markets." 52

so FAO Fisheries Department, FISH STAT Plus (2000), version 2.3.
SID. M. King, "Global Tuna Markets: A Pacific Island Perspective" in Doulman, D. J. (ed.) Tuna Issues and
Perspectives in the Pacific Islands Region, East West Center, Hawaii, 1987, p.292.
s2 Ibid.
[King (1987) further provides an illustration on how an island nation engaged in the global tuna trade is
affected by a sequence of market changes beyond its control. King's example is modified to illustrate this
flow on effect from the global market: for example a new cannery in Thailand is able to export large volumes
of low-priced canned tuna to the US and the EU markets. To remain competitive, say, Soltai would have to
reduce its canned tuna price to its UK buyers (assume no concessions are granted). While in search for
alternative markets, Soltai finds out that the major canned tuna wholesalers around the world have already
developed reliable sources of supply and will pay no more for Soltai canned tuna than for comparable
products from Thailand. Other canneries, say Star-Kist in PagoPago, may feel similar competitive pressure
and may reduce its price in the US canned market. This in turn will lower the price the Pago cannery offers to
say the FSM, Samoan and other suppliers of raw and frozen tuna to the cannery to offset its reduction in
revenue. The Samoan and FSM vessel operators can look for a better price elsewhere, but are likely to find
that most canneries have reliable sources of raw or frozen supplies and will buy from new suppliers only if
price is lower then what Star-Kist is paying. The downward pressure ofraw or frozen tuna prices would also
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There are two general characteristics of the market that drive the tuna industry. The
first is that the supply of tuna is dependent on the natural cycle of availability of tuna stocks
and the size and compostion of the fleet. 53 The second is that canned tuna and sashimi tuna
are two distinct markets. 54 The demand for canned tuna is relatively inelastic to price
changes. 55 In the case of oversupply, it is difficult for industry to expand sales, and so
inventories build up. Tuna prices can fall drastically as firms try to sell their accumulated
inventories. Production cutbacks and idle capacity in the harvesting and processing sectors
are inevitable due to these fluctuations in light of the relatively inelastic demand.

56

In the

case of the sashimi market, price variations occur within species and between species as a
result of factors like size, quality attributes, seasons, catch region, etc.

57

Different species of tuna fetch different prices, depending on consumer preferences,
product characteristics and availability. Bluefin is the most highly sought species for
sashimi, followed by bigeye and yellowfin. Skipjack is mostly used for canning and

dominates the tuna trade in terms of volume, followed by yellowfin.

58

Most consumers

around the world prefer whitemeat, but light-meat is far more abundant and less
expensive. 59 Light-meat accounts for nearly 80% of the canned tuna sales and nearly 90%

lower the expected earnings of the US purse seiners operating in Kiribati waters, thus reducing the amount it
can afford to pay in access fee].
53
D. M. King, "The US Tuna Market: A Pacific Islands Perspective'', D. J. Doulman (ed.), Development of
the Tuna Industry in the Pacific Islands: Analysis of Options, East West Center, Hawaii, 1987, pp. 63-79.
54
Josupeit (2002), op. cit., n.18.
55
This is in the context of the US market that has been the single dominant market since the 1970s. Canned
tuna is a staple diet in the US market: even if sales of a single brand respond to price changes, tuna sales
industry wide are relatively inelastic. D. M. King, "Global Tuna Market: a Pacific Island Perspective", in D. J.
Doulman (ed.), Tuna Issues and Perspectives in the Pacific Island Region, East West Center,: Hawaii, 1987,
p. 291.
36 Ibid.
57
The results of these influences is such that average prices tend to obscure more significant price variations
that may occur at any time so that data are only significant with respect to general trends. G. P. Ashenden,
and G.W. Kitson, The Japan Tuna Market: Multinational Corporation in the Pacific Tuna Industry, Pacific
Islands Development Programme, East West Center, Honolulu, 1987; The Forum Fisheries Agency Market
News Reports more clearly depict the short-term weekly and monthly fluctuations. [See, Tuna Market News
(Annual and Quarterly Reviews, various issues)].
58
Josupeit, (1998), op. cit., n. 13, p.113.
59
King (19~7), op. cit., n.51, p.288. [The US and the European canned market make a major distinction
between white-meat tuna (albacore) and light-meat (primarily skipjack)].
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of the European tuna sales. 60 Albacore was once used only in canned tuna; however, it is
increasingly used for sashimi today. 61
The impact of the global tuna market on the Pacific Island States' tuna exports must
be seen within the context of the changes to their major tuna export markets. Changes to the
US and European markets are presented as "demand effects". The impact of Japanese and
US fishing operations through time are seen as the "supply effect". How did the demand
and supply factors influence and impact the Pacific Island tuna exports?

8.5.1.1 Factors influencing the supply of canned and frozen tuna
In the 1960s and early 1970s, prior to extended maritime jurisdictions, distant water fleets

from Japan dominated the Pacific Ocean. Japan was the largest exporter of frozen tuna by
supplying foreign canneries and also catering for its own domestic market. 62 With the oil
crisis of the 1970s and the declaration of the EEZs by coastal States from 1977 onwards,
Japan developed alternative policies to adjust to these global changes through establishing
access agreements, joint ventures and through programmes of economic co-operation. 63 By
the end of the 1970s however, with the restrictions imposed under the EEZ regime, the
fmancial position of the Japanese fleet declined because of high operating costs in the face
of stagnating tuna market conditions. 64 The industry was restructured with large reductions
in the pole and line and longline fleet and the rapid development of the purse seine fishery
by the early 1980s. 65 Japan, being the major DWFN in the Pacific Islands region at that
time, had an impact on the initial development stages of the tuna industry and trade in the
Pacific Islands States as a consequence of its fleet re-structuring programme. 66 For

60

Ibid.
R Tanabe, "Japanese Market for Tuna other than Canned Products", in K. P. P. Nambiar and S. Pawiro
(eds.) Tuna 97, Papers for the Fifth World Tuna Trade Conference, 25 - 27 October, 1997, Bangkok,
Thailand, Infofish, 1998, p.134·
62
D. J. Doulman, "Distant-water Fleet Operations and Regional Fisheries Cooperation", in D. J. Doulman
(ed.), Development of the Tuna Industry in the Pacific Islands Region:an analysis of options, East West
Center, Hawaiii, 1987, pp. 33-52.
63 See, S. Tarte, Japan's Aid Diplomacy in the Pacific Islands, Pacific Policy Paper 26, National Center for
Development Studies, Australian National University, 1998.
64 N. Fujinami, "Development of Japan's Tuna Fisheries", in D. J. Doulman (ed), Tuna Issues and
Perspectives in the Pacific Islands Region, East West Center, Hawaii, 1987, pp.57-70; A. Bergin and M.
Haward, "Japanese tuna fisheries: Future trends", Marine Policy, May 1992, pp.147-182.
65 See, Y. Matsuda, "Development and Expansion of the Tuna Purse Seine Fishery'' in Doulman, D. (ed.),
Tuna Issues and Perspectives in the Pacific Islands Region, East West Center, Hawaii, 1987, pp. 71-92.
66 See details on the Japanese Programme in, Bergin and Haward (1992), op. cit., n.64.
61
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example, the pole and line vessels displaced from Japan began charter and lease operations
in the Pacific. 67 Japanese joint ventures were established together with a programme of
technical and financial assistance. 68 The management of the joint-venture canneries was
controlled by the Japanese parent companies. When Pafco and Solomon Taiyo canneries
were established, Japan was one of the major exporters of canned tuna and had already
developed well established marketing networks that these joint-ventures could utilise for
their export development. 69 The expansion of Japanese interests into the Pacific region
through joint ventures, leasing and chartering of vessels has been a key factor that
facilitates the transfer of technology and capital to start up domestic tuna industries. It also
facilitated access to the foreign markets through Japanese companies.
The early 1980s through to the early 1990s witnessed major structural changes that
led to a transformation of the tuna industry through transnationalisation of both production
and processing. Nationally based tuna operations in developed countries sourced new and
low-cost production sites (developing coastal States) as well as access to lucrative
markets. 70 Access to the lucrative markets from these low-cost production sites was
accomplished through acquisition of Japanese and US-based firms, where their national
identity (via brand names) became a strategic tool for the transnational tuna corporations.

71

A key factor behind this globalisation of tuna operations was the slump in world
tuna prices in the early 1980s, caused by a combination of both supply and demand
changes. 72 The supply side effects included: the emergence of productive purse seine tuna
fisheries in the Central W estem Pacific, a growing global tuna fleet, a strong US dollar, and
a few years of large skipjack catches. 73 Recessionary economic conditions in the US, low

67

For example the pole and line vessels that were used by IKA Corporation, Solomon Taiyo and Te Mautari
were displaced second-hand Japanese vessels.
68
D. J. Doulman and RE. Kearney, "Domestic Tuna Industries'', in D. J. Doulman (ed.), The Development of
the Tuna Industry in the Pacific Islands Region: An Analysis of Options, East West Center, Hawaii, 1987, pp.
3-31.
.
69
While high quality exports became possible, there were considerable costs associated with cost of sales
either as commissions and or as high management costs charged by the companies and agents.
70
A. Bonanno, and D. Constance, Caught in the Net: The Global Tuna Industry, Environmentalism, and the
State, Kansas University Press: Kansas, 1996, p.180. As a result, brand names like Chicken of the Sea and
Bumble Bee continue to exist and dominate the global tuna market.
71
Ibid.
72
D. M. King, "The US Tuna Market: Pacific Island Perspective", in D. J. Doulman (ed.), The Development
of the Tuna Industry in the Pacific Islands Region: An Analysis of Options, East West Center, Hawaii, 1987,
p. 68.
73
Ibid.
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relative beef and poultry prices, and very low pricing of tuna caused shifts on the demand
74

side. This downturn in the international tuna market affected the fishermen and processors
and consequently forced production adjustments in the world tuna industry. 75 Tuna
production and processing ventures increased in developing coastal States that were closer
to the fishing grounds and provided cheaper labour. 76 While new industries emerged, large
tuna corporations continued to dominate transactions in harvesting, transshipping,
processing, distribution and trading. 77
Almost 70% of all tuna and tuna products are caught, processed, traded or
distributed by 10 multinational corporations78 which operate on every continent and at
every level of the market. 79 The multinational corporations are able to use mobility and
international linkages to foster their interests. Leasing and outsourcing provide
multinational corporations with the necessary flexibility to respond to changes in markets,
resource availability, and tax/tariff considerations.80 As canning operations declined in
mainland US, operations in Puerto Rico and American Samoa expanded with low labour
.
.
81
costs and generous tax mcenhves.
The production of loins accounts for about 80% of the tuna canning labour costs. 82
Through shifting production of loins to low labour cost areas, canneries could realise cost

74

Ibid, p. 9; Bonanno and Constance (1996), op. cit. n. 70, p.124.
D. J. Doulman, Development Options and Growth Constraints in the Pacific Islands Tuna industry, East
West Center, Hawaii, 1987, p.9.
76 Ibid.
11
L. L. Hudgins and L. Fernandez, "A Summary of International Business Operation in the Global Market'',
in D. J. Doulman, (ed.), The Development of the Tuna Industry in the Pacific Islands Region: An Analysis of
Options, East West Center, Hawaii, 1987, p.290.
78
Bumble Bee (formerly of Castle & Cooke), C. ltoh, John West Foods, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Safcol
(Thailand, Philippines, Australia), Star-Kist (H.J. Heinz subsidiary), Van Camp (Ralston Purina subsidiary)
and H. J. Heinz (Australia, US}, [L. L. Hudgins and L. Fernandez, "A Summary of International Business
Operations in the Global Tuna Markets" in D. J. Doulman (ed.), The Development of the Tuna Industry in the
Pacific Islands Region: An Analysis of Options, East West Center, Hawaii, 1987, p.290].
79 Ibid.
80 Bonanno and Constance (1996), op. cit., n.70, p.143.
81 Puerto Rico provided tax incentives such as tax exemptions of up to 90% for periods from 10 to 25 years
depending on the location of processing plants on the Island, to tuna processors and commercial fishing
operations that supply the Puerto Rican canneries. Furthermore, the US territories of Puerto Rico, American
Samoa, Guam and Virgin Islands can ship canned tuna to the US market duty free. [Bananno and Constance,
op. cit., n. 70, p.161].
82
Ibid, p.161.
15
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savings. As a result, loining plants were established in Equador and Mexico to supply the

. . us cannenes.
. 83
remammg
Between late 1988 and early 1989, significant portions of the global tuna
processing industry were bought by Asian-based firms: Bumble Bee was bought by
Unicord, originally based in Thailand, and Van Camp by P. T. Mantrust based in
Indonesia. 84 As a result of these acquisitions, Asian-based multinational corporations now
control over 50% of the US tuna market. 85 Thailand replaced Japan as the largest exporter
of canned tuna to the US market, followed by the Philippines and Taiwan.

86

Thailand tuna
87

processors enjoy a substantial labour cost advantage because of low wage rates. A starting
cannery worker in Thailand earns 90 bahts (US$ 3.50) a day, a minimum wage set by the
Thai government. 88
The US tuna industry was again negatively affected in the early 1990s when the
three largest US 89 tuna processors who controlled 80% of the

us market decided to ban

Eastern Tropical Pacific tuna. 90 Purse seine vessels fishing in the Eastern Tropical Pacific
re-located to the Western Central Pacific. 91 The highly capital-intensive super seiners with
improved technology increased the catch of skipjack and yellowfin in the Western Central
Pacific. 92 Dolphin-safe policies also benefited the Taiwanese and Korean vessels which
increased their production in the Western Central Pacific. This eventually led to an
increased supply of tuna that consequently depressed tuna prices by the early 1990s. Low

83

Ibid. The duty on imported loins is much less then on canned imports. For example, in 1991, the valorem
equivalent duty on frozen tuna loins was 0.4% while 11 % on canned tuna.
84
US International Trade Commission (USTIC), 1992 Publication 2547, cited in: Bananno and Constance
(1996), op. cit. n 70, p.63.
85
United States International Trade Commission (USTIC), Tuna: Competitive conditions affecting the US and
European tuna industries in domestic and foreign markets, USTIC Publication 2339, December 1990.
86
Bananno and Constance (1996), op. cit., n. 70.
87
Ibid, p.167.
88
Ibid.
89
Heinz's Star-Kist, Unicord's Bumble Bee and Mantrust's Van Camp.
90
There were environmental concerns on the increased mortality of dolphins caught in the purse seine nets.
The declining dolphin population in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) led to the establishment of the Marine
Mammal Protection Act in 1972 which limited the killing of dolphins by US fishing boats. By the late 1980s,
dolphins were still being killed. In 1990, the tuna canning firms began purchasing tuna from fishers who did
not kill dolphins and labelled the tuna "dolphin safe". The US government imposed an import ban on tuna
from States whose fleets killed dolphins. (J. Joseph, "The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy in the Eastern Pacific
Ocean: Biological, Economic, and Political Impacts," Ocean Development and International Law, 1994, vol.
25, pp.1-30).
91
Bonanno and Constance (1996), op. cit., n.70, p.172.
92
Ibid.
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pnce canned tuna from Thailand began dominating the global market from 1985 as
Thailand became the major exporter of canned tuna to the EU, particularly to the United
Kingdom and Germany and to the US market. 93
Since the beginning of the 1990s, in the canning industry, loining for exports has
been expanding in developing regions such as the Caribbean, South America and Southeast
Asian countries. 94 This allowed the use of cheap labour, reduced costs of transport and
facilitated final processing in the existing canneries in the US and European markets. The
Pacific Island States have also been diversifying into loining. 95 Again, they are faced with
the competitive forces from other processing plants in developing countries that have
abundant and cheap labour and economies of scale. For example, loin exports from
Thailand have been increasing rapidly for the last three years. 96
The transnationalisation of tuna production and processing thus indirectly led to the
increase in purse seine operations in the Western Central Pacific, first by the Japanese
vessels, then the US Fleet.This was followed by the .Korean and Taiwanese vessels which
saw the ultimate demise of the pole and line fishery that had provided the competitive edge
for Pacific Island tuna exports because of its high quality production methods. Since a large
percentage of Western Central Pacific tuna ends up in the Southeast Asian canneries, the
Thai market provides the benchmark price which then influences the level of access fee,
production and level of supply of frozen tuna exports from the Pacific Island States. 97

8.5.1.2 Factors influencing the demand for canned and frozen tuna
The following briefly describe the factors that influenced the global demand for tuna and its
impact on Pacific Island tuna export development. The discussion focusses mainly on the
US and the EU tuna markets for canned and frozen tuna and the Japanese sashimi market
for fresh chilled tuna, bacause they are the dominant markets for these respective products.
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Ibid.
(ADBI INFOFISH), 1991.Global Industry Update - Tuna, lnfofish, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, p. 27.
95 Personal Communication - Les Clarke, Fisheries Management Adviser, Forum Fisheries Agency, January
2001.
96 Forum Fisheries Agency, Tuna Market News, Annual Review for 2002, 20 March 2003, p.8.
97 Personal Communication - Chris Reid, Tuna Market Adviser, Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, February
2002.
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In the US market, while tuna competes with poultry and meat in the retail food

market, demand is considered to be relatively inelastic to price.

98

When demand for tuna is

low, in order to protect tuna's share of the food market, wholesale prices must be cut
drastically enough to allow a large reduction in consumer prices to stimulate sales volume
99 In
.
and a sizeable retail mark-up to encourage retailers to promote tuna.
creases m
consumption of canned tuna are attributed largely to increase in population, pnce
discounting, dietary considerations, and increases in per capita income.

100

The marketing and distribution of canned tuna in the US is generally carried out by
large food corporations 101 that have well established nation-wide distribution and marketing
networks and centralised marketing and purchasing functions that provide economies of
scale. 102 Therefore, to effectively enter the US market requires some form of long-term
contractual agreement with an existing established food company.

103

The US has also imposed strict standards on the importation of fish and fishery
products. Import standards are contained in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (1958) and
imports must comply with standards set by the Fair Packaging and Labelling Act (1966)
and with the Food and Drug Administration regulations.1°4 Because of the 35% duty for
canned tuna in oil, imports of canned tuna into the US have almost exclusively been in
water pack. 105 "This product enters under a quota which is based on 20% of the previous
year's domestic production and takes a 6% duty." 106 "When the quota is reached, the duty

98

A. D. Owen, and D. A. Troedson, "The United States Tuna Market", in H. F. Campbell and A. D. Owen
(eds.), The Economics of Papua New Guinea 's Tuna Fisheries, Australian Centre for International
Agricultural Research (ACIAR), 1994, pp.242-250.
99
King (1987), op. cit., n.51, p.293.
JOO Ibid.
101
Three brands account for close to 85% of US tuna sales with Star-Kist holding a 46% market share,
Bumble Bee holding a 22% share and Chicken of the Sea holding a 16% share. [C. D. Lischewski, "The US
market for Canned Tuna'', in K. P. P. Nambiar and S. Pawiro (ed.), Tuna '97, Papers of the Fifth World Tuna
Trade Conference, 25-27 October, 1997, Infofish, Bangkok, Thailand, 1998, p.120-121.
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The USA Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 21 USC 321regulates the use of food additives and provides for
food safety standards. The USA Fair Packaging and Labelling Act regulates the size and weight of allowable
packages, preservation of the product within the package, and acceptable packaging materials. These
reF.lations have been periodically modified to include current developments.
10
Asian Development Bank/ INFOFISH, G/oballndustry Update-Tuna, 1991, p.87.
106 Ibid.
Frozen tuna and unprocessed tuna can enter US duty free. Except when fish is caught by foreign fishing
vessels. In such a case the fish must be off-loaded outside the USA and imported into US. Pacific Island
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increases to 12.5%." 107 The US imposes strict standards on the imports of fish and fishery
products. According to the Food and Drug Administration, all fish and fishery product
imports must comply with the same product specification requirements as domestically
produced and processed fish. 108 In 1997 the Food and Drug Administration legislated an
industry-wide mandatory H~ard Analysis of Critical Control Points (HACCP) inspection
programme for handling, processing and storage of seafood, including overseas exporters
and US based seafood importers. 109 The HACCP regulations require all exporters to the US
to have a HACCP plan or to ensure that their programmes are equivalent to the US
requirements. 110
Imports of tuna into the US have also been affected by the US embargo policy
under the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (1976) and the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (1972). 111 Associated with this conservation concern is the undertaking by
tuna marketing corporations in the US to sell tuna that is certified as "dolphin safe" tuna. 112
The development of a market for dolphin-safe tuna illustrates the role of the consumer in
influencing the demand and consumption pattern of the product. 113

Nicholson Act, foreign fishing vessels can offload their catch in these ports. Tariff on canned tuna in oil is
subject to 35% duty (ad valorem) from the most favoured nation (MFN) countries under the GSP and 45% (ad
valorem) from all other countries. [J. M. Floyed, " US Import Regulations", in D. J. Doulman (ed.), The
Development of the Tuna Industry in the Pacific Islands Region: An Analysis of Options, Hawaii: East West
Center, 1987, pp.81-90]. Canned tuna not in oil such as in water packs are subject to 6% duty for MFN
countries and 25% from other countries. Under the USA GSP system, all Pacific Island States and Territories
have MFN trade status with the US.
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llO Ibid.
111
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method in the ETP must have a catch documentation. [MMPA Bulletin, Issue No.18- Ist Quarter 2000, p.7].
112 J. Joseph, "The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy in the Eastern Pacific Ocean: Biological, Economic, and
Political Impacts," Ocean Development and International Law, vol. 25, 1994, pp. 1-30.
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Ibid. [The dolphin-safe labelling was in response to concerns about dolphin mortality due to dolphins
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environmental community convinced the US processors, the industry and the US Congress that dolphin
mortality should be reduced].
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Initially the US tuna industry was vertically integrated and relied on frozen tuna
imports and was self-sufficient in canned tuna production. After the de-coupling of the
industry, the fleets shifted production to Costa Rica, Equador and American Samoa to
supply loins and canned tuna to the US market, and later began to source cheaper supplies
from Southeast Asian canneries for US consumption. The environmental policies in the
Eastern Tropical Pacific have not only affected the global supply patterns but also the
demand for canned tuna in the US market. Consumers wishing to protect the dolphin
associated with tuna fishing pay a premium price for the dolphin safe-label.

114

The highly protective nature of the US canned market made it impossible for Pacific
Islands canneries such as Pafco and Solomon Taiyo to penetrate the US canned tuna
market. The dominance of a few buyers in the US also posed a higher risk to access the US
market. 115
The Western European market is more complex, varied and fragmented in contrast
to the US canned tuna market. 116 Presentation and quality play a more influential role on
demand than price does in markets like the UK. 117 The European Union (EU) market can be
divided into two sub-markets: countries with domestic tuna processing industries and
countries without a processing industry. us .
In 1989, three EU countries (France, UK and Germany) accounted for 75% of total

imports of tuna to Europe. 119 Although the French market is the largest canned tuna market
in Europe, its supplies come from French companies based in Senegal and Cote d' Ivoire.
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only be labelled "dolphin safe" if no dolphins were killed or seriously injured during the set in which tuna
were caught [MMPA Bulletin, 2nd Quarter, Issue No. 15, 1999, p.2].
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that no intentional dolphin encirclement occurred during the entire trip in which tuna was caught, and no
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114
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The French market has been difficult for non-traditional suppliers to penetrate. 121 The
United Kingdom and Germany largely depend on imports to meet their demand. 122 To
achieve harmonisation across markets, uniform regulations for imports into the EU were
introduced in 1993.1

23

Lobbying by French interests (to protect the interests of French

companies in their colonies) resulted in a Community wide import quota on canned tuna. 124
An import quota for EU markets for canned tuna was imposed except for the African,

Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States under the ACP-EU Lome Convention. A 24% tariff
was imposed on non-ACP member States exporting tuna into the EU.1~ 5
Despite uniformity of import policies in the EU, distinctly identifiable preferences
and markets still exist within each European country. Owen and Troedson, assessed the
degree of accessibility of the markets by Pacific Island States.126 For example, 85% of the
Italian canned tuna is packed in olive oil and consumers prefer yellowfin, which explains
why the market has not been a major target for Pacific Island States. UK relies on imported
canned tuna from a number of countries in Asia, Pacific, West Africa and the Indian
Ocean. 127 Previously, most distributors preferred to import canned tuna through Japanese
companies as assurance of quality. 128 However, due to increased competition by
multinational groups, some buyers started buying directly from canneries. 129 The UK

121

Ibid, p.20 [France has largely secured its supplies of canned tuna from it's the French owned interests in its
colonies, mainly from West Africa].
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123
Previously, the markets represented a considerable challenge to canned tuna exporters due to differing
standards and requirements among importing countries and acted as considerable non-tariff barriers to trade.
To have a single community-wide standard that would benefit both exporters and the people; the EU
formalised a control system under which imports of fisheries products into EU are authorized on hygiene
grounds. Under Directive 93/43/EC, all EU food processors are legally bound to have a HACCP Plan. The
HACCP regulation also applies to exporters to EU because responsibility for conforming to the system is
passed along the production chain. [Forum Fisheries Agency, Tuna Product Catalogue: A List of Tuna
Products ofInterest to Pacific Islands, Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, 2000).
124
D. J. Doulman, "European Canned Tuna Market", INFOFISH International, No.1190, 1990, p.17-22.
125
A. D. Owen and D. A. Troedson, "The European Market for Tuna", in H.F. Campbell and A. D. Owen
(eds.), The Economics ofPapua New Guinea Tuna Fisheries, ACIAR, Canberra, 1994, p.254.
126 Ibid.
.
127 D. J. Doulman, "European Canned Tuna Market", INFOFISH International, No.1190, 1990, p.17-22.
128
Owen and Troedson (1994), op. cit., n.125.
129 Ibid.

234

market has been the most accessible market for Pacific Islands States as it is where tuna has
maintained a high reputation for its better quality.

130

German canned tuna consumers are the most price-conscious and this characteristic
has had a major impact upon the development of the market over time.

131

Southeast Asian

countries such as Thailand and the Philippines have dominated the low-priced German
market, as other canneries have been unable to compete. 132 German buyers do not recognise
any consumer brand loyalty, and there are no real efforts to develop brand loyalty.
main focus is on keeping up pressure for prices to remain low.

134

133

The

This has led to frequent

and large scale shifts in sourcing the product with practically every country supplying the
German market at one time or another. 135
Quality control measures have been adopted in the EU since 1993 under the
Commission Directive (491/93/EEC) that apply to the fishing industry. The EU has also
adopted a HACCAP plan where the responsibility for seafood safety is placed on the
processors. 136 For any seafood, including tuna, that enters the EU, processors must have an
effective HACCAP system in operation and a competent authority in the government of the
exporting State to assure compliance with the EU Directive on HACCAP (Commission
Decision 94/356/EC). 137

8.5.2

The sashimi tuna tarket

Japan accounts for one third of global tuna consumption, mostly in fresh chilled form, 138
and ranks as the world's largest market for sashimi tuna.13 9 Prices for sashimi tuna are
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sometimes 20 to 30 times greater than for canned tuna. 140 The sashimi market is sensitive to
quality, size, fat content and method of handling fish. 141 Normally larger size fish (over 25
kg) with a higher fat content, in particular colder water species like bluefin, are preferred
over tropical species. 142 Target species for sashimi include bluefin, bigeye and yellowfin. 143
Bose and Mcllgorm indicate that there is often a high degree of substitutability between
bigeye tuna and yellowfin tuna in the Japanese sashimi market. 144 Yamamoto and Batram
note that bigeye tuna and albacore have become more popular as substitutes for bluefin
since the supply ofbluefin has become scarce due to over-exploitation. 145

8.5.2.1 Factors influencing supply of sashimi tuna exports
Japanese vessels in Japanese domestic waters initially caught sashimi tuna. 146 The
development of ultra-low temperature freezing technology in the 1960s led to the
establishment of distant water longline operations. 147 By the 1970s, the Japanese longline
fleet was operating throughout the Pacific. 148 Many of these vessels had access agreements
with Pacific Island States to fish in their EEZs. For example, in 1986, Japan had 994
longline vessels out of 1,327 vessels on the Forum Fisheries Agency Regional Register of
Foreign Fishing Vessels. 149 By the late 1970s, Korean and Taiwanese longliners also
switched from supplying tuna for the canning market to supplying frozen tuna for the

combination of the two in ice slurry "chilled fish" [A. Mcllgonn, An economic analysis of the Australian east
coast tuna longlinefishery, PhD Thesis, Unpublished, University of Queensland, 1995, p. 28].
140
Japanese Market Information on specifies Products: Tuna. http://www.pic.or.jp/jp/imi/013.htm accessed
13/12/01, p.1
141
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142
G. P. Ashenden and G. W. Kitson, "The Japan Market'', in D. J. Doulman (ed.),The Development of the
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Japanese sashimi market. 150 With expansion in the number of vessels and use of ultra-cold
freezing reefer vessels for transshipping, the Japanese sashimi market became oversupplied by the early 1980s which caused prices to slump.

151

To maintain economic

viability, the Japanese government instituted a 20% reduction in the longline fleet.

152

The frozen sashimi fishery is highly integrated, with Japanese trading companies
virtually controlling all aspects of the fishery. 153 The trading companies facilitate fishing
activities, transportation, re-supplies, and the buying of catch, making the fleet dependent
on prices paid by the companies. 154 This close integration of catching, processing and
marketing has enabled the industry to streamline and control its marketing for frozen

sashimi. Such a marketing arrangement presents a situation where prices for frozen sashimi
stabilise at a level sufficient to cover the cost of operations with modest returns on
investment to ensure the continuity of supplies. 155 The frozen sashimi fishery continued to
be dominated by the Japanese fleet. However, the strengthening of the Japanese economy
eroded the profitability of many Japanese distant water longline fleets in the late 1980s.

156

This in turn improved the competitiveness of other distant water fleets that then targeted the
Japanese frozen tuna market for sashimi. 151 As the Taiwanese economy strengthens, the
cost/price squeeze will gradually erode their profitability too. 158 In the longer term, less
developed countries like China and Indonesia will take over market share from these distant
water longline fleets. 159
By the mid 1980s, the Solomon Islands had acquired two tuna longline operations
for sashimi.

160

Kiribati converted two of its pole and line vessels into longline and Tonga
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Ibid.
152 Ibid.
153
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Honiara, Forum Fisheries Agency, 1998, p.2.
154 Ibid.
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Ibid. [The rate of increase in Japanese wages was faster than the rate of increase in demand for sashimi
making the employment for crew more costly].
'
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Ibid. [Some of the Japanese companies also contracted the Korean and Taiwanese longliners to secure their
supplies of tuna because the labour costs were much lower than Japanese labour and also to overcome the
restrictions placed on the number oflongline vessels by the Japanese government].
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Ibid, p.35.
160 Ibid.
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also operated an albacore longliner. 161 All these operations incurred high losses. 162 The
highly capital intensive sophisticated technology with high operating costs deterred most
other Pacific Island States from venturing into large scale conventional longline fishing for
sashimi tuna.

163

Besides lack of necessary capital, there was also lack of infrastructure and

lack of skilled fishermen in the Pacific Island States for such a fishery. 164
Developments in fishing gear and vessel technology with smaller vessels (15-25m)
that are comparatively cheaper and can carry and set a larger number of hooks has enabled
the adoption. of longline operations for shorter durations closer to fishing grounds. 165 As
frozen longline vessels declined, smaller Japanese vessels using ice increased in the
Micronesian Islands of the Pacific. By the early 1990s, the development of this technology
provided the impetus for other Pacific Island States to venture into the fresh chilled sashimi
tuna trade. 166 Small to medium scale longline operations now exist the in FSM, Fiji, Papua
New Guinea, Palau, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Kiribati. 167
Japan is the largest market for sashimi tuna and therefore has control over the global
price for sashimi. Figure 8.5 shows that import demand for fresh tuna and its average price
has also increased, peaking in 1994/1995 and then declining in 1996 and recovering again.
The rate of increase in average unit price is greater than the rate of increase in import
quantity.
Markets for fresh sashimi tuna are expanding in the west coast of the USA and
Hawaii. 168 Average prices have been consistently higher in the Japanese market than in the
US because of the premium placed on the higher quality fresh tuna. 169 Imports of air-flown
tuna into Japan in 1999 totalled 67,500 Mt valued at 71.87 billion Yen. 170 Indonesia,

161
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162
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167 Forum Fisheries Agency (1998), op. cit., n. 146.
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Honiara, 1998.
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September, 2000, p.13
170 Globefish Highlights, No.1/2000.
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Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia dominated supply of the market for yellowfin and bigeye,
whereas Spain, Taiwan and the US supplied bluefin.

171

Supply of fresh chilled tuna in the

Japanese market is variable with higher landings by local producers in the summer months
(July-August) and greater reliance on imports in the other months.

172

Quantity of Fresh Chilled Tuna lmports and Average Unit Price

Figure 8.5
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Japanese domestic production generally attracts a higher price than imported tuna.

173

In the

case of yellowfin tuna, imports fill the gaps left by local producers in the short term. 174
When Japanese domestic production is higher than average, there is pressure downwards on
prices. 175 Bigeye is strongly influenced by seasonal variations that also affect its price. 176
Maintaining product quality through the proper packaging, temperature control, the
quality of handling en route and the time factor between capture and the auction or retail

171

Ibid, p.8.
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Ibid.
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marketing is important. 177 Foreign producers of bluefm and yellowfin have often faced
rejection of the product due to poor quality. 178 They frequently argue that the high quality
control in Japan is an effective non-tariff barrier to entry into the Japanese fresh tuna
market.

179

Japanese industry representatives consider that such quality control is necessary

to sustain sales of sashimi. 180 Some studies suggest that much of the problem lies in the
lack of proper understanding of Japanese fresh tuna marketing and the preferences that
underlie it.

181

Under the Japanese Food Sanitation law, hygienic inspections are required for

all imported raw seafood. 182 When compliance cannot be determined from import
certification, inspection of the actual shipment is carried out. 183 Random samples of fish
are also inspected and tested to monitor shipments of fresh fish into the Japanese market. 184
The US under the Food and Drug Administration's HACCAP regulations for
seafood also apply to sashimi tuna. Processors (both domestic and foreign exporters) are
required to establish preventative systems to monitor critical points in the seafood
production chain where potential hazards to food safety can occur. 185 Exporters are required
to follow a HACCAP plan from the time of capture, through shore-side processing and
packing until the exports are received in overseas markets. The plan requires control of
temperature and sanitation procedures to be followed.
Besides resource availability and its seasonal fluctuations, the main determinants of
supply of sashimi are the airfreight capacity, freight rate, flight schedule, directness of

177

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Air Shipment of Live and Fresh Fish & Seafood Guidelines,
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178
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shipment and quality of handling. 186 Export volumes have been relatively small and have
continued to rely on the passenger flights linked to the tourism industry.

187

For example,

the decline in Japanese tourists and the consequent reduction in flights from Fiji to Japan
had negatively affected the air transportation of fresh chilled tuna following the 2000
political crisis in Fiji. 188 Plans for expansion of fresh tuna exports would require an
integrated approach with the airfreight industry and customs departments. Good logistical
arrangements are essential to retain the quality of product between vessel and market. To
maintain product quality, it is important to minimise the time between production and
consumption.
8.5.2.2 Factors influencing demand for sashimi tuna exports
A range of factors affect the demand for sashimi tuna. The attribute of freshness is of prime
consideration. Other factors that differentiate the product at the wholesale level and affect
the price decisions include type of species, meat yield, fat content and time lag.

189

Owen

and Troedson describe various factors including regional preferences, age group and
gender, that influence the consumption of tuna in Japan. 190 Tuna consumption is the
greatest in the eastern and far southern provinces and least in the western provinces, and
males between the ages of 30 and 45 eat more tuna than women or men in other age
groups. 191 Special days such as public holidays and the last shopping day before the
weekend are also times when demand increases. 192 Consumers at the retail level in general
are unaware of the species since tuna is sold under the general name of maguro. 193
Pacific Island States have also been targeting the US West Coast and Hawaii fresh
tuna market. A study conducted in 1998 on the fresh tuna market in the US describes the
shift in demand for yellowfin and bigeye as a mainstream food commodity. 194 Previously it

186
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was categorised as speciality seafood. 195 The demand for lightly cooked and barely cooked
fresh tuna in restaurants is increasing as consumers acquire new tastes and become more
health conscious.

196

The demand for tuna also includes longline bycatch such as marlin and

swordfish, which in turn provide a more flexible alternative market although quality
standards remain high. 197
The exports of fresh chilled tuna to prime sashimi markets in Japan and the
expansion of prime quality and grade two sashimi tuna and bycatch to the US markets has
increased the potential for tuna exports from the Pacific Island States. The ability of local
markets to absorb catch that does not meet export requirements or is unable to be
airfreighted on time provides new opportunities and flexible market options although prices
may vary greatly within these markets. 198
Export development of fresh chilled tuna began in the Pacific Islands States in the
1990s.

199

This coincided with the beginning of economic reforms in a number of the Island

States. The key players in sashimi export development have been private local
entrepreneurs and joint venture operations with foreign companies. The experience in Fiji,
Papua New Guinea and the FSM shows that governments have encouraged domestication
by providing direct and indirect incentives such as lower tariffs on imports of fuel and bait,
tax-free status and exemption of export tax.

200

Domestic based foreign vessels either on

lease or charter or under joint-venture and locally owned vessels are exempt from paying
access fees as part of the incentive package to develop local industry, such as in Fiji.
While markets exist for Pacific Island exports of prime quality fresh chilled tuna,
the industry is also high risk in terms of maintaining quality standards. Quality control is
one of the principal factors that will determine the success of export development in the
main fresh tuna markets: i.e., Japan and the US. While the supply by the Pacific Island
States is relativley low and insignificant to affect market prices, large short-term supplies
from Pacific Islands (say on a daily or weekly basis) can depress market prices.
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For example through the Incentives provided under Foreign Investment Regulations to attract foreign
investors. [See for example, the case study on Fiji on current domestication initiatives].

°
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Competition also exists from suppliers in Southeast Asian countries such as
Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia which are in closer proximity to the markets and
. hts to major
. mark ets. 201
fishing grounds and have direct and more frequent fhg

8.6

Tariffs, export development of tuna and preferential agreements

One of the key factors that provided the impetus for developing the tuna trade in the Pacific
Islands has been the existence of preferential market access agreements with developed
country markets. The most significant preferential trade agreement that influenced the
development of tuna exports, particularly from the Pacific Forum member States, has been
the Lome Convention. The preferential treatment has its initial roots in the Generalised
System of Preferences (GSP)202 that resulted after the initial failure of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)203 to solve developing countries' declining terms
oftrade. 204

201

Personal Communication- David Lucas, Managing Director, Solander Pacific (Fiji), July 2001;
Chris Reid- Tuna Market Adviser, Forum Fisheries Agency, March 2002.
202
The GAIT is based on the principle of equality of treatment. According to its most favoured nation rule in
article 1, trade must be conducted on the basis of non-discrimination. If a member grants certain advantages to
another member, these advantages must also extend unconditionally to all other members of the World Trade
Organisation (WTO). Under article ill (4) of GAIT, the products of a member imported into the territory of
another member shall not be subject directly or indirectly, to internal taxes, or other internal charges in excess
of those applied directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.
While GAIT was based on the above principles of reciprocity, it ignored the export interests of
developing countries. Developed country tariff profiles provided zero or low duties on raw materials and
higher duties on products on manufactured and processed products. The tariff structures adopted by the
developed countries provided substantial protection to its own processing activities. Developing country
producers of manufactured good could not compete on equal basis. Consequently developed countries that
selectively applied the most-favoured nation principle under GAIT retarded the rate of growth of developing
countries.
At the 1968 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development II in New Delhi, an agreement
was reached between developed and developing countries to establish the Generalised System of Preferences
(GSP). The legal authorisation of the GSP came in June 1971whena10-year waiver was granted to the MFN
principle of article 1 of the GAIT to its Contracting Parties. [T. Murray, Trade Preferences for Developing
Countries, The Macmillan Press, London, 1977]. See also: UNCTAD, The Generalised System of Preference
and the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Document TD/B/C5/26; reprinted in "Operations and Effects of the
Generalised System of Preference", Sixth Session, Document TD/B/C.5/42, 1975.
203
Following World War II as countries started reconstruction and expansion, they adopted more inward
looking development strategies such as use of high tariffs to enhance domestic economies and industrial
development. This negatively affected international trade and external economic relations and finance. World
leaders met in Brettonwoods in 1944 to tackle the international economic issues that eventually led to a
charter for International Trade Organisation in 1948 in Havana. By 1947, major economic powers agreed to
have an ad hoc arrangement as a forum to handle global trade issues that led to the establishment of GAIT.
204
T. Murray, Trade Preferences for Developing Countries, London: The Macmillan Press, 1977.
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Under the GSP, the understanding was that tariff preferences for the preferencereceiving country would improve access to world markets, provide opportunities for larger
scale production, increase exports and income and expand domestic markets. 205 The
indirect benefits would be that the tariff margin would provide incentives for investment
by local and foreign firms. 206
A background to the establishment of the preferential trade agreements through
tariff concessions is discussedbelow, followed by an analysis of the Lome Convention and
its impact on exports from Fiji and the Solomon Islands.
A tariff is a tax on importing a good or service usually collected by customs at the
point of entry. 207 The reasons for imposing tariffs include protection of domestic industry
and as a means of generating government revenue. 208 By taxing the foreign product, a tariff
brings gains to domestic producers who face import competition. A well-known argument
for import protection is to assist the growth of new industries in a country at the early
stages -of its economic development or to assist a struggling industry to adjust its
operations. 209 Other reasons for import protection include enhancing domestic employment,
improving balance of payments, and eliminating competitive distortions. Non-economic
reasons include national pride, income re-distribution and national defence. 210
In 1965, Part IV entitled ''Trade and Development" was added to GATT which

focussed on special conditions for developing countries. It recognised the need for
developing countries to engage in more favourable conditions of access to world markets
for their products, and for developed countries to refrain from introducing new barriers to
exports of primary and other exports of special interest to less developed countries. Part IV
of GATI also stated that developed countries should not expect reciprocity of
commitments they made in negotiations to reduce or remove tariff and other barriers to
trade of developing countries. At the Tokyo round of trade negotiations in 1979, a
Ibid.
Ibid.
207 P. H Lindert and T.A. Pugel, International Economics, Irwin, USA, 1996, p.117.
Tariffs may take the form of a specific duty payable on each unit imported or ad valorem tariff expressed as a
rcercentage of the unit value of goods imported.
os In poorer countries that lack an adequate base for raising sufficient revenues from taxation of income,
reliance is often placed on customs duties along with other forms of commodity taxation towards financing
fcublic expenditure.
09 Lindert and Pugel (1996), op. cit., n.207.
205
206
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permanent legal basis for the extension of the GSP by developed countries to developing
countries was established. 211 The tariff - preference policy is a logical extension of the
infant industry argument for temporary protection. The objective of tariff preferences in
favour of developing countries is to expand their exports and export earnings with the aim
of stimulating economic development through industrialisation.

212

This objective is to be

achieved through static price advantages that make developing country exports of
manufactured products more competitive relative to domestic production and imports from
third countries. The assumption is that price advantage will bring dynamic incentives for
new investment in export capacity. 213 'Donor' led preference schemes were introduced. The
three major schemes that accounted for some 90% of the GSP trading were the European
Economic Community (EEC), and GSP systems of Japan and the US.

214

Each scheme

identified the developing countries which would benefit, the products which would qualify
for preferential treatment, and the rules and regulations that would apply.
A number of countries gained access to the European Economic Community (EEC)
[now known as the European Union (EU) market] on more favourable terms than that
accorded under the GSP. 215 The earlier EEC Agreement with a number of African countries
and French territories and the Commonwealth preferences were integrated into the EEC
Agreement that eventually evolved as the enlarged EEC's international economic policy
with regards to ex-colonies of the EU - known as the Lome Convention. The Lome
Convention, signed in 1975, provided member countries of the African, Caribbean and the
Pacific with duty free access to the EEC markets for a number of industrial and agricultural

Ibid.
The Enabling Clause - (Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, 28 November 1979 (L/4903). Tiris encourages developed countries to
improve access to their markets and states that developing countries are not expected to reciprocate trade
barrier reduction commitments made by developed countries. The enabling clause permits preferential
~~~atment to be ~ven to, and exchanged among, developing countries, subject to stated conditions.
F. A. M. Altmg von Geusau (Ed.), The Lome Convention and New International Economic Order, Leyden,
A. W. Sijthoff, 1997.
213
Murray (1977), op. cit., n.204.
214
Ibid, p.95.
215
In designing its GSP scheme EEC excluded or greatly restricted GSP trade in products of export interest to
its associated countries by placing ceiling limits on EEC imports which receive GSP tariff treatment, while no
such ceilings exist under its associated Agreement (Lome Convention).
210
211
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products as well as financial and technical assistance. 216 Therefore while these countries
have GSP beneficiary status, they have more favourable market access under the Lome
Convention. 217

8.6.1

Tuna trade in the Pacific Island States under the ACP-EU Lome Convention

Preferential access to the EU market under the Lome Convention has been critical to the
development of the canning industry and canned tuna exports from Pacific Island States, in
particular from Fiji and the Solomon Islands.
In view of the fluctuations in the tuna market and the re-structuring taking place in

the tuna industry as discussed in section 8.5, these canneries and their exports would not
have survived in the global open market. During the early years of operation, access into
the Japanese and the US canned tuna markets was limited as these countries were
themselves engaged in production, processing and marketing that provided tuna for their
domestic consumption. While the US market was the largest canned tuna market in the
1970s and 1980s, its industry was highly protected through high import tariffs and other
non-tariff trade barriers compared to the EU market. 218
Under the Lome Convention, African, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) States can
enter the EU market free of tariff and quota restrictions, 219 provided the products meet
certain criteria outlined in the Rules of Origin. 220 With regards to tuna and tuna products,

216

Lome Convention I was signed in 1975. Lome II (1979), Lome ID (1984), Lome IV (1990) succeeded it,
Lome IV revised (1995). In 2000, the Lome Convention is succeeded by an EU-ACP Partnership Agreement
in 2000 known as the "Cotonou Agreement". The Cotonou Agreement is for a 20-year period.
217
The Lome Convention IV expired in 2000 and a successor agreement is in place known as the Cotonou
Af!:eement.
21
The US market had high tariffs while the EU provided a preferential access.
219
Tuna from ACP States receives 24% margin of trade preference.
220
The Rules of Origin under Protocol I of the Lome Convention specify a number of conditions for tuna to
be considered as "originating" in ACP waters. Article l(g) of Protocol I refers to products of sea fishing and
other products taken from sea by their vessels. Conditions for "their vessels" are stated in article 2.2 of
Protocol I, Lome IV as follows:
- vessels which are registered or recorded in an EC member State, in an ACP States or in an OCT (countries
and territories defined in Annexill);
- vessels which sail under the flag of an EC member State, in an ACP State or of an OCT;
vessels, which are 50%, owned by nationals of States that are signatories to the Lome Convention. In the
case of a company, which must have its head office in one of the ACP or member States; its managers,
chairman of board of directors or supervisory board must be nationals. In the case of a limited liability
corporation, half the shares must be owned by nationals, public bodies or the State;
50% of the crew, master and officers included, must be nationals of State party to the Convention or an
OCT.
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the question of origin is determined by where and by whom the tuna was caught. Tuna
caught within the 12-mile limit (territorial sea) of an ACP State is considered as originating
fish regardless of the origin of the vessels.221 Beyond the 12-mile limit, tuna must be landed
by the ACP country exporting to the EU, or by a vessel flying the flag of another ACP
country or by the EU. 222 If tuna is caught by non-ACP countries outside the 12-mile limit, it
may nevertheless be accepted tariff free into EU markets subject to the granting of
derogation to the rules of origin. 223 The exporting ACP country through the ACP Council
must apply for the derogation.
Grynberg is critical of the rules of origin criteria, arguing that it restricted the
development of the industry and misguided ownership arrangements.

224

The basis for the

rules of origin has also been seen as serving the interests of the EU canning industry,
particularly in France, Italy, Spain and Portugal. 225 Such arguments do lend support to the
opinion that the rules of origin limited the flexibility of seeking non- ACP interests to
maintain the viability and profitability of the canneries in later years of their operations.
The other criteria to meet the Rules of Origin stated in Article 2.3 of Protocol I of Lome N are in case a ACP
State wishes to charter vessels from a third country and where EU vessels have declined the offer to form and
agreement. Article 2.3 states that the upon request of an ACP State, that vessels chartered or leased by the
ACP State be treated as "their vessels" to undertake fisheries activities in its exclusive economic zone under
the following conditions:
that at least 50% of the crew, master and officers included are nationals of the Convention States;
that the charter or lease agreement is accepted by the Commission as providing adequate opportunities
for developing the capacity of ACP States to fish on its own account and in particular as conferring on
the ACP State the responsibility for nautical management of the vessel placed at its disposal for a
significant period of time;
that the ACP State offered the EU the opportunity to negotiate a fisheries agreement and the EU did not
accept this offer.
If tuna does not meet the Rules of Origin under Article 2(2) or 2 (3) of Protocol 1, derogation from the Rules
can be applied. Automatic derogation is based on an allocation made by the ACP-EU Committee on Customs
Co-operation. Allocation is based on the first come first served basis.
The procedures for normal derogation are outlined in Article 31 of Protocol 1. This takes into account the
development circumstances of the ACP State concerned.
221
Article 2(4) of Protocol I Lome Convention N - because The EU recognises the 12-mile territorial sea as
within the definition of the ACP State.
222
Lome Convention N- Article 2(2) and Article 2(3) of Protocol I.
223
Lome Convention N- Article 31 of Protocol I.
224
R. Grynberg, "The EU's Green Paper: a Pacific response", pp.1-18; R. Grynberg, and M. White, "EU Tuna
Preferences in Post-Lome Convention", pp. 68- 87, in R. Grynberg (ed.), The Lome Convention and the
Pacific, The Forum Secretariat, Suva, 1998; R Grynberg, Lome Convention and Rules of Origin and Solomon
Islands Tuna Industry: Handicapped Infants and Delinquent Parents, Economic Department, University of
the South Pacific, [nd].
225
A. D. Owen, and D. A. Troedson, "The European Market for Tuna'', in H.F. Campbell and A. D. Owen
(eds.), The Economics of Papua New Guinea's Tuna Fisheries, Canberra, ACIAR, 1994, pp.251-262; R.
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The Rules of Origin were nevertheless seen as a positive policy by the Fiji and Solomon
Islands governments to help to develop their own domestic industrial capability. 226

8.6.1.1 Pacific Island exports to the European Union
Canned tuna was the major export commodity to the EU from the Pacific Island States. The
United Kingdom has been the major market for both Fiji and the Solomon Islands. Table
8.3 shows that imports to EU from the Pacific have been predominantly canned fish with
small amounts of frozen tuna. Canned tuna exported under the Lome Convention receives a
24% margin of trade preference.

Table 8.3
Yellowfin whole
frozen
Skipjack, frozen
Canned tuna
TOTAL

EU Tuna Imports from Pacific Island Countries (t) 1990 -1997
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

2,213

1,752

2,226

571

459

276

670

1592

283
10,010
13,198

0
9,957
13,104

0
8,640
11,353

564
7,399
8,791

199
8,873
9,844

881
ll,374
13,442

2051
9,696
13,416

1183
10,336
13,665

Source: Centre for Development of Industry. ACP-EU Industrial Partnership Meeting on the role of South Pacific
Operation in the Tuna Industry. Nadi, Fiji, 1-4 February 1999. P.13

The total tuna exports to the EU from the various Pacific Island members of the ACP are
shown in Table 8.4. The relative amounts of exports from Fiji and Solomon Islands show
that these island States have been the major exporters of canned tuna. However, other
Pacific Island States such as Samoa and Kiribati have also begun exporting frozen tuna to
the EU. Papua New Guinea has continued to export small quantities of tuna but more
recently it increased its exports to the EU. 227 Since 2000, exports from Fiji and the Solomon
Islands to the EU have declined.

Grynberg, Lome Convention and Rules of Origin and Solomon Islands Tuna Industry: Handicapped Infants
and Delinquent Parents, Economic Department, University of the South Pacific, [nd].
226 The objective of the Rules of Origin is to assure that ACP States benefit from the Agreement and to protect
the EU from abuse of fisheries by third parties.
227 Personal Communication - Ronald Kuk - Projects Manager, National Fisheries Authority, Papua New
Guinea, 25 June 2002.
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Table 8.4

Tuna Exports to EU as percentage of Total Tuna Exports from Pacific
ACP Member States in Volume (t)
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

6,696

7,463

5,217

14,345.5

7,067

9,845.5

7,844.5

14,007

379

286

2,114

2,339.5

2,820

1,869

Tonga

130

36

Tuvalu

1

Vanuatu

-

-

-

Samoa

67

1,067

2,386

Fiji
Kiribati

Solomon Islands

19,884

42,675

33,293

21,277

30,885

48,861

29,072

38,063

Papua New Guinea

660

165

638

255

169

45

203

1,177

Total Exports to EU (t)

13,198

13,104

11 ,353

8,791

9,844

13,442

13,416

13,665

Total Exports of tuna

27,240

50,303

39,527

36,163.5

40,235

61,289

41 ,042.5

57,502

48%

26%

29%

24%

25%

22%

33 %

24%

(t)
Tuna exports to EU as
%

of total

Pacific

Island Tuna exports

Source: Centre for Industry Development, FAO F1shStat, 2000

Table 8.5 shows the relative importance of tuna exports to the EU from the Solomon Taiyo
Cannery. Almost half of all Solomon Island tuna exports went to the EU (mostly to the
United Kingdom). These canned tuna exports to EU represented around 12% of the total
domestic exports. This indicates that at least 5% of the total national exports of Solomon
Islands was dependent on the UK tuna market.

Table 8.5

Level of Tuna Exports from the Solomon Islands to the EU

Year

Total Exports
$SI (m)

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

164.5
165.2
172.l
221.9
293.8
407.4
457.5
565.3

Total
fish
Exports $ SI
(m)
78.4
65.3
53.2
106.4
88.0
82.6
98.5
145.7

1996

570.l

1997

575.1

Total Canned fish
exports $ SI (m)
9.0
9.1
18.2
36.0
36.8
48.0
60.3
65.2

Total canned Tuna
*exports to EU $ SI
(m)
8.1
8.19
16.38
32.4
33.12
43.2
54
58.68

Canned Tuna to
EU as % total of
Fish Exports
10.3%
13%
31%
30%
38%
52%
55%
40%

Canned
tuna
expons to EU as %
of total exnons
5%
5%
10%
15%
11%
10%
12%
10%

105.3

48.8

43.92

42%

7%

129.8

63 .8

57.42

44%

10%

* Canned tuna exports to EU estimated at 900Yo of total canned tuna exports
Source: Central Bank of Solomon Islands, 1999, Barclay & Wakabayashi (2000)
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1989

1988

1987

1986

r?,396

5,819

kl,706

6,607

14,264

~,211

7,427

~ .546

7,198

6,956

4,768

4,570

16.6

19.6

23 .9

t23.6

18.9

18.6

130.5

26.l

26.6

27.5

17

14.7

3,300

13 ,300

2,500

t2,100

?

3,600

5,800

6,100

~.500

~,200

14,100

4,400

7.4

11.1

9

7.5

?

12.8

23.8

24.3
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20

14

14

44.6%

56.6%

39.1 %

31.8 %

?

68 .8%

78%

93.l %

90.2%

72.7%

82.4%

95.2%
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127.6

24.2

19.1

18.8

30.5

26.4

26.7

25.5

17

14.7

44%

32.6%

40%

68.8%

78%

92%

89.9%

78.4%

82.3%

95.2%

UK (t)
Value of canned tuna

t

exports to UK $US(m)

Q.
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~
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11997
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~

=
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=
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Table 8.6 shows that caIUled tuna exports from Fiji accounted for about 90% of tuna
exports during the 1980s, except for 1988 when exports to the UK were around 78%. The
1990s period shows a decline in the share of exports to the UK market.
To analyse the market dependence of Pafco and Solomon Taiyo caillleries on the
EU margin of trade preference of 24% duty free access, a 24% reduction in income can be
estimated to see its effect. 228 For example, from table 8.6 the total revenue from Fiji's
canned tuna exports to the EU in 1996 can be estimated to be around $ 11.1 million.
Without the margin of preference, the total income would have been around $8.4 million, a
reduction of $2.7m. Table 8.5 indicates that for Solomon Taiyo in 1996, the total revenue
was $43.92 million. A 24% reduction in revenue would reduce the total revenue by $10.5
million to $33.42 million.
Hand estimates the dependence of the Solomon Taiyo on the Lome trade preference
to see its likely effects in the event of the non-renewal of Lome IV.

229

He argues that the

elasticity of supply of tuna is much lower relative to [elasticity of] demand.

230

In such a

case, Sainsbury, the major UK buyer of the Solomon Taiyo tuna can capture part of the
24% duty exemption. 231 Hand's study suggests that the actual scale of benefits to the
Solomon Taiyo from the 24% duty margin is likely to be between 8% and 12%.

232

The

effect of this on the income of Solomon Taiyo in 1998 would have led to a reduction in
total revenue of between $11 million and $17 million. 233
Fiji's share of canned tuna exports to the UK (its major canned market) started to
decline as a result of lack of supply of skipjack from pole and line operations by the IKA

228

The 24% margin of trade preference is provided by the EU market for tuna exports from the ACP
countries.
229
T. Hand, A Review of Fisheries Taxation and Licensing in the Solomon Islands, Economic Insights,
Brisbane, 1999. [While the Lome Preference has continued under the Cotonou Agreement, it nevertheless
provides a useful analysis on the dependence of preferential access by the Pacific Island canneries for
survival].
230
The elasticity of supply is lower because of limited alternative options to supply in the world market by the
Solomon Taiyo or diverting its operations from canning into other activities without incurring high costs.
Demand of tuna on the other hand is elastic to price changes because buyers like Sainsbury can source
alternative markets if prices increase.
231
Hand (1999), op. cit., n. 229.
232 Ibid.
233
Ibid, p.57; [Total income in 1998 was $169 million and total-operating expenses was $148 million. (85%
of the revenue is from canning). If the Lome duty concession was removed, it would lower the revenue
between 8 % to 12%, i.e. $11 million and $17 million. This reduction in the scale of revenue is likely to affect
the long-term viability of the cannery in light of the competitive nature of the canning market].
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fleet.

234

From 1991, the loss of supply from the Solomon Islands significantly reduced

Pafco' s supply of originating fish. 235 Consequently, Pafco had to rely heavily on derogation
as shown in the table below. Table 8.7 shows that by June 1997, 86% of Pacfo's sales was
under derogation from the Rules of Origin.

Table 8. 7
Originating
Fish(Mt)
Under
Derogation
(Mt)
Total (Mt)

Originating and non-originating fish sold to EU by Pafco
1993
1,357

53%

1994
1,382

49%

1995
2,657

64%

1996
2,237

52%

1997(June)
422
14%

1,194

47%

1,455

51 %

1,510

36%

2,079

48%

2,517

2,551

2,837

4,167

4,316

86%

2,939

Source: Arthur Andersen Corporate Fmance, 1997, p.46

In preparation for negotiations for a successor agreement to Lome IV, Grynberg and White

also analysed the significance of the Lome trade preference on the Solomon Taiyo and
Pafco canneries by looking at the broader implications of the loss of trade preference to the
local economy.236 Based on the assumption of zero preference and re-structuring of Pafco,
their study concluded that canned tuna sales in the open market would not even cover its
variable cost of sales. 237 In relation to Solomon Taiyo, Grynberg and White argue that an
effective re-structuring may allow the company to survive, but admit that the cannery has
hardly ever made any profit and with the decline in tariff preference, there is likely to be
further declines of profit.238 In considering the fiscal impact of withdrawal of trade
preference for Solomon Islands, Forsyth estimated that the total injection to the economy
was around SI$47.l million of which SI$5.6 million went directly to the Solomon Islands
government. 239 Using a multiplier of 1.2, the annual increment to GDP from Solomon

234

Arthur Andersen Cotporate Finance, Review of Pacific Fishing Company, 1997; Fiji Fisheries Division,
Annual Reports (various issues).
235
Personal Communication - Peniasi Kunatuba, Permanent Secretary for Ministry of Agriculture Forests and
Fisheries, March 2002.
236 R Grynberg and M. White, "EU Tuna Preferences in the Post-Lome Environment", in R Grynberg (ed.),
The Lome Convention and the Pacific, The Forum Secretariat and the University of the South Pacific, 1998,
pp. 68-87.
~f7 Ibid, p.77.
238
Ibid, p.83.
239 D. Forsyth, "The impact of Lome development assistance on Pacific ACP budgets", in R Grynberg, (ed.),
The Lome Convention and the Pacific, The Forum Secretariat and the University of the South Pacific, 1998,
p.45 (Forsyth considered the period 1994/5).
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Taiyo was estimated to be around SI$53 million.

240

Taxes were estimated to be at a rate of

17.3 % amounting to SI$9.2. 241 Therefore, the total receipts of the Solomon Islands
government resulting from the operation of Solomon Taiyo amounted to SI$5.6 million
from the company plus SI$9.2 million generated by the spending of funds injected by
Solomon Taiyo into the domestic economy - a total of SI$14.8 million, or 4.9% of
"domestic" revenue. 242 Forsyth concluded that since the firm would be unlikely to survive
the withdrawal of the EU trade concession, it seems that such a withdrawal would lead to
the government losing at least SI$14.8 million per annum, or 4.9 percent of "domestic"
revenue. 243
In the case of the Pafco cannery, the overall fiscal effect on the economy of Fiji may

not be as severe as its impact on the island of Ovalau where the cannery has been the only
major employer. The total number of workers at the Pafco cannery has ranged from 800 to
500.244 The presence of Pafco on the Island of Ovalau also supports other major enterprises
like the Ports Authority and the Fiji Electricity Authority (consuming approximately 95%
of the electricity on the Island). The township of Levuka and the surrounding islands in the
Lomaiviti Group depend on the existence of Pafco to support wages, transport and
infrastructure. 245
8.7

The Cotonou Agreement

In contrast to the Lome Convention which was essentially based on preferential tariffs, the

objective of the Cotonou Agreement246 is to promote the progressive integration of the ACP
States into the global economy by enhancing production and the capacity to attract
investment, and ensuring conformity with WTO provisions.247 The strategy adopted aims to

Ibid.
Ibid.
242 Ibid.
243 Ibid.
244
Arthur Andersen Corporate Finance, Review ofPacific Fishing Company Limited, 1997.
24
~ S~ce 1999, -~afco'~ ~~n focus has been loining of tuna under contract for Bumble Bee Company.
Likewise, the pohttcal cns1s m the Solomon Islands has also affected the Solomon Taiyo cannery (which has
been taken over by the Solomon Island government). While the Lome preferential access to the EU and UK
has continued under the successor Contonu Agreement, the practical problems faced by the canneries and in
the face of global competition in the canning market has led to both the canneries unable to take advantage of
the continued trade preference.
246
The Cotonou Agreement is a successor to the Lome Convention IV which expired in 2000.
247
F. Moreau, "The Cotonou Agreement - New Orientations", The Courier, September 2000, p. 9.
240
241
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link development aid to setting up a regulatory and trade policy framework that facilitates
development of trade and the private sector. 248 The Cotonou Agreement is seen to provide
the necessary lever to initiate the process of trade liberalisation within the Pacific ACP
member States and to simultaneously establish an economic partnership agreement with the
EU which is WTO-compatible. The Cotonou Agreement states that "[ e]conomic and trade
co-operation shall build on regional integration initiatives of the ACP States, bearing in
mind that regional integration is a key instrument of the ACP into the world economy''. 249
An eight-year preparatory period has been developed commencing 2000 for the

establishment of a new free trade agreement known as Pacific Island Free Trade Agreement
(PICTA). 250 The Pacific Islands Closer Economic Relations (PACER) has been established
as an economic co-operation framework agreement to assist in the facilitation of this
process. The rationale for implementing PACER is to trigger PICTA. 251 Paralleling these
changes, ACP-EU economic partnership agreements that are compatible to WTO are to be
re-negotiated under the Cotonou Agreement. 252 The Economic Partnership Agreement has a
financial assistance package in addition to facilitating free trade relations. 253
The background to negotiating modalities and procedures of an econonuc
partnership agreement, while important for what they may reveal about the effectiveness of
purpose, are secondary issues for this study and therefore are not the subject of discussion
here. The main point to note is that the Cotonou Agreement is seen as a mechanism to push
towards trade liberalisation of the Pacific Island States within the WTO framework. In the
EU-ACP partnership discussions, fisheries and tourism have been identified as sectors for
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Ibid. [The trade preferences to ACP countries now follow trade rule under Article 1 of GATT].
Cotonou Agreement- Article 35(2).
250
A Free Trade Agreement is a reciprocal preferential trade agreement, under which each party undertakes to
abolish restrictions on imports from the other party, thus constituting a positive discrimination towards one or
several WTO members. PACER sets out the basis for future development of trade relations among the 16
Pacific Islands Forum members including Australia and New Zealand.
251 Personal Communication-Veniana Qalo, Trade Officer, Forum Secretariat, Suva, March 2002.
252 Ibid. [The basis for the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement is provided by the Article XXIV of GAIT
(Territorial Application -Frontier Traffic, Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas) and the Enabling Clause
(1979) on Differential and more Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing
Countries].
25 3 This means that development assistance from the EU depends on initiatives to participate in the FTA with
the understanding that reducing tariff barriers will achieve the objectives of both the EU in terms of
establishing business interests in the region, and for the Pacific ACP States in improving their economic and
social conditions.
249

254

possible economic co-operation. 254 The EU is an important tuna market and a number of
EU States are distant water fishing States that wish to seek access to Pacific Island States'
EEZs. It is too early to speculate on the likely outcome of any fisheries negotiations, but
there is keen interest on establishing access agreements within Pacific ACP States to fish
within their EEZs. 255 Such access agreements are likely to bring about structural changes to
.

.

. . .

.
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current access agreements and will also have implications for domestication 1mtlatives.

8.8

Export development and domestication - emerging issues

Domesticating the tuna industry to achieve value added processing for exports has been one
of the key aspirations of the Pacific Island States. Exports and trade in tuna is strongly
influenced by changes in the global tuna market. As shown in section 8.5, the market is
dynamic and constantly changing. For example, from being the major exporter of tuna,
Japan over the years has become a major importer. The cannery operations from developed
countries have shifted processing operations to developing countries and sourcing locations
that provide cheaper labour and operating costs. A few large multinational corporations
control the global canning market and they also employ powerful marketing strategies
through their brand labels to influence consumer choices. The fresh chilled tuna demand is
growing in non-traditional markets and into new forms of tuna preparations such as pouch
and grill steaks. However, Japan still remains the major dominant market for fresh and
chilled tuna. A few large wholesalers who try to stabilise the market from wide fluctuations
in price also control the Japanese sashimi market. Within the backdrop of such global
market representation, what are the current and emerging issues influencing trade in tuna
that Pacific Island States need to consider to secure the access of their domestic industries
to such global tuna markets?

254

R. Grynberg and B. Onguglo, A Development Agenda for the Economic Partnership Agreement between
the EU and the Pacific ACP (PACP), (A concept paper), The Forum Secretariat, Suva, 2002.
255
This is demonstrated by the EU submissions during the Multilateral High-level Conferences (MHLC)
process to establish the Western Central Pacific Fisheries Convention.
256
For example, the development assistance for capacity building and resource rent would require parallel but
separate negotiations. New measures would need to be established to accommodate the EU within the current
regional co-operative framework for domestication such as the FSM and Palau Arrangement. (This may
require a re-examination of these Regional Arrangements in light of WTO compatibility). Such an analysis is
beyond the scope of the current study because it is still not clear how the negotiations will unfold within the
Pacific ACP- EU Partnership agreement, and in light of the decision undertaken during the negotiation for the
WCPF Convention on a moratorium on new members to the Tuna Commission.
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An analysis of the emerging issues in the global tuna market that is of relevance to
export development indicates that there will be reduced trade preferences. There is also
increased demand for higher quality products. As consumer environmental awareness
increases, the markets become sensitive to production process methods.
Reduced tariff preferences under preferential trade agreements have become
transitory and are on the decline as international trade is liberalised and trade barriers such
as high tariffs are removed. The Cotonou Agreement (2000) aims to facilitate this transition
process rather than provide a secure long term access. In principle, as tariff schedules of
countries decline under the WTO regime, preferential access will become redundant. The
framework for trade liberalisation has already been established under the Pacific Island
Free trade Agreement (PICTA). Domestic industries will be faced with competitive prices
on the global market.

In areas where stocks are declining or where there are environmental concerns, the
type of technologies permitted and the level of effort allowed influence the supply patterns.
This will affect the industry by determining the production and process method allowed and
conditions under which vessels can operate and supply the markets. An example is the need
to obtain an "affirmative finding" in the form of catch certification from the US
government for yellowfin tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific before it can be exported to
the US. 257 Such environmental concerns, particularly in developed country markets, also
influence consumer choices. There is an increasing use of markets as a regulatory medium
for the management of natural resources. 258 The pressure from such sensitive markets will
impact upon how domestic operators are able to conduct their fishing activities and market
their products.
The above factors will either influence the supply patterns or impact on the
characteristics of demand patterns in the tuna market. Any domestication policies of the
tuna industry in the Pacific Islands States would, therefore, have to take into consideration
the implications of the above global trends.

National Marine Fisheries Service, "Reducing Dolphin Mortality in the Eastern Tropical Tuna Fishery''
MMPA Bulletin, Second Quarter, Issue 15,1999, p.1
2ss Product certification and labelling programs exist in areas of agriculture and forestry products. Cases on
fisheries are also on the rise. This is subject of discussion in chapter 10.
2s1
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8.9

Conclusion

This chapter has identified the external influences on domestication of the tuna industry by
analysing the principal factors that impacted the exports of tuna from the Pacific Islands
States. The chapter has shown that accessibility to the global tuna market is crucial for the
success of domestication strategies. The influence of the global market was determined by
reviewing the supply and demand characteristics of frozen tuna, canned tuna and fresh
chilled tuna. The analysis showed that tuna is truly an international commodity where
market dynamics are affected by several complex factors. The chapter also analysed the
pivotal role played by preferential access to the EU market under the Lome Convention.
The analysis clearly demonstrates that without the trade preferences, the canneries in Fiji
and the Solomon Islands would have long ceased operations. However, these trade
preferences will gradually diminish under the new trade regime of the WTO. Finally, the
chapter points out the importance of quality control and environmental considerations,
which are becoming new external influences (besides tariff reductions) that are likely to
impact domestication and export development of tuna in the Pacific Island States.

257

Chapter 9: Implications of the WTO Subsidies and Investment Measures
for Domestication
9.1

Introduction

The global trading regime will have wide ranging effects on the Pacific Island States
whether they are members of the WTO or not. 1 Under the liberalisation of global trade, 2
protectionist policies are giving way to freer trade, and non-reciprocal principles are being
replaced by reciprocity. This has implications for Pacific Islands' exports of major
commodities that are reliant on non-reciprocal trade arrangements. The pressure on the
Pacific Island States to align their trade policies with WTO rules has increased on a number
3

of fronts. Chapter 7 highlighted the dependence of Pacific Island tuna exports on a global
tuna market that is increasingly driven by the new trade regime.
This chapter expands on how the global trade regime under the WTO will impact
the Pacific Island States' tuna industry domestication efforts. The chapter outlines the WTO
system and identifies agreements that directly influence the fisheries trade. The chapter
then focuses on the issues and attitudes relating to subsidies and investment measures that
are currently under consideration within the WTO to identify their likely implications for

1

Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, as members of the WTO are directly affected by their
obligations to adhere to the given trade rules, while the smaller island States which are not members are
influenced directly by their dependence on the global market for imports and indirectly through their
economic relations with other States who in turn are likely to be members of the WTO.
2
Trade liberalisation refers to the reduction of trade barriers such as tariffs, subsidies, domestic assistance and
quantitative restrictions on exports and imports. (S. J. Bache, M. Haward and S. Dovers, The Impact of
Economic, Environmental, and Trade Instruments upon Fisheries Policy and Management, Report prepared
for Fisheries and Aquaculture Branch, Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry,
Canberra, 2001, p.2.) In the01y, liberalisation of markets allows countries to specialise and develop according
to their comparative advantage. (For example see Ricardo's Theory of Comparative Advantage and
Heckscher- Ohilin Theory of Factor Proportions in M. Mikic, International Trade, Macmillan Press Ltd,
London, 1998.) This in turn allows economies of scale that lowers production cost at a constant quality.
(Ibid). Trade therefore results in lower prices, which allows for a reduction in the cost of consumption or else
an increase in either the quantity or quality of products at a fixed level of expenditure. [Bache et al (2001 ),
p.2]. The opening up of markets also facilitates transfer of technology and the flow of foreign direct
investment (FDI) which helps to accelerate development. (R. Findlay, "Relative Backwardness, Direct
Foreign Investment and the Transfer of Technology: a Simple Dynamic Model", Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 1978, (92), 1-16.
3 For example, the decline in the flow of aid and/or increased conditions on the use of aid by donors, the
eminent decline in the margin of trade preferences and to increase economic growth to meet the welfare needs
of the growing population. Other reasons include the need to improve economic performance by adopting a
market-based approach to management and increase the efficiency of use of scarce resources, together with
the endorsement by the Pacific Islands Forum for a regional free trade agreement as a means of a gradual
integration into the global economy.
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tuna industry domestication in the Pacific Island States. The chapter provides some
strategic policy options for consideration in light of Pacific Island aspirations for
domestication. The chapter stresses that, as the trade agenda evolves and negotiations
continue to streamline trade policies, participation in the debate and understanding the
rights and obligations under the WTO regime are important. This will enable Pacific Island
States to identify the means that will best serve their economic and social interest for tuna
fisheries development.

9.2

GATTI WTO trading system and the fisheries sector

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established in 1947 to promote
an environment for a more liberal or free trade, based on the principles of nondiscrimination, reciprocity and transparency. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) was
established in 1995 under the Final Act of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral negotiations
(1994). 4 The overall purpose of the WTO is to create a trading system5 that ensures free
trade by removing trade barriers and providing a forum for comprehensive trade
negotiations. 6
The WTO Agreements outline the principles of trade liberalisation and the
permitted exceptions. Under the Agreement, a member country is to make its trade policies
transparent by notifying the WTO about laws in force and measures adopted. A member
country is also to specify its commitments to lower tariffs and other trade barriers in order
to open its market. The WTO Agreement also prescribes special treatment for developing
countries in the form of longer time frames and exceptions. 7
The Uruguay Round (1986-1994) provided a broader framework for solving disputes
through the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and the Appellate Body. Schott provides a
4

< http://www.wto.org >-the history of GATT and WTO can be found on the WTO website.
The WTO Trading System consists of the GATT, The Uruguay Round Agreements and the institutions that
facilitate the implementation of these agreements such as the Dispute Settlement Body, and the Committees
on various disciples such as Trade and Environment, Technical Barriers to Trade, Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, Trade related Intellectual Property Rights and Subsidies and Countervailing measures.
6
The World Trade Organisation,< http://www.wto.org >Accessed 28 May 2002.
7
Least Developed countries are not expected to uphold or implement some provisions of GATT, i.e. they are
not obliged to grant equivalent concessions to the developed members. This is to allow them time to diversify
5
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comprehensive assessment of the negotiations. 8 The Millennium Round of Trade
Negotiations, which began in Seattle in November 1999, was marked by violent
demonstrations.
The policy differences among WTO members were varied and complex, involving both NorthSouth issues and, more critically, disputes among the major international powers and that caused
the souring of the Seattle Meeting. 9 Four fifths of the WTO members are developing countries or
economies in transition, therefore the [WTO] Organisation cannot be the enemy of the people
that stood in the streets of Seattle. The proponents of free trade therefore see the Seattle Meeting
as providing lessons for putting a "human face" to globalisation. 10

Studies on the costs and benefits of trade liberalisation policies by those who
support the cause and those that oppose it continue, with both sides shaping and re-shaping
the trade agenda and the negotiation process. I I However, it seems that liberalisation
policies will continue and increasingly play a crucial role in setting the international and
national trade policy agenda. IZ
The WTO Agreements of major relevance to the fisheries sector include: 13
•

Agreement on Implementation of Tariffs Schedules;

•

Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures;

•

Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade;

•

Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM);

•

Agreement on Rules of Origin;

•

Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures;

•

General Agreement on Trade in Services;

their economies. Developing countries are allowed longer transition periods. However, members of the WTO
are generally expected to adhere to the principles of the system.
8 J. J. Schott and J. W. Bourman, The Uruguay Round. An Assessment, Institute for International Economics.
WashingtonDC, 1994.
9 J. J. Schott, "The WTO After Seattle", in J. J. Schott, (ed.) The WTO after Seattle, Institute for International
Economic, Washington, DC, 2000, p.xvii.
lO Ibid.
11 For example the two dominant views stem from those that support economic liberalism and the
modernisation ideology and those that critique from socialist and culturalist perspectives. Other views range
from these two extreme perspectives along a continuum between the two perspectives with varying degrees of
reservations and skepticism.
12 The force of globalisation is more eminent with the breakdown of socialist and communist regimes and
their embrace of the free market economy.
13 A. Filhol, Effect of World Trade Organisation's Regulation on World Fish Trade, Globelfish Research
Programme, Volume 65, Rome, Food and Agriculture Organisation, 2000; "International Trade in Tuna",
< http://www.globefish.org/presentations/GATTengl/sldOOl.htm>, (accessed 11December2001).
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•

Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures; and

•

Dispute Settlement.

In the context of domestication of the tuna industry, four of the above agreements that are
likely to have significant implications in the Pacific Islands are analysed. These are the
Agreement on Subsidies; the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures,
Agreement of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade.

9.3

WTO and the subsidies discipline

Subsidies through investment grants, direct financial transfers and soft loans have played a
significant role in the domestication of the tuna industry. Current domestication efforts and
foreign fishing under access agreements continue to operate with various forms of
subsidies. Any changes to the subsidy regime, therefore, will impact on the operation of
both the domestic tuna industry and the foreign fishing activities in the Pacific Islands
region. This will not only affect those States that are members of the WTO but also the
smaller island States highly dependent on tuna resources who are not members.
At the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001, members
agreed to include fisheries subsidies in the new round of trade negotiations. 14 The global
concerns over the sustainability - of important fisheries resources and increased
inefficiencies in the fishing industry causing trade distortions have led to growing pressure
to reduce fisheries subsidies. Subsidies have been identified as a major cause of excess
fishing in the absence of effective management, resulting in over-exploitation. 15 Since
1994, fisheries subsidies have been subject to more stringent controls under the WTO's
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), which is a general
subsidies agreement on industrial goods.

14

World Trade Organization (WTO), Ministerial Declaration adopted on 14 November 2001 at Doha, (Para
28), WT/MIN(Ol)/DEC/l.
15
World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Subsidies and Depletion of World Fisheries: Case Studies, Endangered Seas
Campaign, WWF, Washington, D.C.,1997; R. Amason, "Fisheries Subsidies, Overcapitalisation and
Economic Losses", in A Hatcher and K. Robinson (eds.), Overcapacity, Overcapitalisation and Subsidies in
European Fisheries, Proceedings of the First Workshop, Portsmouth, UK, 28-30October1998, pp. 27~ 45.
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9.4

Theoretical context of subsidies

A subsidy is a form of government support to an economic sector (or institution, business
or industry), generally with the aim of promoting an activity that the government considers
beneficial to the economy overall and society at large. 16 The subsidy can be supplied in the
form of a monetary payment, or other transfer, or through relief of an opportunity cost. 17
Alternatively, a subsidy can be a government expenditure that makes a resource cheaper to
produce than its full economic costs or makes a product cheaper to consumers. 18
Critics say that economic distortions created by subsidies tend to divert resources
from more productive to less productive uses, interfere with price signals and, therefore,
reduce economic efficiency and are a waste of scarce resources. 19 Others argue that
subsidies serve a redistributive goal and help to deal with externalities and therefore correct
market failures. 20 Steenblik argues that in recent years subsidies have been pressed into
service as a catch-all for any benefit granted to an individual, firm or sector, including
those [benefits] resulting from government inaction.21 Steenblik's argument captures the
economic rationale used in environmental policy which states that goods should reflect the
full cost of production. Any environmental externality must be internalised and reflected in
the cost of production. The failure to account for externalities artificially increases
consumption of a good. This ultimately· leads to increase in environmental degradation.
Goods are sold at low prices and markets get distorted. Any market distortion will affect
trade. In the context of international trade, subsidies allow the natural advantages possessed
by one country in producing and exporting a good to be offset by an artificially created

16

N. Myers, and J. Kent, Perverse Subsidies: tax dollars undercutting Economies and Environments alike.
The International Institute for Sustainable Development. Winnipeg, Manta, 1998, p. 2.
17J. Keppler, "Public Goods, Infrastructure, Externalities and Subsidies", OECD, Paris, France, 1995 (cited
in): Myers, N. and J. Kent (1998), op. cit., n.16, p.3.
18 Ibid.
19 Myers and Kent (1998), op. cit., n.16.
20
Ibid.
21 R Steenblik, Previous Multilateral Efforts to Discipline Subsidies to Natural Resource based Industries.
Paper presented the Workshop on the Impact of Government Financial Transfers on Fisheries Management,
Resource Sustainability, and international trade. 17- 19 August 1998. Manila, Philippines, 1999, p.1.
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advantage by another country, thus distorting international markets and frustrating the
22

operation of specialisation in international trade.

9.5

Subsidies in the fisheries sector

Subsidies in the fisheries sector assume a variety of forms and are primarily provided to
reduce the operating and capital costs of harvesting. 23 Subsidies are provided to reduce
operating costs, reduce fishing vessel construction or maintenance cost, or those provided
indirectly by way of income support and as part of fisheries management schemes.

24

After decades of increase in catches, marine capture fisheries appear to have
exceeded their sustainable output in many important fisheries through both increases in
effort and improvements in fishing technology.25 If the catch were measured by value
instead of weight, the decline would be even more marked as most valuable stocks are
fished out and fishers have to hunt other less valuable species. 26 A number of case studies
provide evidence of declines in stocks. 27 According to FAO' s most recent assessment of the
state of world's major fish stock for which information is available, 70% was either fully
exploited, overfished, depleted or recovering slowly from depletion.

28

With fisheries industrialisation policies of the 1950s, as landings increased so did
the construction of fishing vessels. Between 1970 and 1989, the total Gross Registered
Tonnage (GRT) of fishing vessels increased by 87%. 29 Between 1992 and 1997, tonnage on
the register of flag States increased by only 3%

22

30

but the world's fleet increased 22% in

S. J. Bache, M. Haward and S. Dovers, The Impact of Economic, Environmental, and Trade Instruments
upon Fisheries policy and Management, Report for Fisheries and Aquaculture Branch, Australian Department
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Center for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 2001 .
23
A. Filhol, Effect of World Trade Organisation's Regulation on World Fish Trade, Globefish Research
.
Programme, Vol. 65, Rome, FAO, 2000, p.8.
24
WTO, Committee on Trade and Environment, "Environmental Benefits of Removing Trade Restrictions
and Distortions", Note by the Secretariat, WT/CTE/W/67, 1997, Geneva, WTO.
25
J. R McGoodwin, Crisis in the World's Fisheries: People, Problems and Policies, Stanford University
Press, Stanford, California, 1995; Myers and Kent (1998), op. cit., n 16.
~~ P. Weber, Net Loss: Fish ~ob~ and the Marine Enviro~ment, Worldwatch Institute, Washington, D.C, 1994.
See for example case studies m WWF A global Overvtew, The Footprints ofDistant Water Fleets on World
Fisheries, WWF International, UK, 1998, pp.17-82.
28
FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2002, FAO, Rome, 2003.
29
B. Chaytor, "An Examination of Trade and Environmental Policy Responses to Challenges of fisheries
~ubsidi~s", R~iew ofEuropean Community and International Environmental Law, 8(3), 1999, pp. 275-283.
J. F1tzpatnck and C. Newton, Assessment of the World's Fishing Fleet 1991- 1997, Greenpeace
International, 15 January 1998, p.3.
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terms of potential fishing capacity through new additions and refits. 31 Given the
sophisticated technology of the 1990s, only half of the world's fishing fleet would be
needed to catch the maximum sustainable yield of fish. 32
Fishing fleet overcapacity has been identified by the FAO, WWF, UNEP and other
international experts either as a major cause of unsustainable levels of fishing, or as the
principal threat to marine capture fishery resources. 33 The dramatic decline of the world's
marine fisheries from overfishing is widely understood as a problem of overcapitalisation in
the world's fishing industries - the addition to the fleet of more fishing power than the
fisheries resources could sustain. 34 The overcapacity problem has been blamed on open
access where fishers take more than required because of lack of any limitations or controls.
Subsidies on the other hand have accelerated the overcapitalisation of the fishing industry
and hindered the process of reducing capacity.35
The FAO estimated annual fisheries subsidies to be around US$54 billion. 36 This is
made up of government subsidies including price controls, fuel tax exemptions, low interest
loans, outright grants for gear and other infrastructure. 37 However, a recent assessment by
the World Bank estimates the total annual subsidies to be more likely around $16 to 22
billion per year. 38 This is equivalent to about 20 to 25% of the fisheries sector revenue. 39

31

F AO, Precautionary Approach to Fsheries, Technology and Fishery Legislation, Part Two. Scientific
Papers FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 350, FAO, Rome, 1996, p. 210.
32
Myers and Kent (1998), op. cit., n.16, p.129.
33
For example see: FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 1996, FAO, Rome, 1997; World
Wildlife Fund, The Footprints of Distant Water Fleets on World Fisheries, WWF Endangered Seas
Campaign, WWF International, Washington, D. C., 1998.
F AO, The International Plan of Action for Management of Fishing Capacity, Fisheries Department, F AO,
Rome, 1999.
J. Kirkley, and D. Squires, "Measuring capacity and capacity utilization in fisheries", in D. Greboval (ed.)
Managing Capacity: Selected Papers on Underlying Concepts and Issues, FAO, Rome, 1999.
D. Greboval, and G. Munro, "Overcapitalization and excess capacity in world fisheries: underlying economics
and methods of control", in D . Greboval (ed.) Managing Capacity: Selected Papers on Underlying Concepts
and Issues, FAO, Rome, 1999.
G. Porter, Fisheries Subsidies and Oveifzshing: Towards a Structured Discussion, Fisheries and Environment,
United Nations Environment Programme, 2001.
34 G. Porter, "Euro-African Fishing Agreements: subsidizing overfishing in African Waters", in Subsidies and
Depletion of World Fisheries: Case Studies, WWF's Endangered Seas Campaign, Washington, 1997, p.7.
35
Ibid.
36 FAO, Marine Fisheries and Law of the Sea: A decade of change, FAO Circular No. 853, FAO, Rome,
1993.
37
Ibid.
38
M. Milazzo, Subsidies in World Fisheries: a reexamination, World Bank Technical Paper No. 406,
Fisheries Series, Washington, D.C., 1998.
·
39
Ibid.
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Numerous case studies exist which provide evidence of how governments have
.
•ty40
continued to provide subsidies for the fleets to continue fishing and expandmg capac1 ·
The extension of coastal States maritime jurisdiction is also seen as a factor that
exacerbated the overcapacity problem due to subsidies.41 This resulted in resource-rich
coastal States providing financial support to their domestic fleet to take advantage of
fishing opportunities vacated by foreign fleets. States more dependent on distant water
fleets helped their own excessively large fleets to adjust - by vessel decommissioning
schemes and in some cases also by re-directing their vessels to other EEZs and into the high
seas. 42
While the empirical knowledge of "trade" consequences of fisheries subsidies is
less well documented than "environmental" consequences, the absolute magnitude and
relative scale of fisheries subsidies suggests that they have significant impacts on
international markets.43 With increasing trade in fish and fish products and their importance
as a source of food, trade impacts of fisheries subsidies will only increase. A number of
disputes involving fish and fish products have already been brought before the Dispute
Settlement Panel of the WT0.44
9.6

Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

The original GATT rules applied only to subsidies for exports of industrial (non-primary)
products. Subsidies provided to promote exports of primary commodities (agriculture and
fish products) were exempted from international trade rules. Despite similarities between
agriculture and fisheries, fisheries subsidies were excluded from the terms of the

40

Weber (1994), op. cit., n. 26; A. Hatcher and K. Robinson (eds.), Overcapacity, Overcapita/isation and
Subsidies in European Fisheries, Proceedings of the First Workshop held in Portsmouth, United Kingdom,
28-30 October, 1998; WWF, Subsidies and the Depletion of World Fisheries: case studies, 1991, WWF's
Endangered Seas Campaign.
Milazzo, (1998), op. cit. n. 38.
G. Porter, Fisheries Subsidies and Overfishing: Towards a Structured Discussion, Fisheries and Environment,
United Nations Environment Programme, 2001.
41
Milazzo (1998), op. cit., n.38.
42
Steenblik, (1998), op. cit., n.21, p.21; Milazzo, (1998), op. cit., n.38, p.5.
43 Ibid.
44
E. Ruckes, FAO International Trade in Fishery Products and the New Global Trading Environment
Fisheries Industries Division, Module 12, 1999, FAO, Rome.
'
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Agricultural Agreement.

45

However, since 1994, fisheries subsidies have been brought

under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM). The Agreement
deals with multilateral disciplines that regulate how a WTO member country may provide a
subsidy, and the countervailing measures that offset injury caused by subsidies.
The ASCM defines subsidies as financial contributions provided by governments
that confer a benefit.

46

These include such things as transfer of funds, potential direct

transfer of funds or liabilities, foregone revenue, goods and services (other than general
infrastructure), and price and income support programmes. 47
Subsidies can be either specific or non-specific. Only a specific subsidy within the
context of Part I of the ASCM is subject to multilateral trade rules and countervailing
measures. Specific subsidies are those that are directed at certain industries, enterprises, and
groups and industries or enterprises in a given geographic region. 48 Non-specific subsidies
are general and broadly distributed in a country.49 Subsidies are further categorised into
three groups: prohibited, actionable, and non-actionable. Prohibited subsidies are those that
directly affect trade such as promoting exports (export subsidies) or restricting imports (use
of domestic goods). 50 Non-actionable subsidies include all non-specific subsidies and
specific subsidies if they assist disadvantaged regions or promote adaptation of existing
facilities to new environmental requirements. 51 Actionable subsidies must be "specific" and
have adverse effects on the interests of other members and cause an "injury to or serious

45

Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (1994) Annex I. Product Coverage l(i)- excluding" fish and
fish products". During the Uruguay Round Negotiations, fisheries were discussed in the Negotiating Group on
Natural Resources Based Products (NRBPs).There were several proposals on fisheries dealing with subsidies,
access, tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The work of the negotiating group on NRBPs was not successful due to
disagreements by the EU, Japan and Korea on linking access to resources with access to markets. As a result,
fisheries subsidies were included under the WTO Subsidies Agreement (ASCM) which covers all other goods
except agriculture - (G. Porter, Fisheries Subsidies and Overfishing: Towards a Structured Discussion,
Fisheries and Environment, United Nations Environment Programme, 2001, p.4).
46
ASCM - Article 1.1.
47
ASCM- Article 1.
48
ASCM - Article 2.2.
49
ASCM- Article 2. [non-specific subsidies are those that are applicable to the general public such as
provision of government infrastructure to the benefit of all and not specific to any particular group or
industry.]
50
ASCM -Article 3.
51 ASCM - Article 8. Non-specific subsidies are non-actionable unless it can be demonstrated that they are
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prejudice"s 2 to the interests of the domestic industry of another member. s A senous
prejudice claim requires proof of either trade displacement, price undercutting or changes
. mark et shares. S4
m
In order to determine if a subsidy is in violation of the ASCM, a member country

must show that the subsidy is specific, that it fits within the category of an actionable
subsidy and that it causes an adverse economic effect.ss Article 25 of the ASCM requires
WTO member States to notify subsidies granted or maintained within their territories.
Notification of subsidies should be detailed enough to use the data to evaluate whether a
subsidy is distorting trade. A WTO member State can use the WTO' s Dispute Settlement
procedure to seek withdrawal of the subsidy or its adverse effects. A State can also carry
out its own investigations and charge extra duty on subsidised imports if they are found to
be hurting domestic producers. s6 A developing country WTO member can apply for special
and differential treatment during the transition period or until it has reached export
competitiveness in any of the given products for which it will phase out the subsidies. s7 A
least developed country whose per capita GNP is less than US$ 1,000 a year is exempted
from the obligations of the ASCM. ss
No WTO member has yet challenged another member's fisheries subsidies under
the ASCM. One of the difficulties in assessing the impact of subsidies in fisheries trade is
the choice of a suitable measures 9 since the ASCM requires quantification of subsidies in
terms of costs to the granting government. 60 Subsidy notifications to the Committee of the
ASCM indicate that notifications are not as specific as the Agreement requires. 61 The

52

Serious prejudice exists when the ad valorem subsidisation of a product is greater than 5%; subsidies cover
operating losses sustained by an industry; operating losses of an enterprise on a regular basis; debt is forgiven
or grants are provided to cover debts (Article 6 -ASCM).
53
ASCM - Article 5 (a).
54
ASCM - Article 6.
55
Milazzo, (1998), op. cit., n. 38.
56
ASCM - Article 11.
57
Export competitiveness exists if the developing country member's export of the product has reached a share
of 3.25 % in the world trade in two consecutive years. (Article 26.6 -ASCM).
58
ASCM - Annex VII.
59
Milazzo (1998) op. cit., n. 38, p. 14.
60
Un?udgeted sub~idies such as publicly managed resources, tax preferences or those managed by other
agencies are more difficult to measure than budgeted subsidies.
61
Chaytor, (1999) op. cit., n. 29, p. 282.

267

general nature of the data does not allow a systematic evaluation of the effects of subsidies
on trade. 62
While there is a global concern over the sustainability of fish stocks, and therefore
its trade implications, there is no clear consensus yet on how fisheries subsidies should be
dealt with under the WTO rules. The WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE)
together with other international organisations such as the FAO, OECD and UNEP are
working towards building consensus on clarification and elaboration of new rules and
guidelines on dealing with fisheries subsidies.

9.7

Broadening the definition of fisheries subsidies

Several studies and work programmes have been initiated by inter-governmental and nongovernmental organisations and the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment to study
the effects of fisheries subsidies on trade and sustainability for fisheries resources. 63 The
discussion below summarises some of the major attitudes towards the WTO's narrow
definition of subsidies in the fisheries sector.

9.7.1

WTO- Committee on Trade and Environment discussion

In 1999 New Zealand made a submission to the CTE requesting the elimination of fisheries

subsidies that contribute to fisheries overcapacity because of their environmentally
damaging and trade distorting effects. 64 The United States also indicated that additional

Ibid.
See summary of details in: RP., Steenblik and G. R Munro, International Work on Fishery Subsidies- an
update at, 1999 < http://www.oecd.org.pdf/M00005000/M00005866.pdf> (accessed on 13 September, 2002.)
See also: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD}, Financial Support to the
Fishing Industry of OECD Member Countries, Paris, OECD, 1980; 1993 Economic Assistance to the Fishing
Industry: Observations and Findings (Document Number AGR/FI (93) 11 REVl .OECD, Review of Fisheries
in OECD Countries, Paris, 1996; OECD, Transition to Responsible Fisheries: Economic and Policy
Implications, Paris, 2000; F AO, Marine Fisheries and the Law of the Sea, FAO Fisheries Circular No. 853,
Rome,1993; FAO, 1998 The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture,, FAO Rome, 1999, FAO, Report of
the Expert Consultation on Economic Incentives and Responsible Fisheries, Rome, 28 November - 1
December 2000, FAO Report No. 638, Rome, 2001; Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), Study into
the Nature and Extent of Subsidies in the Fisheries Sector of APEC Member Economies, Fisheries Working
Group, and APEC Secretariat, APEC Publication 00- FS-01.1, Singapore, 2001; United Nations Environment
Programme, Fisheries Subsidies, Overfishing and Trade. Environment and Trade Series, 1998; M. Milazzo,
Subsidies in World Fisheries: a reexamination. World Bank Technical Paper No.408, Fisheries Series, World
Bank, 1998.
64 Benefits of Eliminating Trade Distorting and Environmentally Damaging Subsidies in the Fisheries Sector,
28June1999. (WT/CTE/W/121).
62
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capacity exacerbated overfishing so that most subsidies have a negative impact from a
conservation point of view. 65 The EU on the other hand argued that not all subsidies had a
negative impact on fishing capacity. 66
At the special session of the General Council of the WTO on the Multilateral Trade
Round in 1999, Iceland proposed the elimination of subsidies that contribute to
overcapacity because they distort trade and undermine sustainable development.

67

This was

supported by ct number of developing countries. 68 A coalition group called ''The Friends of
Fish"69 lobbied within the CTE to include discussion on fisheries subsidies in the Seattle
Ministerial Conference. 70 While there was no agreement reached, discussions have
continued in the CTE with a focus on the linkage between subsidies, overcapitalisation and
overfishing.
Japan on the other hand argued that the impact of subsidies cannot be determined in
the abstract, but within the context of a particular management system.

71

The Japanese

proposal stated that :fisheries subsidies should be based on a case by case approach by
identifying the different types of management systems in which the subsidy would have a
negative effect. 72
Based on the findings of a study by Munro and Sumaila on the impact of subsidies
on the management of the ecosystem of the North Atlantic, New Zealand submitted a
communication note to the CTE as comments on Para 32(1) of the Doha Declaration. It
stated that subsidies such as vessel buy-back schemes, considered to be benign, are in fact

65

Environmentally- Harmful and Trade Distorting Subsidies, 4 July 2000, (WT/CTE/W/154).
Comments by the European Community on the Document of the Secretariat of the CTE (WT/CTE/W/80)
on Subsidies and Aid Granted, Note by the European Community, 6 November 1998, (WT/CTE/W/99).
67
Preparation for the 1999 Ministerial Conference- Fisheries Subsidies, Communication from Iceland, 6 July
1999, (WT/GC/W/229).
68
Porter (1997), op. cit., n. 34.
69
Australia, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines and USA.
7
Fisheries Subsidies- Communication from Australia, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines and
the United States, (WT/GC/W/303), 6 August 1999.
71
Submission by Japan - Japan's Basic Position on the Fishery Subsidy Issue, 20 October 2000,
(WT/CTE/W/173).
72
Ibid.
66

°

269

damaging.

73

The submission argued that even if management regimes are m place,

subsidies continue to undermine resource sustainability. 74

9.7.2

Inter-governmental organisations

Some of the OECD countries have been major providers of subsidies, first for fleet
expansion, then for restructuring programmes. 75 An ad hoc Expert Group examining
economic assistance to fishing industries stated that lack of government inteivention
constituted an implicit subsidy. 76 The report concluded that if the management regime does
not require fishers to take account of full costs of fish haivesting, fishers are considered to
be receiving subsidies; for example, where foreign access is paid by a government, it is a
subsidy. 77 The report was however received with mixed feelings among the OECD
countries. The EU, which provides the most extensive range of subsidies, 78 advised the
CTE that some subsidies have helped reduce capacity by addressing social concerns related
to fisheries. 79 Canada also supported the idea of distinguishing between subsidies that are
detrimental to the environment and those that are neutral. 80
Within the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) economies, fisheries are
one of the sectors targeted for early voluntary sectoral liberalisation and fast track trade
liberalisation. 81 APEC commissioned a study to investigate subsidies in the fisheries sector
and how the ASCM applied to those subsidies.82 APEC's study indicated that many of the
subsidies were directed at small-scale regional development to support adjustment or for
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G. R Munro and U.R Sumaila, Subsidies and the Potential Impact on the Management of the Ecosystem of
the North Atlantic, Fisheries Center, University of British Columbia, 2001; Submission from New Zealand on
Paragraph 32(1) of the Doha Declaration, 19 March 2002, (WT/CTE/W/204).
74 Ibid.
75
Milazzo (1998), op. cit, n. 38.
76 OECD, Committee for Fisheries, Economic Assistance to the Fishing Industry: Observations and Findings,
Paris, OECD, 1993 (Cited in): Milazzo, (1998), op. cit., n.38, p. 60-61.
77 Ibid.
78 Johnstone estimates that the annual EU Fisheries budget is 875 million Euro, 80% of which is allocated to
securing and subsidizing access license for the EU distant water vessels and re-structuring and modernizing
the fishing fleet under structural adjustment. [N. Johnston, The Economic of Fishing Access Agreements:
Discussion Paper on prospects on the EU-Senegal Case Study, IIED 96-02, 1996].
79 Milazzo (1998), op. cit., n.38.
80
Ibid., p. 8.
81 APEC, Study into the Nature and Extent ofSubsidies in the Fisheries Sector ofAPEC Members Economies,
Fisheries Working Group, APEC Secretariat, Singapore, 2000, p.1.
82 Ibid.
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environmental reasons. 83 While there were differences among APEC economies, these
programmes, together with capital and infrastructure support, were not seen as subsidies in
the context of WTO's ASCM as they were considered legitimate functions of
government. 84 Enforcement, rehabilitation of habitat and maintenance of government
infrastructure were not considered as fisheries subsidies.85 Thus, the level of actionable
subsidies in the APEC economies under the ASCM was considered to be low.

86

However, the APEC study concluded that subsidies could have a different effect in
practice from the intended objective. This was because of the backward-bending supply
beyond the maximum sustainable yield point of the fisheries.87 Subsidies designed to
enhance fish stocks or vessel buy-back programmes to constrain fishing effort and enhance
fisheries sustainability cannot be guaranteed to have precisely the intended positive effect. 88
A World Bank technical report by Milazzo analysed subsidies from an
environmental policy perspective89 and argued that the inability or unwillingness to levy
adequate charges for use of publicly managed resources is a "subsidy". 90 Milazzo argued
that governments need to charge user fees for their own fishers in order to reduce
overcapacity and recover some of the management costs. 91 With increased use of limited
entry systems such as ITQs and license limitations, participation is being restricted and
therefore fishers should pay for the privilege. 92 Milazzo contends that subsidy reforms and
market-based incentives will enhance the fisheries sector's long-term economic
sustainability and society's general welfare. 93 The argument is that reform of fisheries

Ibid.
Ibid.
SS Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87
Ibid. [The backward bending part of the supply curve represents a fishery where effort is beyong
sustianbale levels ie. beyong MSY].
88
FAO, Report of the Expert Consultation on Economic Incentives and Responsible Fisheries. FAO Report
No. 638, FAO, Rome, 2001.
89
The principle of environmental policy states that pric~s should reflect the full cost of production. The price
of goods should reflect the total cost of environmental externalities associated with their production. In the
contex~ of fis~e?~s, user fee could be set to recover socie~'s full cost including costs associated with impact
of fishing activtties on resources other than targeted species, designed, at the minimum, to recover cost of
management and if possible to recover society's full cost for removing a resource in the present as opposed to
future. [Milazzo, (1998), op. cit., n.38].
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subsidies alone will not put the sector back on a sustainable path but that effective
management is fundamental to fisheries development. Furthermore, effective management
must be through market-based incentives such as through implementation of property rights
or harvesting rights. In this way, full cost recovery or resource pricing should be seen as
normal government charges and failure to levy these fees at adequate levels should be
treated as subsidy. 94
The United Nations Environment Programme's (UNEP's) study is specifically
focussed on the links between overcapacity and overfishing and the impacts of subsidies
under different management conditions. 95 The general emphasis of the study is on adopting
an environmental policy approach that could move fisheries towards more efficient
resource use principles and sustainable management. Porter categorised the impact of
subsidies on fisheries resources as those relating to fisheries management services, capital
costs including infrastructure, decommissioning and license retirement, access to foreign
fisheries and subsidies to incomes. 96
In February 1999 the FAO adopted a voluntary International Plan of Action for the
Management of Fishing Capacity which calls for States to develop national plan of action
for capacity management. The Plan requires States to "reduce and progressively eliminate
all factors, including subsidies that contribute to excessive fishing capacity."97 The FAO
also convened an expert consultation on economic incentives and responsible fisheries,
which discussed the definitions and classification of fisheries subsidies and their impact on
fisheries resources and trade. 98
The FAO has classified the effects of subsidies on trade as having revenue
enhancing/decreasing or cost reducing/ increasing effects. 99 The FAO Expert Consultation
on Identifying, Assessing and Reporting on Subsidies in the Fishing Industry agreed that
support to the fisheries sector funded through foreign aid should be considered as
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Fund, 27 June 2002.
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subsidy. 100 The FAO has further developed a methodology for generating quantitative data
for assessing the impact of subsidies. 101 This FAO Guide uses the wider definition of
subsidies to incorporate the evaluation of impacts on the environment.
identifies four categories of subsidies in the fisheries sector:

102

The FAO Guide

103

•

direct financial transfers;

•

services and indirect financial transfers;

•

interventions with different short and long-term effects; and

•

lack of intervention.

The FAO Guide is an attempt to provide a methodology for gathering data and quantifying
subsidies for the first two of the above categories. The data generated can be used to
analyse the impact of the particular subsidy, whether it is a positive or a negative subsidy

104

on the industry, and its trade implications.

9.8

Issues arising from the fisheries subsidies debate

It is becoming apparent now that subsidies undermine the sustainable use of fisheries
resources. The current knowledge of the magnitude and effects of subsidies on the fish
trade is limited and there are a number of deficiencies in the data on subsidies.

105

Consequently, the environmental effects of subsidies are receiving more attention than the
trade effects. Three major issues that emerge from the above discussions are discussed
below.

°
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103
Ibid, p. 34.
104
FAO Guide distinguishes between subsidies that are: "revenue enhancing/decreasing" and "cost
enhancing/decreasing". Based on the case of the application of the subsidy, some reference can be made to
identify whether the subsidy is positive (beneficial) or negative (harmful) to the environment. This will in tum
give an indication whether the subsidy is trade distorting or not.
105
FAO, Expert Consultation on Economic Incentives and Responsible Fisheries, FAO Fisheries Report No
638, F AO, Rome, 2000.

273

9.8.1

Over-capacity and over-exploitation

The connection between subsidies and overfishing has been on the agenda of international
environmental institutions and forums since the last two decades. 106 In the 1996 report to
the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, the Secretary General of the United
Nations urged the reduction of subsidies to the fishing industry and the abolition of
incentives that lead to overfishing. 107 The FAO Plan of Action for the Management of
Fishing Capacity also acknowledges that subsidies have contributed to fishing overcapacity and calls for States to "reduce and progressively eliminate all factors, including
subsidies and economic incentives and other factors which contribute, directly or indirectly,
to the build-up of excessive fishing capacity.... " 108
The removal of subsidies raises questions for fisheries that are under-exploited or
are in a developmental stage, such as those of the Pacific Island States. There are likely
negative consequences for the industry and removing subsidies in such fisheries will do
little to enhance stocks. 109

9.8.2 Distinguishing between positive and negative subsidies
The above general opinion of subsidies at the CTE and the international organisations
supports the view that the impact of subsidies must be seen in terms of its wider economic
effects on the industry and society as a whole. Subsidies such as those for research
activities, disadvantaged regions and environmental regulations must be notified to the
ASCM Committee, but are however, non-actionable unless it can be demonstrated that they
. practice
. and cause harm. llO
are spec1'fi1c m
Subsidies on management of resources such as restrictions on gear or vessel
decommissioning are controversial depending on how exactly the schemes are designed

106

For details see: Chaytor, (1999), op. cit., n.29; Steenblik, (1999), op. cit., n.21.
Report of the Secretary General - section IV, Para 18. The United National Commission on Sustainable
Development. Report (E/CN.17/1996/3).
108 FAO, The International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (1999) - para 26.
109 Once the fish population reaches its carrying capacity growth in stock eases. Therefore, sustainable
harvests can lead to positive growth as a means of optimising the benefits of the resource seen as a "capital
stock". Therefore removing subsidies in an under-expolited stcok does not make any difference to stock
enhancement.
110 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Subsidies, Countervailing Measures and
Developing Countries: with a focus on the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
UNCTAD/DITC/COM/23, 4 July 2000.
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and implemented. For example, in a vessel-decommissioning scheme, the easy mobility of
capital can allow vessels to be re-fitted to operate in other fisheries. Restrictions on one
type of gear can easily lead to adoption of other gear. The contention is that many such
schemes that are non-actionable subsidies should be based on a case-specific basis now and
that the policy approach should consider the impact of the management scheme on the
fishing industry as a whole, including its extemality effects.

111

There is further contention

that what may be considered as "specific" for one country may be considered as a normal
function of government for another and therefore not a subsidy.

112

An example of this can

be a country where fishers are required to pay for the management cost of protection of a
marine habitat because they are the main beneficiaries of habitat protection; while in
another country habitat protection is seen as government action for the benefit of society at
large.

9.8.3

Environmental policy

The subsidies debate expands the definition of subsidies from government financial
transfers to incorporate the "user pay" principle and costs associated with government inaction. This relates to the principle of environmental policy that states that prices should
reflect the full cost of production:
The price of goods should reflect the total cost of environmental externalities associated
with their production, because the failure to consider a particular cost of a product can lead
to creation of negative externality which is a cost not borne by the producer or consumer
but the entire society. The failure to internalise these externalities results in artificially
increased consumption of the good and greater degradation of the environment. The good is
sold at low prices and the market is distorted. Subsidies facilitate the externalities in the
market place by covering part of the cost of production. 113

This perspective argues that certain management costs that are directly benefiting the
fishers should be internalised and that management should be based on cost-recovery
principles.

111

G. R Munro and U. R Sumaila, Subsidies and the Potential Impact on the Management of the Ecosystem
of the North Atlantic, Fisheries Center, University of British Columbia, 2001 - (Submission from New
Zealand on Paragraph 32 (1) of the Doha Declaration, 19 March 2002, (WT/CTE/W/204).
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Industry, 3-6 December 2002, FAO Fisheries Report No.698, 2003, Appendix E., p.28].
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9.9

Implications of subsidies discipline on domestication of tuna

According to SPC scientific assessments, the tuna stock in the Pacific Islands region is
generally in a healthy state except for bigeye. 114 The discussion in chapters 2 and 3 also
shows that Pacific Island States have a strong desire to develop their domestic industrial
capability. In the light of the ongoing debate_on subsidies and the push towards a broader
definition of subsidies, the potential impacts on domestication can be significant. The
recent FAO categorisation of subsidies is adopted here.

9.9.1

Direct financial transfers

Investment grants to purchase vessels, equity infusions, and grants to establish jointventures have been used for large-scale industrial tuna fisheries development throughout
the Pacific Islands States, as the case studies on Fiji and Kiribati have revealed. In a number
of Pacific Island States, currently direct financial transfers are also commonly used to assist
small-scale fishers to develop an artisanal commercial tuna fishery. For example, Fiji has
established a revolving fund to provide seed money to assist indigenous owner
participation. 115

9.9.2

Services and indirect financial transfers

Subsidies commonly found in the Pacific Islands tuna industry include construction of
fisheries-specific infrastructure such as ports and landing sites; fuel tax exemption or
concession for fishing vessel fuel; tax concessions and exemptions; deferred tax
programmes; and loans made on favourable terms.

Other forms of subsidies include:

training and extension support services, fisheries information services, tax-free factories,
ownership restrictions, reduced charges by government services, waivers of import duties,
and tariffs. 116 In terms of domestication, subsidies in the "services and indirect financial
transfers" category are widely used measures to attract foreign fishing vessels to re-locate
to Pacific Island ports and foreign investors to form joint ventures. Subsidies in this group
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116
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are also often used to assist domestic operators to develop commercial tuna fisheries. A
report by the Forum Secretariat reveals that almost all Pacific Islands Forum members use
tax concessions to attract foreign investments. 117

For example, Fiji has an incentive

package that includes income tax concession, tax deduction on export income, investment
allowance on purchase of capital assets for the fisheries sector, duty exemption on gear and
equipment for exporters and duty free import of fishing vessels.

118

Ownership restrictions, training, reduced charges by government agencies such as
export inspection costs are designed to assist domestic fishers to participate in the fishery.

The Papua New Guinea Fisheries Management Act (1998) states clear guidelines for the
operation of companies in the longline fishery: 119
In the interest of meaningful Papua New Guinean participation in this developing industry, tuna
longline ventures will be restricted to citizens and national companies. Ventures with more than
49 percent foreign shareholding shall not be permitted. 120

The ownership restriction by the government is seen to confer benefit to domestic partners
for controlling interest in the joint venture. 121 In the case of the Solomon Islands, Solomon
Taiyo (now Soltai) qualifies for a remission of goods tax on spares, fishing gear, crew food
and supplies because it is involved in processing. 122 In the FSM (not a WTO member),
longline vessels that offload their catch in port are charged a lower access fee. 123 In Fiji,
foreign vessels that land their catch in Fiji are not required to pay the 5% access fee. 124
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9.9.3

Interventions with different short and long-term effects

The subsidies in this category include government interventions that have short-term
negative economic impact on the industry but ultimately result in long-term benefits. 125
Such subsidies include technology transfers, protection of marine areas, food safety and
hygiene regulations and gear regulations. The FAO Guide adopts the principle that fishers
benefit from successful fisheries management by increased long-term sustainable output,
therefore any management assistance is seen as a subsidy.
Whether these long-term benefits from management can be considered subsidies in
practice depends on country specific situation as only a few countries recover management
costs.

126

The FAO Guide is therefore not clear in terms of defining what are "specific"

subsidies to the fisheries sector in this respect, since there is no given standard or
benchmark because quantifying these benefits are more complex. As an interim measure, to
distinguish between non-specific or general government actions or in-actions, a "normal"
situation is used as a benchmark against which a specific subsidy is measured; anything
different from the normal reference point is a specific subsidy. 127 The national context of
the country will decide if a management measure is to be provided free of charge as a
normal practice. In such a case, the management measure will not be recorded as a subsidy
even though it is considered as a long-term subsidy under the new broader definition of
subsidies. In the Pacific Islands region, almost all fisheries management services are paid
by the government and only modest licensing fee or administrative costs are charged. Most
domestic operators benefit from such management schemes and are taken for granted.

9.9.4 Lack of intervention
The subsidies in this category include non-enforcement of existing regulations, lack of
pollution control and free access to fisheries resources. Such subsidies benefit the industry
in the short term but will have possible negative long-term consequences. This category and
125

FAO (2003), op. cit., n.112, p. 35.
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the previous category look at long-term subsidy issues. In the context of Pacific Island
domestication of the tuna industry, these are seen as possible future challenges to industry
development as methodologies and benchmark studies are developed to assess the impact
of such subsidies.
One of the main concerns identified by World Wildlife Fund (WWF) was that it was
not clear if an access fee was a subsidy subject to ASCM rules.

128

However, the implied

rules and guidelines for subsidies suggest that access to fishing grounds be considered as a
"user cost". Below market price access and payments to foreign governments to secure
access to fishing ground is a subsidy. 129 This implies that "tied aid" and development
assistance associated with access is a subsidy. Grynberg and Tsamenyi however draw
attention to the provisions governing access under the Law of the Sea Convention which
predate the WTO Agreement. Under Article 62(3) of the Law of the Sea Convention, the
coastal State has considerable flexibility in the choice of the financial and related terms of
an access agreement with foreign States and their nationals.130 Under an access agreement,
a fee can be charged in various forms, such as a lump sum payment and development
assistance, which provide a government to government transfer. The terms and conditions
of access may cover a range of issues, which may be regulated under the laws and
regulations of the coastal State. 131 These include:
•

licensing of fishers, fishing vessels and equipment including payment of fees and other
forms of remuneration, which, in the case of developing coastal States may consist of
adequate compensation in the field of financing, equipment and technology relating to
the fishing industry;

•

terms and conditions relating to joint venture or other co-operative arrangements; and

•

requirements for the training of personnel and the transfer of fisheries technology,
etc. 132
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However, under the Law of the Sea Convention, it is legitimate for the terms of a fisheries
joint venture agreement to provide tax exemptions or relief to the foreign partner. 133 Such
types of government transfers or development assistance have been a crucial component for
building local skills and capabilities in the domestic tuna industry.
The FAO Guide makes it explicit that foreign aid to the fisheries sector is a
subsidy.

134

Therefore, goods and services under Japanese bilateral agreement and the

development assistance component under the US Multilateral Treaty can be categorised as
potential subsidies subject to the subsidies discipline. Milazzo argues that payments of fees
by governments of distant water fishing fleets is recognised as a prohibited subsidy because
the fees should come from the fishers who directly benefit from the resource. 135 Domestic
fishers should also pay the access fee, which opens them to stiff competition with foreign
operators who have better technology and means. The current practice has been that
domestic fleets are exempt from paying access fees because they are still at an early stage
of development. The imposition of such a fee on the domestic fleet will add to costs and
discourage prospective local entrepreneurs from participating in the fishery.
The ASCM already classifies grants and loans, tax credits and loan guarantees as
prohibited subsidies. As DWFNs implement their subsidy reforms it is likely that there
would be a major reduction in fishing effort by distant water foreign vessels. The likely
implications of these would be that these foreign vessels might re-locate to Pacific Island
ports to reduce their cost of operation. The vessels may either operate as chartered vessels
or in some form of joint-ventures since a number of the Island States require local equity
(assuming that this is not subject to scrutiny in the interim). The other impact would be that
the reduction in the fleet would not necessarily guarantee the actual reduction in effort as
existing vessels and new vessels may re-equip with improved gear or re-locate to the high
seas. 136

1331bid.
134 FAO, Expert Consultation on Identifying, Assessing and Reporting on Subsidies in the Fishing Industry,
Rome, 3-6 December 2002, FAO Report No. 698, FAO, Rome, 2003.
135 Milazzo (1998), op. cit., n. 38.
136 This will demand not only an effective implementation of the vessel decommissioning programme in the
fishing State to ensure that there is effective reduction in effort but also increase the management burden on
the coastal State to monitor the fishing activities of such vessels either in their zones or adjacent high sea
areas.

280

The ASCM exempts general infrastructure programmes from the subsidy rules, but
if the infrastructure project funded by government is more specific to a particular industry,
it could be considered as a subsidy. Government support for basic infrastructure to facilitate
the development of the fishing industry has been vital for Pacific Islands States because of
their relative isolation from major markets caused by high transportation and construction
costs. 137 Pacific Island operators are relatively small-scale and do not have the necessary
capital to invest in capital-intensive infrastructure to support their fishing operations.
Foreign investors re-locate to Pacific Islands only when the necessary infrastructure is
available. 138 Without any form of government assistance to the fishing industry and support
for general transportation, it is unlikely that domestic development through downstream
processing within the Pacific Islands States will be able to expand.

139

Some form of subsidy

to domestic fleets and processing facilities will be necessary as transitional measures in
assuring the profitability of these ventures. 140

9.10

Policy issues for consideration

While WTO negotiations on subsidies are yet to begin, given the pressure from
environmental groups and the progress at the FAO, it is likely that the WTO will have to
deal with the subsidies issue sooner than later. Because the tuna fishery in the Pacific Island
States is still at a developmental stage and the region is characterised by small disadvantged
economies highly dependet on fisheries, their situation should be based on special and
differential treatment.
Porter argues that a developing country that seeks exemptions from subsidies rules
would be required to carry out regular and transparent reviews to ascertain that its fishery is
not fully exploited. 141 The avenue to achieve this is through the effective implementation of
national tuna management plans and the WCPF Convention. However, the WCPF
Convention recognises that Pacific Island States do not have the necessary capacity to carry
out the management obligations and that undue burden of management obligations should
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not fall on these small developing States. 142 In effectively discharging the management
obligations of the WCPF Convention, the special development needs of small island States
for assistance are also acknowledged. 143 Therefore management related subsidies will be
needed for effective management of tuna resources.
These issues should be brought to light through Pacific Islands' representation to
the WTO, the FAO and other fora discussing fisheries subsidies. This is particularly crucial
because the major international focus on subsidies is on the adjustment problems of overcapacity of mostly developed countries with little attention being paid to the development
needs of small island States. New subsidies rules should not place undue restrictions on
government development efforts for small island developing States by applying uniform
standards to all States.
Pacific Island States also need to co-operate among themselves to establish common
positions on identifying those government measures that are considered as subsidies from
those that are normal functions of government. In this way the Pacific Island States can
develop their own benchmark positions on subsidies that are "specific" and non-specific" to
the fisheries sector, and the positive and negative economic and environmental impacts.
Such information can provide useful input in shaping the current work of the FAO, UNEP
and other organisations dealing with trade, environment and subsidy issues.
Access agreements in their current form will require review as the subsidy
negotiation progresses. New methods of assessing resource rent that reflect the market
value of access are needed. If development assistance diminishes or if it is negotiated
separately, monitoring and surveillance costs can be incorporated into the agreements as
part of the access fee to offset the additional management burden on the coastal State.
The expanded definition of fisheries subsidies provides new challenges for
domestication efforts in the Pacific Island States. Domestic operators will find that
gradually they will have to pay for a number of government services that are currently free
or provided at a nominal cost. Faced with high cost structure, and with the possibility of
relocation of the distant water fleet, some opportunities may exist for joint-venture
partnerships. Due to the limited entrepreneurial skills of local fishers, it is likely that
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Western Central Pacific Fisheries Convention - Article 30 (c).
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention - Preamble, Article 30.
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governments would have to continue to play a key facilitating role in industry development
to ensure that such ventures become viable. Therefore, in the interim period, government
efforts can focus on capacity building and training to provide the necessary skills and
entrepreneurship.
The policy options that face Pacific Island States include the need for a longer
transition period and to establish clear policy guidelines on government services and
developing human resource capability. This will result in a better understanding of the trade
implications of subsidies and enable a more a pro-active participation in WTO trade
negotiations. In the longer term, developing new forms of strategic partnership with
DWFNs for industry development may also be an avenue for new forms of domestication.

9.11

Trade and investment

In theory a more open market provides a source of competitive strength through
specialisation. 144 Exposure to international trade is a powerful stimulus to efficiency, which
in turn contributes to economic growth and rising incomes. 145 Trade and investment are
interrelated: · trade in goods and services leads to investment, and likewise, investments
provide the basis for trade in goods and services. 146 Fo11eign Direct Investment (FDI) is not
just the flow of financial capital but also intangible assets like technology, management and
marketing skills and other assets. 147 The study by Borensztein, Gregorio and Lee tests the
effects of FDI on economic growth by analysing data on FDI flows from industrial
countries to developing countries over a 20-year period.

148

The study suggests that FDI is

an important vehicle for the transfer of technology, contributing relatively more to growth
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147

283

than domestic investment. 149 In another study, Balasubramanyam, Salisu and Sapsford
analyse the interrelationship between trade policy, FDI and growth in developing countries
and conclude that enhanced economic growth is stronger in those countries which pursue
an outward oriented trade policy compared to those that adopt an inward oriented policy. 150
Export-promoting countries attract a greater volume of FDI and enjoy greater efficiency
from it.

151

Sun shows that FDI can also stimulate growth of the domestic sector through

backward and forward industrial linkages. 152
One of the outcomes of the Uruguay Round of negotiations was the Agreement on
Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) as a basis for developing rules on investment
liberalisation that would promote greater trade between developing and developed
countries. The Singapore Ministerial Meeting in 1996 established working groups on trade
and investment and trade and competition to review the TRIMs Agreement and investment
policy and competition policy. 153
Foreign investment has been an important source of capital in the early
domestication process of the tuna industry in the Pacific Island States. For example, the
establishment of the Solomon Taiyo and Pafco joint-venture canneries were a result of
foreign investment by Japanese companies. The national fishing fleet and much of the
fisheries infrastructure was, however, a result of foreign aid. As noted by Grynberg and
Siwatibau, the levels of foreign aid are likely to decline or will be harder to access. 154
Chapter 2 shows that a number of Pacific Island States are pursuing or trying to pursue
domestication through private sector-led development. One of the key strategies adopted to
149
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achieve private sector-led development in the tuna industry has been to attract foreign
investment through creating incentives such as tax-free factories, tax concessions,
providing accelerated depreciation, carry forward losses, and exemption or reduction of
fees and charges. At the same time, there are conditions imposed on the foreign investments
such as local equity requirements, employment of locals and purchases of local goods and
services to facilitate the development of the domestic tuna industry. The Pacific Island
Forum Economic Ministers meeting in 1997 adopted an action plan to pursue open, liberal
and transparent investment policies consistent with APEC's non-binding investment
principles. 155
9.12

Trade related investment measures

Trade related investment measures (TRIMs) address national investment policies that could
distort international trade flows and incorporate investment incentives or trade requirements
as part of the approval of FDI in a country. 156 The Agreement applies to investment
measures relating to trade in goods. 157
Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement requires that no member shall apply any TRIM
that is inconsistent with the requirements of Article III (National Treatment) or Article XI
(Quantitative Restrictions) of GAIT 1994. 158 The use of TRIMs by States may distort the
flow of international trade in goods and/or the flow of international investment. An
"illustrative list" of prohibited measures include such things as local-content requirements
(where an investor is required to purchase a certain amount of local products); exportperformance requirements (a certain quantity of product must be exported); and tradebalancing requirements (earnings from exports to pay for imports). 159 Article 9 of TRIMs
provides for a review of the Agreement by the Council for Trade in Goods and to consider
whether the TRIMs Agreement should be complemented with provisions on investment
policy and competition policy measures under the WTO. A developing country member is
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allowed to deviate temporarily from the prov1s1on of Article 2 of TRIMs under the
conditions and terms outlined by Article XVIII of GATT 1994.160 A developing country
member can seek to extend the transition period for the elimination of TRIMs by a request
to the Committee for Trade in Goods by outlining the difficulties faced in implementation
of investment liberalisation measures.

9.13

Multilateral Agreement on Investment

The greater mobility of capital, coupled with extensive privatisation and greater
globalisation in production, has resulted in a five-fold rise in private investment flows since
1990.

161

For many developing countries, FDI has become the most important source of

capital inflow, overtaking both official development assistance and funds made available by
multilateral development banks. 162 While the latter sources of funds continue to play a
predominant role in the Pacific Islands, there are clear indications that such levels of aid
will not be sustained and that FDI is likely to play a greater role as an important source of
alternative capital for the island States as they progress with their economic reform
process. 163 With the increasing importance of FD I, there is growing debate that there should
be an international regime on investments under the WTO. 164 A number of multilateral
approaches to international investment already exist. For example, the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank have guidelines on the treatment of FDI to
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complement bilateral investment treaties. 165 The United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) noted that in 1996, there were 31 regional instruments dealing
with investments and eight free trade and regional economic integration instruments that
contained investment-related provisions. 166
Under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), a proposed text for a single multilateral agreement on investment
was prepared for negotiations. 167 The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) was
based on the WTO principles of most favoured nation rule, national treatment and the need
for investor security. 168 It was intended that the MAI would be a model for a binding
investment liberalisation agreement under the umbrella of the WTO.

169

The draft MAI

listed a number of different requirements which covered most of the commonly raised
issues on performance requirements. 170 The MAI covered both goods and services.

171

Downes and van Dyke argue that the MAI included requirements that countries treat
investors according to national treatment and most favoured nation principles which could
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reduce countries' power to limit access to fisheries. 172 The draft MAI also prohibited
performance requirements under which foreign investments are to confer local benefits
such as employment of domestic workers and technology transfer. 173
Two working groups 174 established at the WTO Ministerial Conference in 1996 in
Singapore were tasked to examine the relationship between trade and investment and to
investigate the interactions between trade and competition policy to identify areas for
consideration within the WTO framework to streamline the discipline on investment. 175 The
discussions within the working groups so far indicate that there is no consensus on how an
international investment regime would be pursued within the WTO. There are divergent
views between developed and developing countries on the extent of coverage by an
investment regime on trade. One of the key themes in the working groups has been the need
for greater understanding of the relationship between trade and investment for development
and growth. 176 "The relationship between FDI and economic development is a complex and
multifaceted one, of which trade dimension is only one aspect." 177 It cannot therefore be
assumed that increased trade as a result of FDI is beneficial per se. Trade should not be
used as a sole criteria for evaluating the impact of FDI.

178

Discussion within the working groups also indicates that some policy measures
clearly create negative distortions in the market. These include in particular incentives like
tax concessions, grants, and performance requirements such as the need to employ locals
and to carry out research and development. In the short term these may restrict trade but
have long term development benefits.
Some studies argue against the use of incentives because it increases competition
between countries to attract FD I and in the process can distort the domestic and foreign

172

D. R. Downes and B. van Dyke, Fisheries Conservation and Trade Rules ensuring that Trade Law
Promotes Sustainable Fisheries, Center for International Environmental Law, Greenpeace, Washington, D.C.,
1998, p.17.
173
Ibid.
114 Working groups are not negotiating forums but they provide technical and expert advise which in turn
influences the attitude of the WTO members.
175 WT/MIN (96) DEC, para. 20.
176
Ibid, para 20.
177
Ibid, para 22.
11s Ibid, para 52. It is also necessary to look at other effects of FDI on efficiency, employment and economic
development

288

markets. 179 For example, tax concessions to foreign investments are seen as investment
incentives (subsidies) that transfer domestic revenue to the foreign country.

180

Duncun et al.

argue that the development of basic private sector institutions is a more important priority
than pursuing foreign investment guidelines with incentives in the Pacific Islands.

181

A

similar view was expressed by a survey on foreign investments in the Pacific Forum Island
States which indicated that the major impediments to attracting foreign investment were
· delays and the 1ack of contmmty
. . m
. govemment .182
lack of transparency, bureaucratic
Duncun et al. argue that having institutional reform such as secured property rights, a
commercial code that establishes a sound basis for contract and dispute settlement and a
judicial enforcement of contracts in an impartial manner are essential steps.
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Their study

emphasises that economic reforms through an improved institutional framework will
facilitate a more open market as a precondition for foreign investment flows.

184

On the

other side, a study by UNCTAD on investment incentives indicates that certain incentives
remain a useful policy instrument in the pursuit of development and that they encourage
foreign investment. 185
Other areas for consideration in the investment regime are the coverage of an
investment regime under the WTO, which currently is limited to goods and whether it
should extend to services. 186 In this respect the relationship between TRIMs and the
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Agreement on Services (GATs) also need to be considered and how this may impact trade
in the fisheries sector, particularly with foreign fishing access.
The discussions within the working groups indicate that there is likely to be a push
for a multilateral regime on investment since it is intrinsically linked to trade and
development. The type of regime needed is still unclear but it is likely that there will be
strong focus on the need for greater transparency given that incentives are still very
contentious issues and overlap with the Agreement on Subsidies. The WTO principles of
national treatment and investor security will be vigorously promoted by those members of
the WTO such as the OECD members that want to see long-term stability with their
investment funds. On the other hand, some developing country members would want to
retain some control over their national priorities and sovereignty.

9.14

Impact of TRIMS on the fisheries sector

The liberalisation rules relating to direct investment in the fisheries sector have not come to
the forefront yet because most countries have imposed some sort of restrictions on foreign
investment in fisheries. 187 Downes and Van Dyke argue that the MAI, as proposed by the
OECD, could do more damage to fisheries conservation efforts than all the existing WTO
Agreements combined. 188 This assertion stems from the focus of the MAI on investor
protection without giving much consideration to investor responsibilities and obligations in
terms of the negative externalities on the environment. Since TRIMs so far relate to trade in
goods, a distinction between foreign fishing 189 under access agreements as trade in fishing
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services to foreign investment in fishing vessels and processing operations needs to be
made, although the conditions for access may trigger TRIMs.
The effect of removing trade barriers and quantitative restrictions is often felt at the
market level with changes in prices of imports and exports. In general, prices of exports
would increase, leading to increase in supply, and the price of imports will go down
causing increase in demand. 190 Assuming all things being equal, the net effect will be a
positive gain for both producers and consumers. With increased profitability, the demand
for production inputs such as labour, capital, investments and natural resources will also
increase. Therefore, the removal of trade barriers and quantitative restrictions on fisheries
investments raises the question about the sustainability of the resource, particularly for
stocks with a high degree of risk and uncertainty. Unless fishing effort and/or catch levels
are regulated, excess investments can lead to over-exploitation and over capacity.
Therefore, the impact of liberalising investments in the fisheries and the ability to derive
long-term benefits would directly depend on the nature of the fisheries management regime
in place.
Hannesson analyses the impact of relaxing trade barriers under the three major types
of management regimes: open access, catch control and effective management. 191 These are
described briefly from the perspective of exporting countries. First, under an open access
strategy, over time the gains from trade will be eroded and outweighed by the loss due to
over exploitation.192 The exporting country will end up with increased productive resources
in the fishing industry that would be wasted. 193 Second, under the catch control systems,
increased prices will raise the profitability of the industry and thus attract foreign
investments and fishers. Fishing seasons will become shorter and gains from trade will be
eroded not by depletion of stock but by excessive use of labour and capital in the fishing
industry, thus leading to a higher unit cost that will drive down the profitability and

the same rules and regulations as other factories". [R. Hannesson, Effects of Liberalising Trade in Fish,
Fishing Service, and Investments in Fishing Vessels, Paper prepared for the OECD, AFRI/Fl (2001), 4
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therefore gains from trade. 194 Third, with an effective management, an optimal catch level
is set where the long run marginal cost is equal to the price. Industry would attempt to
minimise cost in order to increase profitability. Higher profits would also reflect higher
rent.

195

Therefore, from an economic perspective, all other government interventions other

than that needed to assure an efficient allocation of resources are considered a market
distortion. 196

9.15

Influence of TRIMs on domestication

Policy decisions which impact on trade of a gtven commodity are revealed through
domestic policy measures which directly relate to the production or consumption of the
commodity and through border measures directly relating to trade. 197 Thus quantitative
restriction on the production or use of inputs in the production of the commodity are likely
to have significant impact on the trade of the given commodity. 19_8 TRIMs specifies the type
of measures that are prohibited. Article 2 states:
TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of general elimination of quantitative restrictions
provided for in paragraph 1 of Article IX of GAIT 1994 include those which are mandatory or
enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is
necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require (inter alia):
(a) the exportation or sale for exports by an enterprise of products, whether specified in terms of
particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of
volume or value of its local production. (Article 2.2 (c))

The compulsory in-port transshipment by foreign vessels can be construed as a
quantitative restriction under the Minimum Terms and Conditions for Access by Foreign
Fishing Vessels and therefore it could be a violation of TRIMs. A number of Pacific Island
States have incorporated this provision in their national legislation
key elements of the FSM Arrangement.

200

199

and it is one of the

The requirement that vessels use local port

Ibid.
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Ad Hoc Expert Group on Fisheries, Definition and Measurement of Trade Distortion for the Fishing
Industry, Committee on Fisheries, OECD, 1991, p. 2.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 Transshipment in all the Pacific Island States is allowed only in ports and designated areas under the
Minimum Terms and Conditions of Access by Foreign Fishing Vessels.
200 In port transshipment serves two important objectives. Firstly, it allows monitoring of catch on board and
as a means of gathering scientific data on catch. Secondly, by using local ports allow for spin-off benefits to
194

195
196
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facilities for transshipment, refuelling and purchase of supplies, which in turn incur a
•
•
•
C:
domest1c
. content .201
higher cost to vessels has a stmllar
effect to requirements
ior
The following outline some of the more obvious fisheries examples of quantitative
restrictions that could come under the TRIMs discipline in the light of domestication
strategies.
9.15.1 Locally based foreign vessels/joint ventures
In some Pacific Islands States, the foreign investment laws require a minimum percentage

of local equity if a foreign investor wants to establish a local fishing operation either as a
foreign based domestic vessel or as a joint venture. For example in Fiji, the minimum local
equity is 30%. 202 The equity requirements can be justified from a management point of
view where it facilitates the process of flag State responsibility if the State has some control
over the vessels under its flag. 203 Furthermore, the Law of the Sea Convention gives
coastal States sovereign rights within their EEZs for exploration, conservation and
management of their fisheries resources (Article 56(1) (a)). One sovereign right of a coastal
State in the EEZ is that it is allowed to discriminate between its nationals and foreign
nationals in the allocation of rights to the fisheries resources. 204 Foreign nationals only
have access to the surplus of the living resources as determined by the coastal States.

205

The coastal State is perfectly entitled to allocate all the fisheries resources in its EEZ to its
nationals under any policies it deems appropriate in its national interest. 206 In the Solomon
Islands Tuna Management and Development Plan, a locally based foreign fishing vessel

the local economies in transshipment taxes, provisioning of supplies, use of local labour and use of other
shore-based amenities by crew while in port.
201
Reviews on the FSM Arrangement as indicated in chapter 6 and the review of the purse seine fishery in
Papua New Guinea have alluded to this problem.
202
Fiji Islands Foreign Investment Act, 29 October 1999; In Papua New Guinea, if a foreign investor wishes
to establish a local enterprise, the minimum local equity is 50% (Papua New Guinea Foreign Investment
Promotion Act 1992); In Kiribati, the local equity requirement is 49 % (Fisheries Act, Sections 2(b) Rev. Ed.
1998)
203
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention-Article 24: Flag State Responsibility.
204
R. Grynberg and M. Tsamenyi, "Fisheries Subsidies, the WTO and the Pacific Island Tuna Fisheries"
'
Journal of World Trade, 1998, 32(6), p.137.
205
Ibid. [On the other hand a ad hoc expert report of the OECD argues that" restrictions of free movement of
fis~?~ effort a~ross int~m~tional b?rde~, and restrictions on the access of foreign vessels to ports and port
facilities, constitutes a s1gruficant distortion of trade in their own right, and they also have significant impact
on the trade in fishing products". [Ad Hoc Expert Group on Fisheries (1991), op. cit. n.196, p. 10].
206 Ibid.
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fishing in the Solomon Islands waters must either operate as a joint-venture or have a
Development Agreement whereby the operator must participate in shore-based
development.

207

Minimum local equity requirements aim to help domestic producers to

participate in the fishery without providing the total capital outlay, to share risk and to
acquire technological and managerial skill. The aim is also to retain part of the profits
domestically. This local equity requirement for foreign investors could be considered as a
quantitative domestic content requirement that may limit the flexibility and decision
making aspects of the foreign operations that would ultimately impinge on their trading
ability and, therefore it is in possible violation of Article 2.1 (a) ofTRIMs.
Associated with joint ventures and locally based-foreign vessel operations is the
issue of employment of local nationals. The Fiji Tuna Management Plan highlights that
besides economic and resource sustainability, policy development includes political
sustainability.

208

In order to achieve such objectives under the Fiji Government's

Affirmative Action Plan, the Tuna Management Plan recommends the allocation of 50%
licenses, contracts and processing licenses to indigenous Fijians and, Rotumans with inshore
resources to be reserved for indigenous Fijians. 209 This Affirmative Action Plan effectively
limits the level of foreign investment flows and other domestic investments and
competition in the fisheries sector in the short to medium term to meet non-economic
objectives. Whether such politically sensitive strategies can be effectively addressed under
the TRIMs Agreement and the WTO Dispute Settlement System is unclear at this time. In
the case of Tonga which has sought accession to the WTO, foreign investment is only
allowed under a joint venture as only Tongan nationals and Tongan fishing companies can
operate in Tonga. 210 This is arguably inconsistent with TRIMs Article 2.l(a).
Papua New Guinea's Tuna Management Plan defmes a locally based foreign fishing
vessel as "a foreign fishing vessel which operates from Papua New Guinea during its
licensing period and lands or tranships an approved portion of its catch in Papua New

207

Solomon Islands Tuna Management and Development Plans (1999) - Strategies and Procedures, Part 2, p.

39.

20s

Fiji - Tuna Development and Management Plan (2002)- Section 4.3.
The justification is provided on the grounds that it addresses wider social issue - address grievances of
indigenous population towards long-term peace and stability of the nation.
210 Personal Communication - Mafi A' Koula, Senior Fisheries Officer, Fisheries Department, Tonga, June
2002.
2o9
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Guinea as an export of Papua New Guinea". 211 The purse seine, longline and pole and line
fisheries have specific criteria for domestication. For example, in the case of purse seine,
the domestication policy states:
... it is necessary to provide for the mechanisms that will allow for a progressive move from
domination of the fishery by foreign licensed purse seine, to a stage where PNG companies may
charter vessels, then to progressively move towards fully domestically controlled and operated
vessels. 212

In the longline fishery, only national companies can charter or operate foreign vessels and
all foreign vessels have to be owned by nationally owned companies.

213

In the pole and line

fishery, locally based foreign vessels need to be licensed as Papua New Guinea vessels
after 5 years to qualify for access to Papua New Guinea Territorial and Archipelagic
waters.

214

It can be argued that the above national domestication policies are discriminatory
against foreign investment by imposing restrictions such as time frame, level of equity and
limits to foreign participation because they restrict the free flow of factors of production
like foreign capital and labour and hence the production and export of tuna.
However, Papua New Guinea and other Pacific Islands WTO members as
developing countries, can request temporary deviations from the provision of Article 2 as
provided for in Article 4 of the TRIMs.

215

Article 4 ofTRIMs states:

A developing country Member shall be free to deviate temporarily from the provisions of
Article 2 to the extent and in such a manner as Article XVIII of GATT 1999, the Understanding
on the Balance of Payments Provisions of GATT 1994, and the Declaration on the Trade
Measures Taken for Balance of Payments Purposes adopted on 28 November 1979 (BISD
26S/205-209) permit the Member to deviate from the provisions of Article III and Article XI of
GAIT 1994.

211

Papua New Guinea - National Tuna Management Plan (1998), Section C. Application Framework) p.16
PNG -Tuna Management and Development Plan - Part 5 Policy on the Tuna Fishery Development.
Domestication Policy.
213
Part A - Type of operations (4)- longline fishery. A national enterprise is one where 50% or more of the
shareholding is in the hands of citizens, unless it is controlled and managed by non-citizens. Where control is
in the hands of non-citizens, the enterprise must appJy for certification under Section 28 of the Investment
Promotion Act, 1992. < http://www.ipa.gov.pg/bif~main.htm >,Accessed on 16 June 2002.
214
Part C - Pole and line Fishery : Areas of operation (Pole and line fishing is mostly carried out in the
archipelagic and territorial seas).
215
Article 5 (3) of TRIMS Agreement further permits developing and least developed country members to
apply for extension of the transition period.
212
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9.15.2 FSM Arrangement
The FSM Arrangement can also be seen to be in violation of TRIMs under GATT. As
discussed in chapter 6, the FSM Arrangement was developed as a strategy to domesticate
the foreign purse seine fishery. Eligibility is determined by a point evaluation system which
is based on the amount of local equity, number of locals employed, level of technology and
skills transfer through training, value of local purchases, flag of vessels and the level of
onshore investments. Vessel licenses are annually reviewed using the above criteria. It can
be argued that these criteria violate the quantitative requirements as set out in Annex l(a) of
the TRIMs Agreement. 216 This is because they impose conditions requiring enterprises to
make local purchases, and support shore-based development in order to qualify for a
regional access license. The implementation of the FSM Agreement could be seen to be
trade distorting and therefore restricting the free flow of foreign investment because it does
not allow flexibility for large commercial purse seiners to operate efficiently, thereby
undermining their trading ability. Large purse seine vessels are required to transship in port
and purchase fuel and other supplies locally. Practical difficulties faced by these vessels
have been inadequate port facilities in smaller island States and price of locally purchased
supplies have been higher, and skilled local labour has been in short supply. 217
The WCPF Convention, discussed in chapter 7, requires the development of a
management system based on allocation of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC). Quotas will
be allocated based on either effort or catch. The ownership of a quota, its transferability and
leasing requirements are likely to be contentious issues in relation to the mobility of foreign
fishing vessels and therefore foreign investment in the fishery. Taking into consideration
the continued desire of the Pacific Island States to domesticate the tuna fishery, it is more
than likely that ownership restrictions will favour domestic producers.
The New Zealand quota management system can be used to illustrate the likely
TRIMs that may arise if tuna is managed under such a system. In New Zealand, the law
requires that there be no more than 25% foreign ownership in a company which owns a
quota to operate a commercial fishery unless exemption is given by the Minister of

Annex - Illustrative List 1. (a) States ... "The purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic
origin ~r from any domestic source, whet_her specified in terms of ~articular produ~ts',,in terms of volume or
value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production .
211 Forum Fisheries Agency, Review of the FSM Agreement for Regional Access, FFA Report, 96/38, 1996.
21 6
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Agriculture and Fisheries.218 This puts foreign companies at a disadvantage as they cannot
operate without a quota and being foreign owned they could not own a quota. The quota
ownership limitations result in export restrictions that are discriminatory against foreign
owned companies, therefore in violation of the national treatment provisions of the
TRIMs.219

9.16

Policy issues for consideration

An investment regime will only fulfil its long-term objectives if it is implemented under an
effective fisheries management regime. Inflow of FDI can lead to over-capitalisation and
over-exploitation of the fisheries if there are no effective controls on catch or effort at the
national and regional level. Since sustainability of the tuna resources is fundamental to
industry development, a broader approach to the understanding of an investment regime is
necessary. The approach put forward by UNCTAD that looks at other dimensions of
investment such as growth and development is a more favourable approach for Pacific
Island States in terms of achieving their development aspirations. While foreign
investments are essential, investor rights and obligations must be considered together.

220

Any international framework on investments should be aimed at harmonising both the
private interests of the investors and the negative externalities imposed through use of
public goods such as the fisheries resources. An effective tuna management regime such as
the effective implementation of the WCPF Convention should be a pre-condition for any
investment liberalisation in the tuna fisheries sector in the Pacific Islands region. In this
context, regulatory measures such as the implementation of the Minimum Terms and
Conditions for Access (MTCs) should be uniformly applied to domestic and foreign vessels
alike. A quota allocation that allows for a rights-based fishery to develop, creates greater
scope for mutually beneficial partnerships between foreign investors and domestic
operators, which could be explored through market mechanism such as those that allow
leasing of quotas. This has the potential to eliminate a number of trade barriers.

218

D. Robertson, The Impact of GAIT and the WTO on the Marine Products of Forum Fisheries Agency
members, FFA Report 95/70, Forum Fisheries Agency, 1995, p.16.

219

Ibid, p.18.
Rights in terms of providing a secure and stable investment environment and obligations in terms of the
negative extemality imposed by such investments on the environment.
220
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A number of studies already indicate the mutual relationship between liberalisation
of FDI policies and the application of competition policies. 221 This exposes domestic
producers and fishers to global competition aimed at increasing efficiency, profitability and
welfare. However, since the domestic producers in developing countries do not have access
to similar technology and capital, they are therefore restricted from making their own
development choices. A critical pool of technological and skilled human resources
capability within the island States is essential if the benefits of FD I are to be realised. For
example, the study by Borensztein, Gregorio and Lee shows that while there is a positive
link between FDI and economic growth, higher productivity of FDI holds only when the
host country has a minimum threshold of stock of human capital. "FDI contributes to
economic growth only when there is a sufficient absorptive capability of the advanced
techniques available in the host country."222 In many developing countries, incentives
schemes (which may be considered as investment subsidies and distortion of the market)
are being used to assist in the development process. For domestication of the tuna industry,
this is a central issue since the domestic requirements imposed on foreign investments
(such as provide training and employment) have been viewed as beneficial for
development.
Each country has different needs and priorities depending on the level of
development. There is a need for selective choice, rather than an outright elimination, of
incentives for the purpose of trade per se and a gradual liberalisation process starting with
economic reforms. In order to avoid the negative implications of competition, the Pacific
Island States should have a more transparent information exchange where policies are
clearly outlined and not based on discretionary powers of individuals or bureaucratic red-

221

For example see, P. Oman, "Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: a study of competition
among governments to attract Foreign Direct Investment", OECD Development Centre, OECD, March 2000.
P. Holems, ''Trade and Competition in the New WTO Round" in C. Milner, C. and R Read (eds.), Trade
Liberalisation, Competition and the WTO, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2002, p.147-175; F. M. Scherer,
"ntemational Trade and Competition Policy'', in E. Hope (ed.), Competition and Trade Policies, Routledge,
London, p.13-30; F. M. Scherer, Competition Policy, Domestic and International Trade, Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham, 2000.
222 Borensztein, E., J.D. Gregorio and J. W. Lee, "How does foreign direct investment affect economic
growth?" Journal ofInternational Economics, 1998, p. 45.
Endogenous Growth Theories show the close link between research and development, investment in human
capital and scale economies to rate of economic growth. Disparities in the endowments of these growthpromoting factors exist between developed and developing countries which economists argue can be bridged
through FDI.
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tape. Pacific Islands States may consider seeking a special and differential treatment such
as a longer transition period that will allow time to adjust and develop the necessary basic
capability and capacity to become competitive in the longer term.
Other policy considerations include a more selective choice of incentives and
careful weighing of the costs and benefits of the various incentives to meet national
development priorities and to avoid adverse impacts of competition on the tuna fisheries
sector at the national and regional level. A more transparent and open decision process is
needed at the national level so that investors can clearly predict the outcomes of their
decisions. Finally, it is important to keep abreast with the developments in the WTO debate
on trade related investment issues to identify the possible policy implications and options
that serve the needs of Pacific Island States. Some of the strategic options include:
•

effective implementation and enforcement of the WCPF Convention with the long-term
option of development of rights-based fisheries systems;

•

studies on costs and benefits of various incentives for selective use that will bring long
term benefits such as training and employment and reduced tax concessions;

•

promotion of private sector development though institutional reforms that provide
stable investment environments;

•

transparent and well communicated policies such as tuna management plans and
national fisheries legislation;

•

capacity building through human resource development;

•

pro-active representation in WTO fisheries debates by various forums; and

•

pursuit of longer transition periods as developing countries.

9.17

Conclusion

A number of multilateral trade agreements under the WTO have direct implications for the
fisheries trade, for the sector as a whole, and for the sustainability of the resources. Foreign
investment and subsidies have provided the necessary capital and assistance in the
development of the Pacific Island tuna industry and continue to be important factors in the
development process.
This chapter has highlighted the attitudes and approaches towards expanding
negotiations on the Agreements on Subsidies and Trade-related Investment Measures under
the WTO. The chapter has also reviewed some of the current debates on fisheries subsidy
and analysed some of the likely implications it may have on Pacific Islands domestication
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efforts in the tuna fishery. Using the FAO classification on subsidies, the chapter indicated
the likely challenges for domestic operators. These challenges can be summarised as
follows:
•

increased operating and management costs faced by industry operators;

•

increased competition faced by domestic operators by the relocation of foreign
operators;

•

increased licensing fees and charges for fisheries advisory services;

•

reduced development assistance, goods and services and 'tied aid' to assist in domestic
industry development; and

•

reduced tax and duty concessions.

The chapter also analysed some of the issues surrounding expanding disciplines on
investment. The chapter pointed out that having an effective fisheries management regime
is an essential pre-condition for liberalisation of foreign investment in the domestic
development of the tuna industry. Domestic operators will find that the level of protection
they have enjoyed will gradually erode as they are integrated into the global economic
system.
The implications of subsidies and investment indicate that Pacific Island States need
a longer transition period under special and differential treatment to allow the development
and adjustment of the tuna industry to the new WfO trade rules. A number of the above
strategic options can be better achieved through greater regional co-operation which can
strengthen the position of the Pacific Islands States as a bloc in the various international
fora. Regional-co-operation will also be essential for implementing an effective resource
management regime which is essential for the flow of foreign investment.
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Chapter 10: Implications of Product Certification and Eco-labelling on
Domestication
10.1

Introduction

Chapter eight showed that tuna exports from the Pacific Island States are heavily reliant on
the major global tuna markets of the EU, the US and Japan. The rise in consumer incomes
in these markets, the increase in consumer knowledge about links between diet and health,
awareness of quality characteristics and access to information about new production and
processing technologies place new demands on producers to provide fish and fishery
products with specific attributes. In particular, concern over the declining status of many of
the major global fisheries resources has provided the motivation to support fisheries
management beyond the use of conventional methods. Tools such as product certification

1

and eco-labelling2 have expanded monitoring and enforcement into the post-harvest sector.
While these factors promote new forms of trade, they also have the potential to distort the
market and act as non-tariff technical barriers.
This chapter analyses product certification and eco-labelling issues relating to the
capture fisheries sector. The chapter provides a brief background to the rationale behind
such measures in international trade, examines their current use patterns and explores their
implications on the domestication of the tuna industry. The chapter argues that such product
attributes will increasingly place new demands for domestication of the tuna industry.

1

Appleton's study suggests 'Product Certification' to entail a much broader concept that refers to certification
of different kinds of product characteristics or attributes including the product's composition or contents,
product quality or form, as well as environmental or social aspects of the product's production process or
method. [A. E. Appleton, Environmental Labelling Programmes: International Trade Law Implications,
Kluwer Law International, London, 1997].
In this thesis, Product Certification is seen in the context of environmental sustainability attribute and so the
study adopts the definition used by the FAO. "Product certification is a measure mandated by governments,
often mutually agreed upon by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs), in order to ensure
that only legally harvested and reported fish landings can be traded and sold in the domestic or international
markets. Product certification also known as catch documentation may or may not necessarily involve a
product label at the retail level. Where product certification comes with a label to inform consumers, it can
influence consumers' choices." [C. R. Wessells, K. Cochrane, C. Deere, P. Wallis and R. Willman, Product
Certification and Ecolabellingfor Fisheries Sustainability, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 422, FAO, Rome,
2001, p.1].
2
Eco-labelling refers to product labelling that reflects the results of life-cycle analysis. Life cycle assessment
of a product is made to determine the environmental impact of the product from 'cradle to grave'. Eco-labels
are seals of approval given to products that are deemed to have fewer impacts on the environment than from
functionally or competitively similar products. [C. Deere, Eco-labelling and Sustainable Fisheries, The
World Conservation Union, Washington and the Food and Agriculture Organisation, Rome, 1999].
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Some strategic policy options for the Pacific Island States are identified for consideration in
the light of domestication of the tuna industry.

10.2

Product certification and catch documentation

Product certification is a statement [from the producer to the buyer] ensuring that certain
specifics relating to the product, for example harvesting, processing and/or handling, have
been undertaken in compliance with environmental, social or food safety and quality
3

standards. Where product certification involves a product label, the label can be used as a
marketing tool.
In the fish harvesting sector the principal objective of product certification (most

often referred to as catch documentation or catch certification) is to prevent, deter and
eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. A documentation process
provides a way to mitigate the losses from fisheries by maintaining a chain of custody of
the products from harvest to importation into the final market. Catch documentation is
issued at the point of harvesting and covers all fish landed or transshipped, whereas trade
certification is issued with respect to products that enter international trade. 4 Regional
fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) require documentation to accompany
particular fish and fish product through the international trade chain identifying the origin
of fish for purpose of ascertaining the level of unreported fishing. 5
Product certification is applied to fisheries where there are particular monitoring
and enforcement problems because of the remoteness of the main fishing grounds, which
carry high costs for effective surveillance and where there is low risk of violations being

3

Anon, Traceability of Products from Fisheries and Aquaculture, Committee on Fisheries, Eight Session,
Bremen, Germany, 12-16 Februmy 2002, (COFI: FTNIW2002/7), p.1.
4 Anon, Advance Copy of the Report of the Expert Consultation ofRegional Fishery Bodies on Harmonisation
Certification, La Jolla, USA, 9-11 January 2002, presented at the Eight Session of the Committee on
Fisheries, Bremen, Germany, 12-16 Februaty 2002, (COFI: FT/VIW2002/Inf.13), p.1.
[At this gth Session, the Sub-Committee on Fish Trade noted that while there is a technical difference in the
use of the terms catches documentation and trade certification. Practically, in terms of the capture fisheries,
they are used inter-changeably. 'Certification' refers to the process of validating that the catch was obtained in
accordance with the agreed criteria, while 'documentation' refers to the process ofrecording in support of the
certification claim].
5
Ibid.
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detected. 6 Product certification is also used as a means to determine the catch levels for
scientific evaluation of stocks. 7
Tracking the flow of product to the first point of sale is used for cross checking to
assure compliance with management rules and to detect illegal fishing. The tracking system
is widely used in tracing food safety, to ensure truth in labelling or in marketing as a means
of differentiating products. 8 Product certification in fisheries, to support fisheries
management and conservation efforts is seen as an extension of fisheries monitoring and
enforcement activities that imposes controls in the post-harvest sector. Product certification
programmes are mandatory for participating countries, and in most instances accompanied
by trade-related measures (such as import or export controls and prohibitions) to reduce or
eliminate trade in fish and fish products that do not meet the approved certificate
requirements. An example of a trade sanction was the embargo placed on Equatorial
9

Guinea (an ICCAT member) for non-compliance of the bluefm tuna programme. ICCAT
also banned imports from flag of convenience vessels from Belize, Cambodia, Honduras, St
Vincent and Grenadines fishing illegally on the high seas in the Atlantic Ocean. 10 In Japan,
tuna imports caught by large-scale tuna longline vessels (LSTLVs) that are not listed on the
'white list' by the Organisation for Promotion of Responsible Tuna Fisheries and
international fishery management organisations such as the ICCAT are prohibited. 11 While
it is not necessary for product certification to have a product "label" at the retail level, the
certification schemes are, however, mandatory to ensilre coverage of the scheme is as
complete as possible for the fisheries management to be effective.

6

M. Lack and G. Sant, "Patagonion Toothfish: are conservation and trade measures working?" TRAFFIC
International, Bulletin, No.19 (1), 2001.
7
The nature of the IUU fishing makes it increasingly difficult to estimate the size of catch. In presenting the
case of the Pantagonian Toothfish, Lack and Sant (2001) indicate that trade information is potentially the
most reliable indicator of the total catch of the Toothfish. [Lack and Sant (2001 ), op. cit., n.6, p.1].
8
OECD, Uses ofFood Labelling Regulations, OECD, Paris, 1997.
9
S. Bache, M. Haward and S. Dovers, The Impact of Economic, Environmental, and Trade Instruments upon
Fisheries Policy and Management, Report prepared for Fisheries and Aquaculture Branch, Australian
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, University of Wollongong, NSW, 2001, p. 76.
10
Anon, "Atlantic Tuna Commission Wins Major Battle Against Pirate Fishing - but the war is still on"
Ocean Press Release,< http://www.greanpeace.org/pressrelease/oceans/2000nov22.html >,accessed 21 Aprii
2003.
11
Resolution by the Meeting of Tuna Longline Fishing Organisations, Tokyo, Japan, 1 August 2002.
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10.2.1 International instruments on product certification
International and national efforts to apply a mandatory catch certification scheme in support
of fisheries management and conservation and to prevent and deter IUU fishing are also
increasing. The FAO International Plan of Action for IUU Fishing states that stock or
species-specific trade-related measures may be necessary to reduce or eliminate the
economic incentives for vessels to engage in IUU fishing. 12 States should take steps to
improve the transparency of their markets to allow the traceability of fish and fish
products.

13

The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries emphasises the

importance of the identification of the origin of fish and fish products trade. States should
ensure that international and domestic trade in fish and fishery products accords with sound
conservation and management practices through improving the identification of the origin
of fish and fishery products traded. 14
Article XX of the GATT/WTO on "general exceptions" also addresses
environmental issues. Article XX (b) of GAIT permits trade actions that are ''necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health". Article XX (g) provides for action "relating
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption". These exceptions
must also satisfy the requirements of the chapeau to Article XX. The chapeau requires that
measures should not be applied in a manner, which constitutes either arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries; or a disguised restriction to trade.
The preamble to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade also recognises that
''no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure ... the protection
of human, animal or plant life or health, of the environment ... at levels it considers
.

appropnate.

,,15

Food and Agriculture Organisation, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate fllegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (2001) - Section 70. [The IPOA-IDU was developed within the
framework of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries].
13
Ibid, Section 71.
14 Food and Agriculture Organisation, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries - Article 11.1.11.
15 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade - Preamble.
12

304

10.2.2 Product certification and catch documentation programmes
A number of fish importing, exporting and re-exporting countries as members of RFMOs
or in agreements with the RFMOs are participating in catch documentation schemes to
minimise the landing of illegal catch. Participating members of the scheme agree to have in
place national monitoring and enforcement procedures to ensure that the identified species
under the certification programmes are accompanied by the required documents. These
documents have to be verified through the passage of the catch from the fishing ground enroute to its final destination before the catch is unloaded.
Under Japanese import requirements, all fish imports and transportation of tuna by
boat must provide a product certification that includes the origin or area of capture of the

-

product. 16 The EU regulations require that all fish products must include information on the
area of catch to be made available at each stage of the marketing of the species. This may
be either through labelling, or packaging, or by means of commercial documents
accompanying the product. 17 These requirements indicate that products originating from the
Pacific that target these major markets require additional catch information to accompany
the tuna exports, which identify the origin of the catch. Some examples of catch
certification schemes by RFMOs are briefly discussed.

Convention for the Conservation ofAntarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
Catch Documentation Scheme for Toothfish - The scale of illegal, unregulated and
unreported fishing for toothfish (Dissostichus spp.) in the Southern Ocean has been a

16

Import of tuna by vessels and frozen tuna (excluding albacore or long-finned tuna) - are designated as
Advance Confirmation Items by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and require the importer to
follow certain procedures. Importers must submit an application form for confirmation by the Ministry of
International Trade Agricultural and Marine Products Office of the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry. (Japanese Market Information on Specified Products: Tuna),
<http://www.pic.or.jp/jp/jmi/013.htm >Accessed, 21 April 2003.
A Resolution on the Organisation for the Promotion of Responsible Tuna Fisheries was adopted at the annual
meeting of the world's leading fishing nations (International Coalition of Fisheries Associations) held in
September 2002 in Akureyi, Iceland. Among the resolutions included steps to eliminate IUU fishing. The
Resolution called on States to reject imports of tuna species managed by global or regional fishing
management organisation that can not present proof that they were obtained under measures approved by
those organisations. (ICFCA Adopts Resolution to Support OPRT),
<http://www2.convention.co.jp/maguro/e maguro/enews 020927.html>, accessed 21April2003.
17
Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2065/2001 Laying down detailed rules for the Application of Council
Regulations (EC) No.104/2000 as regards informing consumers about fishery and aquaculture products _
Article 8.
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significant problem faced by the CCAMLR Commission. 18 To improve the management
and conservation of toothfish, a catch documentation scheme was introduced in May 2000
to monitor international trade in toothfish. Firstly, the scheme aims at management by
determining whether toothfish imported into or exported from the territories of Contracting
Parties are caught within the guidelines of CCAMLR's conservation measures. Secondly,
the scheme aims to gather catch data for scientific evaluation of stocks. 19 Under the
scheme, all landings, transshipments and importation of toothfish into the territories of
CCAMLR Contracting Parties have to be accompanied by a completed catch docwnent.
The catch docwnent includes vessel details and catch details. Vessel details include home
port, national registry, call sign, International Maritime Organisation/Lloyd's registration
nwnber and license details. Catch details are: weight of toothfish species landed or
transshipped in the CCAMLR area, date catch was taken, date catch was landed and details
of vessel to which catch was transshipped. 20

Convention for the Conservation ofSouthern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT)
Trade Information Scheme for Southern Bluefin Tuna - Under the CCSBT, there is a
mandatory requirement that a CCSBT Southern Bluefin Statistical Docwnentation must
accompany all imports of southern bluefin tuna. 21 This includes the imports of all bluefin
tuna captured in the wild or fanned. Import data collected by the scheme is checked against
catch data provided by Contracting and non-Contracting Parties. Parties are required to
provide an explanation to the Southern Bluefin Tuna Commission where discrepancies
occur between the two sets of data. 22

International Convention/or the Conservation ofAtlantic Tunas (JCCAT)
Statistical Documentation Programme for Bluefin Tuna, Bigeye Tuna and Swordfish ICCAT's statistical documentation programme provides certification of the port of origin of
CCAMLR, Conservation Measure 10-05 (2002): Catch Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp.
<http://www.ccamlr.org./pu.E/cds/pl.htm>, accessed 22 April 2003.
19 Ibid. (CCAMLR, Explanatory Memorandum on the Introduction of Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS)
for Toothfish).
20 Lack and Sant (2001), op. cit., n.6, p.9.
21 CCSBT-Southem Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document
Program,<http://www/ccsbt.org/docs/management.html> accessed 21 April 2003.
18
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the bluefin, bigeye and swordfish species and includes detailed information such as the
issuing country, export information and area of catch. The document is validated by a port
State government official or authorised individual or institution of the flag State of the
vessel. If a vessel operates under charter arrangement, the validation has to come from a
government official or authorised individual of the exporting State. Only complete and
valid documents guarantee that shipments of the above species are allowed to enter the
territory of Contracting Parties. 23

Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)
Tuna Tracking and Verification Programme -The IATTC has devised a system of tracking
tuna caught in the Eastern Tropical Pacific area by vessels fishing under the Agreement on
International Dolphin Conservation Program. The purpose of the tuna tracking system is to
enable 'dolphin safe' tuna to be distinguished from non-dolphin safe tuna from the time
tuna is caught to the time of its retail sale. 24 The system is based on the premise that
dolphin safe tuna shall, from the time of capture, during unloading, storage, transfer, and
processing, be kept separate from non-dolphin safe tuna. On the basis of an observer's
determination, the tuna is designated either dolphin safe or non-dolphin safe. The tuna is
kept separate even during the processing stage to assist in the verification of dolphin safe
tuna under the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act - dolphin safe tuna label.25
This case of catch certification is accompanied by an eco-label discussed in the next
section.

10.3

Eco-labelling

"Eco-labels are environmental labels based on 'life-cycle analysis' which entails an
examination of the environmental implications associated with all phases of a product's

22

Ibid.
Recommendation by ICCAT Establishing a Swordfish Statistical Document Program; Recommendation by
ICCAT on Validation of Blue:fin Tuna Statistical Document by the European Community; Recommendation
by ICCAT Concerning the ICCAT Bigeye Tuna Statistical Document Program <http://www.iccat.org/ >,
accessed 22 April 2003.
24
Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program Resolution to Adopt the Modified System
for Tracking and Verification of Tuna, 20 June 2001, < http://www.iattc.org> accessed 22 April 2003.
25
Ibid.
23
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life, comprising its production (including raw material use), distribution, use and
disposal. " 26
Eco-labels are usually designed to achieve four policy goals: (a): improve the sale or image of a
labelled product; (b) raise the environmental awareness of consumers; (c) provide accurate and
timely information for consumers to make informed judgements; and (d) direct manufacturers to
account for the environmental impact of their products. 27

Eco-labels are granted by a public or private body to particular products based on a lifecycle analysis. 28 The goal of eco-labelling programmes is to create market-based incentives
for better management of fisheries by creating consumer demand for seafood products from
well-managed stocks. 29
The potential usefulness of eco-labelling schemes to create market-based incentives
for environmentally friendly products and production process methods was internationally
recognised at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1992). 30
Agenda 21 encourages the expansion of environmental labelling and other environmentally
related product information programmes designed to assist consumers to make informed
choices. 31 · The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries also emphasises the
importance of achieving sustainable fisheries and improving the identification of the origin
of fish and fisheries products that are traded. 32
Usually a chain of custody exercise as a monitoring strategy that documents if the
product was derived from a sustainably managed fishery must precede label claims
appearing on a product. 33 Prior to certification, a set of sustainability standards or criteria
against which a fishery is evaluated has to be developed.
There are three major categories of eco-labelling programmes.

34

First party

labelling schemes are by individual companies based on their own product assessment. The

26

Appleton (1997), op. cit., n.1, p.5.
World Trade Organisation, "Market Access Impact of Eco-labelling", WT/CTFJW/79, 9 March 1998,
para.5.
28
Ibid, p.197.
29 c. R. Wessells, K. Cochrane, C. Deere, P. Wallis and R. Willmann, Product Certification and Ecolabelling
for Fisheries Sustainability, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 422, FAO, Rome, 2001, p.3.
30
Deree (1999), op. cit., n.2, p.4.
.
st
31 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda for Change m the 21 Century Para4.21
32 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries - Article 11.1.11.
33 Deere (1999) , op. cit.,
•
2
n ..
34 Ibid.
27
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label can be referred to as 'self-declaration' e.g. 'recycled paper'. Industry associations for
members' products establish second party labelling schemes. Verification of compliance
can be either internal or by employment of external certifying companies. Third party
labelling schemes are established by private initiative independent from the producer,
distributor and seller of the labelled product. Products or resources are labelled with
information to the consumer that the product was produced in an environmentally friendly
manner. Certain management obligations and procedures need to be fulfilled to attain the
label.
Eco-labelling schemes can be either mandatory or voluntary. Mandatory labels are
government-backed and could act as a trade restriction for foreign producers where imports
could be rejected if they do not comply with the standards or criteria set by the importing
country's regulations. 35 An example of this is providing information relating to food safety
or use of chemicals such as pesticides.
In the case of voluntary labels, it is up to the manufacturer to decide whether or not

to apply for certification of the product, and the consumer's choice whether to buy (or
import) an eco-labelled product. 36 Examples of voluntary labels include those promoted by
non-governmental organisations like the Marine Stewardship Council for certification of
capture fisheries products. All eco-labelling schemes share the common assumption that
consumers' product choices are not just motivated by price and mandatory information
such as product composition and nutritional contents. Consumers also take other product
attributes that relate to environmental, ecological, economic and social objectives into
account. These attributes include such things as use of environmentally friendly production
methods, non-use of child labour, promoting rural communities, and so on.

In theory, eco-labelling schemes rely on market forces through changes in consumption
patterns to influence production practices. Products are labelled to affect consumer
purchasing habits causing changes in demand. By influencing demand, changes may occur

35

WTO," Eco-labelling Overview of Current Work in various International fora", Note by the WTO
Committee on Trade and Environment. WT/CTE/45, WTO, Geneva, 1997.
36
Deere (1999), op. cit., n.2, p.6.
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relative to supply: producers and suppliers may choose to become more environmentally
'responsible' when consumers become more environmentally discerning. 37
The economic analysis of seafood labelling that provides the theoretical justification
is discussed in a number of studies. 38 Wessells, Johnston and Donath carried out a survey
on the demand for eco-labelled seafood (cod, shrimp, salmon) in the US market in 1998.
They concluded that on average about 70% of the respondents chose eco-labelled shrimp,
salmon or cod over non eco-labelled. 39 The study also showed that as premiums (price
differential for the label) increased, the likelihood of choosing labels declined.40 Johnston,
Wessells, Donath and Asche did a similar study in 2001 in Norway. 41 The respondents in
the study were 'educated' about eco-label certification. The results showed that while the
majority of the respondents chose eco-labelled products, their choices were dependent on
the level of premium. The study concluded that the level of premium paid for eco-labelled
fish over non-eco-labelled and the level of consumer awareness about the issue that an ecolabel addresses are key factors to their success. In contrast, Gudmundsson and Wessells
argue that voluntary seafood eco-labelling does not necessarily lead to effective resource
sustainability. 42 A labelled product from a fishery can cause adverse effects on the nonlabelled product. 43 The increase in price of the labelled product can lead consumers to
switch to non-labelled product thereby increasing the demand for the non-labelled product
by substitution.44 Sedjo and Swallow have drawn a similar conclusion on eco-labelling of

37

A. E. Appleton, "Environmental Labelling Schemes: WTO and Developing countries", in Sampson, G. P.
and W. B. Chambers (eds.), Trade, Environment, and the Millennium, United Nations University Press,
Tokyo, 2000, p.200.
38
C.R. Wessells, H. Donath and R. J. Johnston, US Consumer Preference for Eco-labelled Seafood: results
of a Consumer Survey, 1999 (http://www.riaes.org/resources/library); E. Gudmundsson, and C. R. Wessells,
"Eco-labelling Seafood for Sustainable Production: Implications for Fisheries Management'', Marine
Resource Economics, 2000, (15), p. 97-113.
39 c. R. Wessells, R. J. Johnston and H. Donath, "Assessing Consumer Preferences for Eco-labelled Seafood:
the influence of species, certifiers and household attributes", American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
1999, (81), p.1084-1089.
40
Ibid.
4 1 R. J. Johnston, C.R. Wessells, H. Donath and F. Asche. "A Contingent Choice Analysis of Eco-labelling
Seafood: Comparing Consumer Preferences in the United States and Norway", Journal of Agricultural and
Resource Economics, 2001, 26(1): 20-39.
42 Gudmundsson and Wessells (2000), op. cit., n.38.
43 Ibid.
44 If certification raises the price of the labelled product or if there is a large increase in demand for the
labelled product, this could result in a price increase large enough to create an increase in demand for the nonlabelled product through substitution effect which in turn can put pressure on the non-labelled product with a
potenial negative consequences on the fisheries ecosystem.
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forest products that can ultimately lead to negative consequences on forest ecosystems
because of the increased consumption of non-labelled products.

45

While theories are inconclusive and data lacking on the overall efficacy of ecolabelling schemes, recent evidence shows that these schemes are influencing environmental
decisions in a number of countries. 46 Eco-labelling and certification schemes are rapidly
taking effect in the tourism, timber, footwear and textile industries.

47

In practice, data

concerning the market impact of eco-labelled products is difficult to obtain.

48

As Appleton

rightly states, much of the analysis is based on anecdotal information and is subjective
depending on the opinion and orientation of the authors and organisations.

49

For example,

the International Collective in Support of Fishworkers presents a more sceptical view of
eco-labelling as a technical barrier to trade that is being imposed by developed countries on
developing country small-scale fishers. 50 On the other hand, environmental NGOs like
Greenpeace and other institutions such as the Marine Stewardship Council, International
Standards Organisation, the FAO (through its Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries)
and the IUCN (with biodiversity concerns) see eco-labelling as a potential market
mechanism to improve fisheries management and conservation. 51

45

R A. Sedjo, and S. K. Swallow, Eco-labelling and the Price Premium, Working Paper, Department of
Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, University of Rhode Island, 1998.
46
Appleton, (1997), op. cit., n.1, p. 17.
47
Eco-label programs in OECD countries include: the EU Eco-label Award Scheme, the Nordic Swan, the
Swedish Environmental Choice Programs, the Canadian Environmental Choice Program, the German Blue
Angel, the Green Seal of the United States, the Japanese Eco-mark, and the French Norme Francaise
Environment, (WT/CfE/W/79Corr1, 12 March 1998).
48
Obtaining direct statistical data to show the market power of an eco-label on a product is difficult.
Anecdotal evidence is used to show that sales have increased when an eco-label is used. It is also difficult to
separate out the impact on the market of the eco-label in isolation from other factors which may also influence
the market share.
49
Ibid.
For example, UNCTAD and developing countries NGOs focus on trade implications of labelling schemes for
developing countries while various labelling organisations focus on benefits of labelling scheme.
so For example: International Collective in Support of Fishworkers (ICSFW), "The Problems with Labels",
SAMUDRA Report, (22); ICSFW, "Fish Stakes: The Pros and Cons of the Marine Stewardship Council
Initiative" a debate from the pages of SAMUDRA Report; See also, C. R Wessells, Barriers to International
Trade in Fisheries, Discussion paper prepared to the First FAO E-mail Conference on Fish Trade and Food
Security, October- November 1998.
51
D. R Downes and B. van Dyke, Fisheries Conservation and Trade Rules: ensuring that Trade Laws
promotes Sustainable Fisheries, Center for International Environmental Law and Greenpeace, Washington,
D. C. 1998, p. 34-35.
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10.3.1 Eco-labels in the fisheries sector

The most widely known eco-labels in the fisheries sector are the 'dolphin safe' label on
canned tuna and the 'turtle-safe' label put on shrimp and shrimp products in the US. Other
labels of marine and aquatic products include those under the Marine Stewardship Council,
Organic Seafood Labels, Marine Aquarium Council and the International Standards
Organisation.52 The following discussion gives a brief overview of the 'dolphin-safe' label,
the issues surrounding the 'turtle-safe label' and the initiatives taken by the Marine
Stewardship Council that deal with capture fisheries.

'Dolphin-Safe' label for tuna

Purse seine fishing vessels in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) set nets around the
dolphins to catch the less-readily visible tuna underneath. Often dolphins die as a result of
being trapped or entangled in the net. A Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) was
enacted in 1972 by the US aiming to reduce dolphin mortality. The Act was amended in
1988 requiring fishing nations and exporters of tuna to the US to have a regulatory
programme that was comparable to that of the US programme. 53 In the early 1990s, the
three largest US canners announced that they would not buy tuna from fishers who set net
on dolphins or from boats without official observers on board. As part of the MMPA, in
1991 the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act established criteria for the way in
which tuna must be caught. 'Dolphin-safe' was defined to include any product made from
tuna harvested by a vessel that met three criteria: that an official observer was on board
during the fishing trip; a report certified by both observer and owner or manager that net
was not intentionally deployed on or around dolphins; and certification was provided from

52

Organic Seafood Labels - Fish are labelled as farmed or wild and whether it is organic seafood. This
signifies that food has been produced without artificial inputs such as synthetic fertilisers and pesticides.
Marine Aquarium Council - An initiative of the aquarium industry that aims at conserving coral reefs by
creating standards and educating and certifying those engaged in the aquarium trade.
International Standards Organisation (ISO) - general guidelines for environmental labels and declarations not
addressed to any specific product category or sector are being developed by ISO through ISO 14000 series.
ISO 1420 contains nine principles on environmental labels and declarations.
53 See details of the Marine Mammal Protection Act and its implementation in J. Joseph, ''The Tuna-Dolphin
Controversy in the Eastern Pacific Ocean: Biological, Economic, and Political Impacts", Ocean Development
and International Law, 1994, vol.25, p.1-30.
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each exporter, importer or processor accordingly. 54 Trade embargoes were placed on
foreign vessels and exporters who did not have comparable management regulations to that
of the US in the protection of dolphins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific.
Mexico, supported by other 'intermediary' countries

55

considered that the US

violated the international trade rules and took their case to the GATT Dispute Panel. The
Panel concluded that the US could not embargo imports of tuna products from Mexico
because Mexican regulations on the way tuna was produced did not satisfy US
regulations. 56 The Panel noted that one country cannot unilaterally take trade action for the
purpose of attempting to enforce its own domestic laws in another country - even to protect
animal health or exhaustible natural resources. The Panel also concluded that the ' dolphinsafe' label did not violate GATT rules because it was designed to prevent deceptive
advertising practices on all tuna products, whether imported or domestically produced.

57

The Panel noted that the voluntary label did not illegally restrict the sale of tuna since tuna
products could be freely sold both with and without 'dolphin safe' labels, and any
competitive advantage conferred by the label depended on the free choice of consumers to
give preference to tuna with dolphin safe labels. 58
The US continued trade sanctions as part of its domestic legislation but sought to
resolve the disagreement with multilateral negotiations that finally saw the establishment of
the International Dolphin Conservation Program (IDCP) in 1998 under the Panama
Declaration (1995). The signatory nations agreed to enter into binding international
agreement for continued protec.tion of dolphins in the ETP provided the US amended its
import requirements. 59
In June 1999, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) proposed changes to
the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act (IDCPA) allowing the entry of
yellowfin tuna into the US from countries in compliance with the IDCP. The changes also
s4 Dolphin Protection Consumer Infonnation Act of 1992, Public L No.101-627, Stat.4436, 4465-4467, (16

use 1385).

ss 'Intennediary' countries -those handling tuna en route from Mexico to the USA- such as Costa Rica, Italy,
Japan, Spain, Canada, and members of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations.
s6 Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restriction on Imports of Tuna, 16 August 1991
. at (1991) 30 ILM 1594.
'
D/S21/R, repnnted
S? Ibid.
ss GAIT, Dolphin-Tuna Panel, 1991, WL 771248 at43 [cited in, Deere (1999), op. cit., n.2).
s9 For further details on the tuna- dolphin case, background and analysis, see: "The Tuna- Dolphin Case",
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required adequate tracking and verification of tuna imports from the ETP. After a series of
scientific studies, the NMFS concluded that there was no conclusive evidence to confirm
that encircling dolphins to catch tuna causes significant adverse impact on the depleted
dolphin stocks in the ETP. The scientific finding led the NMFS to change its labelling
60

standard in December 2002. The new dolphin safe logo identifies tuna products from ETP
if no dolphins were observed to be killed or seriously injured during a set in which tuna was
caught. 61
The NMFS official mark or label is supported by a tracking and verification programme to
track tuna caught by purse seine in the ETP ocean from capture to final sale. The use of the
dolphin-safe label is voluntary but widely adopted by major tuna canneries and exporters to
the us. 62

'Turtle-safe' label for shrimps
Since 1990, US laws 63 have required all commercial shrimp trawl vessels operating in the
US to use turtle excluder devices (TEDs) where there is a likelihood of intercepting sea
turtles.

64

Congress also prohibited the importation of shrimp and products of shrimps

harvested in ways that were harmful for certain species of turtles. Section 609 of US Public
Law 101-102, states that shrimp harvested with technology that may adversely affect
certain sea turtles may not be imported into the US unless the harvesting nation was
certified to have a regulatory programme and an incidental take-rate comparable to that of
the US, or that the particular fishing environment of the harvesting nation did not pose a
threat to sea turtles. 65 In early 1997, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand brought a joint

<http://www.oceanlaw.net/netpatb/page4-bycl .httn >accessed 24 April 2003.
°National Marine Fisheries Service, ''NMFS Publishes Official "Dolphin-Safe" Mark, MMPA Bulletin, 1st
Quarter, Issue 18, No.18, 2000, p.6; ["US "Dolphin Safe" Tuna Label Back in Court", Bridges, Year 7, No.I,
January-February 2003, p.11)].
61
National Marine Fisheries. Service, "Reducing Dolphin Mortality in the Eastern Tropical Tuna Fishery: Part
Two, MMPA Bulletin, 2°d Quarter, Issue No.15, 1999,p.1.
62 "US 'Dolphin Safe' Tuna Label Back in Court", Bridges, Year 7, No.1, January-February, 2003, p.11.
63 US Federal Regulations 24244: codified at 50 CFR parts 217, 222, and 217 - Regulations implementing
Turtle Excluder Devices (TEDs), June 29, 1987; Technical Amendment (55 FR 41088) additional soft TED,
Scientific Protocol (55 FR 41092)-new TED designs, 9October1990.
64 D. Balton, Setting the Record Straight on Sea Turtles and Shrimp, Remarks to the Eleventh Annual Judicial
Conference of the US Court of International Trade on Social Justice Litigation: the CIT and WTO, New York,
7 December 1999.
65 World Trade Organisation, United States -Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, Report of the Panel (WT/DS58/RW, 15 June 2001).
6
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complaint against the ban imposed by the US to the WTO. 66 The Panel considered that the
ban imposed by the US was inconsistent with GATT Article XI (which limits the use of
import prohibitions or restrictions), and could not be justified under GATT Article XX
(general exceptions including certain environmental reasons).

67

Following an appeal by the US, the Appellate Body found that "the measure at stake
did qualify for provisional justification under Article XX (g), but failed to meet the
requirements of the chapeau of Article XX as it was applied in a manner that constituted
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination". 68 In the light of this ruling, the US revised its
guidelines on shrimp trawl fishing operation and the criteria for its certification. The
revised guidelines require that all shipments of shrimp and shrimp products into the US
must be accompanied by an exporter's/ importer's declaration attesting that the said shrimp
were harvested either under conditions that do not adversely affect sea turtles or in waters
subject to the jurisdiction of a nation already certified under Section 609. 69
The Earth Island Institute initiated the turtle-safe label for shrimpers, who signed an
agreement that they would use turtle excluder devices properly and allow monitoring by
observers. 70 The rationale for the labelling of 'turtle-safe' shrimp has been criticised since
all US shrimp trawlers and imports are required to be turtle-safe. There is also difficulty in
verifying the labels since shrimps are sold in various forms and through many outlets,
unlike canned tuna where the canning companies control production. 71

66

For further details on the case, background, and analysis, see : "Background and Analysis of the Shrimp Turtle Case",< http://www.oceanlaw.net/netpath/page4-byc2.htm#byshrimp >,accessed 21April2003.
67
World Trade Organisation, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WTO case No. 58 and 61, Environment Dispute 8,
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/envio e/edis08 e.htm >,accessed 20 April 2003.
68 Ibid.
69
World Trade Organisation, (2001) op. cit., n.65.
70
S. J. Bache, National Approaches to Bycatch: The Development of Australian and United States Fisheries
Conservation Policy, (unpublished PhD Thesis), Australian National University, 1999, p.294.
71
Since the use of turtle excluder devices (TEDs) has become mandatory, the use of turtle-safe logo
certification program was suspended in January 2001. The campaign by 'Sea Turtle Restoration Project'
however continues through consumer awareness that encourages consumers of shrimps to specifically request
shrimps that have come from certified suppliers.[ "What is the Turtle-Safe Certification Program?"
< http://www.seaturtles.org/progMaterial.cf.?campaign.MaterialID=43 >,accessed 21May2003].
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Marine Stewardship Council

The World Wildlife Fund teamed up with Unilever, a multinational corporation, to create
the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) in 1996. The MSC is an independent international
body based in the United Kingdom that provides for voluntary certification of sustainable
fisheries.

72

The MSC defines sustainable fishery as one that can be continued indefinitely

at a reasonable level; maximises ecological health; operates in a responsible manner; and
maintains present and future economic benefits.73 The Principles and Criteria are designed
to emphasise that management efforts are most likely to be successful in achieving
conservation and sustainable marine resource goals when there is co-operation among the
full range of fisheries stakeholders, including those who are dependent on fishing for food
and livelihood. The MSC sets out three guiding principles and a set of criteria for each of
the principles that set the standard for certification. The principles are that :74
•

a fishery must be conducted in a manner that does not lead to over-fishing or depletion
of the exploited populations and, for those populations that are depleted, the fishery
must be conducted in a manner that demonstrably leads to recovery;

•

fishing operations should allow for the maintenance of the structure, productivity,
function and diversity of the ecosystem (including habitat and associated dependent and
·
ecologically related species) on which the fishery depends; and

•

the fishery is subject to an effective management system that respects local, national
and international laws and standards and incorporates institutional and operational
frameworks that require use of the resource to be responsible and sustainable.

Fisheries that meet the MSC standards are eligible for third party certification by
independent certifying bodies accredited by the MSC. Fish processing, wholesaling and
retailing companies are encouraged to purchase fish from certified fisheries only. By opting
to use the MSC logo, producers of fishery products are expected to give consumers the
option to buy fishery products that have been derived from sustainable, well managed
fisheries.

Refer to "Marine Stewardship Council",< http://www.msc.org >for details on the basic principles and the
criteria for determining sustainability and procedures for seeking certification.
73 Marine Stewardship Council Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Fishing - Preamble
<http://www.msc.org/html/content 463 .htm >, accessed 24 April, 2003.
74 Ibid.
12
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Unilever, which initially was instrumental in setting up the MSC, aims to source all
its supplies from sustainable fisheries by 2005. 75 It controls about one fifth of the US and
European frozen fish market and has pledged to sell only MSC-certified fish products by
2005. 76 Uniliver has been joined by Pacific Andes International in Asia, Kailis & France

Foods and Western Rock Lobster Development Association, both of Australia, and
Britain's three largest supermarket chains: Tesco, Sainsbury's and Safeway.

77

Among the fisheries that have been certified as meeting MSC standards are Alaska
Salmon, West Australian Rock Lobster, New Zealand Hoki, Thames Herring, South West
Mackerel handline fishery and Bary Inlet Cockles. 78 A number of fisheries are also
undergoing full assessment as part of the MSC certification programme, including Alaskan
Pollock, British Columbia Salmon and South African hake. 79

10.4

Certification, eco-labelling and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBn

In view of the large and increasing global fish trade where much of the trade flow is from
developing countries to developed countries, potential exists for certification and ecolabelling to create incentives for improved fisheries management and to create trade
barriers.
The Agreement on TBT under the WTO is based on the premise that WTO
members have the right to develop product requirements and the procedures to assess
compliance with such product requirements. 80 The TBT Agreement aims to ensure that
technical regulations or standards are not used as disguised measures to protect domestic
industries from foreign competition. The TBT Agreement distinguishes between technical

75

Unilever, Environmental Performance Survey Report, 2002, p.6.
WWF, Global Focus on Oceans, WWF -International (Annual Report for 1997),
1998<http://www.panda.org/wwf/Report97/report.htm>, (accessed November 8 2002).
77
Ibid. (The Australian Western Rock Lobster was the first major commercial fishery certified under the
MSC certification process).
78
Marine Stewardship Council, <http://www.msc.org >,(accessed 6 November 2002).
79 Ibid.
80
These are based on the general principle of international law on sovereign rights of nations. States have the
rights to determine the level of environmental protection that is appropriate to their territory. For further
discussion, see: Appleton (1997), op. cit., n.l.
76
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regulations (Article 2) and standards (Article 4). 81 Technical regulations are defined as
mandatory requirements for products or related processes and production methods (PPMs).
Processes and production methods are defined as the way in which products are
manufactured or processed and natural resources are extracted or harvested. 82 "Standards"
are defined as voluntary requirements for products or related processes and production
methods. The TBT Agreement covers all testing, inspection and certification procedures
designed to assess compliance known as "conformity assessment procedures". 83 Both the
regulations and standards may also relate to terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or
labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method. 84
While technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures are covered
through the main body of the TBT Agreement, standards are covered through a "Code of
Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards". 85 Most of the
principles applied by the TBT Agreement to technical regulations also apply to standards
through the Code. 86 All governmental as well as non-governmental standards bodies at the
national and regional levels are encouraged to accept the Code and abide by it provisions. 87
In order to limit unnecessary obstacles to trade, countries are required to ensure that

technical regulations use international standards. If technical regulations are applied in
accordance with relevant international standards, they are presumed not to create an

81

Under a voluntary scheme where a certification criteria non-product related product process methods, i.e.
production methods and processes that do not alter the physical characteristics of the product itself but cause
less environmental impact on the production. In such cases where environmental impact is confined to the
national jurisdiction of the exporting country, unilateral restrictions on imports may cause unjustified
discrimination. Where environmental impacts are transboundary and global, co-operation and consensus
should be pursued.
82 WTO, "Eco-labelling: Overview of Current work in various International Fora", Note by the WTO
Committee on Trade and Environment, WT/CTE/W/45, 1997, WTO, Geneva; OECD, Process and
Production Methods (PPMs) : Conceptual Framework and Considerations on use of PPM-based Trade
Measures, OECD, Paris, 1997.
83 D. A. Motaal, "The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the Committee on Trade and Environment,
and Eco-labelling", in Sampson, G. P. et al (ed). Trade, Environment, and the Millennium, The United Nations
University, 2000, p.225.
84 TBT Agreement - Annex I.
85 TBT Agreement - Annex 3.
86 Motaal, (2000), op. cit., n.83, p. 222-238.
87 TBT Agreement- Article 3.
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unnecessary obstacle to trade. 88 The TBT Agreement sets out a number of key principles
that need to be followed by the standards bodies:

89

•

principle of non-discrimination;

•

regulations and procedure for assessment to be least trade-restrictive;

•

harmonisation through international standards, guides and recommendations developed
with the approval of the international community;

•

equivalence and mutual recognition; and

•

transparency with notification obligations and establishment of enquiry points.

10.5

Eco-labelling debate

Discussions within the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) on the extent to which
eco-labels are covered by and are consistent with WTO rules and how to accommodate
trade concerns have been varied. 90 There is ongoing debate about how TBT Agreement's
obligations on standards apply to eco-labelling initiatives.

91

Voluntary government and

non-governmental schemes may be indirect targets of certain trade disciplines.

92

However,

WTO members are required to take "reasonable" measures to ensure that voluntary
standardising initiatives within their territory comply with the Code of Good Practice.

93

Appleton argues that eco-labelling standards do not legally restrict the sale of
unlabelled products because they have equal access to markets as products with ecolabels. 94 However, Appleton admits that some countries may be disadvantaged by voluntary
eco-label schemes. 95 Countries that enjoy a comparative advantage in the production of
environmentally friendlier products will, in principle, benefit from the marketing advantage
accorded by voluntary eco-labelling schemes. 96 Potential for abuse exists with respect to
formulation of standards for the voluntary eco-labelling schemes, where such standards

88

TBT Agreement - Article 2.5.
See details in: Motaal, (2000), op. cit., n.83, p. 225-226.
90
Ibid, p.231.
:~Wessells, et al, (2001), op. cit, n. 30; Bache, et al, (2000), op. cit., n.9; Appleton ( 1997), op. cit., nl.
For further discussion see: Appleton, (1997), op. cit, n.1 p. 24.
93
Bache, et al (2001), op. cit., n.9, p. 66.
94
Appleton (1997), op. cit., n.1, p.129.
95
Ibid.
96
Ibid.
89
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provide protection to domestic production. 97 Thus the international harmonisation,
notification and consultations on standards promoted in the Code are seen as measures to
mitigate such abuse.
The extent to which a voluntary labelling scheme falls within the Code will also
depend on whether a standard is product-related or concerns PPMs (production process
methods) that are product-related. 98 There are still grey areas in determining voluntary and
mandatory eco-labelling schemes that deal with PPMs not related directly to the product. 99
Disagreement exists because eco-labelling schemes are based on life cycle analysis but
where assessment of PPMs is not product related, it has no actual effect on the final
product. Contention arises when the importing countries make distinctions based on
standards related to PPMs which do not show in the physical characteristics of the produ~ts.
This is because the standards related to the non-product related PPM could differ from
country to country and cover a variety of factors and in tum act as disguised national
protection. Differences between developed and developing countries can easily arise under
such circumstances. An example of this is where eco-labelling is based on the domestic
environmental problems and technologies of importing countries which can overlook other
acceptable products and processes in the country of production.
Issues concerning PPMs also extend to fisheries management since eco-labels in the
fisheries sector are predominantly based on non-product related criteria particularly those
related to harvesting method. 100 Different regions will use different gear and management
techniques based on the conditions of the physical environment, the economic
circumstances, and so on.
Participation in the process of formulating sustainability criteria and certification
processes is one way to ensure that the diversity of fisheries and interests in developing

97

Standards drafted to afford protection to domestic products will be in violation of Article ill of the GAIT
1994, and with reference to Para. D of the Code of Good Practice (most favoured nation and national
treatment to like products of foreign origin).
98
Appleton, (1997), op. cit., n.1, p.124.
99 Ibid.
100 The conservation and sustainable use of fisheries depends on regulatory and management methods in the
production phase (harvesting) as it is where the most environmental impact occurs.
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countries are considered. 101 To ensure eco-labelling has positive environmental outcomes
and is fair, greater dialogue between governments, industry, environmental NGOs and
consumer groups will be needed in determining the products for eco-labels and setting the
assessment criteria and standards.
At the First Triennial Review of the Agreement on TBT in 1997, consensus was
•
•
C'.
d"
. 102
achieved on three key aspects that have provided the future drrect10n 1.or 1scuss1on.
These include:
•

improving international standardisation that represents the interests of all parties
concerned;

•

providing for equivalence pf standards by giving positive consideration to accepting as
equivalent the technical regulations of other members; and

•

improving transparency.

With respect to eco-labelling criteria based on non-product related PPMs, the UNCTAD
has proposed the development of international guidelines on equivalence and mutual
recognition. UNCTAD argues that with non-product related PPMs, the eco-labelling
programmes of importing countries could accept PPMs that are friendly to the domestic
environment of the exporting (producing) country as equivalent to the importing country.

103

Such standards would be more suited to the producing country's environmental and
developmental conditions. 104 With respect to non-product related PPMs that create
transboundary or global problems, it is UNCTAD's suggestions that these would be best
addressed through multilateral environmental agreements. 105
Most trade concerns can be met by ensuring transparency and non-discrimination in
the preparation, adoption and application of eco-labelling schemes. The WTO/CTE
endorsed the use of eco-labels as a means to encourage the development of environmentally
conscious consumers. 106 The FAO is also working on the feasibility of elaborating on the

101

S. Matthew, "Fish Stakes: The Pros and Cons of the Marine Stewardship Council Initiative", A debate
from the pages of SAMUDRA Report, International Collective in Support of Fishworkers, Chennai, India,
1998, p.1.
102
Motaal, (2000), op. cit., n 83.
103 Ibid
104 Ibid
105 Ibid.
106
WTO/CTE, Report of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, CTE, Geneva, WT0,1996.
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technical guidelines for eco-labelling in the fisheries sector that is consistent with the FAO
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. 107
While a number of unresolved issues remain, it is nevertheless clear that ecolabelling and certification programmes are likely to stay, thereby creating market incentives
for producers as suppliers and for consumers to be more rational in their choices about
resource sustainability.

10.6

Implications of Product Certification and eco-labelling for Pacific Islands tuna
industry development

Product certification and eco-labelling schemes present new challenges for both fisheries
management and for the domestication of the tuna industry. Technical regulations and
standards would require increased reporting and implementation of sustainable fishing
practices and methods that are likely to raise the cost of fishing operations. Some of the
implications for the Pacific Islands tuna industry are discussed below.
Product Certification

The WCPF Convention has provision for the development of non-discriminatory trade
measures on species that may be regulated by the WCPF Commission, thus providing the
regulatory framework for the use of product certification measures for fisheries
management. 108
The analysis on catch certification shows that this strategy is increasingly gaining
importance to deter illegal fishing and the use of fishing vessels that evade flag State
responsibility by use of flag of convenience vessels. Most RFMOs have catch
documentation programmes in place for fisheries that show signs of being threatened by
over-exploitation. In the Pacific Islands, while tuna stocks generally are in a healthy state,
there are concerns raised about the status of bigeye stocks, 109 raising the possibility of the

107

FAO, Report of the Technical Consultation on the Feasibility ofDeveloping non-discriminatory Technical
Guidelines for Eco-labelling of Products from Marine Capture Fisheries, FAO Fisheries Report No.594, 2123 October, 1998, FAO, Rome.
108 Western Central Pacific Fisheries Convention-Article 25 (12).
109 J. Hampton, K. Bigelow, M. Labelle, A Summary of Current Information on the Biology, Fisheries and
Stock Assessment of Bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus) in the Pacific Ocean, with recommendations for Data
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potential use of catch certification measures in the Western Central Pacific region.
Concerns have already been raised on a related issue at the Third and Fourth Preparatory
Conferences for the Commission for Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks in the Western Central Pacific regarding the need to combat IUU fishing in the
WCP region. 110
The major tuna export destinations for Pacific Island tuna such as Japan, EU and the
US also have in place catch documentation requirements.

111

In the case of a comprehensive

catch or product documentation programme, tuna catch for export must be accompanied by
the necessary documents and verification details. Such a system will require governments
to implement an effective monitoring, control and surveillance programme that includes
observer and VMS programmes. Catch certification programmes are likely to raise costs for
governments, some of which will eventually pass down to the industry. In such an event,
the industry costs will increase possibly from the costs of acquiring and filling the forms,
placing trained observers and by obtaining verification for their catch. In the case of
achieving the domestication objective, Pacific Island operators and exporters need to be
familiar with the documentation scheme and the type of data needed.
In the Pacific Islands, tuna is landed at several regional and international ports, thus

making monitoring a difficult task for individual countries to track the catch destinations.
Even with institutional frameworks through RFMOs available, the likely costs of tracing
the catch would still be high considering the relative distances between the islands and
catch destinations. Where tuna exporters rely on catch supplies from foreign vessels, they
would have to ensure that such vessels comply with the documentation schemes in place.
The Pacific Island States aiming to domesticate their tuna industry by use of locally based

Requirements and Future Research, Technical Report (36), Offshore Fisheries Programme, South Pacific
Commission, 1998.
110
Proposals have been put forward by two powerful fishing nations, Japan and the US on the need to manage
fishing capacity in the region which is being undermined by the increase in vessels of flags of convenience.
While there are political and economic interests that underlie these proposals, the region is already aware of
the need to combat IUU fishing in the waters of the FFA member States. [Third WCPF Convention PrepCon,
18-22 November 2002, Manila, Philippines; Fourth WCPF Convention PrepCon, 5-9 May 2003, Nadi, Fiji].
It is therefore eminent that some form of regulatory requirements will be needed in the near future to combat
illegal fishing.
111
For example the US requires a certificate of origin from tuna exporters. The certification includes
information on the area of catch, gear used, vessel flag and whether tuna has been harvested in a dolphin safe
manner if tuna originates from ETP. Likewise, Japan requires that all catch landed at Japanese ports by sea to
have certified details about the origin of the catch.
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foreign vessels would have to ensure that the fishing vessels they charter or utilise in their
fishing operations belong to the RFMO members (such as the WCPF Commission
members).

112

Perhaps a positive attribute of compulsory in-port transshipment related to

domestication objective is that a greater portion of the catch, if passed through Pacific
Island ports, would provide a better scope for the monitoring of catch destined for export
markets under a catch documentation scheme. 113

Eco-labelling
The concern about standards for non-product related PPMs which can differ among
countries based on their geographical, climatic and other social and economic
considerations, is also of concern for the Pacific Islands. Where importing countries
establish different product related environmental standards, say for tuna, then the domestic
operators and exporters would have to cater for the different export markets which could
increase the cost of production and restrict any gains from economies of scale. Where
importing countries apply stringent production standards, the availability of capital to cover
compliance costs and technical capacity may be lacking in the Islands, which can affect
their ability to export to such markets.
In order to achieve consumer confidence and to gain a competitive edge, a third
party independent certification process is more desirable and recommended by the TBT
Agreement under the Code of Good Practice. An example of third party certification in the
capture fisheries is the Marine Stewardship Council scheme. The implementation of such a
scheme similar to the MSC scheme would involve high administrative and adaptive costs
that many of the Pacific Island governments, tuna operators and exporters may not be able
to afford. For example, the costs of meeting the scientific data and information
requirements and verifying the sustainability criteria are enormous. There is a general lack
of technical and scientific capability. Quality and quantity of data and reporting systems are

112 This will ensure that members comply with their flag State responsibility under the WCPF Convention. In
case non-member vessels are used, the joint-venture agreements or access and licensing provisions would
need to incorporate flag State responsibility for the particular vessel under the foreign flag.
113 As discussed under the investment liberalisation, compulsory in-port transshipment can be seen as a
quantitative trade restriction an~ in violation of .the ~ade rules. The case could be argued on the gro~ds of
resources sustainability for species that are showmg signs of stress under the GATI XX rules on exceptions.
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relatively weak in a number of Pacific Island countries.

114

The MSC certification criterion

also demands an effective monitoring, control and surveillance system. This is similar to
costs associated with catch documentation where the cost of providing certified labels
would increase the cost of operation.
An important aspect of the implementation strategy of a number of eco-label

schemes in developed country markets is that they are introduced alongside with consumer
awareness programmes that educate consumers about the labels. The involvement of
private companies to capitalise the 'green markets' through various private sector
advertising campaigns also makes consumers more aware of the distinction between
product with labels from those without labels. The major tuna export markets for Pacific
Island tuna such as the US, Japan and the EU already have voluntary labelling schemes.
Thus Pacific Island countries will find that they may need to adopt some certified labelling
schemes in order to maintain their competitiveness in these markets.
The demand for eco-labels may also affect intra-regional trade between WTO
Pacific Island member countries and smaller Island countries that are non-WTO members.
For example, a smaller island country like Kiribati or Tuvalu may not have the level of
capability or resources to provide certification for their catch from vessels under their flag.
The catch may be landed and processed in Fiji. The product may not qualify for a label if
the country is unable to provide evidence that the catch was caught using sustainable
fishing methods.
The demand for certification and eco-labelling in the near future would require
Pacific Island countries to build the necessary domestic capability through training local
people to address such product related issues. Awareness programmes for current and
potential tuna operators would be necessary. Capacity building could be explored through
the provision of technical assistance to developing countries under Article 11 of the TBT
Agreement. One possibility to acquire capital and technical requirements could be through
joint-venture arrangements with foreign operators where capital, access to foreign markets
and information needs could be better facilitated.
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See: T. A. M. Visser, Status of Fishery Statistics in the South Pacific, Asia Pacific Fishery Commission
RAP Publication, 30,Bangkok, Thailand, 1997.
'
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Developed countries (mostly tuna importers) WTO members, while preparing and applying
technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures, are required to take
into account the special development, financial and trade needs of developing countries to
ensure that unnecessary obstacles to exports are avoided. 115 Under such provisions, it is
therefore important that Pacific Island States actively participate in the regional and
international consultations and dialogue on standards setting and assessment programmes
and in WTO negotiations on TBT in relation to certification and eco-labelling issues. Their
active participation can raise awareness about their environmental conditions, social and
economic needs and priorities and in turn positively influence consumers in the developed
markets. This will increase greater awareness in developed country import markets and
help achieve equivalent treatment which is fundamental to the goals of eco-labelling and
certification: i.e., achieving global environmental sustainability.
The implementation of the WCPF Convention (discussed in chapter seven) as a
resource management regime can also facilitate the catch certification and eco-labelling
schemes through its comprehensive data requirements and MCS provisions. Pacific Island
States should therefore focus on the implementation of the WCPF Convention as a basic
necessity for their resource sustainability. 116 This will provide an avenue to capitalise on the
"green markets" of developed countries.
If Pacific Island States are not actively involved in current discussions and

negotiations in the various international fora (which in turn influence the WTO positions),
they are likely to face technical regulations, standards and assessment procedures that are
not as applicable to Pacific Island environmental conditions. Not only will it undermine
resource sustainability but will also affect the domestication aspects since standards would
be set from outside (importing countries). An active co-operative approach would be an
effective means of integrating the Pacific Islands' concerns in the current consultations on

115

Article 12.3 - Agreement on TBT.
Achieving co-operation with Fishing States in the WCP Ocean would be necessary since these States are
also the major export markets (and who also provide the technical and financial assistance) for Pacific Island
tuna development. The Tuna Convention provides the necessary benchmark framework to determine the nonproduct related PPMs that the Pacific Islands could capitalise on. Negotiations on both fora: implementation
of the Convention as resource management measure will also in turn facilitate the co-operation needed on
harmonisation of certification and eco-labelling programmes. It will be up to Pacific Island States to highlight
these over-lapping themes to seek assistance in their implementation programmes.
116
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setting international standards, even though these issues may seem to be future trade policy
concerns.
Since the Pacific Island tuna producers and exporters are small operators,
governments would have to play a key facilitating role to organise the industry, provide the
institutional framework and necessary infrastructure and training for the industry.
Governments would also need to facilitate effective certification programmes based on
international and regional initiatives and ensure continued monitoring procedures. Industry
operators can explore such options as targeting green niche markets through joint ventures
and partnerships with importers.
A regional co-operative approach would not only provide economies of scale in
capacity building and solidarity in international consultations and negotiations, but also
facilitate the implementation of an effective resource management regime that is the basic
foundation of any certification and eco-labelling scheme.
10.7

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that despite the short history of certification and eco-labelling
schemes and several unresolved trade issues under the WTO, eco-labels and catch
certification programmes are only likely to increase and gain greater importance. Pacific
Island States dependent on developed country tuna markets will increasingly face the
challenge of meeting the international regulatory requirements and changing consumer
demands. Therefore, domestic development of tuna industries will have to take into
consideration both certification and eco-labelling issues as the future conditions for
industry operations.
To achieve the domestication objective, Pacific Island States would require the
necessary training and capacity to implement product certification and labelling
programmes as part of their industry development initiatives.
Pro-active participation by the Pacific Island States in international fora will be
necessary to raise awareness of their needs and priorities, status of their tuna resources and
conditions of fishing practices. This will enable Pacific Island States to be involved in the
standard setting and assessment programmes, whether for labelling standards or
certification programmes. In turn this will prevent acceptance of standards set elsewhere
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that may be less applicable and difficult to implement. Participation in the international fora
will also provide a medium to seek the necessary financial and technical assistance needed
to implement such programmes.
At the regional level, to combat the IUU fishing through catch certification schemes
will require regional co-operation among Pacific Island States and with other fishing States
in the region. Co-operative efforts will also be necessary to implement an effective fisheries
management regime that can in turn provide the possibility of seeking access to "green
markets" through sustainably managed fisheries. Strategic industry partnerships can be
forged between domestic operators and foreign investors to access such markets.
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Chapter 11: Implications of Seafood Safety and Quality for Domestication
of the Tuna Industry in the Pacific Islands
11.1

Introduction

While tuna has an important nutritional role in the subsistence economy of the Pacific
Island States, it is an export commodity for the major global tuna markets as discussed in
chapter 8. The increasing demand for fish and fisheries products, coupled with
technological developments in fish handling, preservation and distribution and the added
awareness of, and demand by, consumers for safe and high quality fish have led these
markets to undertake comprehensive evaluation and re-organisation of their fish inspection
and control systems. 1 Strict standards of food safety and quality for fish imports are
imposed by the EU, Japan and the US under the joint Food and Agriculture Organisation
and World Health Organisation's (FAO/WHO) Codex Alimentarius Programme on Hazard
Analysis of Critical Control Points (HACCP) to minimise health risks. The Agreement on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures under the WTO also allows countries to apply
necessary food safety measures to protect human, animal or plant life or health while at the
same time ensuring that such measures do not act as technical barriers to trade.
This chapter demonstrates that development of tuna industries in the Pacific Islands
States will increasingly require meeting the challenges of food safety and quality in the key
tuna export markets. The importance of food safety and aspects of food quality issues are
highlighted, followed by an outline of the WTO trade measures on food safety and quality
under the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The need for national food regulatory measures to
follow international standards such as the Codex Alimentarius and the principles of
HACCP is then discussed. The chapter outlines the regulatory requirements for HACCPbased systems in the US and the EU tuna markets and the practice in Japan to illustrate the
high demands placed on product safety in these markets. The situation of the Pacific Islands
States and the challenges that face them to meet the HACCP requirements are analysed.
The chapter shows that the financial, technological, institutional and infrastructural
requirements for setting up and implementing a HACCAP based system will be relatively
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high for Pacific Island States in the short to medium term. Some possible policy options are
also explored in the light of domestic industry development. The chapter concludes that the
implementation of a HACCP-based system will not only be essential to maintain continued
access to the major tuna markets but will also determine the economic viability of Pacific
Island tuna exports.

11.2

Importance of food safety

Testing fish or fishery products for human consumption involves identifying levels of
histamine, mercury, lead, pathogens, etc. which consumers are not personally able to
determine. Food safety refers to the risk level associated with illness or death caused by
consumption of food products that are contaminated with microbiological or parasitic
organisms, a naturally occurring poison or a chemical contaminant.2 In practice, food
safety is considered with reference to public health regulations which determine the basic
conditions for the wholesomeness and edibility of a given type of food. 3 Technological
advances and processing innovations, economic growth and increased international trade
have brought in many new food products. As product varieties and trade increase under
open markets, the movement of food-borne diseases also becomes more widespread
causing an increase in food safety problems. Mayes argues that there is an increasing need
to improve control over food safety to prevent widespread cross-border food borne diseases
arising from globalisation of the food supply. 4
Seafood-borne diseases or illness outbreaks affect consumers both physically and
financially, and create regulatory problems for both importing and exporting countries.
Consequently, Hensen and Caswell note that food safety assurance systems are becoming
more stringent in response to both real and perceived food safety problems. 5 Demands by

1

Sub-Committee on Fish Trade, Safety, Quality and Fish Trade, Eighth Session, Bremen, Germany,
Committee on Fisheries, COFI: FTNill/2002/9, 12-16 February 2002, FAO.
2 J. C. Cato, Economic Values Associated with Seafood Safety and Implementation of Seafood Hazard
Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) Programs, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper, No 381, FAO, Rome,
1998, p.11.
3 A. Zugarramurdi, M. A. Parin and H. M. Lupin, Economic Engineering Applied to the Fishing Industry,
FAO Technical Paper 351, FAO, Rome, 1995, p. 216.
4 T. Mayes, "The Future of HACCP", in T. Mayes and S. Mortimore (eds.), Maldng the Most of HACCP:
learning from others ' experience, Woodhead Publishing Limited, Cambridge, 2001, p.265-277.
s s. Hensen and J. Caswell, "Food Safety Regulation: an overview of contemporary issues", Food Policy,
1999, (24), 589-603.
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wealthier countries for stricter enforcement of regulations have increased following a
number of highly publicised outbreaks of food-borne diseases (e.g., BSE, E. Coli,

Salmonella, Campylobacteria or Listeria). 6 Cases of illness or death caused by
contaminated fisheries products include the 1997 E. Coli outbreak in Japan and heatlh
problems associated with the consumption of Bangladeshi prawns in the Netherlands in
1996.7 In 1998, the EU banned imports of fresh fish from Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania
and Uganda because of fear of a cholera outbreak. 8 Food safety and quality issues also led
to the loss of a major albacore market (Canada) by the Pafco Fishing Company of Fiji in
1996. The reasons for the rejection of a number of shipments were "staleness, taint, poor
cleaning, underweight, voids, poor presentation and colour". 9 The cost of rejection, return
freight cost, re-labelling and downgrading of the product was estimated to be around $1
million for Pafco. 10
Concerns about safety and quality affect the level of seafood trade and a particular
country's fishing industry. While food safety is a major global concern because of potential
health hazards, seafood products like tuna are under further regulatory scrutiny for
quality. 11

6

S. J. Bache, M. Haward and S. Dovers, The Impact of Economic, Environmental, and Trade Instruments
upon Fisheries Policy and Management, Report prepared for the Fisheries and Aquaculture Branch,
Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of
Wollongong, 2001, p.42.
7
Ibid. [Cato provides a statistical account and various case studies of seafood borne illnesses in the EU, Japan
and the US - See details in Cato (1998), op. cit. n.2].
8
"World Trade Organisation, "EC redrafts aflatoxin rules after heavy arguments", Focus Newsletter, July
1998, Cited in, C.R. Wessells, Barriers to International Trade in Fisheries, Proceedings of the FAO E-mail
Conference on Fish Trade and Food Security, 19 October- 12 December 1998, p. 14. [Tanzania reported that
40% of its fisheries workforce had been laid off, and the country had lost US $ 46.9 million as a result of the
ban].
9
Arthur Andersen Corporate Finance, Review ofPacific Fishing Company Limited, October 1997, p.31.
10
Ibid. [Gillettt also notes the high level of rejection of Samoan tuna to the American Samoan canneries - R.
Gillett, Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) for Seafood Exports: the situation in selected
Pacific Island Countries, A Report for the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the South Pacific
Commission, TCP/RAS/6713, June 1997, p.13; [According to a Senior Fisheries Officer, the rejection is
largely due to limited use of ice for preservation and inadequate storage facilities - Silivia Moala - Fisheries
Division, Apia, 25 June 2002].
11
D. E. Brooks, "Application of HACCP i~ developing countries - problems and prospects", Infofish
International, 1997 (6), p.51-54.
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11.3

Seafood quality

Product quality is often not well defined because of its subjective and multi-dimensional
nature. Different consumers have different perceptions of the level of food quality. Product
quality depends on the bundle of characteristics (attributes) the product has that determines
how well it performs in the marketplace. 12 Both Hooker and Hooker and Caswell identify
the quality attributes of a product to include food safety (e.g., level of pathogens, residues,
food additives), and also nutrition (e.g., fat content, calories), value (taste, appearance,
purity), packaging (packaging materials, labelling), and process (e.g., biotechnology,
environmental impact, pesticide use). 13 While food safety is an attribute of food quality, it
is generally given a much higher profile because of its potential hazardous effect on human
health compared to other quality attributes. 14 Thus some studies and food regulatory
regimes make an explicit distinction between food quality and food safety. 15
The standard tools for economic analysis apply to markets for quality attribute just
as they apply to markets for food products themselves. 16 For example, market demand for a
particular attribute such as safety depends on consumers' willingness to pay for the
additional attribute (safer food), reflecting the value the consumer places on the benefits of
improved safety. On the supply side, food producers will supply food quality if it is
profitable for their enterprises or if they are required to do so by regulation. Providing high
quality food may increase profits by increasing product differentiation, sales, and perhaps
prices, or by allowing the firm to avoid costly events such as food borne illness outbreak
with any associated tort liability. 17 As a result, quality is more often used as a marketing
tool by industries. 18 Since consumers do not have perfect knowledge of the product

12

K. Lancaster, Consumer Demand: A New Approach, Columbia University Press, New Yorlc, 1971.
N. H. Hooker and J. A. Caswell, "Regulatory Targets and Regimes for Food Safety: A Comparison of
North American and European Approaches", in J. A. Caswell (ed.), Economics of Reducing Health Risks
from Food, Food Marketing Policy Centre, Storrs, 1996, p.3-17; H. N. Hooker, Food Quality Regulations
under Trade Agreements: Effects on the Supply of Food Safety and Competitiveness, PhD thesis, University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, l997(Cited in, OECD, Uses of Food Labelling Regulations, OECD, Paris, 1997, p.
5.
14
OECD, Uses of Food Labelling Regulations, OECD, Paris, 1997, p.6.
15 For example, the US FDA mandatory food regulations specifically focus on safety while the EU has safety
and quality aspects. Likewise the study by Cato (1998) makes a distinction between safety and quality. [Cato
(1998), op. cit., n.2].
16 OECD (1997), op. cit., n.14, p.6.
17
Ibid.
18 The industry that manages to provide the required level of quality at a minimum cost will have a
comparative advantage over its competitors.
13

332

attributes in the market, government plays the regulatory role to correct the imperfection or
to mitigate the negative effects by using a variety of regulatory measures. Depending on the
level of risk associated with the imperfection (extemality), regulatory measures may
include imposing input standards, process standards, conditions for use, or information
requirements and enforcement and monitoring procedures.

11.4

WTO rules and seafood safety and quality

While the WTO does not have a mandate to develop food safety standards, it provides
guidelines on measures to avoid food safety from acting as unjustified barriers to trade.

19

As global trade increases, there is a shift from relying on the traditional approach of end-

product sampling and inspection towards the implementation of a preventative safety and
quality approach based on risk analysis. 20 Risk assessment is therefore a key element of the
guidelines laid down by the WT0. 21 The Agreement on the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS) directly relates to the regulation of food safety whereas the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) addresses food quality requirements and issues which
may not be covered by the SPS. 22

11.4.1 Agreement on Sanitary and Pbytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)
The underlying objective of the SPS Agreement is to ensure that govemnients do not use
food safety and quarantine requirements as unjustified trade barriers in order to protect their
domestic industries from competitive exports. The SPS Agreement covers all plants and
animals including fish, wild fauna and flora. 23 Under Article 2 of the SPS Agreement, a

19

Ad Hoc Group on Food Safety, Overview and Compendium ofInternational Organisations with Food Safety
Activities, SG/ADHOCIFS (2000)/4/Final, OECD, Paris, 2000, p.10.
20
Sub-committee on Fish Trade (2002), op. cit., n.1.
21
The GAIT (1947) and GATT (1994) recognise the public health imperative in Article XX (b), which
contains exceptions to rules of free trade. Article XX (b) permits governments to adopt or enforce a measure
"necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health" even though the measure violates the rule of
GATT provided certain conditions are met. These conditions are to ensure that the measure is necessary and
least trade restrictive. The GAIT (1994) elaborates on GAIT (1947) through the SPS to define the
appropriate level of protection and the particular conditions, that it should be based on scientific principles
and on risk assessment and the principles of national treatment.
22
Ad Hoc Group on Food Safety (2000), op. cit., n 19.
23
G. H. Stanton, "The Multilateral Trading System and the SPS Agreement", in Forum Proceedings:
Quarantine and Market Access: playing by the WTO rules, 6-7 September 2000, Canberra, Department of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Australia, 2000, p.24.
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country has the right to impose restrictions on international trade where necessary to protect
human, animal or plant health from certain risks. The rationale behind the SPS Agreement
is that food health and safety issues and related disputes should be settled by science-based
rules. However, a WTO member country should be able to demonstrate that trade
restriction is indeed necessary to protect health; and that there is scientific evidence of
potential health risks. 24 Where scientific evidence to demonstrate health risks is
unavailable, the WTO member country can take precautionary measures and provisionally
impose a measure while further scientific information is sought within a reasonable time to
review the measure. The SPS Agreement states that measures taken that conform to
international standards, guidelines and codes of hygienic practices by the FAO/WHO's
Codex Alimentarius Commission are deemed to be appropriate and non-discriminatory. 25

Article 4 addresses the issue of equivalence where there are equal but different
measures in place among the members for the same product. If an exporting country can
demonstrate that the safety of its product is equivalent to that required by the importing
country, then the product should be permitted, even though it was not produced according
to the standards or processes normally required by the importing country. 26 The initial
burden is on the exporting country to provide the necessary evidence to show that its
product is equally safe, and on the importing country to objectively assess this claim. 27
The SPS Agreement requires that the decision of members be open, transparent and
consistent across different contexts or situations. 28 In this respect, SPS Agreement requires
members to publish all food safety and quarantine regulations so that they are known to
other members. 29 If a country implements a measure that differs from internationally
developed standards, it must notify the WTO Secretariat. 30 Members are also obligated to
create a national "enquiry point" that is responsible for providing information on food
safety and quality measures.

24
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Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures - Article 2.2.
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures -Article 3, Annex A (3) (a).
26 Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures - Article 4.
27 Stanton (2000), op. cit., n.23, p.23-30.
28 Agreement on the Sanitary and Phyto.sanitary Measures - ~icle 7, Annex B. .
29 Agreement on Sanitary and Phtyosamtary Measures - Article 7, (Annex B section 1).
30
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Article 10 of the SPS Agreement provides for special and differential treatment of
developing and least developed countries on products of particular interest to the extent that
the potential health risk is within acceptable limits. This allows developing countries the
scope for phased introduction of new sanitary or phytosanitary measures and to request
longer time frames for compliance with products of interest so as to maintain their export
opportunities. 32 The WTO members agree to "facilitate" technical assistance to developing
country members. 33 A technical assistance and capacity building programme in relation to
the SPS has been established to help developing countries implement the SPS agreement.

34

11.4.2 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement)
The aim of the TBT Agreement is to ensure that technical regulations and standards, and
analytical procedures for assessing conformity with technical regulations and standards do
not create trade barriers. 35 The scope of the TBT Agreement extends to all traded goods. In
the agri-food sector it applies to all rules other than those covered by the SPS Agreement.
The SPS Agreement constitutes an exception to the general scope of the TBT Agreement.

36

The SPS Agreement covers the food safety attributes of food quality. Issues relating to food
quality that are not covered by the SPS fall under the TBT Agreement. These attributes may
include such things as packaging, labelling and certification. The rules of the TBT
Agreement and its code of practice prohibit both regulations and standards from
discriminating between domestic and foreign products and like products of different WTO
members. The TBT Agreement distinguishes between technical regulations (Article 2) and

31

Ibid., (Annex section 3).
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures-Article 10.3.
33
When compliance with a sanitary measure requires substantial investment by a developing country, the
importing government must consider providing technical assistance needed to permit the exporting
developing country to maintain and expand its market access opportunities for the product involved (SPS
Agreement - Article 9 (2).
34
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Technical Assistance and Capacity Building in the
context ofSPS Committee, World Trade Organisation, Geneva, 24 June 2002 (G/SPS/GEN/332).
35
FAO/WHO, "Codex and the international food trade", Understanding the Codex Alimentarius, FAO, Rome,
1999.
36
Bache, et al. (2001), op. cit., n. 6, p.22; S. Chamovitz, "Improving the Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Standards'', in G. P. Sampson and W. B. Chambers (eds.) Trade, Environment and Millennium,
The United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 1999, p.171-194. [The exception is provided under Article 1.5
of the TBT which makes reference to the SPS Agreement].
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standards (Article 4). Standards are voluntary requirements regulated under the Code of
37

Good Practice while technical regulations are mandatory. 38

11.5

Codex Alimentarius

The Codex Alimentarius (Food Code) created by the PAO and the WHO in 1962 has
become the reference point for consumers, food producers and processors, national food
control agencies and the international food trade. 39 Codex is a set of principles or codes of
practice; standards and guidelines which countries can use to protect the health of
consumers and ensure that procedures followed in food trade are fair.40 Prior to the 1994
WTO Agreements, the Codex was voluntary but its incorporation into the SPS Agreement
and the TBT Agreement makes it an integral part of the legal framework for international
trade. The Codex, administered by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, is intended to
guide and promote the establishment and elaboration of definitions and requirements for
foods to assist in their harmonisation and, in doing so, facilitate international trade. 41 The
general principles of the Codex aim to identify the essential aspects of food hygiene
applicable throughout the food chain (from primary production through to the final
consumer) to ensure that food is safe and suitable for human consumption.

42

The Codex

recommends an HACCP-based approach as a means to enhance food safety and indicates
how to implement those principles.43
In the context of fisheries, the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries

recommends that States should establish and maintain an effective national safety and
quality assurance system to protect consumer health and prevent commercial fraud.

44

The

Code further states that States should promote the implementation of quality standards
agreed within the context of the FAO/WHO Codex and other relevant organisations and

37

IBT Agreement-Annex 3.
IBT Agreement Article 2 and 3.
39
Ibid, p. l.
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.
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40 see details on the Codex Alimentarius : FAO/WHO, Codex Ahmentanus - Food Hygiene- Basic Texts (2
Ed.), Understanding the Code; Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, Codex Alimentarius
Commission, FAO Rome, 2001; OECD (Ad Hoc Working Group), Overview and Compendium of
International Organsations with Food Safety Activities, 2000, p.11-23.
41
FAO/WHO (2001), Ibid.
42 Ibid., -The Codex General Principles of Food Hygiene {Section I).
43
Ibid.
44 The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (1995) - Article 11.1.2.
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arrangements. 45 In addition to the general principles of food hygiene, volume (V/9) of the
Codex sets standards for a number of specific fish and fish products.

46

FAO's Codex

Committee on Fish and Fisheries Products has converted its fresh and frozen fish standards
to HACCP-based systems.

11.6

47

Hazard Analysis of Critical Control Points (HACCP)

The goal of HACCP is to minimise the risk of potential food-safety hazards through
creation of a preventative system that monitors those points in the food production chain
where potential hazards to food safety can occur. 48 To ensure safer foods, HACCP systems
are designed to identify hazards, establish controls, monitor controls and provide for
corrective actions. 49 Preventative measures are applied at control points throughout the
seafood handling process through the establishment of target and acceptable hazard levels
and identification of the corresponding test. The HACCP programme establishes a recordkeeping system and regularly monitors critical control points, thus pinpointing potential
problems before they occur. 50 The Codex identifies that the HACCP System consists of
seven principles 51 :
•

conduct a hazard analysis;

•

determine the critical control points;

•

establish critical limits;

45

Ibid., Article-11.1.3.
Among the Codex Recommended International Codes of Practice for fish and fish products include: Frozen
fish (CAC/RCP 16-1978); Canned fish (CAC/RCP 10-1976); Canned Tuna and Bonito (Codex Standard 70;
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(CAC/RCP 8-1976).
47
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Regulations on the U.S. and the E.U. and the Relevant Laws of the South Pacific Region, F AO Project,
(TCPIRAS/6713(A), 1997, p.9;[Codex Alimentarius Commission, Hazard Analysis of Critical Control Points
System and Guidelines for its Application, Alinonn 97/13A, Codex Alimentarius Commisson, Rome, 1997].
48
McDonnan, (1997), op. cit., n.47, p.4.
49
Brooks (1997), op. cit., n.11, p.52.
so For details on HACCP Plans and Programs see: US Food and Drug Administration, Fish and Fisheries
Products Hazards and Controls Guidance, (3rd Ed.), Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, US Food
and Drug Administration, June 2001.
H. M. Lupin, "Internal Auditing ofHACCP-based Sytems in the Fishing Industry'', INFOFISH International,
4/2000,p. 56-64; D. Warne, "HACCP and Quality Assurance in the Tuna Industry'', /nfofish International,
6/91, p 51-56; D. E. Brooks, "Application of HACCP in Developing Countries: problems and prospects'',
INFOF/SH International, 6197, p. 51-60.
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Application. Annex to CAC/RCP 1-1969, Rev. 3 (1997).
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• establish a system to monitor the critical control point;

•

establish the corrective action to be taken when monitoring indicates that a particular
critical control point is not under control;

•

establish procedure for verification to confirm that the HACCP system is working
effectively; and

• establish documentation concerning all procedures and records appropriate to these
principles and their application.
McDonnan points out the increased technical and infrastructural capacity requirements for
implementing a HACCP Plan. 52 Other studies on HACCP programmes include Mayes and
Mortimore's study on the implementation of HACCP systems in both developed and
developing countries that point to the growing importance of HACCP systems. 53 Warne
discusses the technical application of the HACCP and quality assurance in the tuna
. industry54 and Lupin analyses the internal auditing of HACCP-based systems in the fishing
industry. 55 These studies allude to the increased technical and record keeping requirements
and the need for continuous integration of technological development.

The effective

implementation of HACCP must be built upon a foundation of a food safety programme
such as Good Manufacturing Practices that requires basic sanitation standards to be met
first.56
Since HACCP is the central food safety system of choice promoted by the Codex, it
is inevitable that HACCP will play an increasingly important role not only as the system of
choice within individual countries but globally as an important facilitator of world trade in
seafood products. Brooks notes that there are several HACCP models, all of which have the
same intent but the means to the end are stated differently.
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McDonnan (1997), op. cit, n. 47.
T. Mayes and S. Mortimore (eds.), Making the Most of HACCP: learning from others' experience,
Woodhead Publishing Limited, Cambridge, 2001.
54 D. Warne, "HACCP and Quality Assurance in the Tuna Industry'', lnfofish International, 1991 (6), p.51-56.
55 H. M. Lupin, "Internal Auditing of HACCP-based Systems in the Fishery Industry'', lnfofish International,
2000(4), p.56-64.
56 E. Taylor, "HACCP and SMEs: problems and opportunities", in T. Mayes and S. Mortimore (eds.) Making
the Most of HACCP: learning from others' experience, Woodhead Publishing Limited, Cambridge, 2001,
p.13-42. [Basic hygiene measures such as pest control, cleaning and disinfection procedures, equipment
maintenance and personal hygiene practices (termed as Good Manufacturing or Good Hygiene Practices) are
pre-requisite to implementing a HACCP Programme. HACCP is directed at individual product/process lines
and examines whether there are any additional, specific, significant hazards above and beyond the Good
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51 Brooks (1997), op. cit., n. 11.
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11.7

Implementation of HACCP in major tuna markets

As mentioned in chapter 8, the HACCP-based systems are mandatory in the major global

tuna export markets. The US Food and Drug Administration mandated the use of HACCP
for seafood from December 1997 for both domestic and imported fish and fishery
products. 58 In the EU, technical standards are set and implemented at the national level
while the European Commission through its Council issues Directives as harmonised
guidelines for application and enforcement. The Council Directive (91/493/EEC) of 1991
lays down the basic health conditions for production and the placing of fishery products on
the EU markets. 59 Further Directives have been issued that elaborate on the application of
Directive (91/493/EEC) and detail the implementation HACCP Plans.

60

In Japan, HACCP

principles are incorporated into the Food Sanitation Law. 61 HACCP-based regulations have
also been adopted in Australia, New Zealand, Iceland, Brazil, Thailand, Morocco and a
number of Latin American countries. 62

11.7.1 Implementation ofHACCP in the United States
The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) administers HACCP regulations. 63 The
regulations require that all facilities under the HACCP-based inspection system audit and
submit a written HACCP plan. The HACCP plan must identify all hazards and critical
control points, set limits for each critical control point, list the frequency and type of
monitoring procedures, identify appropriate corrective action, list the frequency and type of

58

Seafood HACCP: Final Rule: December 18 1995: Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary Processing and
hnporting of Fish and Fishery Products, - [Title 21 of the Code of the Federal Regulations Part 123 -Fish and
Fishery Products], Food and Drug Administration.
59
Council Directive 91/493/EEC of 22 July 1991 - Laying down the health conditions for the production and
the placing on the market of fishery products, Official Journal L 268, 24/09/1991, p.0015-0034.
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Commission Decision (94/356/EC) of 20 May 1994 - Rules Regarding Own Health Checks on Fishery
Products; (95/328/EC) - 25 July 1995 - Rules Establishing Health Certification of Fishery Products from
Third Countries (not covered by specific decision); (95/71/EC) of 22 December 1995 - Rules on Health
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61
Food Sanitation Law-Law No. 233, 24December1947, (Amended Law No. 91, 31May2000);
A. Filhol, Effect of World Trade Organisation's Regulation on World Fish Trade, Globefish Research
Programme, vol 65, FAO, Rome, 2000,p.14.
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63
Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 123 -Fish and Fishery Products - Sec 123.6- 123.8.
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verification procedures and define the necessary records to ensure compliance. 64 There are
three mandatory aspects to the US seafood regulations 65 :

•

where an identifiable food safety hazard is likely to exist, every processor must put in
place a HACCP plan consistent with the details of the US regulation;

•

the HACCP plan adopted by a processor must have been developed by trained
personnel in HACCP principles; and

• an importer must verify to the FDA that seafood imported has been processed or
produced under an effective HACCP plan.
The FDA requires all suppliers of seafood to the US to have a HACCP plan of their own
and to obtain a HACCP plan from their foreign suppliers or otherwise ensure that their
programmes are equivalent to the US system. 66 This requirement may be met by inspecting
overseas plants, providing certification of foreign inspection, or testing the product. The
requirement is deemed to be met if the importer obtains fish and fishery products from a
country that has an active memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the FDA that covers
the fish or fishery product and documents the equivalency or compliance of the inspection
system.

67

The alternative is for the importer in the US to obtain a written verification of

procedures from the exporter which ensures that the exported fish and fishery products
were processed under a given set of specific requirements and that the product was not
adulterated.

68

To obtain written verification, a number of affirmative steps are listed that the

importer is to follow. 69 The FDA would consider seafood not processed according to a
HACCP plan as adulterated irrespective of the actual safety. 70
From the US perspective as an importer, an MOU is desirable since it shifts the
principal burden of seafood safety enforcement and inspection onto the exporting country.
The government of the exporter, which negotiates the MOU with the FDA to reach

64
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66
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equivalence, must have in place laws, controls, inspections, etc, to assure that equivalent
seafood safety protection exists.
One of the common seafood illnesses is caused by the formation of natural toxin
(histamine) in tuna and tuna-like (scombroid) fish species as a result of decomposition
caused by temperature abuse during handling. 71 Under the FDA's HACCP regulations, the
critical limits include specific time/temperature controls for tuna and other scombroid that
can form histamines at high temperature. 72 Where tuna exports to US are above the limit
(4.4°C, 40°F), the quality and safety of the product may be questioned. Much of the fresh
tuna shipped from the Pacific Islands States to the US is not adequately packed to keep fish
from arriving overseas with the internal temperature within critical limits.

73

11.7.2 Implementation ofHACCP in the European Union

The EC Directive 91/493/EEC defines European Commission standards for handling,
processing, storing and transporting fish. Directive 91/493 provides rules on conditions
applicable to factory vessels, to on-site plants, packaging, storage and transport. Under the
Directive, standards and procedures applicable to fish products originating within the EU
should also apply to fish products entering the EU. 74
A number of EU Directives and Decisions provide further details on the
implementation of the seafood Directive 91/493. Decision 94/356/EC specifies the
implementation of HACCP plans. 75 Responsibility for seafood safety is placed on the
processors, the members of the EU (through the competent authority within each State) and
the European Commission. The competent authority in each State is responsible for
76

ensuring that establishments

71

in the State comply with the rules. An essential component

P. K. Batram, US Fresh Tuna Market Study, FFA report 98/12, Forum Fisheries Agency, p.52.
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of the approval process for a seafood establishment is to satisfy the competent authority of
the existence of an effective "own checks"or HACCP system. 77
The EU regulations require that all fish and fishery products imported from third
countries must come from a processing facility which is approved by a competent body in
the exporting country. Commission Decision 95/328/EC requires that a health certificate
accompany all imports of fish and fishery products. The health certificate must attest that
the health conditions of production, handling, processing, packaging and identification of
the products are at least equivalent to those established by Directive 91/493/EEC. 78 Under
the EC Directive 97/296/EC and 98/143, from July 1998, only countries that have health
control standards and inspection procedures equivalent to the EU standard may export
seafood products to the EU. 79 Article 11(6) provides for an exception for specific facilities
that the Commission may deem to have equivalence. Where the exporter's government has
not achieved equivalence, then only if the Commission experts have specifically approved a
foreign seafood process can that processor export to the EU. This involves experts from the
EU visiting the processor to make an assessment. The EU must be convinced through its
own investigation and local inspection that equivalency is being achieved. EU experts visit
exporting countries to determine the specific import conditions that should be fixed for
seafood from the exporting country. In determining equivalency, the EU experts will take
into account a country's laws, seafood safety standards, actual health condition and
inspection procedures used by the exporting State's competent authority. 80 The EU experts
can conduct further inspections and visits to processing plants in order to ensure
compliance is continuing. 81
Under the EU's "Green Paper'' on Food Law82 and the "White Paper" on Food
Safety83 that provide for the establishment of the European Food Authority, there is likely
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to be a greater scrutiny of imports. The European Food Authority's task will be to provide
scientific advice on all aspects relating to food safety, to operate rapid alert systems, to
communicate with consumers on food safety and health issues and to network with other
national agencies and scientific bodies. 84 Given such developments, countries wanting to
export fish and fishery products to the EU will have to develop approved equivalent
standards of food safety assurance systems.

11.7.3 Japan's Food Sanitation Law
The HACCP principles under the Codex are incorporated into the Japanese Food Sanitation
Law. 85 Exports of fresh and chilled fish, including tuna to Japan, are greatly facilitated if an
exporter has an effective HACCP plan that is approved by the importing company.

86

In

practice, importing companies inspect the exporting companies' operations and assist in
setting up the required standards for exports. Often, Japanese officers trained in HACCPbased systems are employed or seconded to the exporting company to facilitate exports of
fresh and chilled fish to the Japanese market. 87 The arrangement is at the industry to
industry level.
Under Article 16 of the Japanese Food Sanitation Law, importers are required to
submit 'notification of importation of food' to the quarantine station. The notification must
provide details of the product and whether it has any additives. An elaborate process of
checking and inspection is carried out before the products are released from Customs. 88
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Tuna is subject to 'Standards of Frozen, Fresh Fish and Shellfish for Raw Consumption'. 89
Under the Food Sanitation Law, the product standard requires that no antibiotics be used;
the ~anufacturing standard prohibits irradiation of food; and the storage of the product
requires that the total coliform group must be absent for non-food ice and cooling agents
used for preserving.

° Carbon monoxide treated tuna is not permitted under the Food

9

Sanitation Law. 91

Quality is determined by taking into consideration the time factor between the
capture and final sale and the packaging of tuna which is often individually wrapped to
preserve the quality.

92

There are a number of other complex attributes of product quality in

the Japanese market which influence the price of the commodity but do not limit its trade,
such as fat content, size of fish, etc. 93

11.8

International Standards Organisation (ISO 9000)- Quality Assurances

In a number of developed countries, consumer concerns go beyond basic food safety. The

quality of the food, its wholesomeness, how it is prepared, the use of genetically modified
organisms (GMOs), hormones and other growth promoters, cultural preferences, resource
sustainability and protection of environment have all become issues of public debate over
the regulation of the food industry. 94 As incomes rise, consumers become more demanding
and are more prepared to pay for a regulatory regime that provides high standards and
minimises risks. 95 The objective of the quality system are to achieve and sustain product
quality so as to meet the buyers' needs and to provide confidence to both management and
buyers that the intended quality is achieved.

96

The ISO is an industry self-regulation scheme which defines standards for the sole
purpose of facilitating trade. 97 ISO standards are a system of quality assurance standards to
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help ensure that products are being produced under certain standards of quality. The ISO is
an NGO which acts as a third party that offers independent quality certification and is
voluntary.
There are five parts to the ISO 9000 series. 98 ISO 9002 and HACCP are compatible,
as both systems emphasise prevention of errors through proper controls as opposed to
detection of errors through final customer inspection. ISO requirements are also compatible
with total Quality Management Systems (QMS). 99 Canada has applied QMS since 1992 as
a mandatory food inspection programme. 100 The US also has a voluntary QMS programme
that extends beyond the mandatory HACCP programme. 101 The EU HACCP is also broadly
defined as part of an overall ISO 9000 quality system. 102 Seafood processing plants can be
certified to meet various ISO 9000 standards.
There is a growing pressure for an ISO 9000 system to be incorporated into the
procedure of the Codex. 103 The draft Code of Practice (at step 3) does integrate both safety
and quality. 104 The Sub-committee on Fish Trade noted the industry's interest and claims
that it is more cost effective to integrate both under the same HACCP system because most
of the hazards and quality defects are often controlled by the same control/preventative
measures.

105

As this takes place, there will be a greater move by seafood industry operators

to adopt the ISO 9000 standards. This process will create even greater competition for
Pacific Island processors who have yet to meet the basic safety requirements. 106
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There is also a possibility that quality issues may pose greater trade barriers because of the demand for
different levels of quality standards. There is an added contention that integrating quality and safety may
divert the industry from the important safety issues and require more efforts on verification for quality. A
harmonised system of standards would be required to minimise such obstacles.
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11.9

Pacific Islands seafood safety review

The requirements for HACCP-based systems are shifting the regulatory burden from
importing countries to exporting countries. Exporters will be required to demonstrate that
the traded seafood is safe. Exporting country governments and exporters have increased
responsibility for inspection, application of standards, testing and documenting compliance.
In regulating seafood safety, the processor's operations, facilities, and the wholesomeness

of the seafood product are essential factors that will require inspection by an appropriate
national authority that is recognised by the importers as "competent". Exporters would need
to have the technical and . financial capacity while the government would need the
regulatory and the administrative capacity to meet the requirements of operating a HACCPbased system.
A review of legislation on food safety aspects, export procedures and quality
assurances was carried out in light of the HACCP requirements for seafood exports in a
number of Pacific Island States by Gillett in 1997. 107 The study showed that there was no
government inspection authority or competent third party108 in the Pacific Island States to
carry out the required HACCP-related inspection, verification, auditing or enforcement
procedures. 109 The study noted that only a few operators have made any HACCP
preparations. The facilities for testing, legislation and procedures for inspection of the
products are limited. 110 In some Island States, upon specific request from fish exporters (as
required by the importers), Public Health officials from the Ministry of Health inspect
exports of fish. Examinations have been largely visual to ascertain whether there are any
major signs of deterioration since laboratory testing facilities are limited. In Samoa, the
Food and Drug Act (1967) contains provisions for making regulations for securing the
cleanliness of any food "in the course of its manufacture, preparation, storage, packing,
carriage, delivery, exposure to sale, and securing the cleanliness of places, receptacles,
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Gillett (1997), op. cit., n.10.
Currently the Marine Studies Programme of the University of the South Pacific has a post-harvest
laboratory and testing facilities and a certified HACCP Officer. Some larger fresh-chilled tuna exporters also
employ aspects of a HACCP Plan and the tuna canneries are certified by their foreign partners to comply with
their market standards. However, most of the small operators do not follow fish handling and processing
using HACCP principles. No national Competent Authority is yet established in any of the Pacific Island
States.
109 Gillett (1997), op. cit., n. 10, p. 14.
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appliances, and vehicle used in such manufacture". 111 According to the survey by Gillett,
no such regulations have been made. 112 A similar situation was observed in Tonga where
the Public Health Act has provisions for regulations on methods of preparation, testing and
record keeping (Section 42), but no such regulations have been made by the Ministry of
Health to carry out inspections of fish processing facilities.
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In Fiji, the Pure Food Act is

concerned with the wholesomeness, cleanliness, and freedom of contamination and
adulteration of any food. There are provisions relating to the regulation of securing
cleanliness, sanitation of receptacles, places and vehicles used for manufacture, preparation
and storage or delivery of any food. Regulations have been made for a number of specified
foods but fish and fishery products are not specifically addressed.
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The review by Gillett and the study by McDorman both indicated that all Pacific
Island governments are aware of the HACCP requirements for tuna exports but limited
action has been taken in a number of the States. 115 The obvious reasons identified are the
lack of necessary resources and capabilities, including technical, financial and
administrative. Only a few government fisheries officials have a good understanding of
HACCP principles. Many exporters also do not understand clearly the practical
requirements of HACCP and its implications even though some are already implementing
some aspects of the requirements to meet their importer demands. 116 Information flow on
HACCP requirements is not readily available to processors. The Gillett review and
discussions during fieldwork with industry processors revealed that information flow from
government Fisheries Departments to the industry has been limited. Most of the HACCP
related information is passed to the industry by the importers. 117 The inter-agency cooperation between Fisheries Departments, Customs and Health to deal with seafood safety
and quality is also weak and fragmented.
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One of the major problems identified by McDorman is the limited regulatory
control on seafood exports from the Pacific Island States. 118 The FSM, Papua New Guinea,
Solomon Islands and Kiribati have some legislative provisions that deal with seafood
exports but the regulatory requirements and implementation are limited, even though some
make references to the adoption of the Codex standards for processing and exports of
seafood.

11.10 Policy implications for domestication
Fiji, Solomon Islands and PNG as developing country members of the WTO have a legal
obligation to take steps towards implementing the SPS Agreement, but will in turn be more
directly affected by its implementation by the major tuna markets. Other smaller Island
States (non-WTO members) dependent on tuna exports also would need to take steps in
order to secure access to overseas markets that require the tuna imports to follow HACCP
principles.
Implementing an effective HACCP Plan would be necessary for the Pacific Island
States in case disputes arise with developed country importers. The financial and technical
resources, including personnel, required in contesting the quality criteria would be
enormous for Pacific Island governments because the burden of providing an objective
scientific assessment and justification for food safety now largely rests with the exporting
country under the SPS Agreement. Pacific Island States would find that this would not
present a level playing field for them in terms of the elaborate science-based assessments
required to justify their case. Major areas of policy concern in the light of domestication are
the fmancial and technical capacity requirements, the need for skilled Pacific Island
personnel and a legislative framework.
The fmancial and technical capacity required for implementing a HACCP
programme for Pacific Island exporters could be substantial as existing structures are
minimal. While the capital and infrastructural costs would be generally fixed, costs of
monitoring and documenting compliance would be ongoing. 119 Additional resources such
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HACCP uses a dynamic science-based risk analysis approach. As technologies develop and new
information becomes available, necessary changes will have to be made accordingly which in tum means a
continuous change process.
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as adequate supplies of clean water and electricity and the need for skilled personnel would
be part of the cost structure. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or Good Manufacturing
Practices (GMPs) have to be established first before a HACCP plan can be implemented.
Where the availability of fresh water is limited, such as in the smaller Island States like
Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu, desalination plants could be used but these are costly to
operate. Domestic operators and those wishing to establish tuna exporting businesses will
find that the short to medium term costs are likely to increase because of the additional
infrastructure and trained personnel needed to operate a HACCP system.
The review of the Pacific Island situation has indicated that a number of exporters
are not fully versed with the practical requirements of HACCP. Not only Pacific Island
exporters but also the technicians and production workers they employ will need training.
Technical training has been facilitated by the Secretariat of the Pacific Community targeted
at the community level to improve general food hygiene. While this is necessary to develop
the culture for improved SOPs, there is also a parallel need to assist the domestic tuna
industry operators by facilitating access to relevant information and setting up the basic
institutional framework. An effective institutional framework that facilitates inter-agency
co-operation between the Fisheries Department, industry operators, Customs Department
and Health Authorities to establish a "national competent authority" is necessary to secure
long term access to tuna export markets.
One of the key requirements of food safety enforcement and the implementation of
a HACCP plan is the need for effective national legislation that can regulate the processing
of exports and inspection of HACCP programmes, including the establishment of a
competent authority.
Few of the Pacific Islands have created the regulatory authority through legislation
or possess the administrative and technical capacity to meet the new challenges. 120 Table
11.1 summarises the standards and the status of the related legislation in some of the Pacific
Island States. The table shows that none of the countries has yet met the HACCP
requirements equivalent to that of the US or the EU.
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Table 11.1

Overview of Food Safety Legislation in selected Pacific Island States

Selected

Processor

Standards

Inspection

Export

Inspection

Standards

HACCP

Health

Countries

Licence

for

of Facilities

Licence

of Exports

for

Requirement

Certificate

requirement

Processing

Requirement

Exports

Requirement

Facilities
Cook

yes

Yes

yes

no

no

no

no

no

Micronesia

yes

Yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

on request

Fiji

no

no

yes

no

no

no

no

on request

Kiribati

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

yes

Papua New

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

yes

yes

no

on request

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

no

on request

Vanuatu

yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

no

no

Samoa

no

no

yes

no

no

no

Islands

Guinea
Solomon
Islands
Tonga

no

no

* Yes I no based on existence of either requirement or some standards in legislation
Source: T. L. McDorman, Seafood Safety Standards (with reference to HACCP): review of the Import Regulation of
the US and EU and the Relevant Laws of the South Pacific Region, 1997.
Article 9 of the SPS Agreement acknowledges the development needs and technical
assistance needs of the developing country members. Pacific Island States may explore
such assistance

from

developed importing countries

and through international

organisations. In this respect, the EU already has development programmes in PNG and
Kiribati. In the light of current domestication policies, such possibilities can be further
explored by establishing joint ventures with foreign firms. This will assist in the short to
medium term by sharing risks, facilitating technology transfer and providing the necessary
capital. To initiate such development options, Pacific Island governments would need to
have legislation in place so that effective and transparent business operations can be
established. The domestication objectives must be clearly laid out, justified and negotiated
on a fair basis at the outset between parties under mutual agreements. Training of
inspectors, laboratory technicians and personnel implementing the HACCP plan could be
explored at a regional level to provide for economies of scale. A more pro-active role of the
Secretariat of the Pacific Community and the Marine Studies Programme's post-harvest
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training programmes to extend their focus beyond the small-scale community level could
be a possible option.
In reviewing the implementation of HACCP programmes in Thailand and the

various constraints encountered, Suwanrangsi points out that, "embracing a HACCP
philosophy requires moving from a reactive culture responding to external pressure, to a
121
. one seeking to exert a much greater contro1 over busmess
.
proactive
operati'ons " . The

HACCP concept requires a more positive commitment, based on the realisation of the need
to improve product safety and a belief that a HACCP system can enhance the overall
quality of a company's performance. 122 The experience in Thailand showed that those
companies which encountered problems were often those not committed and reluctantly
responding to external regulatory pressure while those that were committed have become
successful operators. 123 Within the same context, there is also a need to ensure that HACCP
operations are based on a teamwork approach since it is the workers who are actually
performing tasks on the production lines. Their awareness and training as part of a team are
also necessary. In the Pacific Islands tuna industry, an appropriate practical training in a
simple language will be necessary to be able to increase individual understanding of his or
her role and task in the HACCP chain of activities.

11.11 Conclusion

There are a number of ongoing debates on the effectiveness of the SPS Agreement in
meeting its objectives. These include the assessment of risk, the use of the precautionary
approach, the basis for scientific assessment and the role of economics in food safety
issues.

121

124

This chapter has demonstrated that while such debates create an element of

S. Suwanrangsi, "HACCP Implementation in the Thai Fisheries Industry'', in T. Mayes and A. Moritimore
(Eds.), Making the Most of HACCP: learning from others' experience, Woodhead Publishing Limited,
Cambridge, 2001, p.183-201.
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Ibid, p.190.
123 Ibid.
124
See for example: S. Charnovitz, "Improving the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, in,
G. P. Sampson and W.B. Chambers (eds.), Trade, $nvironment and the Milennium, United Nations
University Press, Tokyo, pp. 171-194; M.A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO: the interplay of culture,
science and technology, Kluwer Law International, London, 2001.; C. R. Wessells, Barriers to International
Trade in Fisheries, Discussion paper for ~he First FAO E-Mail Conference on Fish Trade and Food Security,
October - ~ovember, 1998.; D: Gebbie and B.. Bowen, "Does SPS Agreement need a Precautionary
Principle?", m Forum Proceedings on Quarantine and Market Access: Playing by the WTO Rules,
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uncertainty, it does not lend support for Pacific Island States that are highly dependent on
tuna exports to treat food safety issues as a low priority. 125 The discussions in the chapter
point out that developing countries and least developed countries can no longer be
complacent, even though they have the flexibility of longer adjustment periods. The
growing momentum in developed countries over the importance of food safety issues and
the level of scrutiny on imports requires Pacific Island exporters to be pro-active.
Furthermore, Asian countries like Thailand and the Philippines, which present direct
competition to Pacific Islands tuna exports, have already implemented HACCP systems in
their tuna exports. The SPS Agreement requires that the burden of proof lies on the
exporting country to justify that its exports should not be discriminated against.
The logical strategy for Pacific Islands exporting tuna is to implement the HACCP
programmes under the Codex recommended in the SPS Agreement to maintain competitive
access to major tuna markets. The chapter concludes that co-operative approaches between
exporters and importers at the national level will be needed to provide a practical means to
adopt a HAACP-based system. While Pacific Island governments can facilitate the
necessary institutional framework, at a regional level, a co-operative approach to capacity
building will provide increased economies of scale and help to obtain the needed
development assistance to adjust and thereby address domestication issues.

Department for Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry, Canberra, 2000, p.165-172.; R Robertson, "Issues Arising
from the Concepts and Complexities of the SPS Agreement", [ibid, p.66-70].
125 It should be borne in mind that much of the debate also focusses on developed countries' arguments to
expand the definition of food safety to i~clude other ~roduct attributes as . co~trib~ti~g to .potential f~od
hazards and the limited scope of risk analysts by only basmg assessment on scientific Justification, thus trymg
to bring more imported food items under the scrutiny of the SPS Agreement.

352

Conclusion
This thesis has examined several aspects of the longstanding aspiration of the Pacific Island
States to derive greater benefits from their tuna resources. Tuna industry development
through 'domestication' has had limited success to date. The thesis argues that despite the
fact that these aspirations have not been met as envisaged by the Pacific Island States,
'domestication' remains high on the development agenda.
Overall, the thesis shows that the nature of the domestication process is changing in
character and the international external e~vironment will continue to exert pressure to adapt
to change. Attitudinal change and greater awareness of international influences is needed
to increase the benefits from the tuna resources for the economies of the Pacific Island
States. This changing international policy framework for tuna fisheries development
presents several new challenges for domestication. It may also provide opportunities to the
Pacific Island States to achieve their domestic tuna industry development aspirations.
Chapter 1 defined the term 'domestication,' its objectives and outcomes as applied
to tuna industry development in the Pacific Island States. Domestication strategies are
themselves guided by the dominant development ideologies. Policies and attitudes, from
resource nationalism, to possible mutual joint arrangements with foreign companies, reflect
the changing dominant ideologies. The dynamic and evolutionary nature of domestication
is not well understood because most often studies are limited in their scope, with emphasis
only on specific aspects of the domestication process. The national policy framework for
domestication outlined in chapter 3 demonstrates this evolving process in a number of
Pacific Island States and puts them at various stages of maturity in tuna industry
development, in spite of costly and disappointing past experiences.
Chapter 2 analyses why domestication is a high priority for the Pacific Island States.
Domestication efforts in the fresh sashimi longline fishery have shown some positive
results and have become the central focus of current domestication efforts in a number of
Pacific Island States. Comparison between foreign fishing and domestic fishing in the
Pacific Islands region shows that production and control of technology is still dominated by
foreign fishing nations.
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Domestication efforts in the 1990s coincided with economic reforms and the push
for private sector led development and a shift in technology from pole and line to purse
seine fishing and from frozen longline to fresh tuna longline methods. The research shows
that the development experience in the region during this period was varied. The major
problems faced by the domestication efforts in the purse seine and frozen longline fisheries
were the lack of adequate infrastructure, high capital cost, shortage of skilled labour, high
cost of fuel, high maintenance costs, low catch rates and fluctuations in the price of catch.
However, we see that the fresh tuna longline fishery, which is less capital intensive, has
developed in a number of Pacific Island States (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands,
Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Tonga, Samoa and the Cook Islands)
with a mixture of foreign and domestic capital and with varying degrees of success. The
major problems faced by the emerging domestic longline industry are the high cost of air
freight to major market destinations, the general lack of support infrastructure required to
maintain high quality products and competition from Southeast Asian suppliers.
Chapter 6 outlines the main regional arrangements for tuna industry management
and development. Under these arrangements domestication has had limited success. In the
case of the Palau Arrangement, individual parties continuously modified the cap for certain
fleet categories to suit their own national interests. There was also reluctance on the part of
member States to forego access fees under bilateral licenses to allow for an increase in
domestic-based foreign vessels. The Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement's rigid
eligibility criteria also failed to take into account the diversity and nature of purse seine
operations. The reasons for the limited interest by foreign vessels to re-locate their
operations to the Pacific Island States included the limited scope for shore-based processing
capabilities, inadequate port facilities, high costs associated with transportation because of
distances, high costs for fuel and other supplies, and diseconomies of scale. The low level
of access fee was another disincentive to relocate operations to Pacific Island ports with
shore-based commitments.
A major lesson drawn from the research case studies is that earlier domestication
efforts by governments failed even though there was continuous development assistance.
The bureaucratic procedures for use and accountability of public funds and conflicts of
interests between equity and efficiency measures were partly blamed for the failure. Other
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major causes relate to lack of technical skills, inadequate infrastructure, high transport
costs, high operating costs, lack of capital, inability to adjust to fluctuating global tuna
market prices, lack of basic facilities such as fresh water supply, and cheap electricity. A
number of these problems continue to persist.
The general policy experience of the Pacific Island States with domestication
demonstrates that individual States adopted approaches based on national self-interest
guided by their national economic plans and where governments played a key role. The
focus was on getting the support for production such as infrastructure, capital, technology
and skills right as basic requirements for industry development. The industry was largely
driven by endogenous factors within the economy such as meeting the employment needs
of the growing population, the need for foreign exchange and rural development. The lack
of national and regional policy co-ordination on industry development has resulted in
fragmented development, and rent seeking behaviour of a number of foreign investors in
the region.
New forms of domestication are being pursued in smaller Pacific Island States by
indirect means such as the provision of access agreements to encourage foreign vessels to
use local ports and employ local crew as conditions of access agreements. The development
of shore-based facilities for servicing foreign vessels and in-port transshipment are also part
of new domestication strategies. The trends in current domestication efforts in the
harvesting sector also focus on relocation of foreign vessels to domestic ports either
through re-flagging or by providing incentives to form joint ventures, lease and charter
arrangements. These are largely drive!l by private-sector interests. In the case of cannery
operations in Fiji, the analysis shows that in order to survive, it had to diversify and bring in
a foreign multinational partner.
In the case of the longline fishery, while a domestic industry exists with a mixture
of foreign and domestic private capital, there are further moves to secure the participation
of nationals to access the tuna resources. The longline fishery illustrates a new dimension to
domestication efforts and shows that domestication is an evolving process. This signals the
beginnings of a possible rights-based fisheries management system.
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Given the continued interest by the Pacific Island States in domestication of the tuna
industry, the second part of the thesis (Chapters 7- 11) looks into the current and future
issues which will impact domestication in the tuna fisheries sector.
Chapter 7 demonstrates that the implementation of the WCPF Convention will raise
management costs through requiring additional human resources, skills, capital and
technology to effectively carry out management, monitoring and compliance obligations. A
key feature of the WCPF Convention is that it provides for the determination of a total
allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE) for the Convention Area. While
many of the implications of the WCPF Convention on allocation are speculative at this
stage, the study argues that some changes are imminent. Limits will certainly apply at the
national level either on catch or effort or both. This national TACIT AE provides a potential
to develop right-based fisheries management systems that empower States to decide the
course of their future domestication strategies. This will provide nationals the opportunity
to participate in the tuna fishery either directly or indirectly by leasing their fishing rights.
States can alternatively allocate their rights to foreign fishing vessels with conditions of
access that allow use of local ports. Resource management and domestic development will
be more closely linked.
The existing regional arrangements will have to be made compatible with the
WCPF Convention. The Palau Arrangement's proposal for a regionally co-ordinated
strategy, based on scientific stock assessment and allocation of effort under purse seine
vessel days provides an opportunity to pursue the purse seine fishery in an effective and
efficient manner. Allocating a regional TAC amongst the members of the Palau
Arrangement will provide the option for individual States either to use their vessel days
themselves or to lease them to other vessels. This also provides the flexibility to adjust to
seasonal variability of catch and maximise vessel efficiency.
As a regional arrangement for in-zone management, the Palau Arrangement has the

potential to integrate the management of the purse seine fishery with the management of the
longline fishery because they target similar stocks. Such management integration will
ensure that the domestic longline fishery is not threatened by over-exploitation of juvenile
bigeye and yellowfin stock. This in turn will allow other Pacific Island States who are not
Parties to the Nauru Agreement to co-operate effectively to implement the Palau
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Arrangement. Currently, there are no scientifically co-ordinated regional limits that focus
on the viability and sustainability of the longline fishery, which is of great importance to
several Pacific Island States.
Much, however, will depend on the co-operative efforts by the PNA members to
agree on regional limits to purse seine days and to determine the criteria for allocation.
Given the relative technological and capital demands of the purse seine and the longline
fisheries, the possibility of developing a regional/sub-regional strategy for domestication of
the purse seine fishery can be considered. Such co-operative efforts can also provide the
basis for setting harmonised policy guidelines for national development of the longline
industry.
The short-term implications of the WCPF Convention relate to strengthening the
FSM Arrangement by encouraging members of the FSM Arrangement to build national
catch data in support of a national allocation to allow for domestic industry development.
The FSM Arrangement, by promoting the use of domestic flags, domestic-based foreign
vessels and joint ventures allows the member States to retain catch data. The long-term
implications reflect the possible opportunities for interested members of the FSM
Arrangement to operate a regional or sub-regional tuna consortium by pooling their purse
seine days for more efficient harvesting.
Successful domestication is also dependent upon access to tuna export markets.
Possible challenges for Pacific Island States tuna export development under the new
international trade regime include the following:
•

preferential markets will gradually diminish and exports will have to become
competitive;

• exports will be subject to specific consumer demands in relation to product attributes
such as food safety, quality, production process methods;

• development assistance will gradually decline with industry having to pay for benefits
and services received; and
•

the technological and capital demands for competitive export development and market
access will require co-operation with foreign investors, such as through joint ventures
and other partnership arrangements.

The framework for international trade under the WTO trade regime will influence the
future policy direction for tuna exports from the Pacific Islands region. Trade issues are
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likely to affect the domestication process by acting either as potential trade barriers or by
subjecting the development efforts to trade measures.
Aspects of current domestication strategies, such as technical training assistance and
infrastructure support, may be seen as potential subsidies under the expanded definitions of
fisheries subsidies currently being mooted under the WTO, the FAO and other international
organisations. These capacity building strategies could become subject to the subsidies
discipline unless efforts are made by the Pacific Island States to influence the current
subsidies debate. Fishers will increasingly find that they will have to pay for a number of
government programmes and services that are currently free or have only nominal charges.
Chapter 9 shows that radical changes to fisheries subsidies will discourage potential smallscale domestic operators from entering the fishery because of high costs.
The liberalisation of foreign investment is also likely to impose major challenges to
domestication efforts by the Pacific Island States. The provision of incentives to foreign
investors to base their operations in local ports and to attract joint-venture partners has been
important for their domestication strategies. At the same time, there are also certain
regulatory requirements regarding how foreign investors should operate to ensure that the
benefits of such investments do trickle down to local economies. These restrictions,
however, could potentially be treated as a domestic content requirement, which is a
discriminatory trade practice subject to WTO rules.
The strategic policy options for the Pacific Islands States to address investment
issues in support of domestication include exploring the WTO's developing country
exemptions and the longer adjustment periods for building the necessary capacity through
education and training. Proactive participation by the Pacific Islands States in the ongoing
debates on investment liberalisation is also important to achieve terms that are consistent
with their future development goals.
The leading debates in both foreign investment and subsidies show the necessity for
having an effective fisheries management regime. The arguments show that positive
subsidies that enhance fishing production and fisheries management can only be justified
upon having an effective fisheries management regime in place that will prevent
overcapitalisation. From the domestication perspective, therefore, one of the key arguments
for the thesis is that an effective fisheries management regime under the WCPF Convention
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is necessary to ensure resource sustainability. This can be achieved, for example, through
the adoption of a well-defined rights-based system.
Consumer awareness and demand for eco-labelled products can pose a potential
threat to those fisheries with no labels in markets with environmentally sensitive
consumers. The implementation of an effective fisheries management regime under the
WCPF Convention provides an opportunity to explore such measures as a strategic
marketing tool. Greater co-operation among industry operators will be needed to implement
such systems whether they are voluntary or mandatory. The increased costs of labelling and
certification programmes are some of the challenges for domestic operators. Increased
monitoring and enforcement costs will challenge government administrations. To avoid the
imposition of stringent standards set by developed countries, Pacific Island States need to
participate in the fora debating product labelling and setting environmental standards to
ensure that the adoption of sustainable management systems also meet the needs of the
Pacific Islands States.
Pacific Island States would need to meet regulatory requirements of HACCP-based
systems in the major tuna markets in order to maintain their market access and improve
their profitability. In meeting the increased safety and product quality requirements,
domestic industry operators would need the capacity to be able to implement HACCPbased systems. Training, infrastructure and institutional support, including legislative
changes and the need to set up competent authorities, are areas for urgent consideration by
Pacific Island States.
The discussion on trade issues shows that despite being small island developing
States with the flexibility of longer adjustment periods or being exempt from trade rules,
some trade adjustment simply cannot be stalled if the industry development objective is to
be achieved. These include, for example, food safety issues and competitive access to
foreign markets.
The study has shown how at the onset of the law of the sea regime the Pacific Island
States decided to move towards a regional approach in terms of tuna development. This
study now indicates this regional approach must increase in co-operation to face the current
and emerging management and policy challenges in the international arena.
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Two levels of co-operative approaches are proposed as being necessary to achieve
the domestication aspirations: co-operation among the Pacific Islands at the government
level and co-operation between domestic operators and foreign investors.
Regional co-operation among Pacific Island States can provide a viable framework
for achieving economies of scale in various industry-related activities. These include
capacity building through human resources development and training to acquire technical
and managerial skills in trade, enterprise development and resource management. The use
of regional training institutions and sharing of technical expertise can provide greater
efficiency. Economies of scale can also be achieved through the harvesting and processing
of tuna resources and by sharing facilities and infrastructure.
Regional co-operation can also assist in the harmonisation of policies and
administrative procedures covering food safety and quality, environmental issues, tariff
reduction, foreign investment and tax regulations, and movement of labour. Co-operation
on these issues are necessary to enable inter-regional and extra-regional trade that will
minimise the opportunity for foreign investors to play one island State against another, and
thus discourage rent seeking behaviour.
Through co-operative efforts, Pacific Island States would be better able to
participate in the international fora to raise their common interests and concerns on tuna
industry development. Since WTO membership is restricted to individual countries, a
regional effort can be developed to facilitate the interaction between the respective Pacific
Island members and the WTO on such issues as differential treatment, waivers, determining
time schedules, notification of procedures, and so on. Participation as a regional bloc in
other related fora such as the PAO, UNEP, UNCTAD and environmental NGOs that
indirectly influence WTO decisions will be crucial for presenting Pacific Islands' positions
on setting and harmonising regional and international regulations and standards. The role of
the Forum Secretariat will be crucial in facilitating such co-operation amongst the member
States.
A collective approach towards implementing a rights-based fisheries management
regime under the WCPF Convention is essential to ensure the long-term sustainability of
the tuna fisheries. The Pacific Island States need to co-operatively agree to a set of criteria
for allocation and the distribution of the regional TACITAE for their in-zones. This will
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provide the basis for regional industrial planning. The differentiation created by the
different levels of allocation among the Island States can be used to identify the
comparative advantages and disadvantages associated with the individual State's level of
allocation and how best to use the allocated right to promote domestic fishery development.
A sound resource rights management regime can lead to bilateral and multilateral trading
opportunities among the island States under the regional Free Trade Agreement (PICTA).
,
Such approaches can trigger further co-operation in the use of regional facilities and
infrastructure such as regional ports, processing facilities and transport links.
Existing regional instruments such as the FFA Convention, the Palau Arrangement
and the FSM Arrangements could be further strengthened to support the development of
co-operative approaches. Pooling portions of national TACs can provide greater advantages
for the development of the capital intensive purse seine fishery. A co-ordinated approach
may also lead to setting regional limits on the longline fishery to maintain its long-term
sustainability, avoid sudden price declines and possibly co-ordinate transportation links.
The framework for gradual development of trade and economic co-operation among
the Pacific Island States and between Pacific Island States and other countries is already
provided by the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER). Some traderelated regional concerns raised in this study such as those on capacity building, training,
determining product standards, and harmonising policy measures can also be addressed
within this trade framework. The free trade agreement, PICTA under the PACER, also
provides a further basis for harmonising investment and taxes policies and setting regional
standards to facilitate inter-regional and extra-regional trade.
The interdependence of policy issues on industry development relating to resource
use and trade development requires greater co-ordination between the Forum Secretariat
and the Forum Fisheries Agency. A mechanism for co-operation and co-ordination by the
Regional Agencies or through a broader institution with participation by industry should be
sought.
The region should continue to build on its co-operative efforts to overcome its
problems of geographic isolation and diseconomies of scale. Non co-operation on fisheries
development issues has the potential to undermine the long-term sustainability of the tuna
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resources and to destroy the successful co-operation built over the years on other regional
matters.
Resource management issues are addressed in chapters 9 to 1O that link trade and
the environment and highlight the critical role of sustainable fisheries systems for industry
development. The development of a fisheries resource (in this case tuna) is intrinsically
linked to its management system as depicted in figure 1.2 in chapter I. While this
reinforces the need for resource management, there are some conflicts between the two
dominant regimes (Law of the Sea and the GATT/WTO) for domestication efforts,
particularly those relating to development assistance to the industry. These issues can be
further clarified by a co-operative approach to negotiations on the role of Multilateral
Environmental Agreements for sustainable trade under the WTO.
The second level of co-operation is at the enterprise and national level between
domestic operators and foreign investors. Since the tuna industry is increasingly shaped by
external global influences, the research demonstrates that at the national level, industry
requirements such as capital and technology are still largely lacking. These can best be
acquired through co-operative association with foreign investors in the private sector.
Developing strategic partnerships can also facilitate access to markets and the acquisition of
necessary skills and enable risk sharing. Once the necessary capacity for viable industries
is developed, the linkages and spin-offs to local economies will follow. These, in turn, will
require governments to provide the necessary institutional support so that mutually
beneficial partnerships can be forged that will allow domestication to occur while avoiding
the previous costly mistakes.
The thesis concludes that the objective of domestication to derive greater benefits
from resource ownership can be achieved through greater regional policy harmonisation on
resource management and trade issues and through mutual partnerships between domestic
operators and foreign companies. A rights-based management system for tuna and the
implementation of relevant international trade instruments and policies can allow increased
domestic development and spin-off benefits to local economies. While the policy intention
of domestication remains the same, the approaches to achieve it will require further changes
in attitude from a narrow nationalistic stance to a broader perspective on developing viable
domestic industrial capability.
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This thesis has demonstrated the changing phases of domestication strategies. In
doing so, it has shown that the current policy context increasingly emphasises the
complementary roles of trade, fisheries management and industry development. This aspect
has so far been understated in the Pacific Island States tuna industry development policies.
Achieving domestication objectives will require development and implementation of a
policy framework that integrates trade and resource management issues into its tuna
industry development strategies. Fwthermore, the thesis has shown that in the context of
the Pacific Island States, a regionally co-ordinated policy approach is needed to address
these trade and resource management issues. This co-operation and co-ordination can be
achieved through the strengthening of existing regional mechanisms and arrangements.
Finally, a number of issues are raised that require further policy research. These
include:
• assessment of regional co-operative efforts such as the feasibility of a rights-based
fisheries system at the national, sub-regional and regional level and the potential
benefits to resource owning nations of co-operative management strategies;
•

the various product development options available in light of changing consumer
demands in export markets;

• costs and benefits of regional domestication efforts by fishery type;
• development of new forms of joint-ventures and strategic partnerships that can avoid
past mistakes; and
• assessment of the implications of the WTO trade rules on export development to
provide evidence to support the Pacific Islands negotiating positions in the
international fora.
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